An Open Letter To Joel
Moderators: Joel Billings, elmo3, Sabre21
RE: An Open Letter To Joel
OKW is the counterpart to the US "Joint Chiefs of Staff", I assume. W is Wehrmacht, which includes air forces, intelligence, and navy. OKH in contrast is only army (Heer), which held command over all fronts. However, according to common literature, after the confrontations and faulting that happened after the Battle of Britain, and subsequently during several of the Eastern European campaigns, Hitler continuously reduced the role, responsibility and influence of OKH, and was happy to have a doll at the head of OKW. This is probably one of the main reasons for so many idiotic decisions, and failures of command and execution during the war.
- Capt Cliff
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RE: An Open Letter To Joel
ORIGINAL: janh
OKW is the counterpart to the US "Joint Chiefs of Staff", I assume. W is Wehrmacht, which includes air forces, intelligence, and navy. OKH in contrast is only army (Heer), which held command over all fronts. However, according to common literature, after the confrontations and faulting that happened after the Battle of Britain, and subsequently during several of the Eastern European campaigns, Hitler continuously reduced the role, responsibility and influence of OKH, and was happy to have a doll at the head of OKW. This is probably one of the main reasons for so many idiotic decisions, and failures of command and execution during the war.
Per the Wiki "W" was the western front. OKH was the "Heer" command for ALL army troops, except OKW, and my have included the Mediterranean. But the eastern front after 12/41 was all Hitler, per the Wiki.
I think the US Joint Chief's was modelled after the British system, but not certain, could be an All American design.
Capt. Cliff
RE: An Open Letter To Joel
No the "W" in OKW is definitely "Wehrmacht".
( I think) [:)]
the Germans themselves had some headaches too concerning OKW and OKH, it's all about ego's in the end I think.
( I think) [:)]
the Germans themselves had some headaches too concerning OKW and OKH, it's all about ego's in the end I think.
RE: An Open Letter To Joel
So if we believe the Wiki we are technically Chief of Staff only till 12/41 then we become Hitler.
You can appoint the OKH chief of staff, as you can see in the misleading command screen where the "commander" of OKH (as indicated) is actually the Chef des Generalstab des Heeres, not the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres.
As the only person who would realistically be able to make such an appointment would be Hitler, the player is essentially already on Hitler's level at the start of the campaign (Hitler is already Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht too).
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RE: An Open Letter To Joel
Indeed, Comrade P. But someone should fix wiki then. OKW is definitely Wehrmacht, and there was no specific OK West. There were of course theater commands for the West, similar as for the Russian theater or for Africa, Italy, and Greece. Maybe someone messing with the wiki didn't catch the subtle difference in the German language use of OK, Oberkommando, or Oberkommandierender (which just means commanding officer, of some unit), but only for OKW, OKH, OKM (and OKL, but I rarely heard this abbrev) these terms have special associations. So you could say there was a "Oberkommandierender Westfront" (an "OKW", but not the OKW), a commanding officer at the westfront, but he was of course commanding the West front theater, which was subordinate to OKH and then OKW.
RE: An Open Letter To Joel
The wiki might be on the short side, but it doesn't state that the OKW was only responsible for the Western Front, it says that due to the OKH de facto taking control of the Eastern Front, OKW basically controlled the rest (which is called "the West" which might be slightly misleading but not far from the truth, as the "Eastern Front" ended up basically including everything east of a line from the Elbe to Italy).
As the front would be moving towards Central Europe, some OKW terrain would become OKH terrain. I'd guess that process required quite a bit of high level power play and backstabbing, it would make interesting literature.
As the front would be moving towards Central Europe, some OKW terrain would become OKH terrain. I'd guess that process required quite a bit of high level power play and backstabbing, it would make interesting literature.
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RE: An Open Letter To Joel
Sounds like the Wiki need's tweeking!! But the "Boss" question has been resolved in my mind. "We" the player are playing Hitler, the Soviet side is less clear to me. I saw other threads that either stated or implyed that "We" were under Hitler or Chief of Staff level. What added to the confusion was not having a modifiable production system. But truly the game would have to start in 1938 for production changes to take affect in 1942, IMHO. Having the production system modeled historically is not really a problem for me.
Nice article ... if it's factual.
http://www.onwar.com/articles/0003.htm
and another ...
http://www.worldlingo.com/ma/enwiki/en/ ... des_Heeres
Nice article ... if it's factual.
http://www.onwar.com/articles/0003.htm
and another ...
http://www.worldlingo.com/ma/enwiki/en/ ... des_Heeres
Capt. Cliff
RE: An Open Letter To Joel
Wiki is fixed, changes are made all the time, right or wrong.
The problem is people who think the Wiki data has been carefully researched and verified. Only a very small portion of Wiki's content comes near this description. The majority of the data, is user supplied belief, opinions and NOT facts.
Anyone who uses Wiki to support a position in a debate is foolish or lazy or both. On any subject there are better places you can use to do research that will provide information that is trustworthy.
The problem is people who think the Wiki data has been carefully researched and verified. Only a very small portion of Wiki's content comes near this description. The majority of the data, is user supplied belief, opinions and NOT facts.
Anyone who uses Wiki to support a position in a debate is foolish or lazy or both. On any subject there are better places you can use to do research that will provide information that is trustworthy.
Flipper
RE: An Open Letter To Joel
ORIGINAL: jaw
ORIGINAL: Skanvak
...I still hope that one day the computer game will be made to have several player on the same side so we can play massive games...
Yes, it would be really cool to have an interface that allowed separate human plays at each major level in the chain of command. In that situation I am certain you would soon discover that there is no need for special Hitler/Stalin rules. Let's face it, there is a bit of Hitler in all of us. Why else would we even play these games? [:D]
JAW, this is exactly my position (and something I have defended on this forum far before this thread).
Capt Cliff, according to the book I read on eastern front, the OKH was mainly doing as Hitler says, but for the Russian, Stalin quite follow the Stvaska plans. Any way I think the player is both a part of the head of state (Stalin) and the Stavska. I think that resuming the player role to one person is wrong.
As for the German side the player is surely partly in Hitler role (chosing strategy) but not fully, the OKH as the player does all decision concerning the army and partly the Generals (like Manstein or Guderian) as the players decide the operationals actions. Last point is lest true for the soviet as there command strucutre let very very few opportunity to initiative and discussing order from Stavska. I read that some soviets generals stop their breakthrough at exactly the number of meters they were ordered to advance wether or not there was german in front of them.
Best regards
Skanvak
RE: An Open Letter To Joel
According to Shirer in Rise & Fall [paraphrased], pg. 318, in 1938 Hitler as head of state had been Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces but then took over Blomberg's office of Commander in Chief & abolished the War Ministry. In its place was created the High Command of the Armed Forces or OKW. In the OKW Hitler was its Supreme Commander & his Chief of Staff was Keitel with Jodl as his deputy. The Army High Command or OKH was run by Brauchitsch (who succeeded Fritsch (see Fritsch & Blomberg affair)) with Halder as his deputy. Brauchitsch was dismissed (for illness?) during Operation Typhoon but Halder remained until 1942. I seem to recall that OKW did assume responsibility for subordinate fronts or areas of operations outside of the Ostfront sometime late in the war but I cannot find any references. However OKW was not OKWest but Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, of course. Keitel & Jodl were hanged for war crimes but Halder only served a couple of years in jail. Brauchitsch died while awaiting trial.
If I got any of this wrong please let me know. Hope this helps.
If I got any of this wrong please let me know. Hope this helps.
RE: An Open Letter To Joel
Von Brauchitsch was dismissed, technically, after Typhoon, as the Soviets were already counterattacking when he was relieved of command.
He is sometimes confused with Von Reichenau, who did die of a heart attack about a month after him, which is why some people think Von Brauchitsch died in January 1942.
He is sometimes confused with Von Reichenau, who did die of a heart attack about a month after him, which is why some people think Von Brauchitsch died in January 1942.
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RE: An Open Letter To Joel
ORIGINAL: Skanvak
ORIGINAL: jaw
ORIGINAL: Skanvak
...I still hope that one day the computer game will be made to have several player on the same side so we can play massive games...
Yes, it would be really cool to have an interface that allowed separate human plays at each major level in the chain of command. In that situation I am certain you would soon discover that there is no need for special Hitler/Stalin rules. Let's face it, there is a bit of Hitler in all of us. Why else would we even play these games? [:D]
JAW, this is exactly my position (and something I have defended on this forum far before this thread).
Capt Cliff, according to the book I read on eastern front, the OKH was mainly doing as Hitler says, but for the Russian, Stalin quite follow the Stvaska plans. Any way I think the player is both a part of the head of state (Stalin) and the Stavska. I think that resuming the player role to one person is wrong.
As for the German side the player is surely partly in Hitler role (chosing strategy) but not fully, the OKH as the player does all decision concerning the army and partly the Generals (like Manstein or Guderian) as the players decide the operationals actions. Last point is lest true for the soviet as there command strucutre let very very few opportunity to initiative and discussing order from Stavska. I read that some soviets generals stop their breakthrough at exactly the number of meters they were ordered to advance wether or not there was german in front of them.
Thanks Skanvak!! This thread has helped give me some perspective on the command structure simulated in the game. Until now it was a bit fuzzy.
Capt. Cliff
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RE: An Open Letter To Joel
An in my opinion your a douche bag ... to each his own. Debate the proposed question just don't shout it down. An I have replyed to civil questions but not any from the "Party of No".
ORIGINAL: ComradeP
So you're insulting people to win arguments you can't win? You might want to join a different forum, there are plenty for people like you.
For the record, this is not my argument.
How exactly are you going to do that? The issue with this sort of option is that you immediately get into fantasy mode predicting the results.
The Luftwaffe lacked experienced pilots, the fuel to train new ones and sufficient weapons to take the P51 et al on. They were shot out of the sky in early 1944 and 2 or 3 extra squadrons wouldn't have made any difference.
There's a pretty direct relation between the number of fighter planes with good pilots in the air and the effectiveness of an enemy bomber force, so I'm not sure where you see the fantasy.
The fantasy is that the Luftwaffe could ever have had the resources to take on the Allies. As I said, their wonder weapons (if they worked) could not be produced in any great numbers. Their attrition was high, and the key issue was not training being cut due to time constraints, but lack of fuel. People were being put in the air with only a handful of hours flight time. Some of the pilots they were up against had spent a couple of years in training.
The question you're not asking yourself is: why did the Luftwaffe lack experienced pilots? The answer being: because they were being attrited to death and had to constantly lower their training times, which in turn lead to a downwards spiral to oblivion.
No, the Luftwaffe lacked experienced pilots because they kept losing them to superior numbers and equipment, and lacked the fule to give a decent training to the replacements. These are not issues that could ever be overcome.
I'm also not talking about "2 or 3 extra squadrons", I'm talking about a fighter force that beats the VVS to such an extent that it is less attrited and a Luftwaffe that doesn't lose precious equipment and planes during a retreat.
But again, the VVS was getting back on its feet by early 42. The Russians produced so many planes that it was only ever a matter of time in the east. Ask yourself this, given the number of "Aces" who walked out of the Russian front with 100 kills or so to their name, how much better do you expect the Luftweaffe to do?
By 1943, the Luftwaffe could acheive air parity and limited superiority where they concentrated, to the point there was only a squadron or two of fighters covering entire Army Groups during battles like Kursk. The Luftwaffe never stood a chance. If the German player can do anything meaningful out of theatre, I'd argue the game is broke....
If you're saying that, say, 500 extra fighter planes with experienced pilots, backing up planes with properly trained pilots, would not have worsened the effectiveness of the Allied bombing campaign, then that's an argument I can't support.
I'm not saying the above would not have made a difference (albeit not the major one you suppose - an experienced P-51 pilot is going to take an experienced ME-109 pilot more times than not). I am arguing the above simply could never have happened.
At no point on the western front would the addition of a single extra division have made any difference. The Germans were annihilated east and west in 1944, so switching a division between theatres really is shuffling deck chairs on the titanic.
That depends on the moment where you add the division. Add a full strength experienced Panzer division to Normandy (as in: actually near the Allied landing area) and the Allied landings would be guaranteed to be less pretty.
But that's a tactical decision. Deploy Panzer Group West between Caen and St Lo the night before the invasion and you might have stopped it. But on what historical grounds are you making this an option? The Germans deployed (off the top of my head) 9 Panzer Divisions to Normandy, plus another Pzgr. Plus another armoured division equivalent in Schwere Btns. They couldn't stop the Allies, the addition of another armoured division would not have saved them.
Probably not stopped, but Allied losses would be higher. Adding such a division to the fighting in Sicily would probably have slowed down the Allied advance significantly. The same goes for the fighting in Italy proper.
But what is the point? In neither instance (even without the extra division you want to send) did the western Allies overrun Germany territory before the Russians started doing it. Why would you want to give up 6th Panzer on the eve of Bagration when what's already in France and the west will hold the western Allies another 11 months as it is.
Perhaps stopping the tide instead of turning the tide would be a better description of what would happen in most cases, but I'd say you're overestimating the Allied chances of success for operations in the West, as many came pretty close to not achieving much at all.
Why stop the tide at all? You;re fighting in the east. The only tide you're really interested in is red and that won't be stopped by sending the GrossDeutschland to the Dutch/french border in September 1944.
But what is the level? France was falling in 1944 regardless of what the German player could feasibly do, not least because even a half dozen extra divisions in Normandy would not have dragged it out beyond the point the allies landed in Southern France.
What would "feasibly" be in this case? If the casualties on the Eastern Front would be lower due to the success of the Wehrmacht or less success of Soviet attacks, German divisions would be in a better shape than they were in "real life" 1944. They would be bigger and would have more room for soaking up losses, especially if lower losses in the East would convince Hitler to not constantly create new divisions but to reinforce existing ones.
A better situation in the east? the Russians lost 11 million war dead. How much worse could they have done in that regard? By all means, introduce a rule that says if German losses are lower in the east, the west will stabilise and allow you to fight into 1946, but don't start sending divisions out of theatre to fight in off map, out of sight, entirely computer controlled guessing wars in Italy and France.
A landing in Southern France assumes the Allies won in both Africa and a large part of Italy, as well as that the Normandy landings had a chance for short term overwhelming success. The Allies would probably have won in Africa, the Tunisian campaign being another pointless waste of German manpower. However, the campaign in Italy was not a set-in-stone success for the Allies. If Rome would not have been captured, Dragoon was never going to happen as Churchill would not have accepted it. Likewise, if the Normandy landings would have been stalled longer, Dragoon wasn't going to happen either as Eisenhower would have objected.
But again, why drag the war out in the west? Just assume (if the German player does well) that there are knock on effects and abstract it. This lets you fight into 1946 in the east, on the assumption the west was made more difficult.
The battle in France in "real life" 1944 has a pretty big chance of Allied success, no matter how often you replay it, but if some variables change (more and bigger German divisions, no Dragoon), the Allied chance of historical success is slim.
But again, mpore German divisios is only possible if the war in the east goes well, so just assume if it does that things go better in the west. Fewer casualties means miore replaemets for the west and maybe more replacement formtions created and sent to it. You don't need to switch units. If things go badly in the east, then sending extra units west to stabilise the western front is just lunacy. There is nio point switching extra Panzers westwards if the Russians are in Warsaw in late 43.
The fighting on the Eastern Front had a direct impact on all later battles. More German success or fewer losses would have meant either a higher chance of German success, or a lower chance of Allied success elsewhere.
Fine. Abstract it. Just assume that if the German player does well enough to survive into 1946 in the east, that there were knock on effects that allowed the west to last longer as well. Ultimately, though, it doesn't require the player to do anything.
This isn't science. In other words, someone needs to decide beforehand the effect of adding extra fighters to the home front, in order to code the parameters into the game. This element is the contentious bit, and I would argue, largely futile as well.
That's not really a solid argument, as it applies to every simulation. The game is already full of such parameters: a fighter has an X chance to shoot down an enemy plane. If more fighters fly over the Reich, those fighters all have an X chance to shoot down an enemy plane. That's not different from the rest of the game's simulation and abstraction at all.
OK. I would agree to a rule that said for every 500 extra fighters the Russian front gives up, German production rises by 0.5% for three months, before dropping back to the historical norm. Those fighters never come back to the eastern front. For every 10 Divisions they give up to the west, the west can last by another month beyond April 1945.
How does that sound?
RE: An Open Letter To Joel
Just as an interested observer who has followed this game's progress, I should say that the Wehrmacht was DEFINITELY "able to win" in reply to the above post. Poor decisions were made which cost a great deal, and even with the poor decisions, they came withing a hair of winning the war several times, including the Normandy landings referenced above. Their deployments of panzer/mechanized units were late due to allied misinformation and intelligence efforts, but the TIMELY arrival of even one of these divisions to the battle area, would have thrown the Americans and British back into the sea, in a battle that was close, even with delayed responses.
Hitler believed the Normandy landing was an allied feint, to pull forces away from the "main landing" expected near Caen. Because of this, nearly an entire day was lost waiting for orders to move more powerful units down to block the landings...if even one of these had been ordered, and arrived on time, the landings would have likely failed, and there never would have been a chance to repeat them, For this reason, Eisenhower held in his pocket that day a prepared statement taking responsibility for a failed attack, that he never had to read.
The German player in a game should not be robbed of the chance to win, just because they did not historically win, they definitely had the chance, and nearly pulled it off.
Hitler believed the Normandy landing was an allied feint, to pull forces away from the "main landing" expected near Caen. Because of this, nearly an entire day was lost waiting for orders to move more powerful units down to block the landings...if even one of these had been ordered, and arrived on time, the landings would have likely failed, and there never would have been a chance to repeat them, For this reason, Eisenhower held in his pocket that day a prepared statement taking responsibility for a failed attack, that he never had to read.
The German player in a game should not be robbed of the chance to win, just because they did not historically win, they definitely had the chance, and nearly pulled it off.
RE: An Open Letter To Joel
The fantasy is that the Luftwaffe could ever have had the resources to take on the Allies. As I said, their wonder weapons (if they worked) could not be produced in any great numbers. Their attrition was high, and the key issue was not training being cut due to time constraints, but lack of fuel. People were being put in the air with only a handful of hours flight time. Some of the pilots they were up against had spent a couple of years in training.
&
No, the Luftwaffe lacked experienced pilots because they kept losing them to superior numbers and equipment, and lacked the fule to give a decent training to the replacements. These are not issues that could ever be overcome.
Williamson Murray disagrees with you in his book "The Luftwaffe: strategy for defeat", and I agree, by and large, with his arguments. Fuel became a problem mostly because the Allies bombed synthetic fuel plants and railroads and because the German fuel supply was running out, but all of that only in 1944. The situation could have been quite different. The main problems up to 1944 remained attrition and the loss of equipment during retreats. Also keep in mind that not all "wonder weapons" would be as expensive as, say, a Me262. Rocket munition was fairly cheap and effective.
But again, the VVS was getting back on its feet by early 42. The Russians produced so many planes that it was only ever a matter of time in the east. Ask yourself this, given the number of "Aces" who walked out of the Russian front with 100 kills or so to their name, how much better do you expect the Luftweaffe to do?
The VVS could be countered by not fighting in the air over Soviet controlled soil and not launching substantial attacks in 1942-1943. The Germans had the means to recover the majority of their losses from 1941 in 1942, but they chose to attack. The same goes for 1943. That's probably also why Guderian and other officers asked Hitler why he wanted to attack at all. There was no way the VVS was going to tear up the Luftwaffe over homeground, it would require years of attrition.
The Luftwaffe never stood a chance. If the German player can do anything meaningful out of theatre, I'd argue the game is broke....
If the Germans don't lose equipment during retreats and in pointless air battles, the game isn't broken if the Luftwaffe is still strong in 1943.
I'm not saying the above would not have made a difference (albeit not the major one you suppose - an experienced P-51 pilot is going to take an experienced ME-109 pilot more times than not). I am arguing the above simply could never have happened.
Maybe an experienced Allied fighter pilot in the latest Spitfire, P-47 or P51 would indeed shoot down a Me 109G pilot more often than not, but that was irrelevant up to late 1943 as the Allies had no fighter cover over most of Germany up to that point, and still required drop tanks to do so. By late 1943, the damage to the Luftwaffe was already done.
But that's a tactical decision. Deploy Panzer Group West between Caen and St Lo the night before the invasion and you might have stopped it. But on what historical grounds are you making this an option? The Germans deployed (off the top of my head) 9 Panzer Divisions to Normandy, plus another Pzgr. Plus another armoured division equivalent in Schwere Btns. They couldn't stop the Allies, the addition of another armoured division would not have saved them.
They couldn't stop the Allies because the majority of those Panzer divisions either arrived way too late or were stuck around Caen. Armoured support west of Caen was mostly up to individual battalions and a motley of units using captured French tanks, not exactly a force that would throw the Allies back into the sea. Not to mention that many forces in the area were understrength because the Eastern Front was absorbing their replacements like a sponge.
But what is the point? In neither instance (even without the extra division you want to send) did the western Allies overrun Germany territory before the Russians started doing it. Why would you want to give up 6th Panzer on the eve of Bagration when what's already in France and the west will hold the western Allies another 11 months as it is.
Actually, when the Americans captured Aachen in October 1944, the Soviets had barely set a foot in East Prussia.
The popular idea seems to be that the Soviets were already overrunning Germany by late 1944, which wasn't the case. Given an extra month or less of a mess in Market Garden, it's likely the Allies would've captured most of Germany and not the Soviets in 1945.
A better situation in the east? the Russians lost 11 million war dead. How much worse could they have done in that regard?
Quite a lot worse. I think we'll see that in some AAR's after the game is released.
But again, mpore German divisios is only possible if the war in the east goes well, so just assume if it does that things go better in the west.
As long as the Germans don't attack in the East, they don't need success to be able to spare a few divisions. Failed offensives did more damage to the Wehrmacht between late 1942 and mid 1943 (up to and including the failure at Kursk and the real turning of the tide) than Soviet offensives.
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RE: An Open Letter To Joel
Ironduke, ComradeP, it is an interesting discussion about the "what-if"s, but I think there are so much variables that influenced every aspect of this war, from Hitler's non-sense interference to the lack of fuel, which lacked according to some authors badly, and according to other literature less, that it is very hard to deconvolute truly what could have happened, and what was unlikely.
Since authors of historical studies are just human, and often have different focus and different technical/economical/political backgrounds, it is necessary to question and assess there conclusions critically. As well as critically assess their data sources and references, or lack and incompleteness thereof.
And as so often in war, opportunity and chance played similarly important roles as did equipment quality, quantity, the advanced tactical and strategical use thereof etc. that no single factor can be truly omitted to predict outcomes. Doing so ends up in surprises.
I think no one can really accurately predict what would have happened had the Germans not exhausted themselves in the winter offensive of 41, or the latter offensives. Or had the armor in readiness without Hitlers involvement at the beaches of Normandy. Or had been luckier with fending off the Allied bombers in 42/43. Or had they had the Panther and Me262 a year earlier in numbers etc. All those components also lead to psychological components, even if the platforms did not appear in numbers, which of course are very hard to judge in their effects. This is soft matter and prone to be not much more than an opinion as nobody can develop hard evidence from this.
I am sure, we all would be very surprised if we could live such an alternative reality and see the true outcome of such changes in conditions. We can speculate a lot here what it would have meant if the Battle of Britain would have succeeded because the Germans might have kept bombarding military infrastucture instead of switching to bombing civilian targets, but find a substantiated, non-speculative answer to this is essentially impossible by nature. Or could you ever have predicted with certainty the outcome of the Ardennes offensive on 1940 despite the chances? I doubt it. No even the Germans could have at that time.
Inherently no game can accurately model all these effects, including psychology on players, nor can it model the inexperience in terms of history (the hindsight and knowledge that we all already have), which lead to human errors and shaped so much more outcomes of battles and campaigns than this technical superiority of some aircraft or tank. Players will already know what to expect of a Tiger, or a T-34, and won't have to learn first how the Yak-7 performs against the Bf-109 at 22,000 feet in a Russian winter climate. Same way is the modeling of battle damage in games, including this, based on general statistics and is being tuned to produce a certain outcome compared to historical limits. This means it is not an absolute, ab initio simulation (that is parameter free, i.e. requires no prior assumptions), which opens the question of whether it could handle a situation very different from the historical path very accurately.
But after all, it is a game, with its approximations and simplifications. And since it is a game, it should allow players to enjoy also testing situations and what-if scenarios and see whether they can succeed better than their historical counterparts -- and in the more areas it allows to test deviations and different tactics and strategy at any level, be it by organization of command, forces, or economy, the more interesting it will be to more players. It is nice to discuss all those ideas and what-if effects that could play a role, but there is no way to truly predict with certainty the outcomes.
Since authors of historical studies are just human, and often have different focus and different technical/economical/political backgrounds, it is necessary to question and assess there conclusions critically. As well as critically assess their data sources and references, or lack and incompleteness thereof.
And as so often in war, opportunity and chance played similarly important roles as did equipment quality, quantity, the advanced tactical and strategical use thereof etc. that no single factor can be truly omitted to predict outcomes. Doing so ends up in surprises.
I think no one can really accurately predict what would have happened had the Germans not exhausted themselves in the winter offensive of 41, or the latter offensives. Or had the armor in readiness without Hitlers involvement at the beaches of Normandy. Or had been luckier with fending off the Allied bombers in 42/43. Or had they had the Panther and Me262 a year earlier in numbers etc. All those components also lead to psychological components, even if the platforms did not appear in numbers, which of course are very hard to judge in their effects. This is soft matter and prone to be not much more than an opinion as nobody can develop hard evidence from this.
I am sure, we all would be very surprised if we could live such an alternative reality and see the true outcome of such changes in conditions. We can speculate a lot here what it would have meant if the Battle of Britain would have succeeded because the Germans might have kept bombarding military infrastucture instead of switching to bombing civilian targets, but find a substantiated, non-speculative answer to this is essentially impossible by nature. Or could you ever have predicted with certainty the outcome of the Ardennes offensive on 1940 despite the chances? I doubt it. No even the Germans could have at that time.
Inherently no game can accurately model all these effects, including psychology on players, nor can it model the inexperience in terms of history (the hindsight and knowledge that we all already have), which lead to human errors and shaped so much more outcomes of battles and campaigns than this technical superiority of some aircraft or tank. Players will already know what to expect of a Tiger, or a T-34, and won't have to learn first how the Yak-7 performs against the Bf-109 at 22,000 feet in a Russian winter climate. Same way is the modeling of battle damage in games, including this, based on general statistics and is being tuned to produce a certain outcome compared to historical limits. This means it is not an absolute, ab initio simulation (that is parameter free, i.e. requires no prior assumptions), which opens the question of whether it could handle a situation very different from the historical path very accurately.
But after all, it is a game, with its approximations and simplifications. And since it is a game, it should allow players to enjoy also testing situations and what-if scenarios and see whether they can succeed better than their historical counterparts -- and in the more areas it allows to test deviations and different tactics and strategy at any level, be it by organization of command, forces, or economy, the more interesting it will be to more players. It is nice to discuss all those ideas and what-if effects that could play a role, but there is no way to truly predict with certainty the outcomes.
RE: An Open Letter To Joel
Great discussion - my two penn'orth.
This is a continental land war (in the East) - if Germany essentially beats Russia in 1942, and wraps things up by Autumn 1943, all the above discussion is meaningless. With no Russian enemy to speak of, the West must sue for peace. The chances of any kind of allied seaborne invasion in these circumstances is doomed. (A status quo treaty ceding the continent to Germany and the rest to Britain and America would be a good result for the allies. My guess is that Hitler would have gone for more - Africa, the Middle East, Britain itself?)
The air war is not even close to being the decisive element in all this, nor is the war in the West. It's what happens on the ground in the East. If Germany wins early enough and deeply enough in Russia, it wins the war. If not, Russia wins the war. A few divisions here and there is not relevant (West or East), neither is the amount of fuel available, nor the quality or number of German pilots/aircraft, nor the bombing campaign over Germany.
This is a continental land war (in the East) - if Germany essentially beats Russia in 1942, and wraps things up by Autumn 1943, all the above discussion is meaningless. With no Russian enemy to speak of, the West must sue for peace. The chances of any kind of allied seaborne invasion in these circumstances is doomed. (A status quo treaty ceding the continent to Germany and the rest to Britain and America would be a good result for the allies. My guess is that Hitler would have gone for more - Africa, the Middle East, Britain itself?)
The air war is not even close to being the decisive element in all this, nor is the war in the West. It's what happens on the ground in the East. If Germany wins early enough and deeply enough in Russia, it wins the war. If not, Russia wins the war. A few divisions here and there is not relevant (West or East), neither is the amount of fuel available, nor the quality or number of German pilots/aircraft, nor the bombing campaign over Germany.
Stuart 'von Jaeger' Hunt
WitE Alpha, Beta Tester
WitE Alpha, Beta Tester
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RE: An Open Letter To Joel
ORIGINAL: von Jaeger
Great discussion - my two penn'orth.
This is a continental land war (in the East) - if Germany essentially beats Russia in 1942, and wraps things up by Autumn 1943, all the above discussion is meaningless. With no Russian enemy to speak of, the West must sue for peace. The chances of any kind of allied seaborne invasion in these circumstances is doomed. (A status quo treaty ceding the continent to Germany and the rest to Britain and America would be a good result for the allies. My guess is that Hitler would have gone for more - Africa, the Middle East, Britain itself?)
The air war is not even close to being the decisive element in all this, nor is the war in the West. It's what happens on the ground in the East. If Germany wins early enough and deeply enough in Russia, it wins the war. If not, Russia wins the war. A few divisions here and there is not relevant (West or East), neither is the amount of fuel available, nor the quality or number of German pilots/aircraft, nor the bombing campaign over Germany.
agree to the point about the bombing campaign over Germany. If war was to reach to 46' then Germany would has los alamos dealing cards to their cities before Japan. If we are going into the sandbox mentality then the british should keep hitting the Dams and the US should be hitting the ball-bearing factories. Speer in his book said 3 more attacks in 43 would of shut Germanys economy down.
the game should turn to a defensive war by 43 for Germany if the Soviets are not defeated. There is nothing wrong with trying out an attrition defense to the soviet attacks but most want a sandbox that can be littered with what-ifs that create odds that put history out the window. Sandbox is fine as long as the AI can sandbox the soviets stealing the atomic bomb in 44 as the US should be able to push its completion up 1 year
I love the fact that I know I have only so long to get a decision in the east as Germany and that I can judge my actions to the historic timetable.
good discussion everyone.....
“We are limited only by our imagination and our will to act.”
– Ron Garan
– Ron Garan
RE: An Open Letter To Joel
Yes, yes, I want a what-if where France is still holding past 1942 so I can attack germany first with my Russian. May I? May i?
Best regards
Skanvak