Does anyone else think the USA CV pilots are over skilled for 1941?

[Jon_Hal]

not the entire air wing of the Hiryu and not the CAP Zeros of all four IJN CVs.

-Which are less than 50%

[/quote]

What does 50% have to do with it? It was still more then in any other CV battle in '42. The Attacking USN airstrike was no larger then the attacks in Santa Cruz or Solomons. Sounds like it is valid to me.

Aircrew skill really didn't count for much in the final result of the battle??? You must be looking at another battle of Midway then the one I know. Aircrew skill determined the outcome of every single carrier battle, ever. even Midway.

-Wrong. Three quarters of IJN torpedo bomber were destroyed before they could have contacted the enemy, as it happened with 3/4 of Vals pilots, so their skills had no influence in the battle. Performance of IJN CAP cannot be well examinated, as they simply weren´t where they were needed. The same thing happened with USA escorts, as the dive bombers were unescorted. USA dive bombers did well in very favorable conditions. IJN bomber crews did well in unfavorable conditions, but they were too few to make difference. USA TBD´s crews had such a crappy aircraft (and torpedo) that their skills didn´t make too much difference, they would have been decimated anyway. I cannot talk about A6M´s role as escorts.

Ok, why do you shrug off the fact that "IJN CAP cannot be well examinated, as they simply weren´t where they were needed." couldn't you make the same arguement for the Wildcat's defending the Hornet and Lexington! They weren't were they were needed.. maybe we shouldn't evaulate that data either? It was the Zero pilots themselves that were at fault for not covering the high altitudes over the Japanese Carriers.. Not the strategy of the battle or Nagumo at fault for that.

Would it make you feel better to just evaulate the Hiryu vs. Yorktown? It was pretty one on one. Or symetrical if you will. Even if you do it was the Yorktown's fighters that scored over Nagumo's Carriers and it was the Yorktown's Fighters that enabled her to survive two attacks by the Hiryu. The Stike that put the Hiryu down wasn't even a single full carriers stike force.

When the USN Strike groups arrived the Japanese had over 40! Zeros on CAP Japanese lost 11 Zeros in air to air combat in the defense of their fleet. The largest such lost suffered by naval Zeros until then.
The USN lost 1 Wildcat in that action

-Sources? This of course points to a superiority of USA fighter aircrews if correct. That´s a conclusion we can reach. However, what about those data that IJN lost only 14 A6M´s in A/A combat in CS PLUS MIDWAY? There seems to be a contradiction here.

.

Sorry about the confusion. That's my fault. the 14 to 10 count was for Wildcats Vs. Zeros at Coral Sea and Midway, Acording to John Lundstrom's book "First Team" Excellent book, btw I suggest you check it out. 11 Zeros were lost in the Great CAP action over the IJN Carriers. Wildcat's accounted for only 6 or 7 I believe. The rest downed by US bombers. One stuck by their own flak. tonight I can give you definate numbers. I think you will see that the professionals on both sides realzied that fighter vs fighter was not the point of Carrier engagements and both sides placed a premium on shooting down the more threating bombers.

I think when you look at the data as an overview you will see that the USN and IJN skill was about equal. Both were the elite airmen of their respective nations, the best of the best.

-Already agreed on this. I´m simply saying that Midway final results doesn´t reflect this equality. I think you´re misunderstanding me.

If we both agree on this then why are we still posting on this topic?

regards,

Jon

[Jon_Hal]

[:'(]All in all,looks like we all agree,their IS a reason the U.S. carrier pilots have a good rating!!!
Seriously folks,please do at least look at those other threads I gave you,they might shed some light on other grey areas as well,P-40 info,etc.....

Good comments M10Bob. And I did enjoy the links. AVG is a little beyond the scope of this thread but it's still facinating reading. i know the Legacy of the Woldcat Zero debate lives on thee boards but it's good to read about the under-appreciated Wildcat and it's important contribution to the Allied Victory against the Japan.

[UncleBuck]

ZYes but what is the Airspeed velocity of a Laden and unladened European and African Sparrow, and could they concievably carry the Long Lance coconut?

UB

[Bombur]

What does 50% have to do with it? It was still more then in any other CV battle in '42. The Attacking USN airstrike was no larger then the attacks in Santa Cruz or Solomons. Sounds like it is valid to me.

-Again you misunderstands me. I said that most of IJN planes were destroyed before attacking USN CV´s. Then you say that the entire airwing of Hiryu and additional Zeroes escaped. I´m arguing that it is less than 50%, and so the word "most" was well placed. I think the total number of aircraft involved in USN attacks in Midway was higher than those involved in Santa Cruz. In Midway we had 36 SBD´s plus 42 TBD´s.

Ok, why do you shrug off the fact that "IJN CAP cannot be well examinated, as they simply weren´t where they were needed." couldn't you make the same arguement for the Wildcat's defending the Hornet and Lexington! They weren't were they were needed.. maybe we shouldn't evaulate that data either? It was the Zero pilots themselves that were at fault for not covering the high altitudes over the Japanese Carriers.. Not the strategy of the battle or Nagumo at fault for that.

-I think that the F4F´s actually fought to defend Hornet and Lexington. Am I wrong? On the lack of adequate aircover at higher attitude, I think this is the result of confusion caused by repetitive attacks, fatigue due to continued combat and lack of coordination. However, I must consider that I don´t know if there was some kind of "land control" over CAP (radio communication between CV´s and figthers, I think the USN had something like that to guide radar oriented interceptors). If the IJN didn´t had something like that, it was poor doctrine and not lack of individual pilot skill. If they had, it would be interesting to know whay they allowed all the pilots to go after the TBD´s.

Would it make you feel better to just evaulate the Hiryu vs. Yorktown? It was pretty one on one. Or symetrical if you will.

-Yes, and the results were the expected draw, however, it must be noticed that the Hiryu was attacked by planes coming from more than one carrier.

The Strike that put the Hiryu down wasn't even a single full carriers stike force.

Right, but at this time the Hiryu had virtually no CAP left

If we both agree on this then why are we still posting on this topic?

-Different methodologies to reach the same results...as you used total losses of CV´s to prove relative skills of IJN/USN pilots, I decided to look at the question from a differnt POV. You interpreted me as asking the IJN was superior, but I didn´t say it. What I said is:
1-Midway was an atypical result due to special circumstances (that is our main disagreement)
2-In a "normal" stituation (where both sides attack more or less at the same time) the IJN was expected to achieve slightly better results due to their better combination of torpedo bombers and torpedoes, the skill of pilots being more or less the same.The Avenger, of course, improved this relation (I don´t know when the USA introduced better torpedoes)
3-There are so many factors involved that it´s difficult to calculate whose side had the best aircrews. I actually think WiTP scores are pretty accurate.

[spence]

I think that all of the CAP Zeros at Midway chased the TBDs because:
1) there was no coordinating Fighter Direction Center in the Japanese TF
2) not all Japanese CAP aircraft had radios and the actual direction of the planes in
combat in a squadron came from the squadron/section leader present on patrol - thus as the TBD groups came in first one IJN squadron then another got sucked into the fray with no one authority able to redirect some group back to altitude. Aggravating that would be the sqdrn/section leaders inability to quickly respond to any such request since not all of his planes were in immediate visual contact with him.

That second point also tends to point to a doctrinal degradation of the Zeros abilities - the tendency of IJN fighter pilots to fight their own individual fight and a corresponding enhancement of the F4Fs - the leader/wingman team practiced by the USN. I am not aware of any factoring in of this USN advantage.

While I'm at it there is some other thread about the Oi and Kitikami having an experimental air search radar installed on 12/07/41. Various IJN type players apparently think it is then fitting and proper that these ships confer the radar benefit/advantage to whatever TF they accompany. In that the IJN apparently didn't maintain a fighter direction center in the Kido Butai and the USN had considerable difficulty making this great concept work in practice and in fact didn't really get it down pat til 1943 (loss of Hornet/damage to Enterprise at Santa Cruz blamed principally on bad resource management by FDCs) it hardly seems fair the IJN get this ability based on the fact some industry twidget got his new gadget onto a ship for evaluation.

[mdiehl]

Again and again, I never said the USN had luck in Midway. Quite the opposite, I put all the blame on bad decisions took by IJN. To say that Midway was not symetric I use the following arguments. 1-USN were fighting under LBA umbrella and IJN was not
2-USN had intelligence information on IJN ships location and IJN didn´t have. 3-USN attacked IJN CV´s before they couldn´t mount an attack by themselves UNLIKE ANY OTHER of the three battles.

Again, it is an error to argue that the battles OTHER than Midway make the IJN aircrews look better than USN ones. No matter how you slice it, F4Fs in head to head combat with A6Ms shot down more A6Ms than were lost. There is, at the root, that inescapable observation. As to the specific remarks above...

(1) USN CVs were not operating under any air umbrella other than their own CAP.
(2) The USN did not know the position of the Japanese ships via intel, they knew it as a consequence of tactical scouting on the day of the battle.
(3) The USN's attack was time to nail the IJN CVs when they weren't ready. Even if you assume that the Japanese suspected that the USN might be in the area, the quandry faced by Nagumo is "Do I really hit Midway or do I lurk around waiting for the enemy CVs?" Either way you lose.
(4) Coral Sea was every bit as assymetrical although in that battle circumstances were almost wholly reversed. The US CVs were located from IJN seaplane tenders operating in forward positions, IIRC one was stationed in the d'Entrecasteaux chain, and they had Rabaul as a back up for long range recon. Despite all that, and having fortuitous luck with cloud cover, the tactical outcome of the engagement was so close that all you have to do is posit that one guy on Lexington does not throw an electrical switch and Lexington lives. All you have to do is posit that Sho's crew fails to get progressive flooding under control on her journey home and she founders.

In face to face head to head engagements USN pilots were just slightly better than IJN pilots throughout 1942. In the game that plays out as a balance between the crude stats of exp and plane characteristics (assuming that fatigue are equal).

[Jon_Hal]

Ok, why do you shrug off the fact that "IJN CAP cannot be well examinated, as they simply weren´t where they were needed." couldn't you make the same arguement for the Wildcat's defending the Hornet and Lexington! They weren't were they were needed.. maybe we shouldn't evaulate that data either? It was the Zero pilots themselves that were at fault for not covering the high altitudes over the Japanese Carriers.. Not the strategy of the battle or Nagumo at fault for that.

-I think that the F4F´s actually fought to defend Hornet and Lexington. Am I wrong? On the lack of adequate aircover at higher attitude, I think this is the result of confusion caused by repetitive attacks, fatigue due to continued combat and lack of coordination. However, I must consider that I don´t know if there was some kind of "land control" over CAP (radio communication between CV´s and figthers, I think the USN had something like that to guide radar oriented interceptors). If the IJN didn´t had something like that, it was poor doctrine and not lack of individual pilot skill. If they had, it would be interesting to know whay they allowed all the pilots to go after the TBD´s.

The concept of Fighter Direction (vectoring CAP fighters in with ship borne Radar) was pioneered by the USN in '42 but far from perfected. When it worked it worked well, vectoring in CAP fighters on recon craft with great precision but there were many mistakes and errors and (as our game portrays) US Carriers ran their air groups independently, with different Directors for each Carrier. in the post critique of all four carrier battles of '42 the qaulity of the Fighter Direction was blamed for some of the failure to intercept some attacking aircraft.

Would it make you feel better to just evaulate the Hiryu vs. Yorktown? It was pretty one on one. Or symetrical if you will.

-Yes, and the results were the expected draw, however, it must be noticed that the Hiryu was attacked by planes coming from more than one carrier.

Hiryu's First Strike on Yorktown.

This attack consisted of 18 Carrier Bombers or Vals and 6 Zeros = 24 Planes 14 wildcats participated in the defense of the Yorktown. Results were fighters shooting down 11 Vals and 3 Zeros, while AA accounted for another 2 Vals. US CAP lost 1 Wildcat. The Japanese scored 3 Bomb hits on the Yorktown.

(Notice the similarity in numbers for these two attacks and the result) a key difference is that the Yorktown was quickly repaired and ready to recieve the Hiryu's next Stike)

Hiryu's Second Strike on the Yorktown.

10 Carrier Attack Planes "Kates" and siz Zeros = 16 Total On the Yorktown there we 6 Wildcats on CAP with another 8 spotted on the Deck. 5 Kates and 2 Zeros were lost in the attack while 4 Wildcat were Shot down. They scored 2 torpedo hits on the already crippled Yorktown that could only mange 19 knots at the time.

The first USN strike on Hiryu was the Enterprise launching a mixed group of 25 SBDs made up of Enterprise and Yorktown survivors ( 1 turned back with enegine trouble) making 24 planes,. Hornet launched a second strike of 16 SBDs but once again these planes were to be a Non-issue as they arrived 15 minutes after Hiryu was hit and knocked out and never attacked her). CAP over the Hiryu was 14 Zeros (remember Hiryu had a lot of Zeros, surviving CAP from the other thre carriers.). 4 Bomb hits later and three shot down SBDs and the last of Nagumo's Carriers was gone.

Hopefully you will see the USN didn't have an overwhelming number of aircraft against the Hiryu. In fact the japanese airstrikes totaled more aircraft the the single US strike. They scored more hits on the Yorktown (3 bomb, 2 torpedo) to 4 Bomb hits on Hiryu, Yet the Yorktown was more then likely still going to be saved until she was torpedoed by a Japanese Sub.

The Strike that put the Hiryu down wasn't even a single full carriers stike force

Right, but at this time the Hiryu had virtually no CAP left

See above for the error of this statement.

3-There are so many factors involved that it´s difficult to calculate whose side had the best aircrews. I actually think WiTP scores are pretty accurate.

agreed

[mdiehl]

You're being a bit sneaky here you start out claiming that the P40's outclassed the me 109 at low altitudes I point out that RAF operational data suggests that more tomahawks were shot down than otherwise. you retreat to claiming USAF P40N's had a better combat history in early 43 then point out that operational sources ( the basis of your claim) are a bit dodgy.

Incorrect on two counts and a failure to read the complete argument. 1. The P40 outclassed comparable ME109 models (by year) at 17K feet or lower. That is indisputable. The P40 was faster and more maneuverable, arguably better armored as well, and perfectly adequate for the job. That is the technical fact that you are desperately trying to avoid. 2. I'm not sure what "RAF Operational Data" you are using as source material. I do know that the RAF had harsh words about early lend-lease a/c sent to the UK in 1940. 3. Since the USAAF seems to have had different results, on the whole US operational studies showing that the P40 was better than the ME109 (which is, to no one's surprise, consistent with the technical merits of the aircraft), the UK studies are either wrong or UK pilots weren't as skilled as USAAF pilots. On their technical merits, my final word is that the P40 was hands down a better plane than the ME109 below 17K feet.

I am trying to make the point that the P40 as a fighter was not in the first class of land based fighters. My point about height limits was that Height = Energy = Speed and that the 109's were more than capable of performing slashing attacks then vanishing

The P40 was not a first class fighter by 1943. But then, neither was the ME109. The ME109 was outclassed at high altitude by the Allied a/c that operated at high altitude... principally P47s, P51s, Spitfires, and P38s. The ME109 was outclassed at low altitude by the P40. It was a nice general purpose fighter that was great in 1939, good 1940-1941, and mediocre thereafter.

Height is only an advantage if you can make those slashing attacks and get away. Problem is that the Luftwaffe weren't particularly versed at deflection shooting on the whole. So the Me109 drivers typically had to spend more time maneuvering to engage the more maneuverable P-40 and, as you know, that bleeds energy... it plays right into the hands of the P40 driver.

Now if we are trying to create combat models for WITP or its counterpart "WITM" looking at loss rates and saying that one aircraft is better than another is a bit tricky if we dont try to isolate as many elements as possible.

I fundamentally disagree. You cannot possibly capture all of the elements in detail in this or any other consim. And if you then "attempt to do so" and you produce a model in which the statistical trends are substantially different from the historical one, the only reasonable conclusion is that you have a flawed model.

Dragging ourselves back to the PTO The Hurricanes in Java were had a very high loss rate to japanese attacks, however the the circumstances were, that there was no effective air raid warning apparatus so combats tended to occur in disadvantageous circumstances for the RAF

The AVG, the USAAF and RAAF guys at Moresby, the NEI pilots (who did quite well in combat), and the Japanese land based pilots suffered from a similar lack of advance warning for long intervals.

Over Rangoon in contrast there was an efficient radar set up which helped the AVG to perform well against opposing Nates & Oscars, and I discount tales of AVG pilots buying kills from the RAF as Sour Grapes ! but do suspect that the AVG's renumeration system may have encouraged inflated claims

The remuneration system was predicated on the the observation of wreckage on the ground. There are a couple things to bear in mind. The general claims offered by the pilots aren't the same as the ones credited by the Chinese. In general, claims made before March 1942 are pretty accurate (as to number of enemy destroyed although not necessarily type). After that the AVG was incorporated into the USAAF and it would not surprise me in the slightest if the 'confirmed kills" were inflated bya factor of three.

in truth I suspect that there is no way to isolate all the elements so we should go back to absolute performance figures now the only way to represent the P40 as a decent fighter is to use range bands rather than overall maneuver and maximum speed figures which seem to have been chosen to flatter US fighters !

Whatever. IMO they were chosen in a design-for-effect manner to produce results that, averaged over a bunch of combats, are in the right ballpark as to kill ratios for the respective time periods. I really feel for the matrix guys. You get Axis Fanboys who will with a straight face claim that the Zeros were better a/c, the Japanese pilots better pilots, and that the combination gave the Japanese an overwhelming advantage. Try to point out that the loss ratios favored the USN in direct confrontations, and favored (probably slightly) the Japanese in early confrontations with Army pilots, and people stipulate that quantitative data are to be ignored.

In Sagan's Baloney Detector kit, the logical fallacy there is a combination of "begging the question" and in effect "claiming special exemption from logical inference."

[mdiehl]

ZYes but what is the Airspeed velocity of a Laden and unladened European and African Sparrow, and could they concievably carry the Long Lance coconut?

'e can't. 'is arm's off.

[m10bob]

Hi guys...I love this forum and the fact it does attract a bunch of fine folks and good thinkers..
A couple of you have made me do some "refresher reading" today as I hate imparting *opinions* w/o saying it's opinion,and so far I have not expressed an opinion in this thread yet.I have provided my sources and several websites.
I re-read Matuo Fuchida's book a while ago and both Jon_Hal and mdiehl have been correct on their statements ref Midway,(according to Mr Fuchida..)
The Japanese did not have radar yet but they did have a CIC(combat information center) on the ships and while it is true,early morning attacks from land did bring the CAP down,more than 2 hours passed before Torpedo 8 showed up.The CIC *radioed* the CAP leader and ALL FIFTY of the CAP planes went to the deck for those reported 14 planes skimming in.(The CIC did NOT tell them to do so in reporting the 14 skimmers).
These CAP aircraft had been in the air since approx 0545 and had been rotating at times to refuel and get back to altitude,but they ALL went after those 14 torpedo planes,thousands of feet below their normal CAP height..
Fuchida was sick that day but dragged himself to the deck of the Akagi and watched the entire battle lying on the deckhis book "MIDWAY" is not ghost-written,but is his recollection of the battle taken from the notes he was required to transcribe as soon as he returned to Japan.
IMHO(opinion),the rating of a pilot must somehow be represented not just by how well he flies a plane,but by where he flies it and when(especially in this case).
Historical records show the F4F scored 1.5 to 1 over A6M2's,and a total of 7 to 1 over aircraft of all kinds..(See my prior threads for those websites).
The facts I have seen bear out the Japanese had good pilots,but their best by far were Tainan Daitai,(with Ota,Sakai,Nichazawa,etc).This was a land-based A6M2 unit which had been in China..
Those guys were HOT and as feared as Richtofen's "Circus" of a prior war..
The Thach "weave" was not the first "defense by offense formation.It was somewhat of a variation of the Lufbery Circle,(where all planes go into a circle and everybody who maintains speed has a target).First to approach stall out is forced to leave the circle and becomes a shot down plane..

[spence]

Think about this. 40+ A6M2s flown by the best the IJN had did not shoot down all of VT-8 or VT-6 before at least some of them were able to launch their torpedos. I don't know how many of those TBDs launched but it would seem that if the A6Ms were so hot AND they were far and away better pilots then when they ganged up with 2+-1 odds on such totally obsolete crates as TBDs there should not have been any launches. My memory is not great but I think VT-8 actually had 4 launches and VT-6 had 6. Both squadrons went in with no fighter cover and were subjected to the undivided attention of the CAP and flak though I think that as VT-6 withdrew the Yorktown squadron (VT-5?) was beginning its run (with 6 F4Fs as cover I recollect).

[m10bob]

Spence,you are correct on all counts..Torpedo 8 had 4 launches,and bear in mind,according to Fuchida,the Zeroes were on them before Akagi could even see the individual planes.The TBD's were being flamed from WWAAAAAYYYYY out,(and as you say) they had the undivided attention of all FIFTY zeroes(according to Fuchida),and they still made it to the flak range of the Akagi.
I don't think those TBD's can be accused of having any kind of speed or height advantage,what do you think??[;)]

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: Jon_Hal

This is from my other message in this same thread (i.e. this is what I meant):

Japanese did well in general because they were able to penetrate defense and execute attack (and sink USN CVs for example).

Japanese strike packages escorted by Zero's were thus successfully and, in that respect, they did what they were supposed to (and in my book that means that they overall "did quite well")...


Leo "Apollo11"

Leo, I assume by you saying that that the Japanese "did quite well" must then mean the USN did even better. Those sucessful strike package suffered worse losses then the USN in every carrier battle and collectively sank less Carriers then their USN counterparts and shot down less opposing fighters then the USN did.
I hope you don't get the impression I'm arguing that the USN pilots were superior in skill. I'm still talking about the basis of this whole thread that I feel the Exp. Ratings for USN and IJN carrier pilots seem correct to me. The USN carriers that fought in '42 faced the IJN air corp at the peak of it's ability and won(at a terrible cost), destroying Japanese naval superiority in the process. The Skill on both sides was exceptional and not to be seen again in World War 2, for by the time the carrier battles of 44 roll around the USN pilots were well trained but not up to the level of the elite pre-war corp. And the Japanese naval pilots were but a shadow of their former selves.

Jon, I think that the biggest mistake we (and under "we" I consider us all with western culture heritage) can make is think of Japanese like we think of us.

Japanese were (and still are) different.

Their culture, philosophy and history are different than ours.

Thus in WWII they simply didn't care about human life in way we think of it.

For Japanese soldier his mission was imperative and his life was almost irrelevant.

Many of Japanese weapons systems were similarly made to be 1st class offensive tools with lilted (or none) care about defensive capabilities of way to protect the soldier.

So... when I wrote that Japanese "did quite well" I meant it with consideration to their way of looking at things.

The strikes pushed through the enemy defense and accomplished their mission (i.e. they sunk/damaged USN ships).

The loss ratios in that respect are irrelevant (because, of course, they lost more aircraft than USN) but they managed to accomplish the mission and that is all that mattered.


What this strategy lacks is constant flow of expert pilots that would take place of their lost comrades and this is where Japanese made their graves mistake...


Leo "Apollo11"

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

I agree but my question to you regarding this is how many of all available USN F4F squadrons used this advanced tactics from the beginning of war?

I'm not willing to call it an "advanced tactic." IMO there was a tendency for USN pilots to not engage in turning fights from the outset. I think the answer has to do with training as I mentioned in my reply to Hipper above.

Were they all immediately knowledgeable of advanced ways to beat the enemy (IMHO not because I remember reading that the "Thach Weave was introduced to all units only after several months of war)?

The beam defense was first used in combat at Midway. Boom and Zoom used before that. Apparently enough pilots were versed in the basic tactics that in its first use, a rookie pilot who'd lost his section buddy attached himself to Thach's (or was it Flatley's I forget) section and at Thach/Flatley's command was able to immediately and successfully employ it based solely on theories discussed at the table and not practiced in drills. In that instance it was a 3-plane beam defense.

If I read correctly you thus think that _ALL_ US F4F squadrons and their leaders and pilots possessed this knowledge from start and that they employed it from start?

As for circling dogfight I still firmly believe that old habits die hard and fact is that fast monocock fighters were very very new inventory for all warring sides (very late 1930's). Pilots who learned their ways in old "cloth and wire" biplanes had certain habits that date from WWI...

Not really. That is, tactical fighter pilot theory was not the least bit stagnant in the USN in the interwar years.

Theory is nice but biplanes are biplanes (together with their "cloth and wire" history) while modern WWII monocock full metal aircraft are something else.

When did USN 100% equipped all its squadrons with new monocock full metal aircraft?

Do you know if all pilots (in all squadron) were trained in deflection hooting or just some?

All USN/USMC pilots were heavily trained in deflection shooting get this, according to Lundstrom, as a result of doctrinal changes made around 1925.

I don't have that book (yet - I will get it same as others) but my objection from start is that new and fast monocock full metal aircraft were late comers (late late 1930's in Europe first) and thus all that was learned before was obsolete in nature...


Leo "Apollo11"

[UncleBuck]

Zero Specs- A6M2- Armament: 2x 7.7 mm MG's, 2x 20 mm cannon.

Performance: Max speed 282 MPH (454Km/h) at Sea Level, 331 MPH ( 533 Km/h) at 14,930 ft (4550 m), Max climb 3150 ft (960m)/min. Time to 19,685 ft (6000m) 7.5 min. Service cieling 32,180 ft(10,000m) Normal range 1162 miles (1870km) with drop tank 1926 miles (3100Km).

Weight- Model 21- empty 3770lb (1710 Kg), Normal loaded 5313 lb (2410 kg) Max loaded 6164 (2796 Kg)

Grumman F4F-4- Armament- 6x .50 (12.7mm) MG's

Performance- 274 mph (441Km/h) at sea level, 320 Mph (515 Km/h) at 18,800 ft (5730 m) cruise speed 155mph (249Km/h) inital climb 1950ft (594m)/min. Service ceiling 34,900 ft (10,637 m)

Weight- F4F-4 Empty- 5895 lb (2674 Kg) Loaded 7952 lb ( 3607Kg)

The stats show that the Zero is slightly faster at both Sea level and at Altitude, but marginally. This data is also not takign in to account if the Zero is Japanese data or US capture data, using higher grade US fuel.

The F4F is Heavier due to more rugged construction, armor, adn much hevier battery of guns and ammo . A6m2 is lighter and lacks armor, rugged construction, and light weight of fire. the 2 type 99 20 mm canons the Zero has only carried 60 rounds per gun. They also had a slow rate of fire. Another Draw back to the Zero was that above 220 Mph it had severe flight control problems, in that the tail and wing surfaces would become very stiff due to excess air pressure on these surfaces.

All in all I beleive that these planes were fairly well matched. the Zero needed to land more heavy shots (20 mm ) to bring down teh wildcat with a very limited ammount of ammo. THe Wildcat was at a climb, and overall speed disadvantage but it was a more rugged plane, with a better ammo load (240 rds/gun) . It also did not have teh compressability issues at higher speeds the Zero sufered. If the wildcat played to it's strengths it coudl deny the Zero it's strengths. the Zero if it played to it's strengths was at the wildcats whim, to engage in combat or not. Being a Heavier plane, it could out dive the Zero.

This data is from Aircraft of WWII by Stewart Wilson ISBN 1-875671-35-8

Over all I beleive the game has it pretty much right with the Zero versus F4F. The USN pilots are of correct experience in the beginning. History bears this out. It also seems that teh USAAF pilots are a bit short changed as they should be higher at teh start as the P-40's were capable and did hold there own against the Zero in 1942. The P-40 was substantually faster than teh Zero (P-40C 345 @ 15Kft, P-40D-E 335 Mph @ 5000ft, 362 @ 15,000 ft.) It had much heavier armament starting with the P40D (4x.50) P-40E (6x .50) as well as better Dive performance and survivability.

Numbers shuold tell teh difference. If one side has more they should clean up on the other side. This being said, the P-40 and F4F should not be push overs either. THe Zero is also dangerous and I beleive more so early in the war due to it's time to climb advantage for interception of bombers.

UB

[strawbuk]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

I'm not sure what "RAF Operational Data" you are using as source material. I do know that the RAF had harsh words about early lend-lease a/c sent to the UK in 1940.

Since the USAAF seems to have had different results, on the whole US operational studies showing that the P40 was better than the ME109 (which is, to no one's surprise, consistent with the technical merits of the aircraft), the UK studies are either wrong or UK pilots weren't as skilled as USAAF pilots.

Not engaging on rest of this BUT... yes of course because in late 1940 RAF pilots are deeply inexperienced, lack skill and have no understanding and experience of the relative capabilities of the Me109...... Only the USAAF ever get it right, silly me.

[mdiehl]

I had a thoughtful post worked out and the frakin page logged me out for reasons that I do not understand.

Leo -

Beam defense:
1. Developed in 1941 by Thach and Flatley in response to strategic assessments that asserted that the IJN had an aircraft faster and more maneuverable than the USN types.
2. Tested in aerial games in 1941 and demonstrated to be effective.
3. By implication known to anyone assigned at least to Thach or Flatley's squadrons (although not necessarily flown) because pilots do not hesitate to talk about theory and tactics.
4. Possibly spread to other units not in direct contact with Thach or Flatley owing to personnel transfers to and from their units.
5. First employed at Midway in a 3-plane formation. One of the pilots had never flown it even as a training maneuver, and yet successfully implemented it.

Conclusion:

1. It was known by some to be useful prior to WW2.
2. It was heavily discussed in units assigned to Thach & Flatley.
3. It was easy to learn, solely on the basis of round table talk.
4. It was easy to implement in combat, even by people who'd not even tried to fly it in training.
5. Because of 1-4, its use would have spread in ways more or less similar to a virus. If you can imagine how quickly, for example, influenza would spread throughout, for example, the National Football League, that'd be a reasonable model for simulating the transmission of knowledge (and implementation because it was so easy to learn) of the beam defense.

OK, now, as to a/c technology.

1. USN first deployed 1-wing aircraft to CVs in late 1939 (Brewster F2). The F4F immediately identified as the successor (pending revisions) because it was a better plane and because Brewster was a real fubar company.

2. The number of wings has little to do with it, especially since the USN doctrinal emphasis on deflection shooting, beginning in the early 1920s, meant that in every instance of adding a new plane the only "barrier" was basic familiarization with the a/c. This sort of barrier would exist with any pilot of any nation transitioning to any plane.

3. If you want ONE single technological event that made deflection shooting skill valuable, look to the synchronized forward firing MGs introduced in 1916. Even in those WW1 biplanes, a good deflectin shooter would, by 1917, have been a real standout, had any of the powers immediately grasped the implications of forward firing guns. What is wierd to me is that *no one* outside of the USN seemed to recognize the value of defelction shooting during the interwar period.

[mdiehl]

Not engaging on rest of this BUT... yes of course because in late 1940 RAF pilots are deeply inexperienced, lack skill and have no understanding and experience of the relative capabilities of the Me109...... Only the USAAF ever get it right, silly me.

You are, indeed, silly and also incorrect. RAF pilots knew ALOT about Me109s by late 1940, having shot down droves of them from July 1940-September 1940. RAF pilots were experienced enough to win the BoB. The problem with their early P40 deliveries was that these were unfamiliar a/c, a little undergunned, and all of the parts did not arrive with them (vis oxy systems, microphone systems, fuel tank liners, and so forth).

The USAAF did lots of things right by December 1941 thanks, to a great extent, by paying attention to the lessons taught to the USAAF by the RAF. Your remark has nothing, however, to do with any of the subjects at hand.

[strawbuk]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

3. If you want ONE single technological event that made deflection shooting skill valuable, look to the synchronized forward firing MGs introduced in 1916. Even in those WW1 biplanes, a good deflectin shooter would, by 1917, have been a real standout, had any of the powers immediately grasped the implications of forward firing guns. What is wierd to me is that *no one* outside of the USN seemed to recognize the value of defelction shooting during the interwar period.

And again - the RAF. What do you think Spitfire pilots were looking through when they engaged Luftwaffe in 1940? A pair of toilet rolls? No it was a deflection sight. Yes RAF still liked to get behind and put bomber in the MG battery cone but they could deflection shoot. And deployed pre-war. eg 1937ish - Galland (or similar) was on a 'courtesy' visit to RAF station. He expressed interest in an unusual fighter sight. The local CO went cagey as it was new and secret, but some WingCo @rse gave Galland the full demo.

[Bombur]

Again, it is an error to argue that the battles OTHER than Midway make the IJN aircrews look better than USN ones.

-And I didn´t say this. I said that the good results obtained by IJN in other battles were due to better toepedo bombers and torpedoes.

(1) USN CVs were not operating under any air umbrella other than their own CAP.

-I´m referring to the ability of airpower projection given by Midway. Bombers operating from Midway achieved nothing but diverted IJN resources and delayed CV operations. Also must notice that the air defense on Midway seems to have damaged a lot of IJN planes. Hiryu had 40 bombers, but used only 26 of them in the attack, this is a loss of 35% (damaged?)

(2) The USN did not know the position of the Japanese ships via intel, they knew it as a consequence of tactical scouting on the day of the battle.

-But they knew where to search due to intelligence and they detected the enemy fleet one day before, didn´t them? And best recon was a consequence of Midway and the lack of IJN planes.

(3) The USN's attack was time to nail the IJN CVs when they weren't ready. Even if you assume that the Japanese suspected that the USN might be in the area, the quandry faced by Nagumo is "Do I really hit Midway or do I lurk around waiting for the enemy CVs?" Either way you lose.

-Look to the last of the references I posted. The author argues that actually the enemy fleet was detected at 7:45 and what delayed the launching of IJN attack was the exchange of antiship ordnance ordered by Nagumo, and its further reversion. In that case, you cannot say that the USN attack was deliberately timed to catch IJN planes in the deck, as they had no means to know that Nagumo took this fatal decision.

(4) Coral Sea was every bit as assymetrical although in that battle circumstances were almost wholly reversed. The US CVs were located from IJN seaplane tenders operating in forward positions, IIRC one was stationed in the d'Entrecasteaux chain, and they had Rabaul as a back up for long range recon. Despite all that, and having fortuitous luck with cloud cover, the tactical outcome of the engagement was so close that all you have to do is posit that one guy on Lexington does not throw an electrical switch and Lexington lives. All you have to do is posit that Sho's crew fails to get progressive flooding under control on her journey home and she founders.

-It wasn´t as asymetrical as Midway, because in the decisive day both sides knew that there were opposing CV fleets and they were close enough to allow fast detection and simultaneous attacks.