Geopolitical Rules

TIMJOT · Post by **TIMJOT** » Sun Nov 04, 2001 9:01 am

(2) The Japanese faced uncertainty about the US reaction to their attacks on the Dutch and British in the Far East. While TIMJOT can cite some figures applicable to several years before the time in question, I cannot find the public poll data for late 1941, which (with imperfect recall) indicated that the US public had come to regard war with the japanese as almost inevitable after the takeover of French IndoChina. Perhaps if I still had my Lexus/Nexus connections, I could find it, but this appears to be a doubtful issue.

Well in the PH hearings, there is documented testimony that states that FDR as late as October 41 didnt consider attack on Malay or DEI would result in war. Sec.Stimson is on record that his late Nov.41 message to the Empereor was not an ultimatum and did not imply there would be war if Japan didnt comply. Churchill repeatedly ask FDR to station a US fleet at Singapore and to make a formal declaration, that an attack on Malaya would constitute war with the US. He refused both request out of hand. Now if FDR and the American people were so willing to go to war for Malaya. Why wouldnt he make it official? If he had so much support why not sign a formal treaty and take all the ambiguity out of it?

TIMJOT · Post by **TIMJOT** » Sun Nov 04, 2001 9:14 am

(3) If the US delayed war until it was "ready to fight" then Wake would certainly be a tougher issue than it was historically. The Japanese would probably write it off as a bad deal. Guam (not a small island, btw, but rather a quite lareg one, cacable of operating B-17s in 1941 and B-52s and SSBNs in the Cold War) was probably not defensable in 1941 or early 1942 and so probably only minor forces would be left there. The Pi would get significant air reinforcements (c. 100 fighters and 40 B-17s which were, in fact, en route at the time) but significant ground forces would have taken months to get there.

Grumbler, I have repeatedly agreed with you that a delayed entry into the war means that Wake would be next to impossible to take. No arguement, but I also dont think its a big deal. I mean just how significant was the Japanese capture of Wake had with the course of the war?

RE; Guam, well size is relative. Its small compared to the PI, but I agree it was big enought to serve as a bomber base. Its main value though was as vital role it played in the trans-pacific air ferrying route. Like you said though its basically undefensible and this is born out from the fact that in late 41 the US made efforts to reinforce Hawaii, Midway, Wake, PI but made no such effort for Guam.

TIMJOT · Post by **TIMJOT** » Sun Nov 04, 2001 10:04 am

(4) The Japanese plan for conquest in the south was based on the premise that only two of three objective areas - the PI, malaya, and the DEI - could be atacked succwessfully at any one time. The reason to opt for the attack on the PI was because forces for the attack on the DEI could not be positioned until the Malaya campaign had been brought to a succcesful conclusion. Thus, the DEI forces could be used against the PI until the conditions were right for an attack on the DEI.

I cant agree with you here. Although I am sure will come up with some sources that state otherwise. The fact is they did mount all three operations more or less simutaneously. They started invading the outlying islands of the DIE in Dec. and Jan. well before either of the Malaya or PI campaigns had been decided. Now if you are talking about the absolute final phase of the DEI operation ie; the invasion of Java. The fact that wasnt undertaken until late Feb. early March was more due the need to secure bases in Borneo, Celebes, Ambon, and Bali before the invasion than any operational need to complete the Malaya or PI campaigns first. In fact none of the 25th army took part in the DIE campaign. True the 48th div. was used, but that was more due to the typical Japanese unwillingness to veer from agreed upon plan. You have to remember that the Japanese had planed for the PI operation to have been completed by then so it was logical to earmark the 48th which would be in perfect position to move to eastern Java after what was expected to be a relatively easy campaign in the PI. Homma's inablitly to complete the PI campaign on schedule was seen as his failure and they were unwilling to change to there plans on his behalf. Had they thought the PI would have taken so long the would have planned accordingly and used one of the other Div. that I have already pointed out that were available. Or do you think would would have just waited until May 41 to attack Java? The fact is the IJA were unwilling to change plans to what they saw would be rewarding failure, but were only too willing to change planes to reward success. For example they decided to use the Southern Army reserve 32 div. in invading Sumatra well ahead of schedule with the unexpected quick success in Malay and the outlying DEI

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TIMJOT · Post by **TIMJOT** » Sun Nov 04, 2001 10:36 am

(5) To leave the initiative as to the timing for the American DoW in American hands threatened the entire japanese strategy. This seems to me to be a risk that the Japanese couldn't afford to take, given that it was national survival that was at stake. If the japanese were forced to recall forces from the DEI in march 1942 to deal with a sudden US DoW would put the timing for the fall of the Dutch oil fields in jeapordy, which was the one thing the Japanese felt they could not afford.

I think this surrendering this initiative stuff is a little over-rated. Are they surrendering the initiative? They would be taking the initiative to move south while America was weak. RE; allowing America the timing of declaring war. Well they had been risking that since 1937. They couldnt know America wouldnt declare war over China, but they acted anyway. They couldnt know the US wouldnt declare war over indo-china, yet they took the risk anyway. Were they not surrendering initiative in these instances? Or look at it the other way. Were they not taking the initiative by taking these actions in lue of the risk.

Here is another example. Did not Hitler surrendered the initiative of the timing of a DOW to Britain and France when he invaded Poland. He took the risk that they would not go to war over Poland even though they had a signed treaty with France to do just that. He was wrong, but surrendering the timing of a DOW ultimately had no bareing in the western campaign.

America has had a history of winning wars that they did not make the first move. So taking the initiative in declaring war isnt always necessarly an advantage.

Ultimately I admit there was considerable risk involved. I just dont think it anymore risky than taking on the US, and UK simutaneoulsly. To say its always better to attack all your enemies and potential ememies at once is always the best strategy flies in the face of history. You might as well say that Hitler should have declared War on the US and Russia in 39 just to deny them the opportunity to declare war on him first.

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TIMJOT · Post by **TIMJOT** » Sun Nov 04, 2001 11:13 am

(7) Thus, I think that the japnaese attacks on the PI (though not those against PH) were almost inevitable, given their war aims. While in hindsight it might be argued that the Japanese might have been better off to ignore the PI and attack only the Dutch and British, this is merely hindsight arguing and of little exect hypothetical interest to historians.

Athough I agree that the Japanese leadership was probalbly incabable of making any other decision as they did historically, due to they're utter lack of understanding of the American people, leadership and political institutions. As well as there own lack of imagingation and over inflated perception of there superiority. This is not to say however that it was the right decision or that no other decision could have been made with a little more fore thought, understanding and introspection. You call it simply hindsite but really its hard to argue hypothetical without hindsite. How else can you judge the success or failure of a decision without hindsite? Every decision made in the time that its made is thought to be the correct course of action. Its only in the context of history that we can judge those decisions as being correct or not.

I might add its not simply hindsite to know that.

1. America is thousands of miles away and would need months to project significant forces.

2. Although the PI poses a signifacant threat. Its easily isolated if not actually invaded if DOW does occur.

3. America failed to go to war over China incident
even though it was in derect violation of the "Open Door Policy" the conerstone of American foreign policy for over a century.

4. America failed to go to war over "Panay Incident"

5. America failed to go to war over "Indo-china Incident"

6. America failed to go to war with Germany over U-boat incidents.

7. That America had no formal treaty with Britain or the Dutch to go to war on there behalf and even in lue to Indo-china continued to refuse such an agreement.

8. That America, though simpathetic and willing to give material and finacial aid to Britain, Russia and China was unwilling to go to war on their behalf.

9. That America could have but did not give an ultimatum to Japan " Get out of China and Indo-china or there would be war."

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Cmdrcain · Post by **Cmdrcain** » Sun Nov 04, 2001 12:43 pm

Originally posted by byron:
Wait a minute. The production thread is boring, but you want to take advantage of our efforts? Never!

It would be interesting to alter production that early, but it would be an odd system. For the American, I guess there wouldn't be any detail, but just some kind of general guidance to the computer. When the war starts, you have whatever the computer decided could/would be produced in that four years. I can't imagine anyone sitting down and playing four years of nothing but detailed production.

<img src="biggrin.gif" border="0">

Allowing set production way early could have some interesting twists, it would allow a more what if option like What If USA and Japan had had Carrier /air people get their way over the Surface people, then instead of those Fast BB's USA makes maybe you setup to produce More Carriers, the Essex class alot sooner, Japanese might convert surface prod into a bigger CV fleet too.

Then theres the Plane prod.. I'd love also to be able to finetune the research areas.. maybe (at a cost in developing better piston engine types) the usa could get a leg up on jets.. it would mean through producing and using longer the say p39 and p40 and delays or no production of some of the later plane types, Which might be bad if Japan advances in piston types..

Also remember some reserachs by japan were delayed by natural events, eliminate that and?

And What if Japanese player was able put into research and build a real long range bomber type..

<img src="wink.gif" border="0">

Cmdrcain · Post by **Cmdrcain** » Sun Nov 04, 2001 1:01 pm

Originally posted by Ringbolt:
What about if the Germans had wanted bases in South America and raided US shipping on the way to Austrailia from the east or even between the west coast and Pearl? It just occured to me that this is something allies in fact and not just in name might have done. Werent Argentina and Chile both cozy with the Reich before the war too?

With windows I cant see how the game couldn't have Mods that allowed for a vaster global scale, with Germany doing that and perhaps USA going to war with Argentina and Chile sides Germany and japan..

Would expand the Pacific Theater to include south american coast.

Cmdrcain · Post by **Cmdrcain** » Sun Nov 04, 2001 1:10 pm

Originally posted by TIMJOT:

Ah... the CV's missions were to ferry aircraft to Midway and Wake. Hardly a mission suited for BB's

Yes, they were on missions to ferry Marine fighters to Wake and Midway and One CV, Saratoga was in West Coast Port

Other Carriers were on East Coast.

Cmdrcain · Post by **Cmdrcain** » Sun Nov 04, 2001 1:16 pm

Originally posted by TIMJOT:
The fact of the matter is, that the USN position in the Pacific after Pearl Harbor, was never as dire as historically its been made out to be. In fact within one month of PH the USN could have and probably should have deployed deployed 6 Fleet carriers two Fast Modern BB's and 3 older but somewhat modernized BB's. Add this to the fact that no CA's were lost or even damaged at PH and you have essentally an intact Fleet. All your missing are 7 of the oldest slowest and essentially most useless ships of the Fleet.

Granted if it had only been Japan, But the US also had germany and a Germany First.. and they needed for a while The Hornet and Wasp in Atlantic for Convoy Coverage and sub patroling..

DD's CL,CA's too needed for convoy, and Atlantic fleet needs.

Cmdrcain · Post by **Cmdrcain** » Sun Nov 04, 2001 1:43 pm

Originally posted by byron:
Mike:

Iraq is a fascinating study for me. I wonder what will happen if we find they are somehow responsible for the anthrax. I doubt attempted assasination or an air campaign will work, and we'd have to go in on the ground again. But from where? I'm not at all convinced that Saudi Arabia will let us stage from there this time. Kuwait owes us a favor, but I wouldn't want to scenario makes me shudder. If Iraq is culpable, I hope they think it through before they make any grandiose statements.

If Iraq responsiable for Bio attk on USa, ICBM on Baghdad.. Saddam gone.

Ranger-75 · Post by **Ranger-75** » Mon Nov 05, 2001 7:01 am

Jeeez, I go away for the weekend and you guys fill up another page. <img src="eek.gif" border="0"> Too much reading.

I'll have to check back in later, after this week's CGSC (Byron, I'm taking the non-resident course, weekends & Mondays, That way I don't have to spend 11 months in Kansas) <img src="biggrin.gif" border="0">

TIMJOT · Post by **TIMJOT** » Mon Nov 05, 2001 1:48 pm

Originally posted by Cmdrcain:

Granted if it had only been Japan, But the US also had germany and a Germany First.. and they needed for a while The Hornet and Wasp in Atlantic for Convoy Coverage and sub patroling..

DD's CL,CA's too needed for convoy, and Atlantic fleet needs.

I cant see an anymore useless deployment of the Wasp and BB.Washington than convoy duty in the North Sea. Useing USNs newest fastest BB escorting slow merchant shipping to Russia was just plan silly. All becuase Winnie had a Tirpizt complex. I mean gee all he had was 4 modern BBs the King GeorgeIV, Duke of York, Rodney, Nelson all stationed at scapa flow to go up against one lone BB that left its fiord only once in its carreer. Useing a fleet CV for escorting was even more silly. Never mind useing it to ferry aircraft in the dangerously confined seas of the Med. A job that the Wasp and its wooden flight decks was wholly unsuited.

RE: CAs cl,dd, yes but none of the Pacific fleets were sent to Atlantic after PH so the PACIFIC FLEET REMAINED INTACT.,

grumbler · Post by **grumbler** » Mon Nov 05, 2001 9:46 pm

Originally posted by TIMJOT:
I cant see an anymore useless deployment of the Wasp and BB.Washington than convoy duty in the North Sea. Useing USNs newest fastest BB escorting slow merchant shipping to Russia was just plan silly. All becuase Winnie had a Tirpizt complex. I mean gee all he had was 4 modern BBs the King GeorgeIV, Duke of York, Rodney, Nelson all stationed at scapa flow to go up against one lone BB that left its fiord only once in its carreer.

This use of the Washington was, in part, part of her ongoing shakedown. She had only commisioned in May '41 and ships at that time were felt to need a long pre-combat shakedown. It was also a bit of the "show the flag" to let the Brits know the US was able to help them. Unfortunately for the brits, neither Rodney nor Nelson was a modern fast battleship, so when it came time to taking on Tirpitz the british didn't have enough modern fast BBs to provide complete coverage (which makes you wonder why PoW was sent east if the danger in home waters was so great).

However, explaining the situation doesn't excuse it. I agree that the two fast US BBs would have been much better suited to providing AA screens for the CVs at midway than providing political screens for Roosevelt and Churchill in the Atlantic.

grumbler · Post by **grumbler** » Tue Nov 06, 2001 4:51 am

Originally posted by TIMJOT:

I cant agree with you here. Although I am sure will come up with some sources that state otherwise. The fact is they did mount all three operations more or less simutaneously. They started invading the outlying islands of the DIE in Dec. and Jan. well before either of the Malaya or PI campaigns had been decided. Now if you are talking about the absolute final phase of the DEI operation ie; the invasion of Java. The fact that wasnt undertaken until late Feb. early March was more due the need to secure bases in Borneo, Celebes, Ambon, and Bali before the invasion than any operational need to complete the Malaya or PI campaigns first.

The Malayan and PI campaigns launched on Dec 7, while the DEI campaign (excluding the Borneo ops, which as you point out were mere preliminaries to the main event) didn't begin until the 21st and 23rd air flotillas had moved down from the PI campiagn in February.

In fact none of the 25th army took part in the DIE campaign. True the 48th div. was used, but that was more due to the typical Japanese unwillingness to veer from agreed upon plan.

True, but the forces they were transferring were air, not land forces. The main limitation on land forces was lift capabilities, not numbers of troops.

Or do you think would would have just waited until May 41 to attack Java? The fact is the IJA were unwilling to change plans to what they saw would be rewarding failure, but were only too willing to change planes to reward success.

I'm not sure what you are arguing here. What I am pointing out was that Japan withdrew more than two-thirds of the aircraft supporting the PI campaign when it came time to attack the DEI. that they were able to do so was a function of their success to date in eliminating the PI's capability to operate any combat aircraft.

Had they not opted to do this, they would have been forced to leave 21st and 23rd Air Flotillas in Formosa, and so they would have had to plan entirely on CV air (which may or may not have been available, given the movements of the US fleet) for supporting their attacks into the DEI.

I submit that this would have been far too risky in the minds of the Japanese planners. They needed some cretainty that the attacks on the DEI could go on as planned, for that was the entire purpose of fighting the war.

grumbler · Post by **grumbler** » Tue Nov 06, 2001 5:04 am

Originally posted by TIMJOT:
I think this surrendering this initiative stuff is a little over-rated. Are they surrendering the initiative? They would be taking the initiative to move south while America was weak. RE; allowing America the timing of declaring war. Well they had been risking that since 1937. They couldnt know America wouldnt declare war over China, but they acted anyway. They couldnt know the US wouldnt declare war over indo-china, yet they took the risk anyway. Were they not surrendering initiative in these instances? Or look at it the other way. Were they not taking the initiative by taking these actions in lue of the risk.

I am not sure where you are going here. The Japanese viewed the risks of the US going to war over China and Indochina as small, and so took the risk of attacking those places. They viewed the risk of the US going to war over their attacks on the British and DEI as large, and so they decided to attack the US while it was unprepared.

To allow the US to choose the moment of the DoW (which, for planning purposes, they had to assume would be at the worst possible moment for Japan) left the Japanese initial offensives far more liable to failure. Attacking the US at the outset was a risk, but it was one they could manage, becuase they could calculate the odds of success in that situation, wjhile they couldn't in the situation where the US got to choose when to go to war.

If they never attacked the US, and the US decided to wait until 1944 or 1946 to start the war, the japanese are as sure to lose the war as they are if they fail to convince the US that attacking them to retake territory in 1943 is an error. They took the gamble they thought had the highest chance of payoff: to bloody the US so much early in the war that the US wouldn't have the stomach to fight on. I think that the facts support their decision.

Here is another example. Did not Hitler surrendered the initiative of the timing of a DOW to Britain and France when he invaded Poland. He took the risk that they would not go to war over Poland even though they had a signed treaty with France to do just that. He was wrong, but surrendering the timing of a DOW ultimately had no bareing in the western campaign.

A good example. Hitler counted on the Allies to decalre war, but felt that they would not be willing to take an offensive to help the Poles. He took exactly the sort of reasoned gamble the Japanese leaders took. None of them survived the consequances of their errors, but that's the risk you take when you gamble.

Ultimately I admit there was considerable risk involved. I just dont think it anymore risky than taking on the US, and UK simutaneoulsly. To say its always better to attack all your enemies and potential ememies at once is always the best strategy flies in the face of history.

I think you are mistating my position. I have never argued, for instance, that Japan should also have attacked the Soviet Union on December 7th, 1941, so I certainly cannot be accused of arguing that"its always better to attack all your enemies and potential ememies at once is always the best strategy."

grumbler · Post by **grumbler** » Tue Nov 06, 2001 5:20 am

Originally posted by TIMJOT:
Athough I agree that the Japanese leadership was probalbly incabable of making any other decision as they did historically, due to they're utter lack of understanding of the American people, leadership and political institutions. As well as there own lack of imagingation and over inflated perception of there superiority. This is not to say however that it was the right decision or that no other decision could have been made with a little more fore thought, understanding and introspection. You call it simply hindsite but really its hard to argue hypothetical without hindsite. How else can you judge the success or failure of a decision without hindsite? Every decision made in the time that its made is thought to be the correct course of action. Its only in the context of history that we can judge those decisions as being correct or not.

I would argue, if we are to start at first causes, that Japan's best choice would have been to attack no one at all. The history of the last 50 years has proven that the Yen is more nimble and effective in achieving its objectives than the Zero ever was!

I might add its not simply hindsite to know that.

1. America is thousands of miles away and would need months to project significant forces.

Precisely the months when Japan can elast afford any ambiguity about American intentions, because their forces are spread thin and engaged in difficult military operations with little margin for error.

2. Although the PI poses a signifacant threat. Its easily isolated if not actually invaded if DOW does occur.

How you isolate it from American reinforcement without military action against US forces escapes me at the moment. Care to expand on this idea?

3. America failed to go to war over China incident
even though it was in derect violation of the "Open Door Policy" the conerstone of American foreign policy for over a century.

4. America failed to go to war over "Panay Incident"

5. America failed to go to war over "Indo-china Incident"

However, the Japanese were aware that tensions with the US were ratcheting up rapidly as a result of these incidents. None of them occurred in isolation, they were all part of the history of US-Japanese relations. To argue that the fact that the US didn't go to war over the last incident means they will never go to war over a future incident is to ignore history.

6. America failed to go to war with Germany over U-boat incidents.

7. That America had no formal treaty with Britain or the Dutch to go to war on there behalf and even in lue to Indo-china continued to refuse such an agreement.

However, the Japanese were surely aware that the incidents with the U-boats had brought them dangerously close to war with Germany (and that the US HAD gone to war with Germany in WWI without any direct German attack on America, which lead to no problems with the war's popularity in the US). In addition, the US decision to sink all discovered U-boats west of (what was it, 20 degrees west longitude?) meant to the Japanese that the US was virtually, if not actually, at war with Germany anyway. Japan had meantime allied itself with Germany. The chances could not look good to the japanese that the US would stay out of the war much longer.

8. That America, though simpathetic and willing to give material and finacial aid to Britain, Russia and China was unwilling to go to war on their behalf.

This is a mere statement of opinion. Many Americans had already, of course, joined the Canadian Armed forces. How much longer the US would stay out of the war was the question, not whether or not they would join.

9. That America could have but did not give an ultimatum to Japan " Get out of China and Indo-china or there would be war."

Japan felt that this was the effective meaning of the oil embargo and freeze of trade and assets. The US didn't need to fight a war with Japan under the circumstances - the embargo would have meant the end of japan's military capabilities as surely as a war would.

So, the US had, in effect, issued an ultimatum, just not phrased that way.

TIMJOT · Post by **TIMJOT** » Tue Nov 06, 2001 11:15 am

Originally posted by grumbler:

This use of the Washington was, in part, part of her ongoing shakedown. She had only commisioned in May '41 and ships at that time were felt to need a long pre-combat shakedown. It was also a bit of the "show the flag" to let the Brits know the US was able to help them. Unfortunately for the brits, neither Rodney nor Nelson was a modern fast battleship, so when it came time to taking on Tirpitz the british didn't have enough modern fast BBs to provide complete coverage (which makes you wonder why PoW was sent east if the danger in home waters was so great).

However, explaining the situation doesn't excuse it. I agree that the two fast US BBs would have been much better suited to providing AA screens for the CVs at midway than providing political screens for Roosevelt and Churchill in the Atlantic.

Yes,　I agree Grumbler it had to be a political deployment. But they could have probably should have sent one of the older altantic fleet BBs if all they were doing was showing the Flag. Neverless I dont understand if the Navy didnt consider the Washington combat ready why did they send it into a potential combat situation? You think at least they would have sent the N.Carolina which was commissioned earlier and had more training. Yet she spent the six months after PH pleasure cruising in the carribien. I agree that useing them to screen CVs would have been a more effective way of breaking the crews in without putting them in any into any ship to ship situations, which I can understand they were reluctant to do with unexpirence crews. I notice though the Japanese held no such reservations when it came to The Yamato, which correct me if I am wrong, was commisioned after the N.Carolina

I consider the Rodney and Nelson relatively modern. They were designed in the twenties commissioned in the 30s, had 16inch guns instead of the standard Brit 15inch had good armor protection. They were certainly good enough to match up with the Bismarks which were really nothing more than updated SMS Bayden class BBs. You have to admit Churchill had a Tirpitz complex that was disproportionate to the actual danger that it posed

TIMJOT · Post by **TIMJOT** » Tue Nov 06, 2001 11:27 am

The Malayan and PI campaigns launched on Dec 7, while the DEI campaign (excluding the Borneo ops, which as you point out were mere preliminaries to the main event) didn't begin until the 21st and 23rd air flotillas had moved down from the PI campiagn in February.

Dont forget　the Celebes and Ambon. The point is that it was a step by step advance into the DEI that started in late Dec. The CVL Ryujo and seaplane tenders supported these operations. The 21 and 23 flottillas were deployed only after these bases in Borneo and Celebes were secured. Sumatra was invaded before Singapore and PI was complete. That leaves Java, and you really cant expect them to have go charging in without securing the outlying islands first.

K G von Martinez · Post by **K G von Martinez** » Tue Nov 06, 2001 2:36 pm

Not sure if you can call Borneo a preliminary only. It was a prime target for it was the part of DEI with the oil!!

TIMJOT · Post by **TIMJOT** » Tue Nov 06, 2001 3:11 pm

Originally posted by kgvm:
Not sure if you can call Borneo a preliminary only. It was a prime target for it was the part of DEI with the oil!!

True, Java was probably was the least important strategically. Borneo Sumatra had the oil, Celebes had the airfields, Java just had rice and was the political and population center. So the most important part of the operation was finished before the end of febuary.