BB Prince of Wales, Shell hits 25, Torpedo hits 3, heavy fires, heavy damage
CA Exeter, Shell hits 1
CL De Ruyter CL Adelaide, Shell hits 1, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
CL Enterprise, Shell hits 2, on fire
CL Dauntless, Shell hits 1
DD Stewart, Shell hits 7, heavy fires, heavy damage
DD Arrow
DD Electra, Shell hits 8, and is sunk
DD Jupiter, Shell hits 1
Not to be too critical Dan, but why did you have that old tub in with much faser ships?
This is where intuition failed me and failure to fully grasp how the game engine works bit me in the butt.
To my way of thinking, the Allies are guarding a port (Oosthaven). Therefore, the more ships employed, the better. Even if some of those ships are slow (so my thinking went), their stationed at Oosthaven. I'm not asking them to venture forth and hunt the enemy. Just hang around and contribute your fire if needed. Thus, having slow ships like Adelaide, Mississippi and Resolution was fine (so my thinking went).
In fact, though, there are several reasons not to think this way in AE terms. Some I mentioned yesterday, but I also gather than in game terms you have two TFs squaring off against each other, in effect as if on a chessboard, where relative speeds very much enter into the equation.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
ORIGINAL: Cribtop
Shows what I know about the Allied BBs. Except for North Carolina, Iowa and Missouri, I don't know which are the fast modern BBs and which aren't.
Cribtop, that's similar to how I do things in the game. We probably have very similar gaming philosophies, which we enjoy very much and which allow us to compete well against a majority of players. But there is a certain class of Uber Player that knows the specs for every plane, ship, and ground unit, and that knows how the computer routines work to maximize everything from CAP to combat TF composition, so that they can play at a higher level.
Query: Is it worth emersing yourself in the game if it takes that kind of knowledge to compete at the very highest levels? Or would that detract from your enjoyment of the game? IE, some of us really enjoy the intuitive aspect of the game. I think that Uber Knowledge might be more than some of us wish to commit, and might even detract from the intuitive kind of play some of us enjoy. The jury is out on whether I'm willing to dive in that deeply.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
I think it is difficult to get mired in the mechanics and technicalities and forget that the strategy and tactics are the reason most of us play the game. I just recently went on a spree changing every ship commander I could find, bu tstill had to wonder whether some of my decisions were good ones, as I don't know exactly how certain skills modify behavior of the ships. Which is more important, leadership or inspiration?
Ship speed certainly seems something to pay attention to in a surface battle. I recently lost three IJN CLs after placing one fast ship with two slower ones and getting into a battle with an evenly matched US SCTF, and it was AT NIGHT in 42 when the IJN should have done better.
"Success is the ability to go from one failure to another with no loss of enthusiasm." - Winston Churchill
That's going to hurt - two more heavy cruisers either on the bottom or out of action for the foreseeable future (even if it a continuation from the surface combat). While you might be running low on capital ships right now, he is also starting to scrape the bottom of the barrel - and yet another psychological push for him to start pulling ships back from the Pacific (for no other reason than he's just running out of surface combatants).
Never Underestimate the Power of a Small Tactical Nuclear Weapon...
Thinking more about the "intuition vs. calculation" question, I'm thinking that alot of us intuitively feel that the game stops being a game when it becomes a mathematical equation.
On the other hand, there are certain personalities that are drawn to mathematics and algorithms, so that turning everything into mathematical equations is challenging, fun, and satisfying.
But I don't want to turn War in the Pacific: Admiral's Edition into a mathematical equation. When I do that it's no longer a game. It's a science.
Edited to Add: This isn't a criticism of those that do enjoy the mathematical side of the game; who find that detailed analysis adds to their enjoyment of the game. Those gents will almost always be the premier players of the game. I'm just sayin' that I think there are plenty of players who are not "wired" to enjoy the game in that way.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
ORIGINAL: Cribtop
Shows what I know about the Allied BBs. Except for North Carolina, Iowa and Missouri, I don't know which are the fast modern BBs and which aren't.
Cribtop, that's similar to how I do things in the game. We probably have very similar gaming philosophies, which we enjoy very much and which allow us to compete well against a majority of players. But there is a certain class of Uber Player that knows the specs for every plane, ship, and ground unit, and that knows how the computer routines work to maximize everything from CAP to combat TF composition, so that they can play at a higher level.
Query: Is it worth emersing yourself in the game if it takes that kind of knowledge to compete at the very highest levels? Or would that detract from your enjoyment of the game? IE, some of us really enjoy the intuitive aspect of the game. I think that Uber Knowledge might be more than some of us wish to commit, and might even detract from the intuitive kind of play some of us enjoy. The jury is out on whether I'm willing to dive in that deeply.
A very pertinent question. In the end I believe I would answer yes, but I'm not there yet. Why? I have been blessed with a freakish visual memory, virtually photographic. Thus, once I get up to speed on a particular fact or dynamic I rarely forget it. This makes it easier for me to aspire to "learn it all."
However, I haven't played the Allies yet except a few months against the AI as a training mission. Thus, I haven't seen their OOB, and not even I can remember what I haven't seen. This is why I want to play Allies next time, as it will fill in gaps in my knowledge base where all I have to go on is my memory of books on WWII.
On a deeper level, there are times where I enjoy and even cultivate a lack of knowledge as I feel like knowing every sub-routine takes away some of the realism for me. I enjoy the fact that you can do well in this game if you approach with the question "What would I do if I was in command in real life?" It often amazes me how well the game accommodates this.
Still, in time I can't resist the desire to try to be a better player. My competitive instincts combine with the realization that over time you will learn the "tricks of the trade." At that point It will be a different but still fun experience to try to test myself against the Ubers.
His losses are terrible. You lost significant warship--yes--but his cannot be replaced. The Allies simply shift forces from one side of the Pacific to the IO. He cannot.
The spreading of forces into the Pago Pago area is quite foolish (IMO). If you could bloody anything here life is finished for the Japanese.
Member: Treaty, Reluctant Admiral and Between the Storms Mod Team.
Over the last 150 years naval warfare has seen a move towards homogeneity in speed ( across classes ) and firepower ( within classes ). The development of the original Dreadnought was based on the recognition that an "all big gun" battleship was superior to a battleship with mixed calibres requiring very different engagement ranges.
The game models this reality of naval warfare. Put ships with different speeds and very different engagement ranges ( within the same class ) into a single TF and you are, effectively, telling all those ships to stay in formation with eachother. What this means is that all your fast modern CAs, CLs etc will tool along at 18 knots like your WW1 battleships and be utterly outmanoeuvred by enemy ships moving up to 66% faster.
In addition since the enemy can pick a range to maximise their CA, CL and BB effectiveness and whichever range they pick ( just inside CA range or just inside CL range ) they can be sure that they'll be able to get all their guns to fire effectively from that class of ship ( CAs or CL ). The Allied CA, CL and CLAA all have very different ranges at which their fire becomes effective. That means that the TF will actually project less than its maximally effective firepower no matter what range it picks. Its gun performances are just too spread out.
So, the game model is pretty historical. Even the 1:1 matching up till the point of overmatch and then Lanchester Laws coming into action is all pretty historical.
As to the complication and the need to be some sort of mathematical genius with an eidetic memory.... I think you all are getting entirely the wrong end of the stick here.
I'm not saying I'm a good player or planner or anything but I do ok and I think it is instructive to point out that my opponents are very used to getting orders turns back from me 40 minutes after sending them. I think some might think I'm a details player. I really amn't. If a plan for the next 3 months of war cannot be summarised in 4 short sentences then I think it is over-complicated. I don't use tracker because I think tracker leads people to think that if they have all the data they can analyse their way out of a situation and that if their plan is only complex enough they can account for all enemy actions.
Good doctors are expert at summarising patient histories. They spend 40 minutes taking the history and can then give the important positives and negatives in 40 seconds - about 4 sentences. I think that's a useful corollary here. Looking at a BB you can look at all sorts of details but all you really need to do is look at the speed and the main gun type. Everything else can safely be ignored - in terms of naval battles ( and yes, that includes armour since armour level doesn't impact on the ability to operate cohesively in formation in the pre-firing stages of the battle. )
I don't know the difference between a Gridley and a Porter or all the various WW1 BBs and the WW2 ones. I do, however, have a fair idea which are WW1 and WW2 and can recognise that different gun values in the TF creation field usually means they have different main guns. You don't need the detailed knowledge. You just need some very simple basic schema and to apply them clearly.
Blaming this on "there's too much detail in order to get good" is to draw precisely the wrong message. Go the opposite way, learn how to play with even less detail BUT make the details you remember the details which will determine success or failure. I know nothing about the CA, CL or DD classes ( except the Kitakami and the fact that the CLAAs have 5" guns instead of 6" ). Why? When I go to the TF creation screen I can see the speed and I can see the gunpower, with those two pieces of information I can make all the decisions I need - I don't need to know that detail.
Same with the fighters: I don't know the armament of them all. It simply isn't necessary. I know whether or not their armament is homogenous ( which counts a lot ) and for the rest I can look up manoeuvre bands, speed etc once and then create a nice simple rule for use:
E.g. Oscars at 5,000 feet to maximise manoeuvre, A6M2s up high to catch the enemy sweepers when they dive on the Oscars. Simple, effective and doesn't require more than a very quick glance at the plane data screen. Once that's decided for offence and defence then I don't need to look at this again until a new plane comes into service.
Subs: For the Japanese apart from the I-120 class and I-400 class a sub is a sub is a sub. No need to complicate it any more than that. It brings torps a long way across the ocean and puts them into big floaty metal things on the water. That's all you need to know in terms of detail.
So, not more detail BUT the right detail ( and very little of it ). Less is more as it frees up more of your mind for sneaky mental manoeuvrings [8D]. I wouldn't get caught up in the detail of what I've said above, the concept is what's important.
The focus on "just the important details" is why good chess players can play so many matches at the same time. When you do that you quickly learn to deconstruct each match down to just the essentials - Personally I always just reduced the position to a "force map" ( visualised as different strength beams of light denoting paths of movement/attack. Where the lights intersected was very bright and the centre of gravity of the position. By doing that I didn't have to remember the positions of all the pieces and could reduce the task of memorising the positions of 16 pieces into just the task of visualising and memorising 1 "force/light map". So, I could remember 16 games with no more effort than my opponent could remember where each of their 16 pieces was.
A simple little trick of abstraction and remembering the "right" details turned what appeared to be an impressive feat of up to 16 simultaneous matches into child's play. It's a damned sight more impressive when you don't explain it first of course LOL!
Forgive the thread posting again - I just think people often don't look at why these things occur dispassionately but instead prefer to look at these situations as another reason to confirm their prejudgements - in your case, Canoerebel, that the game relies on too much micromanagement and to get really good you need to learn all that detail. Honestly, I'd suggest you back off on the detail. I think it is getting in the way of your progress. Just my opinion of course and only offered because I think you are much more open-minded than most and open to improvement ( even if we don't always agree even on important things [:D] ).
NB: Detail is a different thing than micromanagement ( of which there is a lot in pilot training - although much less in the BETA ).
I hope this is accepted in the spirit in which it is intended by you and ALL posters to your thread.
John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.
Nemo, I see what you mean. I pledge to not hide behind the "that's too complicated" excuse to be lazy. Thanks for the comments.
Cribtop, a photographic memory is a gift! I shall beware of you lest we someday lock horns in battle.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
Yeah, but I'm also semi-OCD so it takes about 2 hours to process a turn. A far cry from Nemo's 40 minutes. Still, it is kind of scary. I could probably recite numerous 80s movies to this day almost word for word (Then why are you smiling? Because I know something you do na know... I am not left handed!).
I was aware of the importance if TF speed and religiously match speeds of TFs. What I did NOT know was that the ships actually try to optimize their "stand off ranges" if you will. I assumed the model wasn't that robust, but I'm impressed to learn that it is. That means, however, that in general you want to avoid TFs with both BBs and CAs/CLs as they have different engagement ranges. This was not my practice to date but it looks like my practice needs to change. Hmmm.
PS - Unless the model is good enough that it assumes your CAs charge down into closer range while the BBs stand off. I assume that is NOT the case however as there is a single dynamic range number for the entire surface engagement (i.e. Range closes to 9,000 yards, etc). Assuming that the entire force is presumed to be at a single range that would prevent CAs and BBs at different ranges. I need to switch up my SCTF compositions.
However, this news validates the doctrine of LCTFs (a term from my AAR), and probably explains why these forces perform so well in their appointed role of destroying light combatants like PT boats.
Well there's explicit levels of modelling and things which arise organically.
Bottom line though, if you run the tests. you'll find that a TF comprising 3 CAs and 4 DDs will do better vs a TF comprising 4 CAs and 4 DDs if you make that 4th CA one which is either much slower OR has very different and weaker main gun armament. YOu can argue whether that's super-realistic given that the CO of the 2nd TF might well elect to fight it out at the range which bests suits his 3CAs and 4 DDs leaving the obsolete CA to just sit there and take a few shells without contributing much. The game, however, assumes that if you include it then YOU are ordering the CO to stick it in the formation and to match speeds etc etc etc with it.
As to BBs and CAs. Depends on the BBs and CAs. Some of them ( including many of the Japanese ones IIRC ) have pretty much the same speed and same gun range as the BBs. Those ones you can mix and match easily. When you see people assess the BBs anc CAs of both sides they always overlook this. The naval planners of the time didn't. Also you need to realise that a knot or two of difference in speed or 1,000 or 2,000 yards in gun performance isn't a big deal if it'll allow you to combine 4 ships instead of sending in two pairs. But that's not what people do, people often have a great TF and then put in a virtual cripple - I first happened upon some of this when wondering WHY the computer was coded to split damaged ships off into Escort TFs in between combat rounds. That led to the thought that it might be important not just to save the ships but for the face validity of the combat model.... and that then led to in-game experiments with "virtual cripples" in otherwise great TFs etc etc.
Dan,
Well, I don't think you are "hiding" behind it. I didn't want to imply that. I just think that sometimes we all reach for the reason which gives us the least challenging outcome. That's a simple human trait.
As to Cribtop's memory: Well, what is commonly termed an eidetic memory is simply a different way of processing information and storing it. It has very little to do with analysing it or selecting the appropriate data. Plus eidetic memories are simply a different way of processing information since true long-term adult eidetics ( meaning (and this is simplified before someone jumps on me for not giving a more accurate but hugely more complex definition )they can remember stimuli in the absence of understanding ) don't exist - well, so long as you exclude the Elizabeth Stromeyer example which had some issues with methodology.
You could play games with Cribtop's memory by:
a) presenting him with information in a manner to which he is not accustomed so that the unconscious grouping which enables these feats of memory cannot be applied as equally - basically learning his schema and defeating them.
b) simply overloading him. The example he gives suggests the possibility of poor filtering allowing overloading.
It wouldn't be too difficult to do with a little thought but, really, there's no need. Just recognise that while knowledge is power knowledge is more than just having infinite information at your fingertips [8D]
John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.
Canoerebel<~~~gettin' schooled here!
Seriously, thanks for the information. When Nemo said yesterday, "Including Mississippi in the TF made it sub optimal" (or words to that effect), I had no idea why it rendered the TF less effective. Now, I not only have a better understanding of why, but also understand that in some ways this accurately models real life. Thus, I am encouraged to learn and apply, because not only does it make me a more effective player, but also because it better reflects some of the realities of the real war.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
No fair, Nemo - Dan and I aren't even playing yet and you're telling him how to beat me. [:D]
I suspected part of your answer to be correct in that I was guessing that, for example, the Kongos and IJN CAs would play nice together. Kongos have 14 inch guns and 30kt speed and I bet the IJN 8 inch CAs aren't too far off in terms of range. However, you probably wouldn't want to put Yamato class with CAs but perhaps could group them with the 25 kt 16 inch IJN BBs. Lots to ponder.
2 kt and all IJN BBs and CAs would be effective at 32,000 yards. In return the Allies would be a minimum of 9 knots slower AND would only be able to return fire with ONE BB ( Mississipi ) at 32,000 yards. Resolution could join in at 31,000 yards but, obviously, the IJN could be expected ( in daylight ) to try to maintain themselves beyond that range. Even if they couldn't it'd still be a 7 vs 3 matchup from 30,000 to 25,000 yards, at which point in time the Allied CL would join in making it 7 vs 4.
I think when you see those ratios you see just how devastating that sort of matchup is. The Allied TF composition LOOKS good on first view but when you look at the speed ( meaning the Japanese get to dictate the range of engagement ) and their ability to generate many on one engagements sequentially as the range closes you can see the Allies are in a worse position than they think. No hugely complicated analysis, just the basics simply applied without wishful thinking or preconceptions ( most analysis here is only carried out in order to confirm the prejudices of the person doing the analysis - not in this thread, just on the forum in general. That's why so much of the analysis is worthless, it is analysis to fit a given end-point not analysis designed to lead where it may).
Yamatos vs RN or USN BBs during daytime.
46, 42, 39 / 39, 33 / 35, 36
Range isn't everything though and there are multiple factors which fit in. Suffice it to say though doing this right yields significant improvements in results.
Doing the basics right and then getting sneaky with complicated interplays of TF composition and sequencing can be downright devastating... I might suggest having a quick look back at the initial Armaggedon scenario in which I committed the 1945 IJN to naval combat vs the US and sank roughly 30 ships in return for 1 of my own ( IIRC ). It wasn't a battleline matchup but there was some work done on optimising sequencing and mixing in order to get that result. I didn't higlight it at the time since I get bitched at for having long posts anyways and when I say stuff like that I usually get attacked for it - so I tend to just shut up and hide a lot nowadays.
Anyways, *cloak engaged *....
P.s. As to telling Dan how to beat you.... Maybe I'm just starting the meta game for our game?
John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.
I usually use ships of the same class within surface combat task forces. It is not absolutely detailed, but quite easy as many class have at least some difference at endurance/speed/gun/AA/torp/asw armament - this you can see easily when selecting ships for your Task Forces.
I dont worry about classes, cant see how having everyone with the same gun calibres should be an advantage.
However I do keep the fast and slow BB's seperate, same with putting the older, slower combat ships away from my SCTF's.
But, in keeping Sumatra out of the hands of the jap you scrape up everything you can find.
I put my vote in for playing the game as fun (though extraordinarily detailed) rather than a mathematical exercise. I try to optimise my forces, but couldnt give a stuff about the precise numbers.
PS For those who scoot around in SFTF of about 12 units, loose a ship and see a DD escort a damage unit soon end up with only a half dozen, start off with 20-25 and given the same attrition you still have 15= to continue the battles.
I see the battle keeping to move in CR's favour, still far from supremacy but on that side of the ledger.
Interdum feror cupidine partium magnarum Europae vincendarum
IJ cruisers are pure death on the high seas, especially when under the command of somebody like Tanaka.
Japan only gets 18 of these babies, so each one that goes under is a stellar victory for the Allies. Seriously, the Allies should celebrate each one as if they had won the Battle of Iwo Jima.
I think the Allies have sent under five CAs in this game to date. All five perished in the waters of the DEI. That's good attrition for this early in the war.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
