The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

[Crackaces]

You play with some house rules, no? The point of them is to make the game better reflect RL (at least in part) platform and other game-related capabilities, no? Why bother with this if this is a game of chess?

First and foremost, WitP AE is breakthough in my opinion on designing a WeGo computer game with excellent FOW. From this standpoint I think WitP AE is a challange. As far as modeling ..

1. Airwar .. detection begins at the target hex not the first opportunity.. I beleive that model was adopted because the desgners did not understand Circles of Apollonius algorithums and the current model was a much more simple to implement. However, this one little design decision renders the entire strategy modeled in RL somewhat moot ...

2. Naval Airwar -- I do realize that some randomization of strike packages are required to reproduce the FOW of Naval Airwar, but have no ability to pre set up strike packages and being totally dependent on a computer algorithum sets up huge packages going after single ships and burning up sorties .. I have no control .. Like setting strike package thresholds based on type of ship scouted, and number thresholds ... "Hey scouting says only one PT boat should we launch?"

3. Naval Conflict -- Damage seems to me to be quite random .. I am not sure a BB commander would open up big guns on a PT boat at 15 miles away ..Maybe Halsey ..

4. Ground Combat model .. a single support squad has the same area of influence as a 100,000 AV army stack. If occupying a SLOC that line is interdicted. In my opinion, the game is dependent on the hex, but does not model ground units in relation to the hex. If you are goign to model the detail of a single sqaud than one has to use a much more complex modeling system of map rendering to represent the space and influence occupied by that squad.


Because of this .I too see WitP AE representing War in the Pacific as much as a civil war chess set represents the battle of gettysburg ... But .. above and beyond chess the game, WitP AE does have a complex set of rules and a combat system that is a challenge all by itself. Because of that I have played 2 PBEM games.

I do find one thing amusing about the JFB crowd .. they have no problem pointing out that a Burma Campaign would be impossible in 1942 due to the political constraints, but have no compunction about playing scenario #2 and the real life economic and political constraints to this possibility ... the "real life mantra" has sort of a one way set of rules to constrain the Allies ...

[Canoerebel]

Poultry Lad pointed out that I didn't enumerate the units (or parts) lost. I didn't, but I never do that. Nobody's ever seen me list the units the Japanese player loses when I take a big sexy base. I just don't think that way. So it's not some kind of subtle indication that I'm hiding or suppressing what I lost. It's just that none of these bases (and what they had) were signficiant in the overall scheme of things. Similarly, I almost never post about sub losses (for me or against me). And I don't get into the minutae of the air war. My approach is more a general summary - with one exception - capital ships. Those I do account for - for and against. Look at my description of the IJ raid around Oz. That was painful for me, but I gave the detail on the major ships I lost.

[JocMeister]

ORIGINAL: Crackaces
I do find one thing amusing about the JFB crowd .. they have no problem pointing out that a Burma Campaign would be impossible in 1942 due to the political constraints, but have no compunction about playing scenario #2 and the real life economic and political constraints to this possibility ... the "real life mantra" has sort of a one way set of rules to constrain the Allies ...

I guess its safe to assume that only a very, very few JFBs would play this game with the historical restraints suffered by the IJ. Even scenario 1 has some very unhistorical things about it.

But, I guess that is a good thing the game is like it is or we AFB wouldn´t have anyone to play against! [:D]

[crsutton]

Just a comment. I am proud that after the initial and inevitable early disasters in my game with Ark that I have only lost two or three tank regiments in the entirety. Otherwise, I have played a cautious defense but not a Sir Robin with not losing major units as one of my long term plans. Not that I feel the loss of the men but in game terms (especially considering that we started when the game did not allow you to repurchase eliminated units), it just made good sense to preserve the units.

However, knowing what I know now, if I were to start another game as the Allies I would be more than willing to sacrifice a few units in forward deployment to slow down the Japanese advance just as Canoerebel is doing in this game. And this is not without a historical foundation. The Allies made decisions to risk unit elimination to gain time and strategic goals in real life. (Bastogne comes to mind.) If I can put a unit in an advanced spot that will force the enemy into a solid long term battle of attrition. Or just cost him a good amount of time, or divert his attention during a key point in the campaign. Then I will do so and deal with the loss if need be. This is the role that any commander had to accept-sacrificing units for the good of the whole.

Remember, the Allies (and the public) in the end accepted the expected casualties from kamikaze attacks and knew fully well that the invasion of the home island would entail hundreds of thousands of casualties. The American public I am sure was sad about this, but in the end did not shy away from the job at hand.

[AcePylut]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

So John feels good about his position, right?  How?

1. He hasn't taken any coveted territory (New Caledonia is his only conquest beyond the bare minimum of what Japan will take in most games).

2.  He hasn't attrited the Allied OOB to any appreciable extent.

3.  Since June he's been racing around the map attending to fires that I started, thus losing the initiative on whatever plans he might have wanted to implement.

4.  He's been his own worst enemy (long-delayed conquests of Singapore, Clark Field, Batavia and Manado; complete mismanagement of the air war; etc.)

5.  By exerting maximum possible pressure - massed infantry and most of his air force for many months - he finally took Changsha, but then permitted the isolated Chinese army to escape back into the MLR.

I haven't done anything flashy in the game yet.  I've been concentrating on logistics, laying the foundaiton for future operations.  The Allies have massive concentrations of men, aircraft and supply in India, Oz, and Hawaii/West Coast.  I am pretty much ready now to move when the right opporunity comes along. John's been alot about flash, and I give him credit for attending to some of my moves, but he hasn't done the slightest thing the upset or molest the foundation for future Allied success.

While I have had a few trying moments - China and the KB raid around Oz - I haven't broken a sweat yet. I"m still in my comfort zone. Compared to recent matches against Q-Ball and PzH....well, there's no comparison.  Part of that's due to this not being Scenario Two. 

Well I'd have 5 points to add:

#1) He hasn't taken any coveted territory. Last I checked, though, he controlled all the historical conquests. and oil centers he needs. That would be coveted in my eyes. Or are you thinking that coveted territory is the territory you thought he was going for, but didn't? I don't mean this in a bad way and I'm not criticizing - but don't think that because he didn't do what you thought he would do, he's somehow failing.

2) It's hard to attrit Allied CV's when the Allied CV's run away from everything. On the BB front, You're down 5 iirc. On the plane front, IJA is doing offensive missions, so he's going to lose more. Once the tide changes, you're going to lose more. Well... read "should", cuz you don't know. Johns crazy aggressive and might try a West Coast Invasion in '44

3) The way I see it is that, in the Gilberts, you just gave John a bunch of troops and experience and gained nothing for it. I know you believe you "created a thorn in his side that slowed him down", but did you really do that? If he truly wasn't planning on expanding elsewhere - then you really didn't slow him down.

4) He's been his own worst enemy. I would agree - but then again - I also detect a great amount of hubris coming from this AAR. I think right now, you are both being your own worst enemy, in elevating nothing victories and nothing actions into "strategic game changers". Maybe you're doing this from a "allies propaganda for the homefront" point of view, or maybe you really think that getting Ramree or holding Tarawa for 7 weeks is going to win the war. They won't.

5) If he surrounds your army and destroy it - it regens in 60days at 1/3rd strength. If he forces your army to retreat, it doesn't get the magic rebuild. not sure of the level of your army at this point, but are you sure that he was trying to destroy it, and not force it to retreat and thus be rebuilt from a limited pool of men and supplies? I dunno.

[Canoerebel]

1. Essentially every Japanese player takes the historic gains. Most take considerably more. Darwin and Port Moresby are pretty much givens. Many games see the Japanese take most of the Alutians, Midway, and Luganville. It's not uncommon for Japan to take New Caledonia, Perth region, and NE India. So, yes, I'd say John is well behind a typical experienced IJ player's progress.

2. My carriers haven't run. They covered landings in the Aleutians. They chases part of the KB across the Tasman Sea. They covered the operations around Exmouth and Carnavon. They've been very active in the Bay of Bengal.

3. The Gilberts operation was well worth it. Seven weeks of full commitment by Japan that allowed the Allies freedom to pursue gains Oz and Bay of Bengal (plus eliminated risks in many other parts of the map). Too, John lost a bunch of destroyers.

4. "Hubris" is excessive self pride or confidence. I am pleased with the Allied performance thus far. I'm being candid in saying that rather than displaying a false modesty. But dose this amount to "hubris"? I don't think so, but I'm in a poor position to judge.

5. In China, John was working to keep the cut off Chinese army isolated. He worked feverishly to place units that would cut off their path of retreat. He didn't succeed. Obiously, his best play was to keep them isolated and then leave them in the jungles to waste away, but through a skill or luck or whatever, the Chinese army reconnected to the MLR.

[Crackaces]

Essentially every Japanese player takes the historic gains. Most take considerably more. Darwin and Port Moresby are pretty much givens. Many games see the Japanese take most of the Alutians, Midway, and Luganville. It's not uncommon for Japan to take New Caledonia, Perth region, and NE India. So, yes, I'd say John is well behind a typical experienced IJ player's progress.

This is not scenario #2 .. but a hybrid on steriods Scenario #1 .. I am not sure comparing John's current progress against scenario #2 has internal or external vailidity ...

What is lacking on both sides is a linking construct from actions to outcomes and how victory will be achieved .. instead the focus has been on body counts and this does not directly link to victory IMHO .. unless this involves the complete destruction of the KB and even then Obvert has shown us the IJ can put up a fight.

Joeseph Goebbels is hard at work on both sides .. [;)] But in my mind I can see CR's postion in Burma as tying up 7 - 10 IJA divisions and already the IJ are comitted to defending Alaska Islands .. . Once the Allies get resources and platforms .. I suspect a plan toward victory will roll forward despite losses and the body count the Poultry Man finds abhorrence [8D]

[Canoerebel]

Whatever this is - John says it's something between Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 - but I'm not sure, I still think he's lagging on what you'd expect to see from the way of Japanese conquests at this stage of the game.

I haven't seen body counts in my AAR. Have I missed them? [&:]

As for a "linking construct," I don't understand. Allied strategy has been linked since the beginning of the game. Perhaps I'm just not laying it out clearly, but every single move has been done with a purpose - looking both to the future and in an effort to take advantage of John's proclivities.

Aluetians operations in early '42 were done to prompt John's concerns in NoPac. I thinkit worked.
Gilberts in early June was done to free up the Ramree operation (or, if John went the other way by focusing on Ramree, the Allies would concentrate on the Gilberts).

The Gilberts opened up the move on Carnavon/Exmouth, which had mixed results. This was mainly to heighten John's concern over Oz so that I can use it as an effective feinting target later.

While John worked hard on Luganville, Gilberts and NoPac, the Allies beefed up things at Ramree and Assam.

Now I'm hoping to goad John into moving into the Bay of Bengal in a big way, since I've tried to set it up as an effective fighting theater and since that might open up opportunities elsewhere (the Aleutians was my hope, though that may be stillborn).

The ultimate objective for the Allies is to move east from Burma and west through CenPac. That might change as circumstances warrant, but that's been the goal since the start of the game.

The Allied moves are as complimentary to these objectives as possible, so I don't understand the point Crackaces is making.

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: GreyJoy

You seriously thinkthese 20 quicky posts will be able to keep u guys up with the Hairy Asian Experiences? pufff....

Damn! I probably need to hire a PR firm for my AAR! [:D]

[Crackaces]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Whatever this is - John says it's something between Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 - but I'm not sure, I still think he's lagging on what you'd expect to see from the way of Japanese conquests at this stage of the game.

I haven't seen body counts in my AAR. Have I missed them? [&:]

As for a "linking construct," I don't understand. Allied strategy has been linked since the beginning of the game. Perhaps I'm just not laying it out clearly, but every single move has been done with a purpose - looking both to the future and in an effort to take advantage of John's proclivities.

Aluetians operations in early '42 were done to prompt John's concerns in NoPac. I thinkit worked.
Gilberts in early June was done to free up the Ramree operation (or, if John went the other way by focusing on Ramree, the Allies would concentrate on the Gilberts).

The Gilberts opened up the move on Carnavon/Exmouth, which had mixed results. This was mainly to heighten John's concern over Oz so that I can use it as an effective feinting target later.

While John worked hard on Luganville, Gilberts and NoPac, the Allies beefed up things at Ramree and Assam.

Now I'm hoping to goad John into moving into the Bay of Bengal in a big way, since I've tried to set it up as an effective fighting theater and since that might open up opportunities elsewhere (the Aleutians was my hope, though that may be stillborn).

The ultimate objective for the Allies is to move east from Burma and west through CenPac. That might change as circumstances warrant, but that's been the goal since the start of the game.

The Allied moves are as complimentary to these objectives as possible, so I don't understand the point Crackaces is making.

By body counts I mean loss of squads and platforms. The fact you are up 1,500 aircraft as an example does not link into victory conditions IMHO. The squad body count is mainly emphasized by the poultry man; however, Unless you sink CV's and even then I am not sure the count alone makes the difference, it's the ability to exploit that loss is far more important in my mind.

My comments on strategy was solely coming from my belief system, but it looks like to me you are doing an excellent job of tying down IJ resources and then look to exploit where the weakness shows, rather than have Burma has a primary front. That is because right now my understanding if Burma is going to be an axis of advance that one has to fight as soon as possible/practical in the clear terrain using 2E's in your case, rather than letting the IJ get jungle hexes that far forward. I think that is going to make Burma tougher to take in the light that it looks like the IJA plan to form a viable MLR that far forward .. .but it will tie up a lot of IJ troops.

My thoughts on a linking construct clearly come from my thought patterns. It is my thought that this game centers around two possibilites of victory. SCLS or Autovictory before Aug 1945. That is I try to extend my moves not only within the tactical realm but strategically into 1945. I also assume my opponent is seeing the world this way, but often this is a very bad assumption [:)]. So, in my naive mind I think the Allies every move needs to link to another move that links to eventual victory in 1945. So I tend to think AV in April 1945, to get there for example I might adopt a strategy that I need Cam Rahn Bay by 1944 with X victory points. To get to Cam Rahn Bay I need crush the IJ in the Irrawaddy Valley ...losing no more than 3 IJ to 1 Allied VP[including base/port/airfield, ship, airframe, and squad VP's], which leads to armor in Thailand and taking of Cam Rahn Bay by April 1944 cutting of the DEI with X number of VP advantage.

[I set a 3:1 for my Burma operations because I tend to get creamed in my CenPac/SoPac Operations .. trying to balance 2:1 by April 1945 ... My last game I got the 3:1 on Feb 25, 1944 ... Autovictory] ....

So in this case, your 1500 airframe advanatage you have been promoting has a 1500 VP advantage that links to ???? [&:] You have lost X number of troop points in the Pacific that has to be made up .. How? If the plan is to simply move thorugh Burma and CenPAC without a thought of VP costs .. a smart IJ player can come out on top in 1945. The Allies at the doorstep of Japan with just over 1:1 and no autovictory possible .... I am not sure John is capable of this ....So my comment on a lack of linking constructs. It might very well be in your head, and you just intutively have a gut feel of how things unfold. As a kibitzer I am trying to figure that out.

One thought I have and certainly players with far more experience than I disagree .. but I am getting more convinced everyday that the IJ must take less and have shortened perimeters that still defend critical VP's and sources of resources [oil, resources, & fuel] rather than to expand out to the point of almost achieving AV ... and then getting crushed at a single weak point of the Allies choosing ... I think the IJ needs a defense of depth that the IJN can react and punish .. taking Oz for example only extends LOC's for the eventual hammer ....

[Canoerebel]

The 1500-aircraft advantage in the air war wasn't intended to serve as a body count item. It's a shorthand way of saying that the Allies have achieved two important things in the air war that are crucial to prosecuting the war effectively, especially in 1942: (1) Allied pilots are performing well and have gained immensely in proficiency, so they are in a far better position to face the Japanese; (2) the Allies are fighting efficiently, thus my aircraft pools haven't been depleted, which is a huge concern for the Allies.

The 1,500 advantage in and of itself means nothing to me. I've mentioned this before, so I had no idea readers were taking it this way.

[Canoerebel]

Back to the game. The biggest challenge now is deciding what to do if John takes the bait and commits the KB to the Bay of Bengal (or Oz). The Aleutians have been my plan for quite some time, but the difficulty increased substantially with this week's SigInt that 7th IJA Div. is bound for Attu. I could stand down and switch to another target. The problem is the time needed for prep and to move assets around. I could find something small and easy, but finding something large and meaningful is much more problematic. So, at this point the plan remains to hit the Aluetians (or possibly the Kuriles) if the KB is truly out of position. If things don't feel right, the second plan is to stand down and take my time to reconfigure and hit hard somewhere late in the year.

[Capt. Harlock]

I am not commanding men. I am not pretending that I am commanding men. I am playing chess. John is playing chess. I'm trying to win. Part of trying to win is to use my troops efficiently - to not send them in harm's way unless it serves a purpose. I'm not deploying them with the intent of getting them killed. I'm deploying them in a fluid situation in which there's risk and reward.

All that freely granted, but what has the cost been? How many Victory Points has John piled up, and how many units are now off-line for a time gathering recruits?

[Canoerebel]

Once AV is past, victory points are pretty much irrelevant. What I mean by that is I don't base my play on them. If a strategy makes sense strategically, I go with it. The Gilberts made sense. From a VP standpoint, though, the cost was negligible. The Allies didn't lose any ships to speak of (besides a few xAK). The men lost might have totalled a few hundred points. (I think two bases had roughly 140 VP and the ohter around 50 or 70, so these weren't major concentrations.) The units lost don't affect the Allied ability to fight and there's not lag time for "recruiting." Each of the three main theaters (NoPac, Oz and India) have more than enough to handle needs well into the future.

The only thing I'm short of right now is political points, and none of these operations had any influence on those (the only thing that has affected PP is my ignorant switching of several air groups a few weeks ago).

Gilberts and Ramree were synergistic plans implemented at the same time with the aim of one drawing John's full attention so that I would be free to prosecute the other with less interference. John focused on Gilberts, so I focused on Ramree (which, as stated from teh outset, was really the Allies' main objective). John committing to Gilberts in such a huge way for so long was just a bonus.

[Crackaces]

Once AV is past, victory points are pretty much irrelevant.

Just to clairfy, you mean IJ AV, Allied AV is the only way for the good guys to win from a game standpoint. No Allied AV and the bad guys win. This fundemental fact clouds the strategy of both the IJ and Allies in my opinion.

Do you think that thought is a result of not having any games last until 1945? The lastest games have not made it past 1943! Is the real Allied victory conditions in this game to play it out until the IJ gets dispirited and resigns? Very doable and your play from my perspective hinges on that assumption. Very reasonable in my book since your games tend to end before Allied AV becomes the issue of the day, and IMHO) John is really not planning for 1945 either

[Canoerebel]

I ignore AV from an Allied standpoint. IE, I ignore AV once Japan's lost it's shot at it. (For the record: I love the tension created by the possibility of a Japanese AV!)

Once a game gets into 1944 or 1945, both sides have done pretty well and both sides probably know "who the winner is" no matter what the victory points say. I suppose if I have a game going into late '44 in which the Allies are really thrashing Japan, I might then look at AV to see if there's a feasible way of doing it that doesn't totally trash game play (IE, enjoyment of the contest).

But I've never looked at the game as: hmm, I need 2:1 in 1945, so I get x points for Manila, Y for Hong Kong, Z for Singapore, let's get them on this date with only this many planes lost, this many ships lost, while scoring this many strat points against Japan, etc. By that point I'm focusing on Manila because it gives me a base to prosecute the war against the Home Islands, not because of its VP.

[Canoerebel]

I've been really puzzled about the outburst of emotion and criticsm today, especially coming from many folks who I respect and like. I'm trying to figure out what incited the outburst. My best guess is that it comes from people who are mainly following John's AAR. They, in turn, see John conquering three or four outposts in a row, some with decent garrisons like 8th Marine Regiment, and perceive my writing as being cavalier about the losses of these units. If that's what's going on, I can understand how readers with a limited familiarity with my AAR might get an inaccurate idea of my thinking if they're haven't read the full AAR (and who could, given it's vast length?).

Poultry Lad's comments suggesting that I have suppressed the information about the units was particularly troubling until I looked at it from this point of view. If I'm right, readers like Chicken Boy haven't read enough of the AAR to know that I've addressed the makeup of the garrisons of these islands, but long ago came to grips with the fact that they were lost causes in the face of overwhelming force. I did try to send in a few supply ships, but they got mauled. I employed alot of subs to run supply, but that proved ineffective.

I think the criticism over the Gilberts is misplaced, but I recognize where it comes from and that reasonable minds can disagree. But any criticism over Akutan Island could only be based on ignorance of what went on. The Allies occupied that island back in January or February. Things went well for quite some time, but then John committed a large force that I couldn't compete with. I used subs and transport aircraft to send in supply. I used a few xAKs. I staged fighters forward to Cold Bay and they gave John fits. But ultimately I couldn't compete with Umnak Island. But the Allies held that base for seven months and it took most of that time and three BBs (Yamato, Mutsu and Nagato) to take it. Overall, this was a victory for the Allies (who also still hold the other base occupied at the time, Cold Bay.)

If it's John's readers that are irritated at my attitude, please give me the benefit of the doubt. Surely you haven't read enough of this ridiculously long AAR to know how carefully I've woven these things together in the long-term interest of the Allies.

If it's my readers that I've irritated, please PM me and tell me where I've gone astray.

[Crackaces]

I might then look at AV to see if there's a feasible way of doing it that doesn't totally trash game play (IE, enjoyment of the contest).

You have an excellent point here CR from my perspective. In both of my PBEM games I stayed within reason, but exploited IJ mistakes that fell within the parameters of "totally trashing game play". Burma offers such a problem. In my last game I ended up with the Commonwealth threating to take Peking in Feb 1944, and not really War in the Pacific per se .. ... I do think the IJFB's are getting smart and now allocating the resources to prevent a debacle ...

[paullus99]

If you're not 100% committed to the Aleutians Operation, what else might make sense - something that would be significant and long-lasting (not just a pin-prick)?

John loves the opportunity to commit 100% against an Allied Counterattack (again, his game against Andy is an excellent example of his style) - is there someplace vital, that you could hold, that would force him to play on your terms & not his?

Just an idea.....

[Cap Mandrake]

ORIGINAL: GreyJoy
Dan, the only way to beat me is, probably, to have a mirror AAR thread about a match between the two of us[8D]

I disagree. He could try sprinkling in some goofy spelling errors [:)]