Rommel - A great general?

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

That's like saying they broke out because they achieved a breakthrough. Why did it take them as long as they did to achieve enough attrition to break out?

Attrition takes time. A lot of attrition was achieved in the six weeks or so of Rommel's command, and a little more in the following week. That the Germans broke after that last week doesn't mean that the fighting in that one single week was more important than in all of the previous six. It was just the straw that broke the camel's back.

I repeat, my experimental evidence (playtests of France 1944) seems to show they should have reached it sooner.

Perhaps historically the attrition divider wasn't so low.

My point remains that the attrition rate is just fine in the scenario from Cobra onward. But not from D-Day to Cobra - during that period, the rate in the scenario was too high, making shock necessary. That is experimental evidence that something was slowing the Allies down more in that period than in the latter one. Rommel is as good a theory as anything else.

Or if those Generals made different decisions.

.... how can you allow the Generals to make different decisions, and yet say that their ability- which produces an 8% increase in the fighting strength of all their units- remains exactly the same?

What's wrong with that? It's like having leader units - Napoleon, Lee, Jackson, etc.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: TOCarroll

Rommel's choice was wrong to push into Egypt--he forfitted either air superiority or supplys.

Correct, but only from the perspective of 20:20 hindsight. As I've pointed out, while logistics were stretched by that advance, there is no way to know whether the Axis were stopped by logistics or the huge material reinforcements the CW received.

From Rommel's perspective, the CW had just been ravaged by the losses at Tobruk. He had no reason to suspect those losses were going to be more than made up. And, if they hadn't, logistics might not have been enough to stop him.

[KarlXII]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Dabbs

What seems to me the single largest contributing (not the only) factor to Rommel's defeat in North Africa was the lack of oil to power the Italian navy on a consistent and extended basis.  That would have been helpful for the escorting of merchant marine supplies to Libya and likely could have extended to starving Malta of supplies.  As it was, I think the Axis came close to bringing Malta to a real emergency; but pressure relented as it was starting to take effect.

I suspect the Italian navy used lack of oil as an excuse not to act, rather than it being a real reason.

Anyway, the work of blockading Malta was done by the Luftwaffe- but there were long periods in which virtually no pressure was being put on Malta from the air at all. Had the significance of Malta been realised in 1941, the island could probably have been reduced in a year. Of course the Luftwaffe saw Russia as a rather higher priority.

The Italian Navy did really have problems with oil. They had a lot of large ships and had even more problems than the germans in getting any oil at all, while Germany at least had the Romanian Ploesti oilsources (and before june 1941 also relied on oil from Soviet). Hitler was forced to part with some of his oil reserves to Italy so that the navy and airforce could conduct their important missions in harassing Allied shipping in the Mediterranean (prior to 1942) and to escort all the supply and merchant ships to North Africa. I agree that the Italians seldom showed the agressiveness that the germans did and they had problems in coordinating their navy with the airforce in operations but the fact remains that on most occassions they had to decide wether it was worth sending out their capital ships to harass the allied or not depending on the successrate in relation to how much oil such an undertaking would consume.

Personally I would say Enigma was one of the major things the allied had in winning the war and also the constant lack of oil for the axis. The Axis (After autumn 1942) where always in lack of oil and in 1944 that was critical. They became static and had to abandon as much equipment as they had lost due to enemy fire. Enigma also always give the Allies information on where and when axis reinforcements was and where to arrive as well as orders to the current army, navy and airforce. Ok, that last paragraph was out of the topic though

Would consider Rommel "good", but Guderian probably best in class and a class above Rommel...IMO.  That's one thing about the German Army though, they had a lot of good generals from division-level up to army; whereas it's difficult to come up with any comparable list of generals by country.

Mm. Nazi Germany had all the right characteristics for producing fine generals. First, the country had an excellent military tradition in the first place, and had come up with a pretty good system come 1918. Second, they had lost the First World War. This made them take a long, hard look at the way war is fought and come up with radical solutions to its problems- something the Allies did not do to the same extent. Third, the National-Socialist movement was so revolutionary in nature that it was natural for it to encourage revolutionary forms of warfare and the newest types of equipment- at the same time avoiding the destructive purges which broke the back of the Red Army. Fourth, the army's tiny size between 1919 and 1934 meant that only the very best military men could be in uniform at all (some of the generals of the Second World War were not even comissioned officers prior to 1934), and the expansion to the Wehrmacht was done so rapidly that these men were promoted to high command much faster than in other circumstances, preventing the domination of army thought by conservatism which occurs in most armies.

[Sarkus]

I agree with most of what's been said along the lines of Rommel as a great tactician who wasn't necessarily well suited to command above the division level. He made it work in N. Africa to an extent because of good staff support and what I view as poor opponents. Most of the time the British had more and better supplied forces and yet struggled. To justify that they had to elevate Rommel to a higher status than he deserved.

What bothers me the most is the tendancy of Rommel fans to ignore the questions about his relationship with Hitler. None of the biographies I've read have really been able to shed much light on it. And yet, Rommel was one of Hitler's favorite generals at a time when Hitler criticized the German army as a whole as not being "Nazified" as much as he would have liked. Throw in Rommel's close proximity to Hitler during the Poland campaign (as commander of the army's official bodyguard unit) and the clear role Hitler played in getting Rommel, who had never commanded tanks at any level, assigned to command an armor division for the invasion of France in 1940, and clearly questions are raised despite his family's post-war insistence that he wasn't a Nazi. Since his family also insisted he had nothing to do with the plot to kill Hitler in 1944, he's hardly exonerrated.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

My point remains that the attrition rate is just fine in the scenario from Cobra onward. But not from D-Day to Cobra - during that period, the rate in the scenario was too high, making shock necessary.

Maybe this has something to do with the excess quantities of active defender equipment, which have a tendency to produce density penalties.

What's wrong with that? It's like having leader units - Napoleon, Lee, Jackson, etc.

Well this is what I suggested earlier in the thread- that Rommel's effect should be much more localised. Of course this is difficult to do in TOAW.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

From Rommel's perspective, the CW had just been ravaged by the losses at Tobruk. He had no reason to suspect those losses were going to be more than made up. And, if they hadn't, logistics might not have been enough to stop him.

It was quite obvious that the Allied logistical situation would recover with the retreat to Egypt (just as Rommel's own had recovered when he was forced to retreat back into Libya earlier in the campaign). The forces lost in the Summer of 1942 were not that irreplaceable either- 8th Army was largely able to extract itself from the Gazala battles and 2nd South African lost at Tobruk was not a first-line division in the first place (though the three other brigades lost there were).

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: karlxii

I agree that the Italians seldom showed the agressiveness that the germans did and they had problems in coordinating their navy with the airforce in operations but the fact remains that on most occassions they had to decide wether it was worth sending out their capital ships to harass the allied or not depending on the successrate in relation to how much oil such an undertaking would consume.

They always had the oil on hand for a major sortie- since it was still available when their fleet steamed into Malta after the surrender. The low stockpile merely allowed them to convince themselves not to take aggressive action. I'd say that if the German navy had been in that position, they would have been much more active. They tended not to look for excuses not to act.

Personally I would say Enigma was one of the major things the allied had in winning the war

Certainly in the Mediterranean: by the second half of 1942 we knew the point of departure and course for every merchant ship heading to North Africa. Though it sometimes backfired; when we overheard Rommel's initial orders not to attack we made the mistake of assuming they would be obeyed.

Enigma also always give the Allies information on where and when axis reinforcements was and where to arrive

They managed to catch the Allies out during the Battle of the Bulge. We only had some of the codes, not all of them.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Sarkus

What bothers me the most is the tendancy of Rommel fans to ignore the questions about his relationship with Hitler.

Yeah. I was once ridiculed on another forum for pointing out that Rommel was a keen supporter of Hitler (even if he wasn't quite as bloodthirsty as the latter), and was only able to rise so rapidly through the ranks because of his position as Hitler's favourite. There seems to be some kind of anti-Nazi myth that's grown up around Rommel.

Since his family also insisted he had nothing to do with the plot to kill Hitler in 1944, he's hardly exonerrated.

My understanding is that he knew about it- but that's all. Of course, senior army officers were always talking about this sort of thing, so he may well not have believed it would happen.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious
Maybe this has something to do with the excess quantities of active defender equipment, which have a tendency to produce density penalties.

Yes, it could be any number of other things, as I've already said. But, while one can question my methodology, it remains an experimental data point that supports giving Rommel higher than normal marks in Normandy.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

From Rommel's perspective, the CW had just been ravaged by the losses at Tobruk. He had no reason to suspect those losses were going to be more than made up. And, if they hadn't, logistics might not have been enough to stop him.

It was quite obvious that the Allied logistical situation would recover with the retreat to Egypt (just as Rommel's own had recovered when he was forced to retreat back into Libya earlier in the campaign). The forces lost in the Summer of 1942 were not that irreplaceable either- 8th Army was largely able to extract itself from the Gazala battles and 2nd South African lost at Tobruk was not a first-line division in the first place (though the three other brigades lost there were).

I never said otherwise. But it was not obvious that the CW was going to be so heavily reinforced to where they were much stronger than even before Gazala. We can't know whether it was that reinforcement or the logistics problems that stopped him. Clearly, there would be some force level, below which the CW can't stop him regardless of the logistical difficulties.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Sarkus
Since his family also insisted he had nothing to do with the plot to kill Hitler in 1944, he's hardly exonerrated.

My understanding is that he knew about it- but that's all. Of course, senior army officers were always talking about this sort of thing, so he may well not have believed it would happen.

I've heard that he discussed with some subordinates what they would do if he ordered them to ceasefire with the Western Allies. That suggests he may have been in on the plot after all. It's irrelevant to how skillful a commander he was, of course.

[TOCarroll]

On Rommel vs. Adolf:     Rommel was certainly aware of the plot. He advocated the removal from power of Hitler, followed by a trial (perhaps by a peoples court? [:D]). Actually a military trial. Rommel was realistic enough to see where Germany was headed, but unrealistic enough to want a peace with the Western Allies, and continuation with the war with Russia. He had a curoius dualism, common to many who serve their country. Loyal to a fault (obeying the El Alimen stop order). But not blindly loyal. Perhaps Wolf Heckman (who served in North Afrika under Rommel) put it best. "...his last act was both the most characteristic, and most typical act of his life. He gave his life to protect his family, indirectly aid the regieme he loathed. Heckman is a major Rommel critic, but isn't blind to his virtues either. If you find a copy of Rommel's North African War, it's a great read. [:)]
 
Tom OC

[hank]

IMHO Rommel was one of Germany's best divisional commanders.  They had many excellent division commanders like Balck and Rauss that got little press time.  As an army or corp level commander Rommel was good but not the best.  Correct me if I'm wrong but his command of the Normandy defenses was his highest level of command.
 
From what I've read, Manstein was the man.  As an army group or corp commander, Manstein's record stands as one of the best if not the best.
 
later

[TOCarroll]

I agree. But Manstein had a general staff background, and came from "Military Aristocracy" (e.g. Prussian Military family). He was exposed to training and situations that Rommel had to lear on the fly. Also, commanding larger groups of men, and present at more high level breifings, Manstein probably had a better overview of the overall military situation. He certaihnly had a better overall grasp of grand strategy than Rommel. Both however commanded Army Groups: Rommel Army Group Africa, and Army Group B (France), and Manstein Army Group Don, later Army Group South in Russia. Rommel, however, was smart enough to figure out that Germany had lost WW2 before Manstein. Rommel seemed to be more intuitative, where Manstein was analytical.
 
Tom OC 

[hank]

I'm reading a book now called "Blitzkrieg Legend" (by Karl-heinz Frieser).  So far a good book.  It pointed out before 1940 there was much planning by Halder and Manstein.  Halder was considered an excellent stragegist but his strength was also his weakness.  Halder was extrememly analytical to the point were he actually relaxed by doing higher mathematics and logic problems. (yea, I do math problems for fun too.  Not!!  I have to get paid before I'll do math for "fun".)
 
Manstein on the other hand had a more unpredictable style of planning.  He intuitively knew of maneuver, logistics, etc. but his planning was more toward actions that were not predictable through analytical calculations such as Halder would do.  I think Manstein had many traits that Rommell had in those regards.  Manstein and Rommel were risk takers.  Many other generals were not.
 
I agree with what you're saying about Rommel.  He did not have the position or help Manstein did.  Plus, as you said Rommel was more realistic about how the war was progressing (or lack of). Even though Manstein and Hitler bumped heads on many occasions he was still dedicated to the Axis cause.  Rommel saw the writing on the wall long before he died.
 
regards
 

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Clearly, there would be some force level, below which the CW can't stop him regardless of the logistical difficulties.

Right- but the British already had enough force even as they were retreating from the Gazala Battles and the loss of Tobruk. Given a short, prepared and unflankable line, excellent supplies and replacements for the tanks which had been lost in the previous few months, it wasn't necessary to have a particularly large force.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay
I've heard that he discussed with some subordinates what they would do if he ordered them to ceasefire with the Western Allies. That suggests he may have been in on the plot after all. It's irrelevant to how skillful a commander he was, of course.

Indeed. Just an interesting tangent. Your point is well taken- however it only indicates he knew of the plot and was prepared to go along with it, not that he was actually involved in the planning or execution. Of course, merely not reporting the plot is a pretty serious action.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: TOCarroll

On Rommel vs. Adolf:     Rommel was certainly aware of the plot. He advocated the removal from power of Hitler, followed by a trial (perhaps by a peoples court? [:D]). Actually a military trial. Rommel was realistic enough to see where Germany was headed, but unrealistic enough to want a peace with the Western Allies, and continuation with the war with Russia.

He doesn't seem to have been much of a politician. Supposedly he advocated putting a token Jew in high office to improve the image of the Third Reich. Clearly, he didn't get it.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: hank

I agree with what you're saying about Rommel.  He did not have the position or help Manstein did.  Plus, as you said Rommel was more realistic about how the war was progressing (or lack of). Even though Manstein and Hitler bumped heads on many occasions he was still dedicated to the Axis cause.  Rommel saw the writing on the wall long before he died.

Mm. It's a matter of how far you believe Manstein in his memoirs: according to that he (quite reasonably) felt that Russia could be fought to a standstill in 1943, but after that just seems to have been fulfilling his duty as an officer.

The author's self-publicism and curious double-standards notwithstanding, Lost Victories would be my number one recommended read for a TOAW player. Definitely makes one think in the right sort of way.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Clearly, there would be some force level, below which the CW can't stop him regardless of the logistical difficulties.

Right- but the British already had enough force even as they were retreating from the Gazala Battles and the loss of Tobruk. Given a short, prepared and unflankable line, excellent supplies and replacements for the tanks which had been lost in the previous few months, it wasn't necessary to have a particularly large force.

But Rommel doesn't know that they've been so reinforced. My point was that one cannot look at the command decision after Tobruk and conclude that the logistics guarantee defeat and Rommel was a fool not to realize that, or that a General Staff School trained commander wouldn't have made the mistake. Rather, the chance of success depends upon the CW force level. With what Rommel knew of the magnitude of the Tobruk and Gazala victories, it was not an unreasonable decision to press on.