Shattered Sword Website

[NawlinzVoodoo]

I did not read Sword, but I did read every other book on Midway. Yes, MI does take into fact, the IJN numbers and post-war information. Poor Nagumo, that was one unlucky SOB. [;)]

[decaro]

Nagumo led the most successful raid in IJN history and still got chewed-out by Yamamotto because he didn't sink the US CVs; what was he supposed to do, wait at Pearl for them to return from Wake? The surprise was over by his 2nd air strike when the kido butai began losing aircraft that were needed for all the other IJN Ops to be set in motion once PH was neutralized!

Nagumo began his career as a torpedo officer and commanding a carrier group was apparently beyond his abilities, but IJ seniority was inflexible when it came to appointments, i.e., the next man in line, not the best man suited for the job at hand.

[Prince of Eckmühl]

I'm gonna get the book because of the subject matter, but I have to mention that the customer review at the bottom of the product page details information that was previously revealed in Shattered Sword. The "revelations" that I'm referring to are those associated with the technical challenges of arming IJN strike aircraft and the apparent truth that the Tone's #4 search-plane wouldn't have overflown U.S. ships even if it had launched on time. If in fact these are presented by the author as "breakthrough discoveries" on his part, then he's full-of-bull. We'll see. [;)]

PoE (aka ivanmoe)

[Prince of Eckmühl]

ORIGINAL: NawlinzVoodoo

I did not read Sword, but I did read every other book on Midway. Yes, MI does take into fact, the IJN numbers and post-war information. Poor Nagumo, that was one unlucky SOB. [;)]

Nagumo was really just a cog in the machine that was the Kido Butai. He was straight-jacketed by the finely-honed doctrine that had grown up with the legendary force. What's not always understood or appreciated in this regard is that it was created not only to deliver decisive blows against enemy naval forces, but that it was supposed to do so without significant loss of its own ships or aircrew. That was what the KB was all about.

That's what it trained for, and that's the way it behaved operationally. Everything had to be done, just-so. For example (as I've noted numerous times previously), the KB's carriers operated by division. Come strike time, one of the division's carriers would provide 18-21 dive-bombers, the other would provide 18-21 torpedo-bombers, and each would provide 6-9 fighters. The ships would launch together, the a/c would form-up and off they'd go, joining up with a/c from another carrier division if available.

I'd be errant if I didn't emphasize what I described in the paragraph above was not a "preferred mode of operation," rather it was a religion of sort to the officers of the KB, carved in stone, if you will. Japanese naval officers believed, perhaps justifiably, that this was the only method of attack that would allow them to deliver a knock-out blow while suffering minimal losses. They knew that a battle (or war) of attrition would see them at a steadily worsening material disadvantage, one that they couldn't win, so they weren't gonna play that game. No, it was gonna be all or nothing.

So, you've got this guy, Nagumo. He's in charge of a superb group of four carriers, the forte of which is air-raids against unprepared targets. Decisions well beyond his purview dictate that his force will be used in totally different role, to go on station and support an invasion of an island that's been heavily fortified during the preceding year. After he's neutralized the island's air-defenses, it's believed that the enemy fleet will emerge to do battle, and a second Tsushima will ensue, a battle of annihilation that was totally dependent on the doctrine that made it possible, one that Nagumo simply could not deviate from.

So long as Nagumo adhered to doctrine, he couldn't fail personally. If the battle were lost, it was because the doctrine was flawed, which of course it was, at least in the bastardized form that manifested itself with the Midway fiasco. If on the other hand, Nagumo had acted on his own, the failure and disgrace would have been on his head, something that was simply unthinkable to any admiral in the IJN. So, no, I don't see Nagumo as being unlucky, a sad sort of victim, perhaps, of his own culture and that of the IJN. And I suspect that his family was really sort of relieved when he was killed in the Marianas in 1944 and whatever tinge of dishonor that stained his reputation was finally expunged, his luck having finally improved.

PoE (aka ivanmoe)

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: Prince of Eckmühl

... Nagumo was really just a cog in the machine that was the Kido Butai. He was straight-jacketed by the finely-honed doctrine that had grown up with the legendary force. What's not always understood or appreciated in this regard is that it was created not only to deliver decisive blows against enemy naval forces, but that it was supposed to do so without significant loss of its own ships or aircrew ...
PoE (aka ivanmoe)

That's because after spending millions of yen to convert and then refit IJ's hybrid CVs -- Akagi and Kaga -- it couldn't afford to lose them; there were no cost-effective replacements for these ships.

But not only was it unrealistic to assume that the kido butai was going to incessantly inflict damage and never catch hell itself, but to send them to sea w/o bothering to install radar, the latest AAA ,redundant fire and damage control systems, etc., is beyond my understanding.

What was the IJN thinking?

[Prince of Eckmühl]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

But not only was it unrealistic to assume that the kido butai was going to incessantly inflict damage and never catch hell itself, but to send them to sea w/o bothering to install radar, the latest AAA ,redundant fire and damage control systems, etc., is beyond my understanding.

What was the IJN thinking?

Let me begin by noting that the items that you cite as being essential to the preservation of the KB are ones that would make its ships more survivable if successfully attacked. And let me add another "feature" to your list...decent radios for the CAP, channels over which they could be alerted to an enemy encroachment. As it was, ships sought to communicate the presence of hostile aircraft by firing their main batteries in the direction of the intruders and hoped that the CAP would get the message. I don't know about anyone else, but that strikes me as a little too "Nelsonian" for what was otherwise billed as a technologically advanced military, one which sought to challenge the largest navies of the age, those of the U.S. and the British Commonwealth.

Given its country's very limited industrial base, the IJN was forced to make critical decisions as to how and where to focus the precious resources at their disposal. If you break those items down into two categories, defensive and offensive, those that would make its ships more survivable as opposed to those that would make them more lethal, what you see is that they consistently erred on the side of the latter. This dovetailed nicely with cultural norms that placed great value on attack, as a virtue of sorts, and conversely, was rather more circumspect about devoting too much attention to what many viewed as essentially less honorable defensive duties.

The strategy of seeking a decisive engagement and executing an all-out-attack worked against the Russians in 1905. The Czar's navy was soundly defeated and there was essentially no navy left to carry on the fight. Without a doubt, this emboldened the IJN to believe that they could pull it off again if only they could find the proper weapon. The "sword," as it were, turned out to be the Kido Butai. And one of the great ironies attendant to WW2 is that Japan's "cleanest" victory, its attack on Pearl Harbor, failed to knock-out the USN and it's Pacific Fleet. In effect, the KB had failed at the first and most important task presented to the force during it's career against the USN.

Even after its post-Midway doctrinal reforms (circa 1943), evidence suggests that the IJN could never really bring itself to devote too much attention to defensive measures, and continued to seek a time and place to knock the USN out of the war with a decisive attack. In a very real sense, what all this indicates is that the Japanese never had a chance in hell of winning this war, short of an outright session by the U.S. of its interests in East Asia and the Western Pacific. Failing that, just about everything else that Japan did, militarily, was doomed to come up a day late, and a dollar short. It simply wasn't gonna happen for them, so long as the U.S. remained committed to prosecuting the war.

PoE (aka ivanmoe)

[Gregor_SSG]

It's interesting to note that the Japanese Army suffered from the same problems. Retreat was an unword, and defense existed only as a purely tactical state which merely denoted any necessary and grudging pause between otherwise continuous offensive action. The Brits completely failed to understand this in Malaya, but worked out what to do in Burma, and used their new knowledge
to rout the Japanese.

Not helping the Japanese was the fact that their offensive doctrine was also very limited, and the only correct response to a failed attack was to repeat the same attack but with an increase in zeal (though probably with a decrease in personnel). The correct response to series of failed attacks was a banzai charge, which guaranteed a serious decrease in personnel, and rarely gained a victory.

Gregor

[Prince of Eckmühl]

ORIGINAL: Gregor_SSG

It's interesting to note that the Japanese Army suffered from the same problems.

When I was composing my post(s) above, I kept thinking about the failure of the Japanese Army to develop an effective anti-tank weapon during WW2. Had they succeeded in doing so, many of the Allied amphibious landings in 1942-1945 could well have been compromised. Again, however, such a weapon would be used primarily in defense, so anti-tank guns and/or shoulder fired weapons simply didn't find their way into the procurement queue, at least not as a priority item.

PoE (aka ivanmoe)

[decaro]

Since both Imperial services were effected, I would say their common denominator was the ancient Japanese warrior code of bushido.

Failure causes a warrior to lose face, unless he dies in the act of serving the emporer, which is always a personal honor despite the tactical outcome. In any event, he would have to peform harri karri/sepuko if he made it back alive w/a failed mission, which would not only dishonor him, but his entire family, even his dead ancestors. Perhaps the IJ commander felt he had nothing to lose at this point, so he rolled the dice and attacked, again and again.

Re IJN offensive/defensive doctrine: As IJN/kido butai commanders were reluctant to use their strike planes as scouts -- it decreased their offensive capability! -- I went in the CaW editor and decreased the training and admin settings of these planes to help simulate this doctrine.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: Prince of Eckmühl

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

But not only was it unrealistic to assume that the kido butai was going to incessantly inflict damage and never catch hell itself, but to send them to sea w/o bothering to install radar ...

... As it was, ships sought to communicate the presence of hostile aircraft by firing their main batteries in the direction of the intruders and hoped that the CAP would get the message. I don't know about anyone else, but that strikes me as a little too "Nelsonian" for what was otherwise billed as a technologically advanced military ...

PoE (aka ivanmoe)

Reminds me of the incident -- was it in the Indian Ocean? -- where Brit bombers were attacking the Akagi and Nagumo wasn't aware of it until the water spouts from the bombs began splashing on his deck!

In a memo, an IJN officer suggested radar be installed. But if one of those Brit bombs had hit home, the IJN may have rethought air radar as the KB CVs were "priceless." Then Midway might have been a very different battle.

[tssmith]

Did the Japanese even have an operational radar in early 1942?
 
 

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: tssmith

Did the Japanese even have an operational radar in early 1942?

Re Shattered Sword, Appendix 8:

"... On the AKAGI there have been many times when the first warning was the splash of the bombs ... As a countermeasure, it is necessary to install AA search radar or sound equipment at once." Battle Report of CV Hiryu, No. 9, 26 march 1942-222 April 1942.

Re this memo, the IJN must have had something available, but whether it worked was anyone's guess as it was never installed; as the Hiryu had the largest superstructure of the KB, it would have been the best CV for a primitive radar installation.