Incoming!

[mdiehl]

Combat statistics might be a bit tricky area All after all, combat is not about statistic- it is Murphy's law in it's full scope and practice

We agree that unforeseen things can mess up a predicted outcome based on some statistical calculation. That said, Murphy's law is a statistical argument. Basically it's an engineering law that notes that a part is most likely to fail when it is placed under the greatest stress, and parts tend to be placed under the greatest stress when they're most needed.

I'm not sure how many cases of actual battles can be invoked as examples of Murphy's Law in action. Maybe the ABDA's command and control structure in the battle of the Java sea, USN command and control at the battle of Savo Island, or the Japanese operational plan at Midway (a plan that had no tolerance at all for deviation from predicted perfect execution).

Then ... what was the hit rate for USN WW2 torpedoes?

I don't know. To my knowledge, no one has brought it up before around here. I could probably put something together for USN torpedo shots. You might ask someone at Matrix where their algorithm comes from.

How does their hit rate compare to USN torpedo hit rates in WITP?

I'd guess that certainly the Japanese hit and detonation rate in 1942 was considerably better than the USN hit and detonation rate in 1942.

[wworld7]

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

Robert Strange MacNamara and Donald Rumsfeld both worshipped statistical analysis. Colin Powel,Norman Swartzkoft,Curtis Lemay and Chester Nimitz did not.

I doubt you have done enough indepth research on these men, as your statement above is not accurate at all with Gen. Powel, Gen. Curtis or Admiral Nimitz. I dont' have extensive knowedge of Gen Swartzkoft, but I could guess he would also take offense to your statement, but again with my lack of knowedge of him I could be wrong.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Combat statistics might be a bit tricky area All after all, combat is not about statistic- it is Murphy's law in it's full scope and practice

We agree that unforeseen things can mess up a predicted outcome based on some statistical calculation. That said, Murphy's law is a statistical argument. Basically it's an engineering law that notes that a part is most likely to fail when it is placed under the greatest stress, and parts tend to be placed under the greatest stress when they're most needed.

I'm not sure how many cases of actual battles can be invoked as examples of Murphy's Law in action. Maybe the ABDA's command and control structure in the battle of the Java sea, USN command and control at the battle of Savo Island, or the Japanese operational plan at Midway (a plan that had no tolerance at all for deviation from predicted perfect execution).

Then ... what was the hit rate for USN WW2 torpedoes?

I don't know. To my knowledge, no one has brought it up before around here. I could probably put something together for USN torpedo shots. You might ask someone at Matrix where their algorithm comes from.

How does their hit rate compare to USN torpedo hit rates in WITP?

I'd guess that certainly the Japanese hit and detonation rate in 1942 was considerably better than the USN hit and detonation rate in 1942.

HISTORY

IJN airborne torpedo hit rate was about 20%. I seem to recall the surface torpedo hit rate was about the same as the Allied hit rate. On the other hand, the maximum range of the Japanese oxygen torpedoes was much greater, and their detectability was much lower.

[mdiehl]

IJN airborne torpedo hit rate was about 20%.

Do you know whether or not that varied by platform (for ex B5N vs G4M)?

On the other hand, the maximum range of the Japanese oxygen torpedoes was much greater, and their detectability was much lower.

Yes. That's why circumstances of firing made such a difference (IMO). It was pretty common for both USN and IJN skippers to assume they were taking torpedo fire more or less as soon as they were sure that their own ships had been identified by the enemy. When the Japanese could get a torpedo volley off before the USN knew they were taking fire, the Japanese could do rather well. Ditto for the USN at Balikpapan in 1942 and at Cape Esperence, and subsequent 1943 actions such as Empress Augusta Bay and the like.

That's why Czernecki is correct (IMO) to suggest that the greatest asset of the Type 93A was its speed, rather than its range.

Daylight shots had pretty poor success rates except under pretty weird circumstances, such as the USN DD/DE charge at the Battle of Samar.

[AirGriff]

Now that I've read this entire thread, the odds are statistically pretty good I'm going to head to the fridge for something cold to drink [:D]

[bobogoboom]

[8|]

[RevRick]

To heck with this joyful banter. Clapton and Stevie Winwood are playing on PBS right now... Adios...

[AW1Steve]

ORIGINAL: flipperwasirish

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

Robert Strange MacNamara and Donald Rumsfeld both worshipped statistical analysis. Colin Powel,Norman Swartzkoft,Curtis Lemay and Chester Nimitz did not.

I doubt you have done enough indepth research on these men, as your statement above is not accurate at all with Gen. Powel, Gen. Curtis or Admiral Nimitz. I dont' have extensive knowedge of Gen Swartzkoft, but I could guess he would also take offense to your statement, but again with my lack of knowedge of him I could be wrong.

Ah, but you didn't read what I said. I didn't say that they didn't use statistical analysis.I said that they didn't worship them.They gave statistical analysis as much attention as it deserved. The 1st two genetlemen used SA for SA sake. They didn't see it as merely another tool in a tool box full of options. They say it as the end all and be all. There is the difference. And Lemay , in particular, was quite willing to toss the whole process and go with a gut hunch. [:D]

[AW1Steve]

mdiehl, I wasn't dissing you (ok, maybe I was teasing you a little). Please don't take offense. I was trying to be playfull, and as usual, got a little heavy handed. Sorry. [8|]

[rogueusmc]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

How does their hit rate compare to USN torpedo hit rates in WITP?

I'd guess that certainly the Japanese hit and detonation rate in 1942 was considerably better than the USN hit and detonation rate in 1942.

I like this part...

[mdiehl]

mdiehl, I wasn't dissing you (ok, maybe I was teasing you a little). Please don't take offense. I was trying to be playfull, and as usual, got a little heavy handed. Sorry.

No offense taken. I'm very skeptical of claims of central tendency too except when I understand the data very well.

I like this part...

Weeelll, it *is* a guess. An informed guess. I know what the hit rates for Japanese surface ship torps and under which circumstances. I don't know the hit rates for the US ones. Given the tendency of the Mark XIVs and Mark XVs to dud, run deep, &c, it's not a difficult call to make.

[castor troy]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

That'd be incorrect (as usual), as I am the one who tends to rely on facts. If it really is the collective desire to rehash the whole discussion again (in which it will be demonstrated that the median and modal hit rates of Long Lance vollies was ZERO hits, and the mean 6.25, 12.25 at night at less than 8K yards, and 25% when the Allies didn't know that Japanese ships were in the area), we could do all that, and you could once again attempt to explain why the historical statistical mean, mode, median and circumstances associated with each don't matter.

lol mdiehl.

You´re making a fool of yourself and I don´t mean that offensive at all. I´m not interested in discussing something about the LL at all, nor about the uber Wildcat and the crappy Zero (which would be another of your favourite threads I guess). I only answered your post because of this:

quote mdiehl: The ususal suspects will shortly show up with a litany of reasons why the empirical facts don't matter.

someone starts this thread and you post this as the second post? Well, you must have really good humor as I can´t believe you mean that serious when YOU are then the one that fills up this thread with posts. [&:] LOL Sir.

I´m not agreeing nor disagreeing with what you´re saying about the LL or the Zero vs Wildcat but I do know that usually 80% of the other people disagree with you on that matter and most of them surely know more about those things than I do. Again, I only referred to your statement above as this really made me laugh.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

IJN airborne torpedo hit rate was about 20%.

Do you know whether or not that varied by platform (for ex B5N vs G4M)?

On the other hand, the maximum range of the Japanese oxygen torpedoes was much greater, and their detectability was much lower.

Yes. That's why circumstances of firing made such a difference (IMO). It was pretty common for both USN and IJN skippers to assume they were taking torpedo fire more or less as soon as they were sure that their own ships had been identified by the enemy. When the Japanese could get a torpedo volley off before the USN knew they were taking fire, the Japanese could do rather well. Ditto for the USN at Balikpapan in 1942 and at Cape Esperence, and subsequent 1943 actions such as Empress Augusta Bay and the like.

That's why Czernecki is correct (IMO) to suggest that the greatest asset of the Type 93A was its speed, rather than its range.

Daylight shots had pretty poor success rates except under pretty weird circumstances, such as the USN DD/DE charge at the Battle of Samar.

OPERATIONS RESEARCH and HISTORY

The hit rate didn't vary by airborne platform, but it did vary based on pilot experience. The best pilots got about 20% hits.

The Mogami was responsible for the merchie hits at Balikpapan.

Surface-launched torpedo hits were pretty much random and reflected target aspect more than anything else.

[Nemo121]

Bringing this back to the actual topic I think that a 6.5% hit rate is actually not at all inconsistent with IJN doctrine.
 
If you assume that during a night combat action an IJN DD with 8 torpedo tubes would be able to reload once and fire those reloads that generates 16 torps from a single IJN DD. 16 torpedoes generates one hit. So, an average IJN destroyer flotilla of a half-dozen DDs and a CL should be able to generate 6 to 7 hits. Throw in the torpedo-heavy CLs with the ability to generate 80 launches in a night ( 40 tubes with reloads ? --- going from memory here ) and you have individual CLs which, according to the stats, could each generate an additional 5 hits.
 
When you read Kaigun and read that the IJN seemed willing to expend these torpedo-heavy CLs and at least 30 or so DDs in this night surface action you can see that they could expect to generate at least 40 to 50 torpedo hits. The long range of the Long Lance was, at least in part, to be used to allow the IJN CLs and DDs to target the enemy battleline whilst still avoiding decisive engagement with any destroyer screens so one should expect that those torpedoes would be concentrated on CLs, CAs and BBs. Spreading 50 hits through the USN BBs, CAs and, to a lesser extent, CLs would have been pretty devastating. A single hit would have rendered pretty much any CL or CA less than suitable for combat while two would have seriously damaged any BB.
 
 
The problem of course was not so much with the torpedoes ( given their purposes a 6.5% hit rate from long range actually achieved their purposes ) or the ships but with the fact that those ships were highly unlikely to ever get to fight the sort of action they were designed for. When they DID get to fight those sorts of actions in the early war years the Allied CLs, CAs and BBs tended to suffer --- but the kicker was that those actions were such a minority that even brilliant performance in them wasn't ever war-altering.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Bringing this back to the actual topic I think that a 6.5% hit rate is actually not at all inconsistent with IJN doctrine.

If you assume that during a night combat action an IJN DD with 8 torpedo tubes would be able to reload once and fire those reloads that generates 16 torps from a single IJN DD. 16 torpedoes generates one hit. So, an average IJN destroyer flotilla of a half-dozen DDs and a CL should be able to generate 6 to 7 hits. Throw in the torpedo-heavy CLs with the ability to generate 80 launches in a night ( 40 tubes with reloads ? --- going from memory here ) and you have individual CLs which, according to the stats, could each generate an additional 5 hits.

When you read Kaigun and read that the IJN seemed willing to expend these torpedo-heavy CLs and at least 30 or so DDs in this night surface action you can see that they could expect to generate at least 40 to 50 torpedo hits. The long range of the Long Lance was, at least in part, to be used to allow the IJN CLs and DDs to target the enemy battleline whilst still avoiding decisive engagement with any destroyer screens so one should expect that those torpedoes would be concentrated on CLs, CAs and BBs. Spreading 50 hits through the USN BBs, CAs and, to a lesser extent, CLs would have been pretty devastating. A single hit would have rendered pretty much any CL or CA less than suitable for combat while two would have seriously damaged any BB.


The problem of course was not so much with the torpedoes ( given their purposes a 6.5% hit rate from long range actually achieved their purposes ) or the ships but with the fact that those ships were highly unlikely to ever get to fight the sort of action they were designed for. When they DID get to fight those sorts of actions in the early war years the Allied CLs, CAs and BBs tended to suffer --- but the kicker was that those actions were such a minority that even brilliant performance in them wasn't ever war-altering.

HISTORY and OPERATIONS RESEARCH (based on Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat)

During a night action with capital ships and cruisers broadside-on, each major ship in the US Fleet would subtend about 200 meters of 500-1000 meters, so that a surprise torpedo attack launched at long range would get about 20-40% hits. If the major ships turned away, they would subtend about 25-30 meters, reducing the pHit to 2.5-6%. During the Solomons campaign, the pHit values seen ranged between 6% and 20%, with surprise the dominant factor.

[whippleofd]

OH - OH! Mr. Kotter?!

Yes Horshack?

He was SUNK!

[>:]

Whipple

[m10bob]

ORIGINAL: RUPD3658

ORIGINAL: Feinder

It's a torpedo.  Of course they hurt!

[;)]


-F-

Unless they are an early war Allied dud[:D]

We also know not all of the U.S. subs were deployed with those dud torps...

[mdiehl]

You´re making a fool of yourself and I don´t mean that offensive at all.

No, I'm not. Just noting that there are empirical realities and those who dismiss them. You know, trolls like you. You meant it to be offensive, because you are a troll. And now, green buttoned.

[AW1Steve]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

mdiehl, I wasn't dissing you (ok, maybe I was teasing you a little). Please don't take offense. I was trying to be playfully, and as usual, got a little heavy handed. Sorry.

No offense taken. I'm very skeptical of claims of central tendency too except when I understand the data very well.

I like this part...

Well, it *is* a guess. An informed guess. I know what the hit rates for Japanese surface ship torps and under which circumstances. I don't know the hit rates for the US ones. Given the tendency of the Mark XIVs and Mark XVs to dud, run deep, &c, it's not a difficult call to make.

I've always found that an excess of data leads to a shortage of interest (usually due to eyes rolling into the back of one's head followed by snoring. Having suffered from too many power point briefings , I've often felt that statistical data , (especially taken to extremes) should be considered as a deadly weapon, causing the person that it's being used against to seriously consider taking his or her own life! [:D]

[AW1Steve]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

You´re making a fool of yourself and I don´t mean that offensive at all.

No, I'm not. Just noting that there are empirical realities and those who dismiss them. You know, trolls like you. You meant it to be offensive, because you are a troll. And now, green buttoned.

Come on mdiel, that's insensitive! You know that the politically correct term is vertically and ascetically challenged person of indigenous Scandinavian decent who resides under public over passes (bridges)! [:D]