War Career of the USS Seal

[brhugo]

Whipple:

What is tuber time?

Bruce R. Hugo
_______________________________

CDR (SS) 1979-Present
79-83 Penn State NROTC
83-84 NPS, Orlando
84 NPTU Ballston Spa
84-85 SOBC, New London
85-89 USS Michigan (SSBN-727B)
89-91 Naval Guided Missiles School, Damneck VA
91-99 COMSUBPAC Det 122 (USNR)
00-10 IRR+

[whippleofd]

CDR:

Tuber: A derogatory term for submariners. And yep I figured you had to have it as I see some "you had to be there" stuff in your writing. It's a good read.

Whipple

[Cribtop]

This is great, brhugo - keep it up!

Especially chilling given the foreshadowing of a tragic ending in the first post.

[brhugo]

Whipple,

Yes I have chronic tuber time.  It's like being clinically insane, except for the clinical part.

Being surrounded by other ex-nukes at work, including other tubers, is therapeutic but it's also like getting constantly reinfected ...

Bruce

[brhugo]

A few hours after nightfall on 10/17, the Seal was wracked by a massive explosion. Initially LCDR Hurd suspected that they had been sighted and torpedoed by another submarine, but when a second salvo was not forthcoming he focused his concern on the serious condition of his ship. The collision alarm had been sounded and a report of flooding had been made over the 4MC circuit. Both diesel engines had stopped and the shock had snapped the whip antenna off the sail.

Water was pouring into the ship through a crack in the hull and several fittings that had completely carried away. A mine, probably broken free of its mooring, had exploded against the port side of the ship nearly amidships. The deck had been completely torn away for 20 feet near the explosion. The Seal was well compartmented, and the watertight doors should have been able to confine the flooding to a single compartment, but pipe whip had deformed many of the penetration seals in the damaged compartment’s forward bulkhead and they freely passed water below the new rising waterline. The machinist mates managed to get one diesel restarted and the Seal tentatively began withdrawing from the area.

Casualties were heavy. Two men were killed outright and another would eventually succumb to a severe concussion. Doc Kelley was overloaded with broken ankles and arms and treated the worst of the injuries while the other sailors received first aid from their uninjured shipmates.

The situation was grim. The crew was having difficulty controlling flooding in the second compartment and the Seal was thousands of miles from the nearest friendly port. LCDR Hurd did not expect that the Seal could remain afloat long enough to get help, but he did not share this with the crew. But many of the Seal’s crew had the same fear.

System damage: 32
Flotation damage: 62 (50 major)
Engine damage: 4 (2 major)

[Cribtop]

Had a close friend at UT Austin (go Horns!) who went to design nuke sub engines at Groton. Before that, hower, a silly Navy rule required him to serve two tours on a sub. Problem was he was 6' 4" and was posted to an attack boat. Saw him years later and he still had the scar on his forehead at "hatch height." Kept forgetting to bend down at the doors, he said. [:)]

[Kubel]

Great read...fingers are crossed for the Seal and her crew.

[brhugo]

[center]Part II: The Ordeal of the Seal
[/center]
As it became clear that the Seal was in no immediate danger of sinking, the crew focused on mitigating the damage the ship had taken. The forward drain pump was aligned to take a suction from the bilge of the compartment forward mine-damaged one, and an emergency diesel-powered dewatering pump had been rigged to augment it. The problem with the 2nd diesel was found and a work-around found, but with the Seal so low in the water any speed above 6-7 knots threatened to swamp the induction ports. The damaged diesel was smoking excessively probably due to a damaged piston ring and it was shutdown. The engineer designated the damaged diesel as “emergency use only”, apparently missing the irony.

While the crew labored to plug the leaks in the bulkhead, LCDR Hurd ordered all non-essential weight thrown overboard to regain some reserve buoyancy. All but eight of the remaining 3280 lb Mk-14’s were jettisoned; those that remained were tube loaded and could be quickly fired overboard if necessary. From the bridge LCDR Hurd watched TM1 Gallenstein carry the torpedo record books to the side; although these contributed negligibly to the Seal’s displacement, the torpedo gang LPO seemed to take great pleasure in heaving them into the water.

The Communicator drafted a sitrep to COMSUBPAC detailing the ship’s predicament and her intended destination (Darwin) for repairs. There was no request for rescue and the skipper did not add one; he reasoned that COMSUBPAC would consider this automatically. LCDR Hurd initialed the message draft but transmission had for several hours to wait until a replacement antenna could be erected.

COMSUBPAC did evaluate a rescue of the Seal’s crew. Since she was deep in enemy territory the only plausible rescue platform was another submarine. APS1 Argonaut was available and would have been ideal for this purpose but COMSUBPAC reasoned that if the Seal was going to be overcome by damage from the mine hit then the rescue sub could not reach her in time. Provisions were made to pick up all or part of the crew by flying boat when the Seal was within range, and this information was sent back to the crew along with a recommended transit route.

The navigator plotted the recommended route which was only slightly longer than his own at 3200 nautical miles (79 hexes). It would take the Seal 20 days to make this trip based on the speed they were making good. It was credible that the Seal could last this long – provided she remained undetected. But she would be any easy kill for the first ASW platform that she ran across. The ship had not attempted to submerge since the mine explosion and it was possible that the increased leakage due to the higher submergence pressure even at periscope depth could overwhelm the drain pump (the diesel pump could not overcome much submergence pressure and could not be run for long in any case with the ship bottled up.)

[brhugo]

Two days after the Seal was damaged by the mine, the Japanese navy rose from the dead.
An allied CV group supporting landings in the Solomons was jumped by aircraft from the Akagi and Hiyo; the Enterprise, Wasp, North Carolina, and South Dakota were torpedoed. Counter strikes damaged both Japanese carriers but both of these had been reported as sunk or seriously damages in earlier fighting. Apparently some of the battle damage assessment had been optimistic. Although all of the damaged ships survived to fight again, the two battleships had to return to Pearl Harbor to completely repair the torpedo damage and the expansion in the Solomons was on hold for months.

By 10/22/42 the Seal was 2350 nautical miles (58 hexes) from Darwin and the crew had made steady progress in plugging leaks and mitigating the flooding (Flot 55). But the combination of exposure of power, pneumatic, and hydraulic lines to the seawater environment in the flooded compartment was causing a slow but relentless degradation to the ships systems (Sys 34). But with the Seal having covered one-quarter of the distance to Darwin so far, the crew was nonetheless beginning to expect that they would make it there safely.

Unfortunately, the Japanese made the intended sanctuary at Darwin untenable. Bombing raids from enemy bases had become more frequent and the small fighter squadron at Darwin had been whittled down to nothing by the Zeros escorting the bomb-laded Bettys. As if to highlight the danger, the SS Shark was sunk on 10/23 at the pier while undergoing repairs. The Seal was redirected to Broome, news that was not taken well by her weary crew.

[brhugo]

As the Seal made her way slowly to Broome, the crew routine settled into periods of extreme boredom punctuated with brief periods of adrenaline rush.  Although there was little the crew would be able to do in the event of an air attack except dive to periscope depth and hope the bombs missed, the topside watch was nonetheless increased.  This had the result of increasing the number of false aircraft sightings in direct proportion and the attendant rush to battle stations, a shift of propulsion from diesel engines to the battery, and preparations to dive.  The effect of the increased submergence pressure on the damaged ship and the temporary repairs was still unknown but the potential for catastrophic failure and loss of the sub was substantial.  Miraculously, day after day passed with nothing more threatening than a false alarm.   The Japanese soon deduced that many of the bombs being dropped on Darwin were simply kicking up rubble and their attention shifted to Broome.  Broome was less equipped to defend itself from the air than Darwin had been and all of the ships transferred there the previous week were evacuated to Perth.  On November 3rd the Seal received a radio message directing her to make port in Perth, a change that added 1,350 nautical miles to her route.   Although the war in the southwest Pacific had quieted down, the Japanese and allies were vigorously engaged in Burma.  A combined British, Indian, and Australian thrust had recaptured Akyab but the allies were finding it impossible to keep the troops there supplied overland.  Unless this problem could be solved, the next phase of the operation to recapture Magwe and eventually Rangoon would be impossible.  Convoys from Ceylon and Madras to Chittagong and Akyab were being torn apart by land based aircraft.  The allies had committed most of their fighter squadrons in the theater to the air defense of Akyab and the resupply effort, but the Japanese seemed to have an endless supply of Oscars, Zero’s, and Nate’s even as the allied fighter numbers dwindled to ineffectiveness.   On 11/4/42 the Seal was still nearly 2,150 nautical miles from Perth but was closing the distance by almost 150 nautical miles every day.

[brhugo]

By 11/10/42, the Seal was close enough to an operational Australian seaplane base that a flying boat was able to rendezvous with the Seal and take off some of her most seriously injured crew. The Seal did pick up one new temporary crew member: LT Donnely who was an Engineering Duty Officer assigned to the Australian Navy as a liaison. His assignment was to identify the repairs required to return the Seal to service and return to Perth with this information so that the necessary parts and equipment could be made ready for her arrival. The Catalina had also had room for some fresh food, but most of the supplies transferred to the submarine we essential consumables such as medicine and critical spare parts. The crew also sent back a mail bag full of letters to the home front, but censors would redact much of the information the senders had included about their ill-fated patrol.

Four days later LT Donnely with a case full of marked up-drawings, sketches, and work requests was picked up by another Catalina for the first leg of his trip back to Perth. Although essentially in friendly waters now, the Seal still was at risk of being sighted by a Japanese long-range patrol and her track hugged the coast of Australia to maximize the chance of survivors making landfall should the ship be unable to complete the return trip. On 11/18/42 LCDR Hurd announced that the ship was within 500 nautical miles of Perth.

Four days later a tug from Perth came alongside and helped guide the Seal into Perth harbor and her berth at one of the repair piers. With a sigh of relief, LCDR Hurd ordered the diesel shutdown and the cold iron watches set. Against the odds, his battered command had survived the 3200 mile, 36 day transit from the Pusan minefield to the safety of the Perth shipyard.

Next, Part 3: Perth
[I am in a busy portion of my rotating shift cycle at work and haven't had as much time as before to work on my AAR. Also, it is only Oct 43 in my campaign so when I catch up with that (if the Seal has survived) then the story will really slow down as I am playing one-day turns.]

[brhugo]

[center]Part III: Perth[/center]

After unloading all ordnance, including the last of the Mk-14’s (which had not had to be jettisoned) the Seal pulled into Perth’s drydock. To the crew’s surprise, she was not there long. Perth’s drydock, although small, was the only one for thousands of miles and it had a lot of customers. Besides having been a repair refuge for allied subs damaged by escorts in the Dutch East Indies, there had been a steady stream of merchants damaged in collisions and other mishaps including a few that had survived I-boat attacks. Although warships had priority, ships were frequently rotated out of the drydock to make room for those with damage that could be repaired in no other way. And the Seal had lots of damage that could be repaired pierside. During her first brief time on the blocks, the Seal received a temporary patch consisting of a curved steel plate backed by a rubber sheet that was attached to the hull over the hole by strongbacks bolted to temporary anchor points.

After the crew had been debriefed by the squadron intel officer, about one third were given transfer orders to other commands including the executive officer. The Seal’s off-going XO was transferred to New London where he would become the commissioning CO of the USS Bluefish (SS-222) under construction at Electric Boat. His replacement would be LT Schneegas, who had been the navigator on an East coast submarine before a short shore assignment with COMSUBLANT.

During his welcome aboard meeting with LCDR Hurd, LT Schneegas showed him a copy of a naval message he had received while at COMSUBLANT. The message was from BUORD and was their response to the initial complaints of poor Mk-14 reliability. LT Schneegas had underlined one portion in blue pen: “EXTENSIVE PREDEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONAL TESTING OF THE MARK FOURTEEN TORPEDOE HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT IT IS A RELIABLE WEAPON WHEN MAINTAINED AND EMPLOYED PROPERLY.” The Seal had never received this message because COMSUBPAC had declined to forward it to their submarines. But COMSUBLANT had transmitted it and copies had made their way to the Pacific fleet. One enterprising submarine skipper had fired warshot into the torpedo nets at the Hawaiian Islands test range to prove that the torpedoes ran deeper than set. Another had fired a four shot spread into a cliff face and had gotten only two explosions. Only the direct intervention by Admirals Kimmel and Nimitz had stopped disciplinary action against the two commanders.

At the going away party for the departing wardroom members, the JO’s presented the off-going XO (LT Traverso, who had been spot promoted to LCDR) with a plaque containing an altered version of the ship’s emblem: the image of the stern seal had been replaced with one carrying a net full of mines and the ships hull number had been changed to “SSMS-183”. LCDR Hurd had received some of the same ribbing when the Australian CO of the Perth facilities has asked him if the US was experimenting with a submarine minesweeper. The get-together was an upbeat one even though all present knew that there were long odds of all of them surviving the war. But the crew had survived long odds already and still had some of the bullet-proof optimism of the young.

[Kwik E Mart]

great stuff! hope you keep it up...

[brhugo]

I will be unexpectedly out of town for two weeks but will continue this after action report when I get back.

[brhugo]

Repairs to the Seal were performed in parallel with refresher training for her crew. Although submarine facilities available at Perth were limited to those required to perform major repairs, training and administrative functions were available at a hastily constructed facility at Brisbane. Personnel and equipment surviving the Japanese attacks at Darwin and Broome had been transported to Brisbane which was the new headquarters on Submarine Squadron 9.

The Seal’s approach team was flown to Squadron 9’s attack trainer which consisted of a mockup of a Gato class control room. Above the mock-up was a small room into which the periscope extended to provide a view of a scale model of a potential target. The model rode on a disk that could both rotate on its axis and revolve around the periscope at a fixed distance. As the OOD ordered changes in course and speed, a set of gears translated the relative motion between the submarine and its “prey” into dials that read out the resulting range, bearing, and angle on the bow of the target. An operator then adjusted the orientation of the target model using hand-cranks for bearing and angle on the bow and adjusted the magnification of the periscope optics to simulate the appropriate target size. The trainer could not simulate effects such as smoke, weather, and a “hull down” condition (due to the target being slightly beyond the periscopes “horizon” but it did allow the crew to practice closing on a target, collecting target motion data, and obtaining a firing solution.

Although the Mk-14’s reliability problems had been adequately demonstrated, COMSUBPAC suspected that crew proficiency weaknesses had also contributed to poor attack results and so a Squadron representative observed the first day of each submarine crew’s performance in the trainer. LCDR Hurd’s ability to accurately determine target height and angle on the bow was about average compared with the crews that had been evaluated so far, and the crew as a whole was slightly above average in obtaining accurate firing solutions. The only crew performance issues identified were due to the new members of the approach team who were still relatively green, but after a week of practice in the trainer the crew was judged to be satisfactory and was flown back to Perth to assist in the Seal’s overhaul.

With the Seal’s temporary patch installed, the mine-damaged compartment could be partially addressed while waterborne. All of the electrical equipment and wiring was a total loss and several of the pumps were too badly damaged to be refurbished. The initial repairs consisted of ripping out wiring, sprung piping and deformed supports. Several components were too large to be removed through the hatches and a hull cut was briefly considered to allow replacement of these before the sub reentered drydock; this plan was rejected when it was determined that a large enough section of the pressure hull around the explosion site would have to be replaced later anyway. The inner hull surface was stripped down to bare metal and repainted, and the damaged bulkhead penetrations were repaired.

The damaged diesel was overhauled, and when it became clear that the hull repairs would be the limiting factor for the Seal’s return to service, an overhaul of the undamaged diesel that had been scheduled for July 43 was pulled up and performed in parallel.

[brhugo]

Additionally, an upgrade that had been authorized for April 42 but never installed due to operational demands was finally implemented. An SD air search radar was installed on a fixed mast above the conning tower. Operated from the conning tower, the SD radar was only vaguely directional. It was capable of warning that a plane was within about 6 miles of the boat, but couldn't pinpoint a bearing, or give much in the way of information on the type of air contact detected.

[brhugo]

The Seal also received an SJ surface search radar. This was a directional radar, which could be used to sweep the surrounding sea for targets. The primary limitation on range was the height of the retractable mast since radar is limited to line-of-sight. The SJ radar was designed for search, ranging, and navigation. In addition to conducting surface searches, the radar masts could also be extending above the water before surfacing, to check the area for enemy warships and aircraft.

[brhugo]

On 12/3/42 repairs to the Seal had progressed as far as they could pier side. Using her “head-of-the-line” privileges, the boat was nudged into Perth’s small dry-dock by a tug. The temporary patch was removed and a hull cut was made to remove the torn and deformed section of the pressure hull. Ruined equipment that was too large to have been removed earlier was extracted and replacements winched, “come-along’ed” or otherwise persuaded into position in the refurbished compartment. Then began the laborious task of connecting scores of power, cooling water, pneumatic, and hydraulic connections to the replacement pumps, motors and other auxiliary equipment. In may cases the old parts had been obsolete and field changes were required to make everything fit.

When not assisting the shipyard workers or participating in retraining, the Seal’s crew enjoyed the hospitality of their temporary duty station. Unlike Darwin, Perth has been relatively untouched by the war although the crew did have to contend with the fuel shortage and nightly blackouts. Additionally, the Aussies were much friendlier that the Soerabaja locals had been and it was said that a sailor couldn’t pay for a drink in any of the local taverns. Few of the crew were disappointed when the word was leaked that the Seal’s repairs would extend into late January or early February.

[whippleofd]

ORIGINAL: brhugo
it was said that a sailor couldn’t pay for a drink in any of the local taverns.

Exactly what I experienced as a young MM2 last time I was there back in '86. Since the young ladies of Perth/Fremantle were interested in a sailor in uniform, there were other benefits to be experienced as well.

Whipple

[brhugo]

President Roosevelt’s fears concerning the midterm elections were validated when the Democrats lost control of the House of Representatives by a small margin (208 to the Republicans’ 223 with four seats being held by minor parties). Concern over World War II and American losses in it was one factor in majority party decline. Polls showed that had the presidential election had also been at stake in November, Roosevelt would have lost by about 4 percentage points. Hoping to turn public opinion, Roosevelt opened the spigot of combat citations and flooded state and local newspapers with press releases for these. The residents of LCDR Hurd’s home town of Metamora Michigan learned that he had received the Navy Cross:

“The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Commander Kenneth Charles Hurd, United States Navy, for extraordinary heroism in combat and meritorious conduct in offensive engagements with enemy Japanese forces as Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. SEAL (SS-183), in action on the night of 17 October 1942, during the SIXTH War Patrol of that submarine in Japanese controlled waters. While patrolling the Yeloow Sea, Lieutenant Commander Hurd’s ship was severely damaged in an engagement with overwhelming enemy forces. Without regard for his own safety, Commander Hurd refused to give up the ship and led his crew in a 3000 mile transit to a safe port. Commander Hurd’s determination and nautical skills are reminiscent of those of John Paul Jones’ and reflects great credit upon his command and the United States Naval Service.

SECNAV’s staff had gotten the war patrol number wrong and a mine hardly constitutes “overwhelming enemy forces” but LCDR Hurd had in fact been promoted. Notification of the citation and the promotion did not reach the Seal until 1/28/43, two days before she left Perth following completion of repairs.

While the Seal recovered from her battle damage, the allied offensive in the Pacific and Burma theaters was beginning to pick up. Magwe was recaptured by British, Australian, and Indian forces on 12/6/42 with about 50% of that city’s oil wells and refineries still operational. The US was able to exert enough control over the Solomons/New Britain airspace to support occasional battleship bombardments of Rabaul and with Japanese defensives so blunted, the Shortlands were captured on 12/9/42.

The poor performance of the Mk-14 torpedo was not the only factor hampering US submarine effectiveness. Expansion of the Japanese base network and the neutralization of Australia’s northern ports by air bombardments were resulting in long, non-productive transits for submarines based at Brisbane and Pearl Harbor. The well developed base at Shortlands was on the target list both to support the later offensive against Rabaul and to provide a forward base for submarines operating against the Japanese sea lanes from the Dutch East Indies to Japan. A second operation to recover the port of Darwin was also being developed -- code name “Popcorn”. Operation Popcorn was audacious given the balance of forces at the time: a transport force defended by CVEs and escorted by a second CV task force would force its way to Darwin and provide badly needed supplies and additional fighter air groups for the air base there. The CVs would continue to provide temporary air cover until the airfields could be returned to operation. The hope was that once Darwin could defend itself against enemy air attacks, Submarines could be re-based there from Perth and Brisbane.

Operation Popcorn was “placed on the back burner” when the Japanese navy sortied on 12/12/42. Attacking from an initially undetected position, the Saratoga was hit by a bomb and the CLAA San Juan torpedoed. The Japanese strikes were substantially blunted by a heavy CAP that included land based fighters operating from the Shortlands. The US counterstrike (reportedly) scored three bomb hits on the Hiryu, four on the Kaga, and four on the Hiei. The returning aviators excitedly reported that the Hiryu had “definitely been sunk”. But the Japanese carriers were still capable of launching a late afternoon strike; despite a few close calls, no hits were scored. A second US strike hit the “sunk” Hiryu with 5 more bombs, put another bong and a torpedo into the Kaga, and hammered the Hiei with 5 bombs and a torpedo. Combat continued sporadically over the next three days with the BB Maryland chasing down the damaged Hiei and sinking an escorting destroyer, and another Japanese carrier strike hitting a transport group and torpedoing the escorting CVE Nassau. By this point, Naval Intelligence could not determine if there were more Japanese carriers in the action beyond the Hiryu and the Kaga, or if the damage to the Hiryu and the Kaga had been significantly over reported, or both. Accordingly, the undamaged US carriers remained within range of land based fighter support until the situation could be sorted out.

The Japanese tried to take advantage of the confusion by racing in a small cruiser task force to engage and sink transports at Lunga. Lunga was being covered by battleships, but in a night action still dominated by superior Japanese training, the Nevada and Tennessee were torpedoed in exchange for heavy damage to the CA Ashigara. The Japanese were slow to clear the area and were intercepted by undamaged forces the next day: Two Japanese destroyers were sunk and the CA Furutaka took two 14” hits in her superstructure. The BB Tennessee was torpedoed; this was attributed to a Japanese submarine but in reality it was the work of one of the Japanese destroyers (the capabilities of the pure oxygen-using Long Lance torpedo were still not fully understood). Another Japanese carrier strike was made against the damaged US BB’s with no hits being scored and finally one additional opponent was identified: the CVL Ryujo.

The allies and the Japanese continued to throw clumsy blows at each other like two punch-drunk boxers: the task force containing the CVL Ryujo was encountered at night by an allied task force that included an undamaged BB, 3 CAs, 4 CLs, and 3DDs. In an engagement similar to the June 1940 sinking of the Glorious by the Scharnhorst, One CVL was hit by a 16” shell and a second CVL by two. The second CVL suffered an obvious magazine explosion. The CA Chikuma, CA Kinugasa and CL Tenryu were also damaged in exchange for damage to three US destroyers. Naval Intel determined that that the CVL Ryuho had been sunk along with the Kinugasa and Tenryu, but all three of these ships were sighted within a few days (alive if not well).

And yet the days-long battle that would be known as the "Battle of the Solomon Islands" was far from over ...