ORIGINAL: Cohen_slith
The Allied won the BfA in '43 though. (As per, the submarines were suffering losses too high for too thin results)
It was just the early of '42 - roughly the very first 3-6 months where indeed the USA were just fresh to the war and the Uboot achieved astonishing successess.
The point is that anyhow cannot be replicated here in the game.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Happy_Time
”For several months, none of the recommendations were followed. Coastal shipping continued to sail along marked routes and burn normal navigation lights. Boardwalk communities ashore were only 'requested' to 'consider' turning their illuminations off on 18 December 1941, but not in the cities; they did not want to offend the tourism, recreation and business sectors.[3] :p186 On 12 January 1942, Admiral Andrews was warned that "three or four U-boats" were about to commence operations against coastal shipping (in fact there were three),[3]:p212 but he refused to institute a convoy system on the grounds that this would only provide the U-boats with more targets.
When the first wave of U-boats returned to port through the early part of February, Dönitz wrote that each commander "had such an abundance of opportunities for attack that he could not by any means utilize them all: there were times when there were up to ten ships in sight, sailing with all lights burning on peacetime courses."
A significant flaw in U.S. pre-war planning was the failure to provide ships suitable for convoy-escort work. Escort vessels travel at relatively slow speeds; carry a large number of depth charges; must be highly maneuverable; and must stay on station for long periods. The fleet destroyers equipped for high speed and offensive action that were available were not the ideal design for this type of escort work. When the war started, the U.S. had no equivalent of the more effective British Black Swan-class sloops or the River-class frigate in their inventory. This blunder was highly surprising since the American Navy (USN) had previously been involved in anti-submarine work in the Atlantic (see USS Reuben James) and at the time was marginally aggravated by the loss of the destroyers "loaned" to Britain through Lend-Lease; however, these vessels would have been largely obsolete for anti-submarine purposes due to their counter-attack vulnerability and inherent inability to maneuver as required to combat submarines. The U.S. also lacked both aircraft suitable for anti-submarine patrol and any aircrew trained to use them at that time.”
There are many ways to include this in a game, but you can also choose to ignore it for sake of some generic play balance.
But like with so many things, technology, tactics, doctrines, etc.
At some point you end up with Risk and not a WW2 ETO game.
Just like the air war bringing its own challenges to model historically yet fun enough for both sides to play, same with the war at sea - with Submarines bringing their own challenges and needless to say the war on land.
Where these games all break down in their “historical” component is the fear of asymmetry - and understandably so.
Game balance and 20/20 hindsight are like the sound barrier of wargaming.
