‘Apocalypse ’45’ Review: A Momentous Documentary Presents Never-Before-Seen Footage of the Grisly En

[Platoonist]

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

But the Luftwaffe really got shot up later in the US bombing campaign. Some of the problems with the daylight raids was the lack of coordination which resulted in a strung out bomber formation.

It took some time to accept the dictum laid down decades earlier by Mitchell, that air superiority was an essential condition for a strategic bombing campaign. Doolittle seems to have been one of the earliest of American bomber commanders to accept this fact.

So, what really cinched the bombing victory was the P-51. Once long-range fighters began escorting American bombers, casualties soared among the defending German fighter pilots. Even Goering admitted it was over. The Mustang was a major contributing factor to the collapse of the Luftwaffe in the West and the success of the Anglo-American invasion of France. When the Allies could finally focus their strategic bombing on synthetic fuel plants and other petroleum facilities, early in 1945, the Germans quickly ran out of fuel. This was a major contributing factor to the collapse of the Wehrmacht. However, the Russian capture of the oilfields in Romania and Hungary probably didn't hurt either.

[Dante Fierro]

After the London Blitz moral qualms were largely abandoned in favor of an "if that's how they want to play the game ..." attitude. Sir Arthur Harris of Bomber Command voiced the opinion that the Axis, having sown the wind, were entitled to reap the whirlwind. Roosevelt also voiced this sentiment, stating that he wanted the Axis bombed "heavily and relentlessly ... they have asked for it and they are going to get it"

Nice detail in your descriptions. You sound like an actual historian. Thanks for the overview ... this is what I thought I had read. If I recall, there was an accidental? bombing of Berlin - and then Hitler decided to retaliate by bombing London - and then it escalated from there ...

[RangerJoe]

ORIGINAL: Platoonist

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

But the Luftwaffe really got shot up later in the US bombing campaign. Some of the problems with the daylight raids was the lack of coordination which resulted in a strung out bomber formation.

It took some time to accept the dictum laid down decades earlier by Mitchell, that air superiority was an essential condition for a strategic bombing campaign. Doolittle seems to have been one of the earliest of American bomber commanders to accept this fact.

So, what really cinched the bombing victory was the P-51. Once long-range fighters began escorting American bombers, casualties soared among the defending German fighter pilots. Even Goering admitted it was over. The Mustang was a major contributing factor to the collapse of the Luftwaffe in the West and the success of the Anglo-American invasion of France. When the Allies could finally focus their strategic bombing on synthetic fuel plants and other petroleum facilities, early in 1945, the Germans quickly ran out of fuel. This was a major contributing factor to the collapse of the Wehrmacht. However, the Russian capture of the oilfields in Romania and Hungary probably didn't hurt either.

Yes, Fatso Hermann knew it was over when radar tracked P-51s going to meet American bombers going to Berlin. But the later P-47s with longer range also helped. It also helped when the escorting fighters were free to attack targets of opportunity as they returned to England. The fighter pilots enjoyed shooting up the insulators in the electrical transmission lines to let the sparks fly, not to mention shooting up choo-choo trains.

Not a bad fighter for being quickly drawn up so the company would not make the P-40 aircraft. Then someone put in a thoroughbred engine in it.

[BBfanboy]

ORIGINAL: Dante Fierro

So did Harris. And call it what you will so did the U.S., especially when it came to Japan. The technology of the time just didn't support any other way, as just about all combatants found out.

Yes, this is also my take on the subject. The US and I believe Britain's air marshal was particularly Pro targeting German cities. There was a debate on how effective this would end up being, but it was done anyway. Part of the reasoning at the time (I believe) is that it would 'demoralize' the Germans from fighting further ...

An Italian General named Douhet wrote in the 1920s his doctrine that aerial bombing would demoralize the civilian populace and cause them to seek surrender quickly. The Germans tested it out at Guernica, and because it was an unprecedented atrocity (and totally without a military target), the shock did cause a huge morale drop. But many outside Guernica were now steeled to resist harder because of that bombing, so the strategy did not exactly play out as Douhet theorized. After the Germans blitzed Warsaw and Rotterdam, the British were under no illusions about what would happen when Hitler got a chance to attack London.

The whole pretext for bombing London came when British bombers flying at night with primitive navigation equipment could not find their target because of weather. Since they used a lot of their fuel searching for the target they jettisoned their bombs to ensure they could make it back to base. The jettisoned bombs fell on some unfortunate village. That was the pretext Hitler needed to justify targeting British cities like Coventry, Belfast and London. Whether the Nazis still believed in Douhet's theories is questionable, but they did like to destroy anything the enemy owned - total war meant scorched earth everywhere.

[Alamander]

The concept of "total war," of which strategic bombing was an extension, was mostly invented by the U.S. during the Civil War and first implemented by Grant and by Sherman in his march to the coast. As for "the blitz" being the excuse for strategic bombing and the first bombing of German cities being an accident, this is largely post-war allied propaganda. The plan, from the beginning, was for a strategic bombing campaign targeting all enemy industrial and population centers. That is the campaign for which the 4-Es were designed.

The book to read on the subject is Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. He traces most of the strategy and tactics used by the U.S. (and by extension England), including "total war, victory by attrition, leap-frogging, and so forth, back through U.S. military planning to the Revolution. It is a must-read for anyone intersted in military history and is on the short-list of nearly every military history PhD student.

[Lowpe]

ORIGINAL: Alamander

The concept of "total war," of which strategic bombing was an extension, was mostly invented by the U.S. during the Civil War and first implemented by Grant and by Sherman in his march to the coast. As for "the blitz" being the excuse for strategic bombing and the first bombing of German cities being an accident, this is largely post-war allied propaganda. The plan, from the beginning, was for a strategic bombing campaign targeting all enemy industrial and population centers. That is the campaign for which the 4-Es were designed.

The book to read on the subject is Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. He traces most of the strategy and tactics used by the U.S. (and by extension England), including "total war, victory by attrition, leap-frogging, and so forth, back through U.S. military planning to the Revolution. It is a must-read for anyone intersted in military history and is on the short-list of nearly every military history PhD student.

Look at Epamindondas in 369 bc.

[Alamander]

ORIGINAL: Lowpe


Look at Epamindondas in 369 bc.

Weigly is talking about modern military history. One of the major themes in modern military history is the emergence of the modern "draft" army from the professional military class of the late-medieval period and the idea of complete military mobilization implemented by Napoleon. What Weigley is arguing is that to this modern doctrine of complete mobilization, the U.S. added concepts such as the idea of "total war."

In the ancient orient, there were societies built around a complete military mobilization. The Assyrians, for example, transformed their society from a largely mercantile people, concerned first and foremost with securing and developing international trade from the orient to the coast of the Mediterranean (and with the Phoenicians) into a militarist society, governed by soldier-kings, and accomplished a near complete military mobilization.

One can argue. of course, that Assyria was also the originator of the concept of "total war" as they struggled to maintain control of their frequently rebellious tributaries. The depopulation and forced migration of peoples who proved difficult and the razing of entire cities, which began in the Sargonid Dynasty of the Neo-Assyrian Empire, could also be called the first instance of "total war."

With the "Westernization" and professionalization of war, especially under Alexander the Great and later the Romans, the concept of "total war" mostly disappeared from history until modern times. Although, one could make the case that Ghenghis Khan and the Mongols reintroduced it for a time.

[fcooke]

ORIGINAL: rustysi

They had all of that on the Thames TV series The World at War in about 1970. Narrated by Sir Laurence Olivier. Didn't they show that on American TV?

Yes. I have it on DVD, but unfortunately a couple of the disks went bad.

never before seen by the public,

There were thousands of reels of film that were just shoved somewhere that were 'never seen by the public'.

Why is this material being released now?

Most of it was just never viewed by anyone. Not much was intentionally kept from being seen, at least after the war.

Just a guess, but my sense is that the graphic power of the footage is something the U.S. government was only too happy to keep a lid on.

Sometimes, as in the case of film from Tarawa. Deemed to disturbing when it happened. Later released to help buoy yet another war bond drive.

I am guessing most of us older folk have seen the series. Some fairly disturbing footage in there. I also have it on DVD, hopefully none of mine have gone bad.

[rustysi]

If I recall, there was an accidental? bombing of Berlin - and then Hitler decided to retaliate by bombing London - and then it escalated from there ...

IIRC is was the other way around. Not that it wasn't going to happen anyway.

[Dante Fierro]

IIRC is was the other way around. Not that it wasn't going to happen anyway.

Ah! I think you may be right. heh.

[Ian R]

ORIGINAL: Platoonist

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

But the Luftwaffe really got shot up later in the US bombing campaign. Some of the problems with the daylight raids was the lack of coordination which resulted in a strung out bomber formation.

It took some time to accept the dictum laid down decades earlier by Mitchell, that air superiority was an essential condition for a strategic bombing campaign. Doolittle seems to have been one of the earliest of American bomber commanders to accept this fact.

So, what really cinched the bombing victory was the P-51. Once long-range fighters began escorting American bombers, casualties soared among the defending German fighter pilots. Even Goering admitted it was over. The Mustang was a major contributing factor to the collapse of the Luftwaffe in the West and the success of the Anglo-American invasion of France. When the Allies could finally focus their strategic bombing on synthetic fuel plants and other petroleum facilities, early in 1945, the Germans quickly ran out of fuel. This was a major contributing factor to the collapse of the Wehrmacht. However, the Russian capture of the oilfields in Romania and Hungary probably didn't hurt either.

My understanding (most recently reinforced by Richard Overy) is that Dolittle, from late 1943, decoupled the escorts from closely escorting the bombers. In effect, the bombers were used as bait, with the fighter groups sweeping ahead of them, and permitted to chase down the Luftwaffe interceptors rather than stick with the bombers. The new doctrine included shooting up the interceptors on their own airfields on the way home. This campaign kicked into high gear in about February 1944 as more P51s became available and the weather opened up a little. By about late April the USAAF had achieved air supremacy (in daylight) over Western Europe.

On another question raised in this topic - Overy in Why the Allies Won argues persuasively that the allies did not conduct a "clean war", not after 1942 anyway (and up to then in the limited western European theatre). In order to defeat their immoral enemies, they adopted their trait of casual immorality - with the only difference being in degree. The Soviets had no qualms about it. General Lemay once observed that if the US had lost the war, he would likely have been tried as a war criminal and executed.

I don't agree with revisionist hand-wringing now, as to whether different decisions ought have been made 76-7 years ago. The decisions made at the time were made in the conditions of the time - where defeating the criminal axis regimes that were busy slaughtering eastern European, Soviet, and Chinese citizens by the multi-millions was urgent, & necessary, by whatever means were available (although they didn't, as they might have, use chemical weapons).

Interesting debate:

Intelligence squared debate on city bombing in WW2

[rustysi]

This campaign kicked into high gear in about February 1944

Known as 'Big week'.

General Lemay once observed that if the US had lost the war, he would likely have been tried as a war criminal and executed.

Yes, referring to his campaign against Japan.

I don't agree with revisionist hand-wringing now, as to whether different decisions ought have been made 76-7 years ago. The decisions made at the time were made in the conditions of the time

100%

[RangerJoe]

Big week, when a man born in Canton, China, attacked over 40 Luftwaffe fighters, shot down at least 5 of them, kept attacking even when he was out of ammo, then went back to England. It was the bombers crews reports which alerted the 8th Air Force, then he was put in for The Medal.

[Ian R]

Ding Hao!

[RangerJoe]

ORIGINAL: Ian R

Ding Hao!

+1!

[Ian R]

He was already an ace with the AVG wasn't he? (and ex-USN to boot).

[RangerJoe]

ORIGINAL: Ian R

He was already an ace with the AVG wasn't he? (and ex-USN to boot).

Yes, he was. Captain Howard in one of the AVG units. He was an enlisted pilot who was offered a commission but he refused it. After he got out of the AVG, he was a civilian for awhile but then the Navy did not seem to want him while the Army Air Corps did want him - as a major, I do believe.

[Ian R]

Is he in AE in the AVG?

[RangerJoe]

ORIGINAL: Ian R

Is he in AE in the AVG?

Yes.

[Ian R]

[8D]