First Contact 1986: having a terrible time playing Norway

[thewood1]

I'll see if I can find my own tests. I had several ships staggered in a line from the detecting platform to the shore off the northern coast of the Philippines for my test. I don't remember the units or the era. It was 2-3 years ago and I've changed laptops 2-3 times since then so no telling where it is.

[thewood1]

I found the old test. I updated it to db487 because it was having an issue with a sensor on one of the units. The deep rebuild fixed it. Its a 1970s era radar against an abrupt elevation change on shore. The main purpose of the test to to make sure terrain LOS was working with older model radars a few years ago. I think it was 1.01 CMNAO. I also just tested out of curiosity how radar clutter worked. What I saw was that with the solid shoreline that had a rapid elevation increase behind the target, the detection range went from 17nm to 4nm if the target ship was within 1 to 1.5nm of the solid shoreline. You can see I put a ref. pt. on the shoreline. In this scenario, just switch sides, hit play, and you can let it run. Then just check the message logs and contact reports for a play-by-play.

Its not a perfect test, but at least gives a clue that something is effecting detection distance when very close in shore. I'm going to play around with newer and older radars and see what it shows.

[ExMachina]

Super! Thank you very much!!

[thewood1]

I just ran it with a modern Burke DDG and it detected the inshore ship at 14nm and all the others around 18nm. So there is significantly less clutter impact on a modern radar set.

[deepdive]

Norwegian MTB`s where never intended to engage armed opfore they would be used for ambush, hit and run on invasion forces and support ships. The MTB squadrons where experts in camoflaging their boats and they would hug the coast line if they had to move in hostile environment. The sivil fishing fleet would be extremly important in supporting MTB operations wherever possible.

[Gunner98]

That's a good theory, and perhaps in the late '40s or early '50s would have been feasible.

Unfortunately for the Norwegian navy, the Soviets also understood this tactic and had no intention whatsoever in complying with it.

The Northern Fleet had dozens (50+) missile boats - which really only had one purpose since they were not really ocean going and there was no immediate threat to their northern coast or bases. That is not counting the hundreds of small patrol and ASW craft they had available.

The Soviets would not intentionally put their amphibious forces at risk, if there were no major NATO formations in the Norwegian sea they would stay out to sea where the Norgi's couldn't get to them. Or, in the more likely case that there were were; they would use short hops and scour the fjords in advance with dozens of boats and Be-12 amphibious aircraft. As soon as they had air superiority it would be a matter days before the Norgi boats were sunk or forced south.

So strategically, the Norwegian missile boats were a success as they made the Soviets devote significant resources to counter them. Operationally they were also a success as they limited the Northern Fleets options until they were dealt with. But here we are talking about their tactical use; and this is where they would have had problems probably from the late 1960's or early 1970s onward because of sensor technology and Soviet superiority in weapons.

It would have been a very happy Norwegian missile boat commander who had survived long enough to actually see a Soviet amphibious craft. But that is unlikely.

[thewood1]

I have always regarded these Soviet boats as an offensive sweep prior to the big push. Specifically to get at the Norwegian boats the Soviets knew were waiting.