Air combat

[mdiehl]

Just to be fair, early on in the Lower Solomons Allied air losses were severe.

Yes. As however you point out, they were not particularly more severe than Japanese losses. In fighters just about 1.2:1 across the whole campaign at Cactus, favoring the Japanese, and only talking about land-based aircraft from both sides. The US won most of the daily engagements, but lost a big one in late August when a Japanese strike arrived undetected and bounced the F4Fs.

For the USN vs IJN, in no battle at any time did the IJN inflict a favorable (to the Japanese) loss ratio. Not once in the entire war.

In overall losses, all types of aircraft, in no confrontation between Japanese pilots, in any suite of machines, at any time, did the Japanese have a favorable loss ratio against USN/USMC pilots in a campaign. The loss ratio generall favors the US around 2:1 in 1942 and, by war's end, 50-100:1.

...all was not roses for the red, white and blue.

Indeed not. But if one merely points out that the alleged Japanese superiority in both aircraft and pilots is not supported by any credible source of data, one is usually accused of claiming that "all WAS roses for the Red White and Blue." I have consistently argued that the model should tend to produce sustained combat loss ratios, in 1942, in the Solomons, around 1:1. The most typical Axis Fanboy response (paraphrasing a whole bunch of replies is)... "Saburo Sakai was a real man. He would not lie. When he says that Japanese pilots were far superior, I believe him. You, mdiehl, are just claiming that the US was overwhelmingly superior at everything through all time, because of your..." etc etc etc.

All that I have maintained is that in circumstances similar to the Solomons campaign, it is a legitimate yardstick to how the sustained campaign results come, in regard to loss RATIOS (not absolute numbers of a/c because, after all, players are free to pump their aircraft into the theater in different numbers or at different rates than historically), to the real event.

[BillBrown]

I would like to make sure of a defination here. When you talk about kill ratios, are you talking about aircraft losses, pilot losses, or both? I am wondering about this in connection with your 1.2-1, 2-1, or 50-1 ratios. My take on this is that the USN/USMC tended to be fighting relativity close to their bases while the IJN was fighting a long ways away. Also, the US put more emphasis on resue operations.

Anyway, the base question still is important. It is the loss of pilots that is the telling thing. The US was in the process of building a veritable flood of aircraft and even Japan was able to build a respectable number of aircraft, they just could not replace pilots.

[mogami]

Hi, I don't mind 1-1 loss ratios. When planning an operation as Japan I would just make sure to have 2-1 in aircraft. After rotating all my groups through the combat I should have air control. (or forced enemy into deploying more air assets.) I do not claim perfect understanding of WWII.
I understand in the early period the Allied in the SRA had no replacements. The larger Japanese airforces quickly wore them out.
The South Pacific and Burma became the only active areas for aircombat. The Army in Burma and the Navy in the South Pacific.
The Japanese Naval Air then went through the same process the Allies had suffered through in the SRA. Heavy loss without adequate replacement.
I always give the Solomon Campaign credit for breaking the IJN LBA.
The Imperial Navy Air Arm could not sustain the battle.
In WITP it would be my intention to win campaigns rapidly. (or admit defeat and pull back to set up a new battle area where I could fight for air control with better chances. If Japan allows their airforce (Naval) to be destroyed it will be very difficult if not impossible to rebuild it in time for the next campaign.
I also plan on getting the IJA airforce involved much sooner and in greater strength. (I think it is the Army's job to fight sustained battles.
The IJN air arm is an offensive weapon. IN UV I try not to let my airgroup become involved in unproductive combat.

It's not automaticly hopeless for Japan (aircombat wise) However a few bad choices can make it so.

[Tristanjohn]

I would like to make sure of a defination here. When you talk about kill ratios, are you talking about aircraft losses, pilot losses, or both? I am wondering about this in connection with your 1.2-1, 2-1, or 50-1 ratios. My take on this is that the USN/USMC tended to be fighting relativity close to their bases while the IJN was fighting a long ways away. Also, the US put more emphasis on resue operations.

Anyway, the base question still is important. It is the loss of pilots that is the telling thing. The US was in the process of building a veritable flood of aircraft and even Japan was able to build a respectable number of aircraft, they just could not replace pilots.

Hi, Bill.

Mdiel chose to break it down into somewhat broad phases with respect to kill ratios and his figures are essentially correct. To put it in a nutshell, by war's end the final kill ratio was something in the neighborhood of 20:1 in the favor of the Allies (basically American planes and pilots) versus the Japanese air arms of both services. To express this more particularly: once the Marines got hold of the Corsair the first major shift in that ratio commenced; when the Hellcat arrived on the scene the air war began to devolve into a turkey shoot for the good guys; it was a veritable slaughter by the close, and not just because the Hellcat and other American models were such all-round superior aircraft, which they certainly were, but by the time this excellent Grumman machine, for example, became available in round numbers the Japanese had been reduced to sending up pilots with minimal training and virtually no experience in equipment which by then had been rendered vastly inferior.

The picture was grim for the Sons of Nippon by the time the 'Canal fell, a truly classic no-brainer, and a more responsble government in Japan would have called a halt to the carnage; in the event, no such institution had its hand on the reins to Japanese power, as the madmen who had started it all were still firmly in control, and so the conflict was destined to continue, in grisly fashion, toward its own terrible end.

[mogami]

Hi, Other factors impacting the airwar. USN subs sinking Japanese tankers with Av gas. Lack of fuel reduced hours Japanese pilots fly in training. Lack of high octane fuel affects performace of Japanese aircraft in combat. (There are newer models of Japanese aircraft whose performance in combat was degraded by the fuel. Late in the war Japanese high octane is made from pine tree. (The engines only last a few days burning this stuff) I seldom see Japanese fuel degradion used as a reason for Japanese decline in aircraft. performace. Always it is Allied aircraft were better. In tests during and after the war. Usng US 100 octance fuel several models of Japanese aircraft were shown to out perform US models. (The Japanese aircraft are labeled "unreliable" however this was due to the poor fuel.) If the USN subs do not hit the Japanese tankers. And the Japanese can maintain a supply of fuel the airwar will be more prolonged. (another nearly impossible if)

If the Japanese had been able to produce high octane gasoline in sufficent amouts and transport it where it was needed. Allowing better training for replacement pilots, and improved performance for combat aircraft. They might have been able to delay the collapse of their airforces for several more weeks. (No really. The ratios would still have been one sided but not to the degree they were by 1944. They might have been able to provide better escort to the suicide attack strikes.)

Each new Allied invasion would have faced stronger air then was the case. This is the single largest contribution of US Subs. I think this is the only example of a true stratigic weapon. The US/Allied subs had a major impact in all aspects of the Pacific war. But since the war was primarily an airwar their impact on the Japanese airforces was decisive.
The lack of high octane gas impacted the Japanese long before the impact of oil was felt. The cracking plants were also in the SRA. The Japanese only had these running at 76 percent of pre war production by 1943 and they were losing the shipments. to subs. (I would be interested in getting specific combat ratios from Japanese airgroups deployed near cracking plants where high octance was in better supply.)
(It would be really interesting if we could track down ratios based on the octane the Japanese were using. (after shipments of good fuel compared to missions when they were using "bad" fuel)

[Tristanjohn]

Yes. As however you point out, they were not particularly more severe than Japanese losses. In fighters just about 1.2:1 across the whole campaign at Cactus, favoring the Japanese, and only talking about land-based aircraft from both sides. The US won most of the daily engagements, but lost a big one in late August when a Japanese strike arrived undetected and bounced the F4Fs.

For the USN vs IJN, in no battle at any time did the IJN inflict a favorable (to the Japanese) loss ratio. Not once in the entire war.

This is correct. To it a take a step further, wiser Japanese pilots were already beiginning to shy away from mano-a-mano engagements with Widcats before the issue at Guadacanal had been settled, and by the beginning of 1943 bombers were following suit with regard to their choice of either pulling out to "fight" another day or driving home their attacks on Allied convoys, only, as a rule, to be forthwith shot out of the air by our AA batteries.

In overall losses, all types of aircraft, in no confrontation between Japanese pilots, in any suite of machines, at any time, did the Japanese have a favorable loss ratio against USN/USMC pilots in a campaign. The loss ratio generall favors the US around 2:1 in 1942 and, by war's end, 50-100:1.

Right on. (See my reply to Brown.)

Indeed not. But if one merely points out that the alleged Japanese superiority in both aircraft and pilots is not supported by any credible source of data, one is usually accused of claiming that "all WAS roses for the Red White and Blue."

Well yes, but just take a look at who's talking. The forum is full of fools, and worse. Apparently that's the only market for games these days. (Woe be unto us.)

I have consistently argued that the model should tend to produce sustained combat loss ratios, in 1942, in the Solomons, around 1:1.

I would welcome that. I'm not holding my breath.

The most typical Axis Fanboy response (paraphrasing a whole bunch of replies is)... "Saburo Sakai was a real man. He would not lie. When he says that Japanese pilots were far superior, I believe him. You, mdiehl, are just claiming that the US was overwhelmingly superior at everything through all time, because of your..." etc etc etc.

See above.

All that I have maintained is that in circumstances similar to the Solomons campaign, it is a legitimate yardstick to how the sustained campaign results come, in regard to loss RATIOS (not absolute numbers of a/c because, after all, players are free to pump their aircraft into the theater in different numbers or at different rates than historically), to the real event.

A couple weeks ago or so I tried to use the analogy of a home-made baseball game with dice where boxcars are a home run, double deuces and two treys singles, a one and a three a walk and so forth. My point was that just because such an approach to "modeling" baseball might yield scores that looked reasonable didn't mean this method represented any sort of sophisitication in the field of baseball simulations per se.

I went to this trouble in an effort to refute the simplistic notion held by some (all too many) around here that just because UV happens to yield reasonable kill totals at the end of its scenarios (and I do not know if this is even true--I haven't gotten that far in any of my PBEM games yet) it does not necessarily follow that its model is realistic, that the game simulates World War II action in the South Pacific, except in the loosest possible employment of that term.

Now I was talking to the same crowd you talked to, and it went in one ear and directly out the other.

Next question please.

[mogami]

Hi, Has any one ever published a study on the effect of octane on air combat in WWII? Prior to the war there was a major US expansion of high octane output. Prior to the embargo Japan had attempted to corner the market of US 100 octane. I can only assue the early aircombat was fought using this grade of fuel. I wonder when they ran out and began using the lesser octane fuel. This had to have an adverse effect on their combat results.

[Tristanjohn]

Hi, Other factors impacting the airwar.

All of that's very interesting, I'm sure, but it misses the point of this and other threads in the forum: the game called UV isn't close to being a serious or even semi-serious model of World War II in the South Pacific. It doesn't matter how fun it it might be to play, it doesn't matter how often a spokesperson for the company or one of the forum hacks babbles on and on about how it's just an "operational" study of the campaign . . . the bottom line remains that the game errs both statistically speaking and, more importantly still from my point of view, in its methodological approach to and sense for its subject.

That's the way it is. Anything short of that is denial.

[mogami]

Hi, The point of this and other threads is to improve the games.
It does not take a genius to point out faults.
Threads have to explain why things occured in history and how they can be modeled by the programmer. Just crowing in every thread about how bad UV is does nothing.
I've yet to understand your agenda. Or how you arrive at who is and who is not a forum hack or a matrix spokes person. Is it simply a matter of who agrees with you or just any one who can point out errors in a game? Unless you are writting code nothing you have posted is usefull.
Everyone is quite clear on the fact that people do not agree on the outcomes of combat in UV. For some reason it comes from people who do poorly. Then we all hear what a rotten model UV is and WITP will be unless everything is redone.
My posts in thread have had nothing to do with UV or WITP. I was only addressing one issue. Japanese Avation fuel. Japan began the war with stocks of USA made 100 octane. They fought the early battles using this fuel. When did they switch to lesser octane fuel?
(This could be one of the "modifiers" used in WITP. When Japan expends the prewar stocks aircraft performance declines. When they do not produce enough lessor octane fuel, the replacment pilots begin to decline) This could be one path for how and why of Japanese air power decline. (Other factors would be change in allied tactics.)

[mogami]

Hi, I think we are all aware of the impacts of historical myths on war-games. Factors that are placed inside game mechanics to reproduce historical outcomes. The Napoleononic games that made the Napoleon counter stronger then a Russian or Austrian Corps.
American Civil War games that inflated the value of confederate units so they could duplicate the "Lee" effect. Rommel endowed with super natural powers.
Some of these myths enter the games because the games creators think them facts, others because without them one side (usually the side that experienced success and thus created the myth) cannot win without them.

There are players who would like to do away with such things and force the players to possess the required skill to duplicate historic results. (I am in this faction) The problem arises from two fronts.
Players who cannot demonstrate enough skill to win.
Players who do not act the same as the side that lost.

Thus in war games France in 1940 is always portrayed as incompetent (Not just their Supreme Commander but the entire army and airforce)
Japanese pilots are marvels (despite not being able to overpower inferior aircraft in China and being defeated by the Soviets in 1939)

The easy way to reproduce the historic results has always been to just rate the winning side higher then the losing side. Where this tendency existed throughout the period of conflict no real complaints are heard. However when these results were transitory the problem is manifest in how to duplicate the change from superior to inferior. Here the designer must know the causes of the decline of one side and the rise of the other. Also there must be events that trigger these changes.
(If you simply pick the historical time for the change you run the risk of forcing a change that possibly could have been avoided.)

If you ask the majority of war-gamers to name the best German general of WWII you will hear Rommel named quite often. This is what I call the "Familiarity" effect.
Rommel is well known because he fought the Western Allies in a minor but well covered and exciting Campaign. In order to duplicate Axis success Rommel has to be endowed with powers. Without them the Allied player will alter the course the Historic Western Allies took in North Africa and defeat the out numbered Axis forces well ahead of schedule. (It would be historically correct to achieve this result. All one must change is a few British actions (sending the veteran units to Greece and replacing them with untried units) If the Allied player does this the Axis forces are out of Africa before Rommel can do anything. The future course of the war is altered.
The Japanese in any war-game have to have several special attributes. They must be permitted to launch the war by surprise. They must achieve air superiority early
They must out perform enemy naval units in night surface battles. Their submarines must ignore merchant ships and go after enemy warships.
The reality of course is the mechanics of the game must allow the player to reproduce certain elements of the above by correctly employing his assets. Simply mandating any result is inaccurate. Unskilled planners should suffer reverse where their historical counter parts enjoyed success. (And likewise it should be possible for any player to reverse history-as much as it was possible to reverse history.) You should not mandate events that results from decisions different then the players.
The Japanese should not be forced into undertaking the Midway operation.
The Romans must not be forced into falling for Hannibals center retirement at Cannae. But of course the moment the Romans do refuse to advance the simulation is no longer strictly speaking accurate. Unless you can prove what results to be accurate.
Personally I think a games detail should use ratings or factors that do not change without being the result of on map events. (SPI's combat results charts for War in Europe. The Axis declined and Allies rose regardless of what had transpired up to that point)

The AI effect. Often certain things must be implanted into a program in order to get the AI to operate in a historical manner. These aids or cheats are to enhance the program enough to challenge the human player. One cannot expect these to always be justifiable except as a means to help the AI. When the same benefits are given to a human they distort the game.

The problem of deviations from historical paths.
One of the major problems with war-games. The more accurate the model the farther from history the players will move. This is a difficult issue to define.
Russian-Japanese War of 1904. Grand Strategic simulation.
Why would the Russian player send the Baltic fleet around the world?
Would not the Russian player dispatch every available land combat unit east?
Would not the Russian player relieve several of his top commanders?
Would the simulation after this reproduce the Russian-Japanese War of 1904?
But still the model using the ships/leaders/units of the period should produce plausable alternative outcomes.

This is why the most important datas in a simulation are national base lines.
Ratings that apply across the board as much as possible. These would be the before "modifiers" are applied ratings.
Weapons, ranges, costs, requirments. Speed, range
If you get these right then the model is off to a good start.
No one will ever agree on subjective ratings. (Ratings that alter other ratings or influence the degree of their effect-experiance, morale, fatigue)

Since WITP will have an editor the most important thing is to get all the non subjective matters installed correctly. The problem with myths is they always have a element of truth in them. Distilling out the truth is not as easy as we would be led to believe.

The weather model: A general forecast is given (what operational planner get) On map the actual local in hex weather is not always in accordance with forecasts. The local in hex commander execute orders based on local weather.
One historic example. How long before ordering the Normandy landing was Eisenhower certain of the weather?
UV/WITP an open invitation has long been outstanding for anyone with a workable model to submit it for inclusion. The present being the best they can do. It works. You have to make both allowance and adjustments. Blanket "it sucks" achieve nothing.

[Tristanjohn]

Hi, The point of this and other threads is to improve the games. It does not take a genius to point out faults.

It requires even less genius to deny these faults

Threads have to explain why things occured in history and how they can be modeled by the programmer. Just crowing in every thread about how bad UV is does nothing.

I have endeavored to offer concrete examples of how and where the model could and should be improved; I have gone so far as to sketch out how these changes might be incorporated in-game. Thus far my entreaties have enjoyed nothing more polite and intelligent than ad hominem argument and collective denial that any such problems exist to begin with.

And you've done more than your share along those lines.

I've yet to understand your agenda.

So now what? Your claim is you have a learning disability?

Or how you arrive at who is and who is not a forum hack or a matrix spokes person.

That's a snap. A Matrix spokesperson would be someone like David Heath or Ross Moorhouse, you know, someone who works at Matrix, earns their living at the company, the usual suspects.

A forum hack would be someone like B20 or the like. (God help us all.)

Is it simply a matter of who agrees with you or just any one who can point out errors in a game? Unless you are writting code nothing you have posted is usefull.

Thank you for that feedback. I'll give it all the consideration it deserves.

Everyone is quite clear on the fact that people do not agree on the outcomes of combat in UV. For some reason it comes from people who do poorly. Then we all hear what a rotten model UV is and WITP will be unless everything is redone.

Please do not be be idiotic with me, Mogami. If you cannot or you are not willing to carry on serious discussions then just go away and play somewhere else, will ya?

My posts in thread have had nothing to do with UV or WITP. I was only addressing one issue.

For your information this thread is about UV and WitP. If you haven't figured that out you've no good business here at all.

Japanese Avation fuel. Japan began the war with stocks of USA made 100 octane. They fought the early battles using this fuel. When did they switch to lesser octane fuel? (This could be one of the "modifiers" used in WITP. When Japan expends the prewar stocks aircraft performance declines. When they do not produce enough lessor octane fuel, the replacment pilots begin to decline) This could be one path for how and why of Japanese air power decline. (Other factors would be change in allied tactics.)

I believe this is one of underlying problems with the entire project. You people seem to think the cure is to take a model that is already corrupted and transform it into something more complicated still. That's just plain ignorance of modeling theory--more complicated doesn't equal better, more complicated=more problems.

The key is to have clear vision of what you want to model in the first place, and how you want it look in the end. And if 2by3 thought that what we've got today was a good-looking end product as war simulations go then I see no hope whatsoever that WitP will arrive any more functional or historically representative than did UV.

I am sorry if that is blunt, but I just don't know any other way to say it.

[mogami]

Hi, If you were not always so full of your self you would see my fuel question is an attempt to understand the CAUSE that produced the outcomes you want to argue about. Air to air loss ratios and comparitve merits of aircraft types and pilot ratings.

Any factor that contributed to combat performace. Blanket claims like
"the allies are under rated because later results prove they must have been better."
What if reality was Allied pilots began to achive more success at same time Japanese pilots were flying aircraft that had performance degraded by using poorer quaility fuel.
What if part of the difference in performance between air units was they also were using different fuel?
Did the "Elite" Japanese airgroups use the 100 octane while the groups that did not produce so many outstanding flyers used 80 octane?
Is this a documented item that can be checked or is it purely speculation.

I have seen you define a better model, I've seen you compare it to UV/WITP I must have missed where you decribed how to write it other then to say with your model you would not have lost a battleship.

I don't think 2by3/Matrix are going to read your posts and stop work to begin again. I think you would have more progress if you hired a programmer to write your code and spent your time explaining it to him.
It is fruitless to contiue finding fault here. They are doing the best they can. Its too bad you didn't find out about the project 3 years ago.

[Tristanjohn]

Hi, I think we are all aware of the impacts of historical myths on war-games.

This last post goes nowhere useful fast, but I'll give you credit for trying to interject intelligent discussion, and I do not disagree with all that you wrote.

Without parsing your entire message, I'd like to say that if I were a wargame designer I'd avoid historical simulations like the plague and devote my energy instead to a giant blitzkrieg-like project where there is no suggestion of historical derivation from the subject--just warfare in the raw.

However, gamers like their Waterloo titles and so historical simulations tend to sell better than stuff like Tactics II. That being the case, if I were in Gary's shoes I'd chock the entire on-going model (no matter how much time has been invested) and start over from scratch. And this time I'd whisper to myself over and over and over again: I will not design another WWII Pacific-war game with super Japanese, I will not design another WWII Pacific-war game with super Japanese, I will not. . . .

[mogami]

Hi, I'm beginning to understand how Bruckner felt about Hanslick.

I've seen your PBEM game. I know you are trying to do things 6 months ahead of time. I know you have not yet fought the battles that destroy the IJN air arm. You ignored the enemy and when it hurt you, you cried foul. It was not UV that made the Japanese "Super" it was you.
You landed at Lunga and the Japanese ignored you. So you decided to move closer and the Japanese ignored you. So you expanded your operations. But never once did you force the Japanese to commit.
Then you blundered and the Japanese response hurt you.
Until and unless the Allied engage and defeat the Japanese they will be a threat. They are not over modeled. You blundered. You have to fight them before you can say they are too powerfull. Letting them sit and rest and build and then sending unprotected ships to them does not make them modeled incorrectly.

The speed that you arrived at your conclusions is revealing.

[Tristanjohn]

Hi, I'm beginning to understand how Bruckner felt about Hanslick.

I've seen your PBEM game. I know you are trying to do things 6 months ahead of time. I know you have not yet fought the battles that destroy the IJN air arm. You ignored the enemy and when it hurt you, you cried foul. It was not UV that made the Japanese "Super" it was you.
You landed at Lunga and the Japanese ignored you. So you decided to move closer and the Japanese ignored you. So you expanded your operations. But never once did you force the Japanese to commit.
Then you blundered and the Japanese response hurt you.
Until and unless the Allied engage and defeat the Japanese they will be a threat. They are not over modeled. You blundered. You have to fight them before you can say they are too powerfull. Letting them sit and rest and build and then sending unprotected ships to them does not make them modeled incorrectly.

The speed that you arrived at your conclusions is revealing.

This discussion isn't about my PBEM results, it's about Gary's game. You apparently are unable to comprehend that it is irrelevant to me who wins and who loses the game. For me the only issue is how the game model simulates this period of history.

My primary interest in UV has been as a preview of what WitP will look like when it is released. I do not like what I see. WitP might well be the last large computer game dealing the Pacific war that I will own in my lifetime; if it behaves the same as UV I will be greatly disappointed. I went through this years ago with Pacific War when Joel gave that game a haricut, and I don't want to go there again.

Call me selfish if you will, but I want this one to come out right, and I am prepared to squawk if that will help.

But I'm glad you brought this up: the most depressing element in this business for me has been the realization of just what sort of people are involved in this project--what their knowledge of the subject is, where their priorities lie with regard to realism vis-a-vis "playability" and a host of other concerns. I don't think there's one chance in a million WitP is going to be released in any better shape than UV. The company seems not only willing but eager to take its lead from gamers pretty much like you, Mogami. And forgive me for saying so, but you and yours can't cut it by half.

So please. go away and win another twenty-seven games of UV against your kind or whatever it takes, but leave me alone. I have nothing left to discuss with you on this subject.

[Mike_B20]

I feel strangely honoured being referred to by Tristanjohn as a hack.
If he had any praise for my contributions I'd be genuinely worried.

Tristanjohn, take some time out from practicing your IQ tests.
Take a break from thinking up new derogatory adjectives for everyone who doesn't follow your line of thinking or you consider your intellectual inferior.
Spend some time using the search function to explore the forums for previous discussions you'd find many of the concerns you raise have been discussed ad nauseum (you might like to add that to your repertoire of latin terms, your use and abuse of ad hominem is getting boring).
You have to excuse some of us for bleary eyed boredom when you launch into a new harangue on the general stupidity of the designers and players and the inadequacy of the model...been there, seen that *yawn* :sleep:

You might discover that many of the people you dismiss as stupid have argued for some of the same things you have been arguing for.
For myself, I have changed my mind on a few issues as being in agreement with you on anything is something I find repugnant.

[HMSWarspite]

I realise I am taking a risk here , but has anyone the slightest idea what the likes of Tristanjohn wants in all these threads?

I really cannot understand his point, and my (extensive) reading of this forum leads me to believe that it boils down to 'GG is wrong because he rates the Japanese as good', 'I am right because I rate them as poor'. Is it really this simple, or have I missed something?

Mogami, I like your line of thought on 100 octane, and it would be a very good question, I hope the data is around somewhere (although I have my doubts - anyone know what IJN/A sqd records are like?) There will also be a pilot experience, and tactical element, but the a/c performance drop off argument works better for me than the 'allied a/c are just better' school of thought.

[mogami]

Hi, Concerning the size of various airfields in PNG. It has been suggested that Lae was incapable of being enlarged and maintaining larger numbers of aircraft.
In UV the Japanese have a shortage of support units. (With all their support units deployed on map they will still not be able to provide support to all their aircraft) So the Japanese player must decide bases to be enlarged and given support and bases that are left undeveloped.
Much of the future campaign will be a product of these decisions.
During the actual conflict Lae although a major Japanese base was always short of aircraft and supply. (The Bismarck Sea battle was a Japanese attempt to reinforce/resupply Lae.) Japanese attention focused on events in the Solomons. (After Aug 42 we find the Japanese are reducing the number of aircraft using Lae as a base.)
What is interesting is the number of Allied airgroups one finds there after the allies capture the base. Lae was used to support Allied Medium Bombers. Several groups along with recon and fighter groups flew out of Lae.

The Japanese in scenarios 7 and 14 (the same scenario different end dates but the closest to actual history for this area) do not have enough airgroups to spare any for Lae. (It would be nice if airgroups could split. (27 ac fighter group form 3x9ac groups) (In WITP airgroups can split in this manner)
In these scenarios it is Lae's proximity to Port Moresby that makes the Japanese tend to reduce the importance of Lae (it is next to impossible to maintain supply to this base)(reflecting the historical outcome) In the other scenarios (with May start dates) The Japanese can commit to the build up Lae.

In other scenarios there are always too many aircraft for both sides "up front" This produces larger then historical aircombats. Perhaps some airgroups should be assigned to Northern Command

(In late Aug 43, by which time the allies can be said to have achived air control a normal raid on the then main Japanese airfield at Wewak was 28 aircraft per day. One of these attacks claimed to have destroyed 200 Japanese aircraft. (Far as I can tell there were over 200 Japanese aircraft deployed at Wewak prior to the raid but it is hard to determine the status of these aircraft (how many were damaged and how many were operational)

So my question regarding the airmodel is should there be limits to number of airgroups allowed to take part in airbattles or should it be unrestricted. The unrestricted use of airgroups by players can result in battles much larger in scale then any that occured in the area during the period.

[pry]

Hi, Concerning the size of various airfields in PNG. It has been suggested that Lae was incapable of being enlarged and maintaining larger numbers of aircraft.

[snip]

So my question regarding the airmodel is should there be limits to number of airgroups allowed to take part in airbattles or should it be unrestricted. The unrestricted use of airgroups by players can result in battles much larger in scale then any that occured in the area during the period.

Mogami I see no reason to impose any limits, just because something did not happen "Historically" does not mean that it could not have happened at all in game terms. If in WITP a player has the support, the assets and supply available why should he be precluded from doing so if that is what he thinks he needs to obtain his campaign goals.

I do not think the airmodel has anything to do with this; it is a support and supply function. Now historically as we all know there were problems with supply and support that limited groups to 50% operational aircraft at most times that is what limited mission sizes and numbers of aircraft operated at most bases.

This is not covered well in UV in my opinion and allows folks to stack 200 aircraft into bases far too easy. I think a better way to simulate this would be to drastically increase the supply requirements for bases forces and you must have something like 2x supplies before you can operate a base at full capacity. If you can meet these requirements than let them fly without limits on numbers.

Arbitrary limits because something did not happened historically should not preclude any player from doing it as long as all the resources required are in place.

[pasternakski]

So my question regarding the airmodel is should there be limits to number of airgroups allowed to take part in airbattles or should it be unrestricted. The unrestricted use of airgroups by players can result in battles much larger in scale then any that occured in the area during the period.

I think that this would be a good opportunity to give air HQs a role. Maybe a severe limitation on numbers of squadrons able to participate in a mission could be imposed that would be alleviated to some extent by presence of an air HQ.

Just a thought.