The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII

[Dragoon 45]

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45

Also mentioned in previous posts are examples from the First World War. Normally accounts from that war emphasis the horror of serving in the trenches and little is actually mentioned about troop quality. I believe everyone in this forum will agree that the Allies wasted troops' lives at a tremendous rate. But I would argue that American troops in World War I stood head and shoulders above any other troops committed by the Allies. For instance at the Battle of the Argonne in particular the Battle of Belleau Wood, U.S. Forces (both Marine and Army) breached the German trench system completely, the first time this had happened in the war. Throughout the War the Germans had developed tactics that prevented the French or British from making any major gains in the trench fighting. Indeed part of the French Army mutineed because of the blunders of its high command. The British Army was quite adept at portraying limited gains as a great victory as were the French. The only actual success for the British in the entire war was at Cambrai and it was squandered by poor planning. If you check KIA figures for the entire war you will find that the British and French lost over twice as many men as the Germans lost on all fronts.

I sense a man who has read Mosier? I think the whole "US infantryman in WWI was superior" argument is way off to be honest. It just doesn't stand up. For example, one German assessment of the AEF read:

The initial attack was carried out according to schedule but the successive waves showed great inaptitude in following up the advance. Officers as well as men did not understand how to make use of the terrain. Instead of seeking protection when they encountered opposition they merely fell back. To crawl backward or forward on the ground or to advance in quick jumps does not seem to by understood by the Americans. They remain lying on the ground for the time being, and then just stand up again and try to advance.

Neither in mass formations nor individually do the Americans know how to conduct themselves in an attack.

The higher command, also, did not understand how to grasp quickly the new situation and exploit it to the best advantage. After the infantry had reached its objective the higher command failed. They were not familiar with the tactical principles in the use of divisions and attack units for the destruction of the enemy. It was therefor possible for the [German] Army Detachment, under the most difficult conditions, to extricate itself from its precarious situation in one night, and, with only a short distance intervening between it and the enemy, to occupy new positions of resistance…

That was written about 1st Army. After the Argonne, one German wrote:

The American Infantry is very unskillful in the attack. It attacks in thick columns, in numerous waves echeloned in depth, preceded by tanks. This sort of attack offers excellent objectives for the fire of our artillery, infantry and machine guns.

Essentially, Pershing refused to allow the Americans to fight under British or French control for reasons of his own, so they went into action and suffered in the same way the British and French had done in 1915 and 1916. Their refusal to listen to French and British hard experience cost a lot of lives. The Americans disheartened the Germans because they offered the necessary manpower to overwhelm them, and they knew it, but American performance on the battlefield, although enthusiastic, would not have unduly worried the Germans had they had enough men to compete.

The performance of the BEF at this stage of the war (and of the french) was better, based on years of hard experience getting the tactics for offensive action right (in a war whose technology had usually helped the defence).

Regards,
IronDuke

Yes I have read Mosier and I do agree with some of his points. I do not believe the British performance was better in the later stages of the War than the Americans. The British to the best of my knowledge never used infiltration tactics in conducting large scale attacks in World War I. If the British and French troops had so much better experience than the Americans had at this stage in the War how do you explain casaulity rates. The American casaulities generally matched the Germans when committed to action. In every case except Cambrai British and French Forces suffered much more casualities than the Germans did. Also Pershing would not let the French or British control the AEF for one important reason: He didn't trust them. The British wanted to break down the Americans and use them for replacements for their units and the French wanted them to use to reinforce their units. Nether case was politically reasonable. Prior to the commitment of the Americans there was a very grave danger of the Allies losing the War. Imperial Russia, Italy, Romania, and Serbia were all defeated by the Central Powers. By late 1917 the Germans were only fighting a one front war. And no I am not maintaining that the Americans were super soldiers either. You cite one instance of a German After Action Report about American performance, I can cite others were the Germans could not explain why they lost a position to them, with many references to the excellent troops used. Also please remember the French had a large hand in training the AEF prior to its commitment to battle.

[SeaMonkey]

Great discussion, and I'm not going to discount any of the obviously great points made in this thread, but instead state the difference in simple terms. I've been reading "The Forgotten Soldier" by Guy Sajer and the one thing that really seems to stand out is an army lives and dies on its stomach, to paraphrase an old cliche. So that's my premise, and the point has already been made,... logistics. Not just the quantity of, but also the quality. The little presents, letters, words of encouragement from home. Knowing that you have a just cause and that some day this will be over, propaganda or not. That the homeland and loves you will return to will be awaiting with open arms and in appreciation of your sacrifice and will still be in one piece due to your efforts. And essentially, the "simple terms" have a timeless application, simple puzzle with complicated pieces.

[KG Erwin]

Posted by Dragoon45:

I must disagree with KG ERWIN in one aspect of the argument he presents. The U.S. Army did not form divisions the way he refers to. I don't have the exact figure but I recall the strength of the U.S. Army was approximately 100,000 regulars in 1939. A lot of the National Guard Divisions, those numbered in the 20-40's, were committed as they were when mobilized. Meaning not a lot of personnel changes were made. Some of these divisions performed very well from the initial commitment and others didn't. The higher numbered divisions were formed from drafts of trained (not combat experienced) personnel from other formed units in the states. In a lot of cases these trained drafts only had at best one to two years experience in the Army. There was not a large pool of combat experienced leaders available in the U.S. Army prior to D-Day. Those combat experienced troops the Army possessed were still in combat either in the Med or Pacific. Yes the U.S. Army experienced large problems when it expanded. What has always surprised me is how well a lot of these green units performed when first committed to combat.

To Dragoon 45: Yes, I overstated my case here, as the subject that prompted this thread was specifically on the expansion of the US Marine Corps from 1941 to 1944. That was my original frame of reference, and I mistakenly included the US Army in my argument.

To Iron Duke: A further part of my argument is based on the Marines' opponents, arguably the toughest we faced during WWII. The casualty ratio alone doesn't tell the story, because in many of the island assaults, the Japanese fought literally to the last man. Every amphib invasion was another D-Day, and we were never defeated. While technologically, the Japanese were inferior to the Germans, they never surrendered en mass, and in contrast to our German opponents, only defended more fanatically and constructed even more formidable defenses as the war went on.

Now, as a whole, all of the US armed forces were unprepared to go to war in Dec 1941, but the US government was already developing plans for a rapid industrial and military expansion. The defense budget increased from 8 billion (1940) dollars in 1940 to 26 billion dollars in 1941, PRIOR to our entry into the war. Also, don't forget that we launched a major amphibious offensive only 8 months to the day after Pearl Harbor. This was nothing short of incredible, and was an even more formidable accomplishment than the five-month buildup before Desert Storm fifty years later.

(BTW, I'm very pleased with the way this discussion has progressed. No flaming, no demagoguery, and no locking up. Thanks for keeping this on a high level, gentlemen. [:)])

[Golf33]

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
Only bad decisions by higher authorities back in the states limited the upgrades to the Sherman that would have allowed it to go head to head with the German Tanks i.e. refusal to upgun it in 1943, except for the Jumbo refusal to up armor it, and the U.S. Army's decision to use gasoline powered instead of Diesel powered M-4's.

I am not at all convinced about the diesel vs petrol argument. German tanks have not gained the reputation for cooking their crews that has been attached to the Sherman; and yet every German tank was powered by petrol. This suggests to me that the cause of Shermans brewing-up had to do with inferior design - particularly in ammunition storage, not fixed until the (W) models. Crew discipline in storage of ammunition may have also played a role; I recall reading that the British suffered fewer brewed-up Shermans because they were more retentive about storing everything according to the load plan, while American crews had more leeway and often had loose ammunition stuffed into every corner of the turret. I can't recall the source though so this should be taken with a big grain of salt.

Motivation of the Troops I believe was a wash, with no clear advantage on either side.

Depends on who you look at. Omer Bartov's Hitler's Army takes an unconventional and deeply unpopular look at Wehrmacht motivation and combat performance and concludes that brutalisation and fanatical Nazi ideology were the main components of both by the end of the war. His work is still quite controversial though!

Regards
33

[IronDuke_slith]

Original: Dragoon 45

What instances are you referring to where the Allies struggled? .

The Normandy campaign, Arnhem, Hurtgen Forest, Patton in Lorraine, chunks of the Bulge. All of Italy.

In Normandy perhaps? Only two veteran American Divisions (82 Abn and 1st ID) were committed through the Normandy beaches.

D-Day forms only part of the discussion. One of the other formations, the 101st performed exceptionally well despite its green status. It was an elite formation. Only 29th and 4th could be classed as standard. They did not face quality opposition for the most part. 352nd Infantry was not quite the regular Wehrmacht infantry Division some accounts class it as, and (IIRC) although there was a FallschirmJaeger regiment in the American area of operations on D-day, they were not involved immediately.

There was some thought given to using green formations on D-Day on the basis they did not know what to expect and might perform better if things got very hairy as a result.

I would also argue that the British and Canadian divisions committed through the beaches were green also. The British 7th Armored Division was in theory a veteran division but sure didn't show that in the early battles in Normandy (Villers Bocage, etc.).

The 50th on Gold Beach was veteran and performed very well. The 7th performed very poorly throughout the campaign. It was not the only British formation. The reasons behind it form part of the general reasoning I hold as to why Germans fought harder. In the case of the British troops, many had fought for several years. They knew that once ashore and established the game was up for the Germans, and no one wanted to die needlessly with the end in sight. The 7th were a veteran formation but had some very bad days in Normandy, for reasons like this.

Green Troops make mistakes, it is how they learn in combat. And the German units in Normandy had a core of combat experienced leaders. Green troops vs experienced troops will normally show the green troops in a less than favorable light most times. I would also argue that the British troops early in the war were hindered to a large degree by inept commanders. And the British were not alone in this area, the American Division and Corps Commanders in the early days of North Africa are examples of this also. I would go back to something I posted in this thread earlier, "There are no bad troops, just bad leaders". The intangibles are what motivates troops to fight. Was the German soldier better than the Allied soldier? We can discuss this at length and all of us will have varying opinions on the subject. My own opinion is that the German soldier was no better than the Allied soldier. But I do believe that the German soldier was much better served by the Staff at levels from the Army and Corps level down than the Allied soldier. To my way of thinking this is what accounts for the performance of the German soldier throughout WW II

To some extent, but it would be wrong to overplay this. The German formations in Normandy were not up to very much. There were some decent formations around on D-Day like 21st Panzer, but most of the other quality formations arrived from 7th onwards, with the II SS Panzer Corp not arriving until the end of June. These men were also what made up the Wehrmacht after five years of slaughter. It was the ability of very ordinary formations to put up a decent fight that characterised the Germans until almost the very end. The aforementioned 352nd was eventually disbanded when reduced to just a few hundred men. Less than a month after losing a million casulties in the Normandy campaign together with several hundred tanks and several thousands guns, the germans were halting Market Garden and stopping Patton in Lorraine. The Allies had air supremacy, better logistics, more ammunition for their artillery and the sure fire knowledge they were going to win. Two thirds of the German Army were tied down getting slaughtered in the east and yet it still took eleven months to finish them off in the west.

I also don't buy the reasoning that it was in part down to Staff officering. Yes, the Germans usually excelled at this, but Normandy was not a war of manouevre. What movement they managed, was usually done in darkness. Normandy was a series of never ending small unit actions (in the bocage) and a series of set piece slaughters around Caen. That German formations lasted as long as they did, filled with new troops and the survivors of five years of combat needs explaining. The Staff Officer is irrelevant the minute the first shot is fired. We didn't break out of Normandy, so much as the germans ran out of bodies to put in front of us. That we didn't get through earlier is explained by a number of reasons, including the nature of the terrain, a number of green formations, questions about morale amidst the allied formations, German advantages in certain areas of equipment but also a tactical ability on the part of the average German formation that took some overcoming.

To me wargaming is trying to change history. Where is the fun in it, if you know before hand what the outcome is and there is no way it can be changed. The fun is in can I change history if I do something different in a given situation. Trying to understand these intrinsic factors is part of trying to change history.

To me, it is trying to do better than was done historically, with the same forces. I don't really enjoy the research type games. The Germans would have won the war had they had the Panther in substantial numbers in 1940, but that was never possible, so why attempt to game it?

The Allies were not particularly well marshalled, even before German ability was taken into account. I think there's plenty of scope in wargaming to do better, even if the Germans are often granted better abilities on the counters.

What would have happened if Hitler had not declared war on the United States?

He had a half chance of a stalemate in the east, or lengthening the war there until 1946/47. I don't think the lack of a declaration of war would have stopped Roosevelt and lend lease.

What would have happened if Patton not Eisenhower was appointed CinC of SHAEF?

This is a toss up. Either defeat in Normandy or war between Britain and the United States.

What would have happened if the M-26 was developed and produced in time to equipment the U.S. Armored Force prior to D-Day? And the list goes on.

I could envisage this, American tank design and procurement was often tortuous. However, you might have to remove the TD units from most American divisions and revise American doctrine. The Ground forces themselves fought long and hard to keep the M26 and its ancestors out of combat, because American doctrine favoured the TD as the prime anti-tank platform and they were worried that mounting 90MM weapons in tanks would see crews go looking for fights with German armour, which was not what the Army had in mind for them. In the end the General Staff intervened to force the US Army to accept the M-26s in the wake of the set backs in the Ardennes. Therefore, I could envisage this (just). It requires only attitudes to change, not necessarly physics. It might be more interesting to mount one or two units into special battalions, or replace the upgunned 76s with M-26s for the Normandy campaign, as a more realistic objective pre D-Day, but it would have been interesting to see the result.
Regards,
IronDuke

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: Golf33

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
Only bad decisions by higher authorities back in the states limited the upgrades to the Sherman that would have allowed it to go head to head with the German Tanks i.e. refusal to upgun it in 1943, except for the Jumbo refusal to up armor it, and the U.S. Army's decision to use gasoline powered instead of Diesel powered M-4's.

I am not at all convinced about the diesel vs petrol argument. German tanks have not gained the reputation for cooking their crews that has been attached to the Sherman; and yet every German tank was powered by petrol. This suggests to me that the cause of Shermans brewing-up had to do with inferior design - particularly in ammunition storage, not fixed until the (W) models. Crew discipline in storage of ammunition may have also played a role; I recall reading that the British suffered fewer brewed-up Shermans because they were more retentive about storing everything according to the load plan, while American crews had more leeway and often had loose ammunition stuffed into every corner of the turret. I can't recall the source though so this should be taken with a big grain of salt.

Motivation of the Troops I believe was a wash, with no clear advantage on either side.

Depends on who you look at. Omer Bartov's Hitler's Army takes an unconventional and deeply unpopular look at Wehrmacht motivation and combat performance and concludes that brutalisation and fanatical Nazi ideology were the main components of both by the end of the war. His work is still quite controversial though!

Regards
33

I've a copy of Bartov's The Eastern Front 1941-45, German troops and the barbarisation of warfare on the shelf that I'll get around too shortly. I think he pushes much the same theme. It's uncomfortable reading for traditional Wehrmacht grognards.

Regards,
IronDuke

[IronDuke_slith]

Original: KG Erwin

To Iron Duke: A further part of my argument is based on the Marines' opponents, arguably the toughest we faced during WWII. The casualty ratio alone doesn't tell the story, because in many of the island assaults, the Japanese fought literally to the last man. Every amphib invasion was another D-Day, and we were never defeated. While technologically, the Japanese were inferior to the Germans, they never surrendered en mass, and in contrast to our German opponents, only defended more fanatically and constructed even more formidable defenses as the war went on.

KG,

I think none of the Amphib operations the Marines ever launched were tougher than what the Allies faced on D-Day, I really don't. You can argue the one that was tough - Tarawa - nearly ended in disaster. If memory serves, at Iwo and Okinawa, the Marines got ashore without a shot being fired. The week long bombardments meant beach defences weren't the issue, it was what you did when you got ashore that mattered.

At that point, firepower meant the Japs were finished, it was just a question of time and attrition. I'd argue that after months or years of fighting in the atolls, your average Marine would have suffered badly at the hands of the Wehrmacht because they would never have fought an enemy so tactically adept, or well equipped. They simply weren't trained for it.
I've no doubt they would have adapted eventually, but only for the same cost in casualties most other american units did.

As for toughness, you could argue the Japs were tougher because of what they suffered, and their willingness to fight to the very last man, but in no way did their tactical skills match those of the Wehrmacht. They were poorly equipped, often starving, and their method of counterattack was simply fixing bayonets and charging. Their toughness didn't prevent them dying in droves, because they could not withstand the firepower being brought to bear.

Regards,
IronDuke

[EricGuitarJames]

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

What would have happened if Patton not Eisenhower was appointed CinC of SHAEF?

This is a toss up. Either defeat in Normandy or war between Britain and the United States.

IronDuke

[:D]

True or not that is extremely funny. Where's Von Rom when you need him[;)]

[EricGuitarJames]

Great discussion. I'll just throw in a couple of comments.

Re: The Sherman:-

It's quality was it's reliability. German tanks were better engineered and their maintenance teams worked near miracles keeping them in the field at times but nevertheless many broke down and were abandoned. The Sherman would always get to the battlefield and once German armour and AT was neutralised could be relied upon to give support to the infantry.

Re: British troops in WW1:-

True they did not use 'infiltration' tactics but credit for utilising this is often given to Monash. Where the British were innovative was in their 'combined arms' tactics in the 1918 campaign. Close co-operation between tanks, artillery, aircraft and the infantry meant they were able to prevent the German army from re-establishing the static war of 1915-18. Smashing through the Hindenburg line in 24 hours is a stunning achievement however it's looked at.

Re: WW2 American soldiers:-

I think it's difficult to make a case for the average GI to be the best soldier of the war. What can be said is that overall he enjoyed the best support and the most reliable equipment of any army in the field during WW2. It would take a poor general and poor motivation to throw away that kind of advantage in a battle.

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

What would have happened if Patton not Eisenhower was appointed CinC of SHAEF?

This is a toss up. Either defeat in Normandy or war between Britain and the United States.

IronDuke

[:D]

True or not that is extremely funny. Where's Von Rom when you need him[;)]

I hate to say it, but I miss him, you know, I really do. Things haven't been the same around here since he left (or was it evicted, I wasn't sure who was doing what to who by the very end).

Proof that he doesn't hover around here as a lurker is evidenced by the fact that he hasn't jumped in to defend the Good General's honour. Still, life goes on...
Regards,
IronDuke

[KG Erwin]

I put in a call for a medic. Hope he arrives soon. [;)]

[Devil Doc]

GENERAL THOUGHTS

I. In terms of a rational approach to the conduct of warfighting, the US armed forces did the best job in World War II. Yes, the Germans did some good staff work, but they were all over the place on their approach to sustaining their forces. At the operational level, they may have been on top early in the war, but the US Army's division & corps commanders & their staffs were doing outstanding work by 44-45. No other army could've sustained the deep armored thrusts across France, or pulled off victory in the Ardennes. You can't chalk that up to our supposed "material superiority." There's no doubt the German emphasis on mission focused tactics was effective, but they NEVER had a logistical tail that would sustain their operations.

2. The American fighting man beat the enemy in the man to man battle. When the chips were down at Omaha, in the Gothic Line & the Bulge, our Soldiers beat the Germans man to man. Anybody who thinks our soldiers hunkered down in their holes waiting for the supporting arms & tanks just hasn't studied the tactical employment of our forces. This line of thinking is absolutely wrong.

THE MARINE CORPS IN THE PACIFIC

1. There was a learning curve in the initial employment of our amphibious forces in the Pacific. Well, yeah, when is there not in combat? That doesn't mean our Marines didn't know what they were doing. No Marine unit in World War II was ever defeated by the Japanese, except when the American forces surrendered in the Phillipines, & at Wake Island, which was a hopeless cause. Before the Marine Corps developed the concept of modern amphibious assualt, this form of warfare was dismissed as undoable. (i. e., Gallipoli) The officers who wrote the Tenative Manual for Landing Operations in '34 at MCB, Quantico were the very same men who went on to lead our amphibious forces into combat in World War II.

2. Marine units in combat during World War II absorbed casualty levels that, by the book, should have made them combat ineffective. You don't have to take my word, find the casualty statistics for yourself. On Iwo Jima, there were approx. 48,000 casualties on 8 square miles of ground during the 30-some days of combat. No other battlefield anywhere in World War II reached that level of concentrated violence, not even on the eastern front.

3. The Vth Amphibious Corps had a ONE HOUR respite before the Japanese opened up on the from Suribachi, from the defensive forts on the left flank and from the prepared defenses on Motoyama #1. I wouldn't call that an 'easy landing', but maybe you were there? The first platoon to make it across the narrow strip to the west coast of the island had 5 men left in it. 13 battalion commanders were killed or wounded on Iwo.

4. There were no great sweeping drives in the Pacific campaigns the Marine Corps fought in. The Japanese did not surrender, so the Marines had to destroy every shread of resistance before an island was secured. And in many campaigns, they fought shoulder to shoulder with Soldiers. The only time the Japanese surrendered in significant numbers was on Okinawa, and that didn't occur until after our forces broke through the Shuri Line. Okinawa was a blood bath. No campaign in World War Ii even came close, except on the eastern front.

5. No other military force in the 20th century was able to maintain a uniformly high standard during expansion as the US Marine Corps. The German army defeated itseef through its haphazard growth. The Waffen SS ceased to be a elite organization because it grew too large, too fast with no sustainment base. The Germans did not grasp the logisitical realities of fighting a mechanized army. They never had one anyway, only armored and mechanized units embedded in an essentially 19th Century army.

The Marine Corps's expansion (and for that matter, the US Army's) was controlled, logical, and most importantly SUSTAINABLE. The American armed forces did not expand beyond our industrial capacity due to centralized planning. The most damning evidence against supposed German military superiority was their drive to have as many little armies as possible, instead of one powerful & combined military force.

[Devil Doc]

I'm here for you buddy, only if you're lookin' for a corpsman!

[Dragoon 45]

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

Original: KG Erwin

To Iron Duke: A further part of my argument is based on the Marines' opponents, arguably the toughest we faced during WWII. The casualty ratio alone doesn't tell the story, because in many of the island assaults, the Japanese fought literally to the last man. Every amphib invasion was another D-Day, and we were never defeated. While technologically, the Japanese were inferior to the Germans, they never surrendered en mass, and in contrast to our German opponents, only defended more fanatically and constructed even more formidable defenses as the war went on.

KG,

I think none of the Amphib operations the Marines ever launched were tougher than what the Allies faced on D-Day, I really don't. You can argue the one that was tough - Tarawa - nearly ended in disaster. If memory serves, at Iwo and Okinawa, the Marines got ashore without a shot being fired. The week long bombardments meant beach defences weren't the issue, it was what you did when you got ashore that mattered.

At that point, firepower meant the Japs were finished, it was just a question of time and attrition. I'd argue that after months or years of fighting in the atolls, your average Marine would have suffered badly at the hands of the Wehrmacht because they would never have fought an enemy so tactically adept, or well equipped. They simply weren't trained for it.
I've no doubt they would have adapted eventually, but only for the same cost in casualties most other american units did.

As for toughness, you could argue the Japs were tougher because of what they suffered, and their willingness to fight to the very last man, but in no way did their tactical skills match those of the Wehrmacht. They were poorly equipped, often starving, and their method of counterattack was simply fixing bayonets and charging. Their toughness didn't prevent them dying in droves, because they could not withstand the firepower being brought to bear.

Regards,
IronDuke

Iron Duke.

You raise some points here I would like to address. You disregard the Japanese tactical skill in some very important areas. The Japanese were past masters at camoflauge and very adept at setting up a defense in depth. Yes they did commit some serious mistakes in their counterattacks against U.S. Forces. The Japanese just like every other army had their strong points and their weak points. Omaha Beach is mentioned as a case for the Germans being superior in defense of a beach area. I would first say that the Germans never achieved the concentration of firepower in a small area that the Japanese did. And I would also counter that Omaha Beach was an example of very poor planning and execution. None of the bombs dropped by allied bombers hit their targets on Omaha, the Naval Gunfire Barrage lasted less than three hours. The German defenses were essentially untouched when the Americans hit the beach. What is to me more important about Omaha is how the troops overcame all these problems and still succeeded. There is a book out (Omaha Beach, A Flawed Victory) that should be required reading for any serious student of the D-Day landings. SHAEF decided to forego a long bombardment of the beaches in the hope of achieving tactical surprise. This action by SHAEF almost cost the Allies the D-Day landings.

Comparing the Japanese vs the Germans to me is like comparing apples to oranges. How do you compare two armies that never fought against each other? The Germans would never have taken the kind of losses that the Japanese did in the Pacific. On Tarawa there was only three Japanese POW's out of a force of over 5,000 defenders in an action that lasted a little less than three days. The Germans never set up the kind of defenses that the Japanese did. How do you compare the defenses manned by 5000 men on a three acre piece of ground, a small Pacific Atoll, to the type of defenses set up in Europe. I know of no area in the European Theater that compared to the types of defenses set up by the Japanese. No defensive area ever set up by the Germans ever achieved the concentration of firepower that the Marines faced in the Pacific.

What advantages and disadvantages did the German Infantry Squad have over the Allied Infantry Squad? We have all danced around the subject but have not actually stated them.

1. The most important advantage the German Infantry Squad had was the deployment at squad level of the MG-34/42. The firepower represented by the use of a squad MG was not matched by Allied formations.

2. The K-98 was a bolt-action rifle which did not have the firepower of the M-1.

3. By June 1944, most German Squad Leaders were veteran combat experienced leaders. The German practice was to take combat experienced troops and send them to either NCO or Officer schools for promotion.

4. German Infantry Units were normally formed from the same small geographical area, Berlin, Saxony, Baden, etc.. So unit coehesion was probably a little bit better in most cases with the exception of the British county regiments and most National Guard units.

5. The Germans probably had more realistic training. Although Live Fire Training in and of itself is not the end all and do all of training. Much was made about the extensive use of Live Fire Training by the Soviets prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. They suffered losses through training accidents that would be unacceptable to Western Armies. But I think we can safely say the Soviets never equalled the Western Armies in the level of training. The type of training is not near as important as how the training is conducted.

6. The German Infantry never enjoyed the logistical support that the Allies had.

7. Also German doctrine for small units has not been addressed. It was SOP for the Germans to immediately conduct a counterattack anytime they were forced out of a position. Yes it was also the doctrine of the other armies, but was never adhered to like the Germans.

8. Another area that I do not believed has been touched upon is in the matter of ruthlessness. I do not refer to this concept in a derogatory sense, but in the sense of doing what ever needs to be done no matter what the cost. Lets face it the Allied armies were acutely aware of casaulities throughout the war, for a number of reasons. The Germans throughout the war were more willing to do what ever it took to achieve their objectives than the Allies were.

I am sure there are others that we could add to this list and we can debate all of these based on a number of factors. I will return to my previous statements concerning Leadership. All the different factors mentioned in all the posts in this thread boil down to one thing: Leadership. Without effective leadership the best troops perform poorly and the worst troops perform above all expectations with it.

[KG Erwin]

ORIGINAL: Devil Doc

I'm here for you buddy, only if you're lookin' for a corpsman!

Thanks for your response, Devil Doc. I knew you'd offer some good commentary. [&o]

You, too, Dragoon45.

I had a few choice comments to add, but decided to bite my tongue this time. [;)]

[SemperAugustus]

What about the Soviet forces from 1943 and onwards? Once they got rolling they did quite well against the German forces, not to mention the Japanese in Manchuria.

[KG Erwin]

ORIGINAL: SemperAugustus

What about the Soviet forces from 1943 and onwards? Once they got rolling they did quite well against the German forces, not to mention the Japanese in Manchuria.

Very true, and I'm surprised the Russians haven't been mentioned before. There have been some great studies released in the last ten years on the preparedness of the Red Army in 1941, such as David Glantz's "Stumbling Colossus".

The Russians had some major leadership issues in 1941-42, and some major organizational deficiencies, but by 1943-44 these were partially remedied. They learned well, and by 1945 could "do the blitz" with the best of them.

However, their troop training was not on a par with the other allies, and they never did get that sorted out, even until the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991.

[EricGuitarJames]

ORIGINAL: Devil Doc

GENERAL THOUGHTS

I. In terms of a rational approach to the conduct of warfighting, the US armed forces did the best job in World War II. Yes, the Germans did some good staff work, but they were all over the place on their approach to sustaining their forces. At the operational level, they may have been on top early in the war, but the US Army's division & corps commanders & their staffs were doing outstanding work by 44-45. No other army could've sustained the deep armored thrusts across France, or pulled off victory in the Ardennes. You can't chalk that up to our supposed "material superiority." There's no doubt the German emphasis on mission focused tactics was effective, but they NEVER had a logistical tail that would sustain their operations.

2. The American fighting man beat the enemy in the man to man battle. When the chips were down at Omaha, in the Gothic Line & the Bulge, our Soldiers beat the Germans man to man. Anybody who thinks our soldiers hunkered down in their holes waiting for the supporting arms & tanks just hasn't studied the tactical employment of our forces. This line of thinking is absolutely wrong.

Re. 1) Well the deep armoured thrusts into France weren't sustained and we could debate the Ardennes into eternity - I disagree fundamentally on whether only the American army could have won there. However, I don't want to hijack this excellent thread so maybe another time. (-;

Re. 2) I think if we look at Hurtgen Forest, Salerno, Kasserine Pass it is easily possible to make a case for the superiority of the German soldier, 'man to man'. The 'Bulge is a strange case since it would depend on which sector of the front and what period of the battle you wish to cite. The panic that went through the American army in the first few days of the German offensive somewhat colours the view of the individual soldier. Certainly no-one in the higher command echelons emerges with much credit, Hodges 'bugged out' and Bradley came close to a nervous breakdown!

Please don't misunderstand me here, I'm not trying to say that the average GI was a poor soldier, I'm attempting to backup my point about the difficulty of proving he was the best.

[KGV]

I have to admit I am deeply ignorant about the US Army in the WWII era, but it occurs to me that the Americans had something in western Europe that none of the other combatants had and that was the principle of mass. By that I don't mean mass in the same sense that the Soviet armies knew it but in the psychological boost it must have given American planners. More than just the production capability of the US, but also the knowledge that there were able bodied men who could fill the gaps if an assualt turned particularly disasterous. Without trying to sound like im compairing Bradley or Devers with Zhukov or Konev, they could afford to take bigger gambles, could absorb heavier losses than either the British or the Germans. Hitlers Ardennes offensive was ill judged and poorly supported, but more importantly it squandered veteran soldiers and armoured units his forces desperately needed. The argument put forward that the American advances although bloodier than the British advance minimised the overall losses in the campaign by reducing it does not take into account IMHO the implications of heavy casualties on the moral of a nation weary of war. Monty's advance on Antwerp is a case in point. It infuriated the Americans who understandably wanted the port opened to shorten their supply lines but had the British army charged in, cleared the port but in doing so sustained heavy casualties the advance could well have stalled. I believe Monty's only mistake was that he didn't have enough Scottish regiments up front, nothing like the sound of the pipes to put a man off his lunch. [:D]

[KGV]

[quote]ORIGINAL: IronDuke


As for toughness, you could argue the Japs were tougher because of what they suffered, and their willingness to fight to the very last man, but in no way did their tactical skills match those of the Wehrmacht. They were poorly equipped, often starving, and their method of counterattack was simply fixing bayonets and charging. Their toughness didn't prevent them dying in droves, because they could not withstand the firepower being brought to bear.

Are you generalising here or refering specifically to the battles that took place in the Pacific?

In your opinion did the japanese conduct their offensive operations in south east asia, particularly burma in a tactically inept fashion? Do you consider it to be the case that the Japanese army only managed to advance against the British as a direct result of having caught the British off balance and constantly on the back foot, but as soon as the British managed to secure an entrenched position closer to their lines of supply they did not have the skill to break through? I have read very little on the subject but that is the overall impression that i get.