Ridiculous Surface Combat Result

[Barb]

I am planning to create a sandbox scenario with few ships and no interference with anything else. Run it 20 or so times and see the results. I will post it here then.

Help me to find 2-4 CAs and 4-6 DDs of "equal capabilities" somewhere in middle-late 1942. Post your suggestions.

[romanovich]

ORIGINAL: Sheytan

The discussion of rates of fire, and fire "weight" is interesting. It dosnt address the dynamics of a engagement. Many factors contributed to the end result. NOTE IN THIS AAR THE IMPACT OF RADAR, which has been much critisized in AE as giving the Allied player too much of a advantage. What EA and WITP actually FAILS to model is this effectiveness, less so in AE, which frankly I think could be solved by giving a qualifier to the year of employment, or a skill check, vs vie crew skill.

FURTHER AE AND WITP FAILS to model the sheer rate of fire a BB possessed, it expends it main gun battery too casually and frankly is much too shallow in WITP AND AE to model these capital ships. "except in the famed and amusing NUCLEAR bombardments notable for WITP".

This AAR illistrates NOT only the CC confusion of the application of radar but its utter distruction when employed ideally.

Battleship Night Action
Naval Battle of Guadalcanal
November 1942

In this decisive action WASHINGTON and SOUTH DAKOTA engaged a Japanese force termed around the battleship KIRISHIMA. SOUTH DAKOTA suffered extensive topside damage, but WASHINGTON's accurate fire mortally injured KIRISHIMA. Set aflame and racked by explosions, KIRISHIMA was scuttled by her crew. The last major Japanese naval thrust at Guadalcanal had been turned back, and WASHINGTON had done what she had been designed to do -- sink one of her own kind in a gunnery action. WASHINGTON was the only American fast battleship to defeat another capital ship.


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VIEW MAP OF BATTLE


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WASHINGTON ACTION REPORT
SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING EVENTS AND GENERAL COMMENT

On the night of November 14-15 WASHINGTON was flagship of Commander Task Force 64 (ComBatDiv 6). In column, with four destroyers ahead and SOUTH DAKOTA astern, she stood north between Russell and Guadalcanal, then east and southeast, passing north of Savo. Standing west from this point, first radar contact was made at 0001 with enemy ships east of Savo. From 0016 to 0019 fired 42 rounds 16", opening at 18,500 yards, at large cruiser or battleship which it is believed was sunk. From 0016 to 0017 fired 100 rounds 5" at ranges 12 to 13,000 yards at enemy cruiser or large destroyer which was also engaged by SOUTH DAKOTA and was left burning. Standing on north-westerly courses fired 133 rounds 5" from 0025 to 0034 at ranges about 10,000 yards at light craft close to south-east shore of Savo which were engaging our destroyers; all were silenced and one was left burning. From 0100 to 0107 fired 75 rounds 16'' and 107 rounds 5" at ranges from 8,400 to 12,650 yards, at battleship northwest of Savo which was firing at SOUTH DAKOTA. This battleship was silenced and was subsequently tracked by radar through a 500-degree turn. From 0100 to 0107, fired 120 rounds 5", at ranges from 7,400 to 9,500 yards, in succession at three enemy cruisers illuminating and engaging SOUTH DAKOTA.

By the time our 5" fire on light craft close to southeast shore of Savo had ceased, one of our destroyers was sunk, one was hopelessly afire (she exploded and sank a few minutes later) and the other two were put out of action (they retired southward). Subsequently, and before we opened fire on ships northwest of Savo, the SOUTH DAKOTA was seen to the eastward between this ship and Savo on a course to northward of WASHINGTON course. What appeared to be the SOUTH DAKOTA was seen at about 0121 at a considerable distance to the southeastward between this ship and Guadalcanal on a southerly course.

From radar tracking and visual observation of enemy ships, there were:

(1) Fired upon by this ship and apparently sunk:

•1 large cruiser or BB (WASHINGTON only.)
•2 large cruisers (WASH 5".)
•1 destroyer (our DD's plus WASH 5".)
(2) Fired upon by this ship and apparently damaged:

•1 14" BB silenced and out of control (WASH. only.)
•1 DD burning (WASH. 5".)
•5-9 light craft silenced (our DD's plus WASH. 5" plus S.D.)
•There was no melee. This ship was undamaged.

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COMMENT

The following comments are submitted:

•Our radar is effective for accurate gunfire at long ranges at night. Japanese radar aboard ships present, if any, is not effective for surface targets.
•Japanese are sufficiently familiar with radar and aware of our use of it to make full use of land cover both between them and ourselves and closely backing them up.
•Our optical vision is superior to Japanese.
•Our fire control and the effectiveness of our projectiles meet or exceed our expectations.
Accordingly,

•We should seek rather than avoid night action, opening at ranges as great as satisfactory solutions can be obtained.

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[...]
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LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Radar has forced the Captain or OTIC to base a greater part of his actions in a night engagement on what he is told, rather than what he can see. This ship was not hit but examination of SOUTH DAKOTA revealed completeness with which bridge structure may be riddled by shells and splinters which penetrate 1" ST S bulkheads. The enemy may be counted upon to hit foremast superstructure.

The captain and navigator should be in Conn. An experienced officer, other than the navigator, should be FOOD and should filter for the Captain the tremendously numerous reports received at the conning station over the various telephone circuits.


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ComBatIve 6 ACTION REPORT

This action demonstrated the tremendous value of radar in a night action. Battleships obtained excellent fire control results using radar range and radar spots, combined with optical instruments.

Strong signals from enemy ships permitted quick and accurate solution and spots.

First phase opening ranges 16,000 - 18,000 yards, illumination by setting moon. Hit with second Salvo. Second phase opening range 6,000 - 9,000 yards; illumination by star shells, did not add to accuracy of fire.

No indication that enemy used radar. Enemy apparently ranged on gun flashes, but inaccurately. SOUTH DAKOTA hit after enemy searchlight illuminated her.

Own gunfire superior to Japs, particularly as range increased.

SG radar invaluable in locating surface targets and coaching fire control radar's on.


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Samuel Eliot Morison,

HISTORY OF UNITED STATES
NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II, Volume V

The battleship action of November 14-15 was vastly better fought by the United States Navy than the unorganized brawl of two nights earlier. Admiral Lee had a positive doctrine that he maintained, despite the absence of his entire destroyer screen. An able and original scientist as well as a flag officer, he appreciated the value of radar, used it to keep himself informed of enemy movements and tactics, and made quick, accurate analyses from the information on the screens. Yet some mistakes of earlier night battles were repeated. Lee's task force was a scratch team, destroyer and battleships captains alike being unfamiliar with each other and with their commander. Apparently the recurring urgencies in the South Pacific imposed a haphazard composition for every task force thrown together to meet the enemy. Again, and not for the last time, the Japanese taught the American a lesson in the use of torpedoes. SOUTH DAKOTA was lucky to escape alive. WASHINGTON, conned by Captain Glenn Davis and directed by Admiral Lee with a skill and imperturbability worthy of her eponym, saved the day for the United States.

Interesting read. Of note, this historical engagement, the first (or one of the very first) that validated use of radar by achieving measurable results, took place late in '42, a year into the war. Which - coincidentally, or not - also marked the turning point in the Pacific campaign. Not to beat a dead horse, but does the game engine model the changing impact of radar on the outcome of engagements properly over time (locating enemy, engaging, accuracy, etc. in battle resolution)? It shouldn't be a constant. It should definitely not be a big factor before the end of '42, but it seems by the reported outcomes it may be.

Possibly unrelated to this, some of the Allied surface craft in the early going seem to pack too mean of a punch. I can't recall reading that the assets the Allied could deploy early on scared the bejesus out of the Combined Fleet. But in AE they clearly do: "Famous last words: I tried to intercept, then I met Boise..." (well put in an earlier entry to this thread). That can't be right. Are the experience levels for these assets - relative to those of the Jap fleet - set too high? Boise, PoW and Repulse should not be capable of bringing the Jap early conquests to a halt. Right now, there's a good chance they can do that.

I haven't played into late '42 in any of my AE test runs, but do the Allied assets increase in punch from what Boise et al? By that I mean: if Boise can sink the Jap fleet train in Dec '41, what will South Dakota and later BBs do once they are effectively deployed later in '42?

I probably should wait with volunteering to take up the Japs until someone can show that you can get them out of '42 in a well-played PBEM.

Cheers to the AE team for a great simulation, though. This is just fine tuning stuff. The game itself is massive and great.

[Justascratch]

From a different perspective I am very happy that a game like AE can't be reduced to figuring the odds of a given situation and consistently being rewarded for the effort. If that were the case, a player just needs to memorize a few tables of data to play a very boring, pre-calculated and extremely unrealistic war game. But in real life a destroyed unit meant lost lives, human anguish and big losses placed incredible pressure on political and military leadership - the part we are playing. These gut wrenching aspects of war are simulated quite nicely when the combat result runs against all odds & the player gets just a small bitter taste of these emotions. While such results should not be the norm, the chance they can happen jacks up the risk to both sides and brings a level of emotional reality to the game that transcends the medium.

[romanovich]

You got me wrong. I really like the randomization of outcomes and the possibility of extremes. It only appeared that extreme outcomes are generally to the detriment of the Jap forces engaging in the early going. That's what this thread started out about discussing...

[Justascratch]

I must admit I have not played long enough to have a feel for what you are saying. It is a very interesting point, I'll keep my eyes open and see if I notice the imbalance. I hope not.

[Dili]

It doesn't matter if a Brooklyn or Cleveland could only generate 8-10 rpm per tube, it was still able to mess up more waterline area of a DD per minute than a BB, especially given that the BB couldn't track the DD at close range with its main battery and so had to rely on its secondaries.

Why that gets dropped here? As far as i know we aren't talking about that particular situation concerning BB's. If there is a point being made is that Cruisers can ravage a BB with very few damages to itself.

The King George V gives only one bursting charge value so is missing data. So we can get to US http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_14-50_mk11.htm

14" HC round has 104lb of bursting charge while the AP has 22lb for 6" 13lb and 1,95lb. The BB round fragments are typically much heavier so they have much more kinetic energy.

In gaming terms: both commanders begin by deciding whether the battle is worth fighting and then assess the balance of forces continuously. Every few percentage own casualties, they reassess the situation using both the current force ratio and the relative casualty rates. If the battle is no longer worth fighting, they break off; otherwise they continue. Fog of war plays a role in this, producing an unexpected victory for the losing side about 10% of the time.

Yes if the loosing side has speed to get away - there is also the issue of time - destroying a bunch of small boats is one thing destroying big merchants takes time(specially by destroyers) that makes possible for others to run away -unless stopped in harbour. I also agree that wipeouts should happen only due to surprise if the inferior side has speed to get away, any overmatch due to quantity, quality or both should only happen if the inferior side doesn't have speed(or misidentifies).

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: EUBanana

ORIGINAL: herwin
*snip*

That sounds rather like... stating the obvious.

Almost every wargame (commercial or professional) uses a breakpoint model. Helmbold demonstrated they were all seriously wrong. Unfortunately, nobody has been able to come up with an alternative. I mentioned earlier something about poker. I did a game-theoretic analysis of the situation and discovered the best strategy evolved chaotically--forever. Thinking hard about the problem made me feel like I was schizoid-a bit like your typical spy-catcher gets to be.

[jazman]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: EUBanana

ORIGINAL: herwin
*snip*

That sounds rather like... stating the obvious.

Almost every wargame (commercial or professional) uses a breakpoint model. Helmbold demonstrated they were all seriously wrong. Unfortunately, nobody has been able to come up with an alternative. I mentioned earlier something about poker. I did a game-theoretic analysis of the situation and discovered the best strategy evolved chaotically--forever. Thinking hard about the problem made me feel like I was schizoid-a bit like your typical spy-catcher gets to be.

It sounds like the disengagement algorithm would be quite complex, an AI project in itself.

[Dili]

It sounds like the disengagement algorithm would be quite complex, an AI project in itself.

I don't see why. The game already has build the agressiveness of commander and how that means retirement or not from combat? I remmeber in witp was stated that inferior forces would avoid combat or was that related to TF type? For damage disengagement if a TF has a surface combat value and that value is lost suddenly at certain threshold could mean the disengagement. In Witp there was also a problem that ships could be burning, heavily damaged and the guns and AA remained more or less intact.

[Cap Mandrake]

ORIGINAL: herwin

Almost every wargame (commercial or professional) uses a breakpoint model. Helmbold demonstrated they were all seriously wrong. Unfortunately, nobody has been able to come up with an alternative. I mentioned earlier something about poker. I did a game-theoretic analysis of the situation and discovered the best strategy evolved chaotically--forever. Thinking hard about the problem made me feel like I was schizoid-a bit like your typical spy-catcher gets to be.

Not so fast. I propose this algorithm:

H-4......miss
B-7......miss, loser
H-3......HIT! You looked didn't you, cheater?

[SteveD64]

I guess, for me, as a noob I haven't played enough to see any big Jap disadvantages (also I've only played Guad and Aleutians scenario). But the one that stands out is having a task force wiped out to the last ship.

[Rapunzel]

Surface combat? Where were the Saratoga's aircraft? Grounded by weather conditions? 29000 yards visibility!

The initial reason the various navies built CVs was to maintain air superiority and air observation over the battlefleet. That made it rather difficult for a SAG to surprise a CVTF during the day.

No the weather was good. The 4 other cv tf´s managed to disengage. Only the Saratoga groop and the tanker tf was totaly anilated. (Saratoga went down too). I am against the all or nothing approach in AE. 20+ Tansport TFs with escorts should not be total destroyed from an cl - dd group.

[Rapunzel]

Another onesided japanese victory. Both tf´s were surface tf´s.

Night Time Surface Combat, near Lunga at 114,138, Range 5,000 Yards

Allied aircraft
no flights

Allied aircraft losses
No Allied losses

Japanese Ships
CA Chokai
CA Aoba, Shell hits 6
CA Kinugasa
CA Furutaka, Shell hits 5
CA Kako

Allied Ships
CA Astoria, Shell hits 23, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
CA Quincy, Shell hits 11, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
CA Vincennes, Shell hits 10, Torpedo hits 3, and is sunk
DD Wilson, Shell hits 8, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
DD Dewey, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
DD Hull, Shell hits 4, and is sunk



Reduced sighting due to 14% moonlight
Maximum visibility in Clear Conditions and 14% moonlight: 6,000 yards
Range closes to 29,000 yards...
Range closes to 23,000 yards...
Range closes to 17,000 yards...
Range closes to 11,000 yards...
Range closes to 5,000 yards...
CONTACT: Japanese lookouts spot Allied task force at 5,000 yards
CONTACT: Allied lookouts spot Japanese task force at 5,000 yards
CA Aoba engages CA Vincennes at 5,000 yards
CA Furutaka engages CA Quincy at 5,000 yards
CA Astoria engages CA Furutaka at 5,000 yards
CA Aoba engages DD Hull at 5,000 yards
CA Aoba engages DD Dewey at 5,000 yards
CA Aoba engages DD Wilson at 5,000 yards
Range closes to 2,000 yards
CA Furutaka engages CA Vincennes at 2,000 yards
CA Quincy engages CA Furutaka at 2,000 yards
CA Kinugasa engages CA Astoria at 2,000 yards
CA Vincennes sunk by CA Aoba at 2,000 yards
DD Dewey sunk by CA Aoba at 2,000 yards
CA Aoba engages DD Wilson at 2,000 yards
Ehrlich, R.M. orders Allied TF to disengage
Range increases to 6,000 yards
CA Quincy engages CA Aoba at 6,000 yards
CA Quincy engages CA Furutaka at 6,000 yards
CA Kinugasa engages DD Hull at 6,000 yards
CA Aoba engages CA Quincy at 6,000 yards
Range closes to 5,000 yards
CA Kako engages CA Quincy at 5,000 yards
CA Astoria engages CA Aoba at 5,000 yards
CA Quincy sunk by CA Kinugasa at 5,000 yards
DD Wilson engages CA Aoba at 5,000 yards
CA Chokai engages CA Astoria at 5,000 yards
CA Astoria sunk by CA Furutaka at 5,000 yards
DD Wilson sunk by CA Chokai at 5,000 yards
Range increases to 6,000 yards
CA Kako engages DD Hull at 6,000 yards
Combat ends with last Allied ship sunk...

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Dili

It sounds like the disengagement algorithm would be quite complex, an AI project in itself.

I don't see why. The game already has build the agressiveness of commander and how that means retirement or not from combat? I remmeber in witp was stated that inferior forces would avoid combat or was that related to TF type? For damage disengagement if a TF has a surface combat value and that value is lost suddenly at certain threshold could mean the disengagement. In Witp there was also a problem that ships could be burning, heavily damaged and the guns and AA remained more or less intact.

Handle it like chess. Count your pieces. Count your opponent's pieces. (Old DD = 1, new DD = 2, old/small cruisers = 2, new/large cruisers = 4, large/battle cruisers = 6, battleships = 8, New Jerseys = 10, Yamatos = 16.) Look at the totals. If you're outnumbered >2-1, break off. Use the two totals as your estimates of the combat power of the two sides. They each should produce damage at those rates. Wait and take some significant damage. Update the damage production rates--probably using a Bayesian approach. If it looks like you're being handed your head (your casualty proportion>2*the enemy's), break off. Otherwise continue.

[jwilkerson]

The >2 to 1 measure rings true. Comparing main gun broadside weights of the two battle forces at Jutland, the British outgunned the Germans 2.3 to 1. When the Germans realized they were engaged with the full Grand Fleet they reversed course.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

The >2 to 1 measure rings true. Comparing main gun broadside weights of the two battle forces at Jutland, the British outgunned the Germans 2.3 to 1. When the Germans realized they were engaged with the full Grand Fleet they reversed course.

Of course! That's why Kurita broke off at Samar. Those 3 DD's and 3 DE's had his BB's, CA's, and DD's badly outnumbered in "points".

Herwin's idea is a good basis..., but the "fleet orders" and the "mission" and the "situation" and the "leadership" all need to play a role as well.

[jwilkerson]

Yeah, but there were also some aeroplanes involved at Samar - that throws off the (pure surface) calculation a bit.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

Yeah, but there were also some aeroplanes involved at Samar - that throws off the (pure surface) calculation a bit.

That's what I mean. It's a good "basis", but "situational factors" still need to be a major player in the calculations. Face it..., Kurita's orders were for a "suicide mission", and he still turned away! Gotta be a lot of "factors" involved in reproducing that (including "dumb luck").

[jwilkerson]

Sure there are other factors, but having worked on the Jutland numbers a couple of weeks ago - and getting the 2.3 to 1 ratio - and then seeing herwin toss out a 2 to 1 general idea - it matched up too well with what I'd seen not to mention it ...

[John Lansford]

It didn't help that Scheer had his "T" crossed by Jellicoe, and the RN was firing at ships outlined by the sun while the British ships were hidden in the near darkness.

Last night I had a lone DD encounter a transport TF of 8 AK's escorted by a single CM.  The results were not good for the AI; 5 of the ships sunk, the other 4 left burning heavily, with 1200+ LCU losses.  The DD didn't get touched; oh, and this was in daylight.