It seemed to me that TIK warned about how unreliable both the Germans and the Soviet sources were during the Cold War. True, his main point is how the Western historians relied too much on German sources, due to the realities of the Cold War. However, his second point is that through the modern works of historians like Erickson and Glantz it is possible to see how the Germans were beaten operationally on the battlefield, and not merely by being overrun by a tsunami of Russian hordes.
If the figures were as unreliable as he said, it's quite possible that NO reasonable conclusion could be based upon them. Yet he continued to bring up casualty list after casualty list from precisely those tainted sources. While the Nazis are kaput and unlikely to re-emerge to reinvent history, the other guys are trying very hard to do just that. So sources that are derived from or provided from the Soviet archives are *more* questionable, IMO. And arguing what constitutes 'hordes' of Soviets is semantics, IMO.
I get it-the Germans were beat solidly by 1945. Yup. I think even modest scholars of the Second World War understand that the Russian performance as the war progressed improved in all facets. TIK's overanalysis of shaky data points trying to parse out FOW casualty figures to attempt to prove a semantic argument was laborious and, ultimately, unconvincing. YMMV.
The second was an otherwise very good review of Market-Garden. Good supportive documentation and insight. But his conclusions about the failure (whose fault was it?) were unsound. He came back to Gavin as being instrumental in the failure of Market-Garden. Gavin? Really? He glossed over the attendant responsibility of Browning or-God forbid-Montgomery as primary overseers and blamed 'middle management'.
I saw that video, and I feel that the point is much simpler: Gavin had the opportunity to capture the Nimegen bridge as soon as the 82nd landed, but wasted precious hours and at the end the Germans were able to bring in reinforcements.
Gavin was the man on the spot, and he fumbled a crucial tactical move. Again, this may be a matter of sources. However, once more it seems to me that TIK quotes his sources. People who rely on different ones can reach different conclusions - but these different sources should, at least, be named.
Know who was at Gavin's side during the entirety of the operation? Browning. He dropped in with the 82nd. HE was the man on the ground who should have interceded for the sake of the operation. Failing that, Montgomery had additional oversight responsibilities.
My opinion is that Gavin should have taken the bridge by the first afternoon. My opinion is also that the entire operation was doomed to failure and that the
operational failure should lie with the high command. Montgomery and Browning being the two most obvious.
I appreciated TIK's effort to bring up this tactical failure. He (briefly) glossed over the other significant failures of concept and operational leadership. Briefly. Before rendering his conclusion. There were a laundry list of reasons why the operation failed. All of them pretty good reasons for failure. He subjectively chose one that was further down the chain of causality.
Sources schmources. He can cite sources after the fact. But to then use those sources to put together an argument that is wholly subjective and only a fraction of the complicated explanation for failure? Nah. Source 1: spaghetti. Source 2: spaghetti. Source 3: spaghetti. Conclusion? Banana. Irrelevant conclusion based upon the source material.
Heavy weighs the crown. All too often, divisional leaders or battalion or regimental leaders got the dirty end of the stick pointed at them when a poorly conceived 'shoestring' plan went belly up on them. I believe that operational / theater leadership needs to be where the buck stops, not the lower rungs of the leadership ladder.
Example: The 1st and 29th infantry are repulsed at Omaha. The landings fail. Eisenhower must face the press. Instead of his now famous 'the fault is my own' note, he blames Generals Huebner, Taylor and Cota for their failure to secure their
tactical objectives. Hardly inspiring leadership.
ETA: Found this from Browning's Wiki page:
After the war, Gavin and his staff were criticised for the decision to secure the high ground around Groesbeek before attempting the capture of the Waal bridge at Nijmegen. Browning took responsibility for this, noting that he "personally gave an order to Jim Gavin that, although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen bridges as soon as possible, it was essential that he should capture the Groesbeek Ridge and hold it".[73]
Is that a sufficient source for you?
