ORIGINAL: IronDuke
IronDuke said:
The other occasion is when they use someone else's words to describe or highlight something, because they agree with it, and know that the point has been made elsewhere, and by quoting rather than just restating the point, they give it extra weight because they prove other historians agree with them. Alternatively, it may be something outside their sphere of influence and they quote it because the historian is a recognised leader in that field. Did you not know this?
Von Rom said:
Heheh
D'Este was writing a balanced book about Patton. He presented both sides of the arguments. Unlike some authors who inject their opinions willy-nilly, D'Este tries to present both sides' views.
That is why D'Este's book is a superior work. He gives us the opinions of Patton's supporters as well as his critics.
Didn't you know that?
Wrong. When authors do that, they place the for and against critics beside each other so readers can compare the arguments. Look at Pg 634. D'Este does not present the pro-Patton explanation for anything. He merely cites his critics, prefacing the quotes with words of his own:
"Patton's achilles heel, which would be painfully evident later in Lorraine, was that rather than cut his losses, he would attempt to storm his way out of a bad situation in the name of prestige."
D'Este criticises him then goes to quote Carr and Whiting in support of his position. This argument should be over to all but those who will not see.
IronDuke said
Patton said of the three units he took: "Bradley, my best three divisions are 4th Armoured, the 80th and the 26th." Patton's own words.
The units in 352 Volksgrenadier Divisions Corp were 5th Parachute (which wasn't actually a parachute division anymore as it had been destroyed in Normandy and rebuilt from surplus Luftwaffe ground crew) and 79th Volksgrenadier which certainly wasn't rebuilt from veterans because the previous 79th was destroyed (1 man living to tell the tale). It was formed from the 586th Volksgrenadiers. The sources are Nafziger and Mitcham. The same people I used to illustrate the 352nd contained no combat veterans.
Some of these units actually performed creditably despite their various deficiencies.
Von Rom said:
Yes they did. They weren't exactly the misfits some might think they were [8|]
That depends. If you make operational mistakes, you can allow poor units to look better than they actually are. These units were not Volksturm, but neither were they regular army. Patton should have done better.
You also forgot to mention the counterattack by the 1st S.S. Panzer “Der Fuhrer” Division which was sent south in an attempt to cut-off Patton's relieving forces fighting outside of Bastogne.
Part of the problem of taking you seriously are the errors. I'm reluctant to point them all out, because I get accused of being nitpicky. However, since I presume you have sources for this, it leaves me with little confidence in your arguments because your sources must be so poor.
Most SS units had titles. 1st SS Panzer Division was actually called "1ST SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler". It grew out of his personal body guard unit.
"Der Fuhrer" in SS Terms referred to the Panzergrenadier Regiment no 4, which fought in 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich, a completely different formation.
Liebstandarte (that's 1st SS Panzer) did indeed come south at the very end of December 1944. However, a second feature of your arguments is a lack of perspective (exactly what you accuse me of). SS Liebstandarte had by this time been in action since the beginning of the Bulge. These attacks were carried out by two Kampfgruppes. One made up of around 30-40 tanks and some Panzergrenadiers, the other from what was left of the Divisions Panzergrenadiers. Some of the Divisional Jagdpanzers also seem to have taken part. All in all, the strength was maybe two Battalions worth of Panzergrenadiers and about 50 armoured vehicles. In percentage terms thats about a third of the divisional infantry and a quarter of it's tanks. It's artillery was hamstrung by a lack of ammunition.
Other units did take part, including a new Volksgrenadier division which had just arrived in theatre after a hurried journey from Hungary. It had no heavy weapons. Around a third of i;'s men had seen some action in the east, two thirds hadn't. Large numbers of luftwaffe ground crew had been drafted in to make up the numbers.
Despite these handicaps, the VG did take the attacks initial objectives.
What this has to do with Patton's drive on Bastogne is anyone's guess, as these attack took place in order to drive him back from Bastogne after he arrived.
In some brutal fighting both sides suffered 16,000 dead with 600 tanks destroyed. Quite the little scrap, eh?
I'd love to see the context of this as I can only conclude you're providing figures from more than just this attack (something else you are often caught doing), or taken the losses from a period between two wide dates. Liebstandarte had less than 50 tanks. Panzer Lehr which took part had a handful of MK IVs. The American 4th Armoured supported the 35th, but didn't have anything like 500+ tanks and certainly didn't commit that many to help. I'm not sure, therefore, where these 600 tanks appeared from, unless you're taking casualties that include other units that joined this engagement later, or fought as the battle moved on. There weren't this many casualties when Liebstandarte collided with the 35th.
From the history of the 35th Infantry Division:
"We did not know that Hitler had ordered some of his best remaining troops to cut off the Third Army’s relief of Bastogne at all costs. Now across our front from our right came the elite 1st S.S. Panzer “Der Fuhrer” Division, sent down from the German Sixth Army to break us – the 167th Volksgrenadier Division, and the 5th Parachute Division from the Seventh German Army. Fighting see-sawed in and around towns like Lutrebois where we lost two companies of the 134th Regiment, Marvie, where we at last broke through to the 101st Airborne, Surre, Villers La Bonne where the 137th lost companies K and L, cut off and hit by the Germans with flame throwers, the survivors captured and marched into Germany to a prison camp, Boulaide, whose grateful citizens would welcome returning veterans in later years as tour groups, Tarchamps, and Harlange where a single farm, fortified, stopped the 320th Regiment. Frostbite, illness and exhaustion, the freezing waters of the Sure River, waste deep, waded across by the 320th soldiers. Deep snow which slowed attack and bogged down G.I.s who were unable to move fast enough to evade the lethal fire of enemy machine guns, mortars and artillery shells, tree bursts and craters. The fields and woods became graveyards littered with dozens of destroyed tanks and assault guns, half tracks, trucks, equipment, and corpses."
This picture will give readers an idea of what the three Third Army divisions had to march and fight in. Imagine travelling in freezing cold for two days with little sleep or hot food and then, without rest, fight a series of battles:
I see it is here (from the Divisional history) that the error re 1st SS Panzer comes from. The two other formations were not "The best remaining Hitler had" although the Author has at least qualified his remarks as "best remaining" in reference to Liebstandarte.. The elite of the third reich after 5 years and 6 million dead were not quite what they once were.
You're also mixing up stories here in order to improve your point (What I believe is another failing of yours). You tell us this story about the 35th (brave men all, lets not forget where they fought and what they did, although this has limited value in a thread about Patton's operational ability). You then start banging on about third army, forty eight hour marches and no sleep. 35th Division did not take part in Pattons famous about turn and march. It joined those three divisions later, at Bastogne. It joins 3rd Army during the battle, not before.
The conditions you describe were indeed atrocious, but they are irrelevant, in so much as the conditions were the same for the Germans (unless you have discovered the German front line was in a more temparate climate). The conditions were absolutely dreadful, but whilst these illustrate the bravery and strength of the men involved, they do not illustrate much about Patton's operational abilities.
I said:
This is just frustration for me. Unable to admit you are wrong, you decide instead to change the whole line of argument
You said:
Where am I wrong when I disagree about the basis of the argument? [&:]
Let me put it to you this way:
The whole basis for the supposed early German BliztKreig during the early years is really just a myth isn't it.
The mighty German war machine attacks little Poland, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, etc, and even France really offers up a poorly led and divided Allied force.
Heck, the Germans couldn't even bag hundreds of thousands of Allied soldiers stranded at Dunkirk.
The Germans enjoyed a 3:1 advantage in the Battle of Britain - yet failed miserably.
Even in Russia the German forces surprise-attacked poorly-led, poorly equipped forces with low morale.
What value are these victories? Of what value are Rommel's and Guderian's victories against such weak and inferior troops?
Get my meaning? [;)]
[:D]
I accuse you of changing the basis of the argument every time you are proved wrong, and you then go on to move the thread onto the Battle of Britain. If you right (which you're not), and Guderians victories were always as easy as this, then how can these victories be used to support Patton?
You bring up the 352nd. But I can easily bring up all these German victories and more and compare the quality of soldiers the Germans fought against.
And this proves what exactly about Patton's victories? This is not tit for tat. You don't win the argument by saying, ah but your general fought inferior opposition as well.
There's more:
In the Ardennes, the Germans had overwhelming superiority and firepower, and had Bastogne surrounded. And yet, they couldn't capture that little town of Bastogne. What poor generalship and leadership [;)]
You do not know this battle at all. In the north, the spearheads of Ist Panzer (Liebstandarte, not Der Fuhrer, that's the other one if you remember) destroyed their own tanks because of lack of fuel. If they couldn't fuel the tanks, how could they supply them with anything else? They pushed this quarter of a million men through a woody, hilly area with few roads. What roads there were were treacherous with ice and snow. They had little petrol (which means driving trucks full of ammo up to the front is difficult) and this often resulted in limited artillery. Many of the formations employed were Volksgrenadier units which had lower complements of heavy weapons and equipment. They had superiority as the battle started, but this was eaten away and by the time of Patton's intervention all gone. Remember, the Luftwaffe took little part in the battle whilst the Allied air force flew thousands of sorties after the weather cleared.
Also, why is failing to take Bastogne poor German generalship. Did McAuliffe and 101st not have something to say about this. (A unit which wasn't under Patton).
And Rommel's stunning early successes in North Africa were against weak and scattered British forces. Gone were the British and Australian troops who were transferred to Greece. So Rommel's victories and his legend were made against weaker and inferior forces.
His first battles were fought with just a handful of troops. He began his attacks before most of his troops had even arrived in theatre. These inferior forces also eventually beat him. Again, what this has to do with Patton's drive on Bastogne I can only guess at.
See what I mean?
I don't believe anybody does.
I wasn't wrong.
Quite the opposite.
The line of debate brought up was simply the wrong thing to be discussing.
Well who brought it up? I was discussing Patton's drive on Bastogne. In reply we've heard about the 35th Division (which didn't take part), the attack of the Liebstandarte (which took place after it was over) and how bad the conditions were (which were the same for both sides).
You earlier admitted in your post that these same forces (the German units fighting against Patton) put up quite a fight, so obviously they weren't a bunch of rag-tag misfits as they are being made out to be.
As I said, they performed well, but that doesn't mean Patton should have done badly against them. A better plan of attack against Bastogne would have caused formations of this quality real problems. Particularly the lack of experienced Officers. In situations of retreat, combat experienced officers can mean the difference between orderly fighting withdrawal and rout.
I brought up the opposing American forces because some were inexperienced, especially the 106th which had just newly arrived on the scene.
As before, irrelevant, I thought 106th was part of 1st Army? What has it's problems got to do with Patton? Much less has it anything to do with Patton's drive on Bastogne.
I said:
Some of the men facing Patton didn't know how to fight
you said:
Please. . .
This is embarrassing. . .
Yet, earlier you admitted in your post that these same forces put up quite a fight. You contradict yourself.
Which is it?
Third Army suffered 50,000 casualties. . .
The next thing you'll be saying is that Third Army only faced cardboard cut-outs of German troops, and their casualties resulted from driving into trees. [8|]
I said that some didn't know how to fight, being poorly trained ex airplane mechanics thrust into the heart of battle, I said some performed well. These are not mutally exclusive. If some are bad, by definition, some must be better, otherwise I'd have described them as all bad wouldn't I?? By making up arguments for me like this, you embarrass yourself.
Oh, and don't forget the 1SS Panzer Division when it counterattacked. . .
about 1400 men and 50 tanks, little or no artillery. No, I haven't forgotten
I said:
Patton thought them his best. 4th Armoured and 80th Inf arrived in Normandy in early August and fought across France, into Lorraine etc. 26th arrived in Early Sept and went into action in early October fighting in october and November before joining the battle in the Ardennes. You can say replacements may have been inexperienced, but the majority had seen combat, in some cases a good deal of combat.
You said:
What do you think happens when men are killed in battle? or when they are wounded? or when they get ill?
They get GREEN replacements.
Third Army had been fighting in Europe since Aug/44.
They had fought a brutual battle at Metz.
In the Ardennes, they had to travel for two days and nights in terrible winter weather and without rest, and then engage in battle. . .
Try driving your car for two days without proper sleep in a winter storm and see how you feel at the end of it.
Please. . .
You do a terrible disservice to the memory of those brave men.
Your cheapest trick yet, to suggest I'm doing a disservice to the memory of these men. I am discussing Patton's operational abilities, not US Army tactical performance in WWII. Attempting to take a moral high tone in such a heavy handed way is offensive. If that's the way you want it, however...
Replacements are often green, but if you are unable to see the difference between a combat unit absorbing replacements (the US replacement system was very efficient), and units made up of old men and boys (and airplane mechanics, and naval ratings) then I can't help you. All combat units have a certain percentage of replacements. The Division isn't destroyed by this because the replacements have received basic training, and are being absorbed into experienced combat surroundings. They are in the right environment to learn, and will not necessarily destroy the ability of a division to function effectively. If they did, how did Patton manage to get to Bastogne at all?
I said:
In terms of the Bulge, less so for Patton, because some of the things you cite didn't apply to him, but to elsewhere in the Bulge.
You said:
I can only shake my head at this type of reasoning, and you wonder why I don't bother to answer some of your posts?
It's just nonsensical. . .
Third Army suffered 50,000 casualties figting the Germans in the Bulge. . .
The nonsense is yours. I thought we were discussing Patton's drive on Bastogne? Also, since casualties prove little about a Generals abilities (only that his men fought hard and bravely) what do casualty figures have to do with it? They can often indicate poor Generalship!!!! You keep taking the argument off track. This section is all about his thrust on Bastogne about which you have said nothing. Instead you talk about how many 3rd Army lost, you talk about SS units appearing out of the snow after he reaches Bastogne. You talk about the 35th which wasn't in the drive and the 106th that didn't even belong to third army. If you're going to change the terms of the argument, let me know beforehand.
I said:
What the Patton homepage ignores about this battle is that it was completely unnecessary. Think of this. You're facing tough fortified positions, you've limited ammo and gas, the weather is so poor, your soldiers have trenchfoot in massive numbers. The weather is so poor, it's hard for your infantry to move, much less vehicles, and air cover is restricted.
Can I just say, this the following words are your best ever bit: If this thread carries on ten more pages, you will never excel this. To accuse me of twisting facts to suit my argument than come forward with this is quite beyond belief.
Regarding Metz:
Patton was a mobile warrior as Rommel was.
I'm not saying that everything Patton did was the best.
But this MUST be placed in persepctive of what preceeded it.
As I mentioned previously, the true error resided with the Allied High Command. Patton had shown how fast he could move. With the proper amount of fuel, which you also admit is true, Patton would have taken Metz and then driven onto the Siegfried Line, with a minium of casualties.
Patton would NEVER have sat still under ANY circumstances, and his superiors KNEW it.
Sitting in front of Metz doing NOTHING would have destroyed Third Army morale. Patton knew they had to get out of their situation.
Trench Foot alone was taking a heavy toll - higher casualties in fact than the Germans.
By not giving supplies to Patton, but rather sending them to Monty, the Allied Command caused two bloody situations: Metz and Operation Market Garden
.
Before analysis of this, can I just highlight the important bit.
Sitting in front of Metz doing NOTHING would have destroyed Third Army morale. Patton knew they had to get out of their situation.
[&:][:D][&o][&o][:D][X(]
What effect on morale do you think wading day after day through rivers of mud and blood, attacking strong fixed defences without proper artillery or air support had? I cannot believe this has been written.
Are you suggesting that to improve morale, Patton decided to risk their lives in attacks with little or no chance of success???????
Do you think American soldiers were war junkeys who would have have preferred spending their days outside under machine gun fire rather than inside in weather as atrocious as it was. This is one of the most contrived excuses I have ever heard. I can not believe you have suggested this in order to protect your hero. Even if it existed as an excuse at the outset of the battle (which it clearly doesn't) American soldiers would have realised it was all pointless very early on. What effect did continuing have on morale then?????
Also, Why will you not understand?
Patton did not have to attack. Bradley told him to stop when it became clear he was going nowhere. He did not have the ammo or supplies to attack. The German defences were too strong in these circumstances. The weather was atrocious and made even infantry movement difficult. Bradley told him when the supplies were turned back on he could swing around Metz and take it from the rear. But no, Patton launches his men into the teeth of fixed defences without proper air or artillery support in atrocious weather. Why? Because he thought they would get bored, otherwise?
I have seen nothing like this in over 500 posts.
If your argument is that Patton hated inactivity, then that is a very bad point for his Generalship. A good General makes the right decisions. A bad one makes the wrong decisions. It was the wrong decision to make an unnecessary attack.
You have previously displayed some appreciation of Rommel. When faced with a poor supply situation, in front of tough enemy defences, this armoured warrior dug in (at Alamein) Patton threw his men forward and beat his head (or rather his men's heads) against the steel of Metz's forts. If you fight off everything else I say, fighting here is not worth it.
This Metz debate, amidst everything we have discussed, illustrates what unblinking acceptance of the Patton legend entails. Think back through what you have told us. In Sicily, they wouldn't listen to him, they allowed the Germans to escape because they wouldn't let him attack. At Falaise, they told him to stop, and he was denied the chance to capture Germans. In Metz they cut off his supplies and he had to attack with one hand behind his back, after the war they conspired together cutting seedy deals to destroy his memory. Time and time again, any of his faults are hidden behind excuses that it was somebody else's fault. This is not history, it is paranoia.
In order to be a Patton fanboy, you have to defend everything he did with excuses that are ever more ludicrous.
The real shame for Patton, is that some of his qualities get missed by the fanboys, because they are too busy defending the indefensible. they don't see the bigger picture.
Patton saw at Falaise that after the breakout, the correct direction was towards the Seine. Instead Patton is ordered to Falaise by Bradley. Patton has seen the bigger picture. This is hidden by the Patton legend that sees every Patton supporter jump up and down endlessly about being ordered to stop at Argentan. Argentan was irrelevant. Patton was wrong to think he could have closed the gap, but right to think the Seine was a good place to park third army. What do we spend our time discussing, yup! Patton at Falaise, because the legend demands it. Not Patton the strategist who made the perfectly logical assumption that the Seine was the place to go.
At the Bulge, Patton never wanted to relieve Bastogne. He wanted to attack further east and slice through the shoulder of the Bulge, cutting off every German soldier. Whether this was on is debateable (Strategically, though, Patton had the right idea). However, the battle to Bastogne is mishandled, but do we ever discuss Patton's initial (and intriguing) idea? No, we discuss Bastogne because Patton supporters refuse to accept he can do wrong. You can even make a case in Sicily for circumstances like this. Patton writes in his diary on the eve of the pointless dash to Palermo that he thinks the British are going nowehere. He has recognised what is going to happen. This is good. What is bad is his response. However, because the Patton legend refuses to allow any criticism, Patton supporters are forced to defend a pointless operation. The supreme irony is that in making him a man who can do no wrong, Patton supporters never get to talk about the revealing moments, in which it is clear he had some military acumen.
I said:
If your examples are all like this, then I would not post them either, as it does your case no good.
you said:
It's called putting a "bad situation" into perspective.
As for bad situations, what about the poor German performance:
1) In Stalingrad?
2) Before the gates of Moscow in 1941?
3) In the siege of Leningrad?
4) In the failure to bag hundred of thousands of Allied soldiers at Dunkirk?
5) In Rommels' failure to take Egypt?
6) In Goering's failure in the Battle of Britain?
7) In the German failure to capture Bastogne?
In other words, every general or army has bad moments.
But it MUST be placed in perspective of the larger circumstances.
To quote you from earlier in this thread, look waaaaayyyyy up to the top. What do you see? Why was Patton so great? What relevance has this?
Respect and regards,
IronDuke
