Jap ASW forces

[castor troy]

ORIGINAL: Bradley7735

ORIGINAL: Mynok

ORIGINAL: Bradley7735

No matter what, once you get a ship that has depth charges to 75/75 (or more) exp, it will become a sub killer. That may be almost realistic when you're talking about USN DE's in 45. But, it's not realistic for any navy in 41, 42 or even 43. And, the fact of the matter is, there are a lot of Japanese ships at start with those exp values. There are none that I know of in the Allied navies.

Are you serious? Do you really, honestly think there are Japanese PBs, PCs, SCs, or DDs with those ratings? Really? Honestly? Have you even started a GC as Japan and played a few turns? ONE FREAKING TURN!?!?!?!

[8|][8|][8|][8|][8|][8|][8|][8|][8|][:@][:'(]

I've done quite a bit of exp examination of WITP AE ships. I've mostly examined combat ships (DD's and larger). I know that most ASW ships are not DD's. Most ASW ships start around the teens to 30's in exp. But, Every Japanese combat ship starts much much better experienced than their Allied (US at least) counterparts. Until 1/1/43. At that point in the game, all ships enter the game with the same averages. Of course, most of the stuff that matters happens in 42.

The Yamato, who couldn't find her ass throughout the entire war starts her career with double (on average) night experience and about 20% more day experience as the USS Washington, who proved her ability in her first combat. It takes an average of 200 days for the average US ship to get to the same night experience as Japanese combat ships get from day 1.

What are you trying to accomplish here? Are you saying that both sides should kill 30+ subs in 42? Are you trying to figure out the definition of Convoy? Are you just trying to argue with anyone who trys to say that some number in the game might be off a bit, especially if it's Japanese?

In 42, Japan conducted a couple of hundred depthcharge attacks and killed at most, 3 subs. In my own games, vs the AI, I lose a magnitude of order greater subs to ASW vessels. and, I don't have very many subs on patrol. It's too tedious for the results and I lose too many. I've even toned down accuracy and effect data and it's still too many losses.

But, I can't figure out the best combination of numbers when number and type of devices, accuracy, ammo, effect, and experience all play a part.

dare to say that again and you will be called troll I guess and don´t critisize anything please. [;)]

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: Adnan Meshuggi
Well - the time bullwinle speaks about is 1942.
Also, the japanese never established a real convoy system - only in late 44, as it was too late.

This is wrong, as I noted above. Check TROMs of Japanese DDs and escorts on combinedfleet.com for examples. Will you say Allies never established a real convoy system because a lot of shipping on secondary routes away from combat zones was running without convoys throughout the war? And it was, you know.

ORIGINAL: Adnan Meshuggi
You know the difference between attacking one lonly ship with one ore two escorts and attacking a convoy with 20 ships and 5-10 escorts? Sure.

Using 20 ships and 5-10 escorts for every cargo-hauling task the opponents had in the Pacific is physically impossible. Period. The Allies never did so, despite having much more escorts . For example, note now not one of the ships sunk by the infamous I-8 in the summer of 1944 (in Indian Ocean, not some extemely remote area, like South Athlantic) was escorted:
http://www.combinedfleet.com/I-8.htm

And this is not an isolated case. I-26 (which, by the way, scored the first hit against an US ship in the war) had similar experience:
http://www.combinedfleet.com/I-26.htm

ORIGINAL: Adnan Meshuggi
In the game british destroyers should be the experts... they fought against the german uboots and know a thing. So their experience in asw should be twice of the americans or japanese. At last they fought for 2 years a serious anti-sub-war and learned a lot.

They were losing this anti-sub war by early 1942, though.

EDIT: And british DDs in AE are the finest ASW ships early in the war.

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: BShaftoe

In any case, it's easy to verify if Allied players complaints are true, and the experience levels for the japanese crews is too high. Play a game with a Japanese player deliberately organizing ships as the japanese did in real life. This is, no more convoys than IRL, no more conversions from ships to ASW roles than the ones that happened IRL, no more ASW air patrols than the ones that happened IRL, etc... etc... etc...

After three or four months, let's check the effectivity of ASW forces and compare them. If Japanese ASW forces still score significantly more "victories" than what japanese crews did IRL, we can conclude that yes, there is an issue with experience levels or with the engine.

Setting HRs for this game will require a lot of research, playing 4 months will require investing in the game for about 1,5 months. And proving something to someone who is already convinced that he's right is futile, particuarly when any case of his opponent just playing better will be taken as a proof that the game is unfair. If you really want an experiment, just run a few months of AI playing against AI.

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: SqzMyLemon

I believe every game for what ever reason is different. I would call my Japanese ASW capabilities into mid February/42 subpar at best. Allied subs often get a first strike in either hitting an escort or a transport. My escorts often respond with "can't find target" or don't respond at all (escorts are anything from E's to PB's to SC's to DD's). And it is rare I even record a hit if they do launch a DC attack. I've lost 50 ships confirmed to Allied subs, if it wasn't for the dud rate, I'd be looking at roughly 70-80 ships sunk in just over 2 months. I believe my opponent has changed as many of his submarine commanders as possible to high skill and aggressiveness levels. The Dutch submarines have been particularly effective as well as the S boats. I can't explain the success of his submarines, and I can't explain the poor showing of my ASW efforts.

My experience is similar to yours. Jap escorts don't do their job and are noticeably inferior to Allied ones in their ability to prosecute contacts, even though I'm playing a mod, where Japan gets more toys at the beginning. IJN is saved from losing dozens upon dozens of ships only by high dud rate. Yes, I replaced practically all poor sub commanders, but I never touched DD captains. We didn't yet do any turns under the new patch, though. I hope it makes subs for both sides a bit less lethal.

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: Bradley7735

In 42, Japan conducted a couple of hundred depthcharge attacks and killed at most, 3 subs. In my own games, vs the AI, I lose a magnitude of order greater subs to ASW vessels. and, I don't have very many subs on patrol. It's too tedious for the results and I lose too many. I've even toned down accuracy and effect data and it's still too many losses.

My advice to you is to master the game, instead of complaining about it. Although, honestly, I cannot imagine what the heck one must do to lose 30 subs to ASW alone in 1942. I used them against invasion beachheads quite a lot, and still lost only 2 in 3 months.

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: Mark Weston

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

I've stated that, if the practices common in the Atlantic comprise the definition (they don't, but if they did), then the Japanese did not convoy. They did not collect hundred-ship formations at one continental port and send them en masse to another continental port.

But that is the correct definition of convoy (or at least, the definition of a convoy that actually works). The statistics and OR were clear on this; the primary value of convoy is simply that it denies the raider intercepts and targets. Instead of sitting in a nice shipping lane and seeing targets every other day, he has to make sure he finds the one monthly convoy. If he misses, it's tough luck 'til next month. The statistics from World War I showed that convoys of that type - even when unescorted - reduced the number of sinkings.

Convoys of this type were extremely not practical for most tasks in the Pacific. And therefore not universally used. By either side.

ORIGINAL: Mark Weston
(Another lesson of the WWII operational research; if you define the goal of ASW as killing submarines you lead yourself up all sorts of tactical and doctrinal cul-de-sacs).

WWII operational reseach demonstrates, that the way to win against subs and actually drive your ship losses down in the long term, is to kill them at the rate enemy cannot accept. Everything else is merely stopgap measures. Similarly, active sub hunting, by air or/and sea, is the most effective tactical way of dealing with them - as long as you have assets from that. Allied air patrols over the Bay of Biscay that started turning the Battle of Atlantic weren't meant to prevent attacks on convoys in any other way than sinking or crippling German subs.

[BShaftoe]

ORIGINAL: FatR

Setting HRs for this game will require a lot of research, playing 4 months will require investing in the game for about 1,5 months. And proving something to someone who is already convinced that he's right is futile, particuarly when any case of his opponent just playing better will be taken as a proof that the game is unfair. If you really want an experiment, just run a few months of AI playing against AI.

Nah, that experiment would be invalid. I guess that the AI isn't made to behave too historically, as it wouldn't be a challenge. So any AI vs AI wouldn't be too conclusive because, if the engine or the experience levels of crews are incorrect, the same mistakes would be detected.

[Shark7]

ORIGINAL: Mynok

ORIGINAL: Bradley7735

No matter what, once you get a ship that has depth charges to 75/75 (or more) exp, it will become a sub killer. That may be almost realistic when you're talking about USN DE's in 45. But, it's not realistic for any navy in 41, 42 or even 43. And, the fact of the matter is, there are a lot of Japanese ships at start with those exp values. There are none that I know of in the Allied navies.

Are you serious? Do you really, honestly think there are Japanese PBs, PCs, SCs, or DDs with those ratings? Really? Honestly? Have you even started a GC as Japan and played a few turns? ONE FREAKING TURN!?!?!?!

[8|][8|][8|][8|][8|][8|][8|][8|][8|][:@][:'(]

I know my Japanese PBs, Es and AMs can't manage to hit the broadside of a barn from INSIDE THE BARN! Sure they engage subs, but they don't hit anything. The only ships I've seen have actual hits on Allied Subs are from very experienced DDs, of which I don't have enough to patrol my sea lanes.

As the other poster put in these forums, it seems the average small escort experience levels of the IJN tend to be in the low to mid 40s, and I am rather sure I don't have any PBs or Es with 70+ XP.

Unless the AFBs want to whine that I shouldn't even be able to try to attack the sub I really can't see a problem. But I am starting to suspect that is exactly what some of them want...the ability to sink the Japanese Merchant Fleet at will with ZERO risk to their subs. The whole argument I keep seeing is that Allies should sink every sub they contact and Japanese should never even attack, much less get a DC hit. [8|]

[Adnan Meshuggi]

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: Adnan Meshuggi

Why should i? You ignore the facts even if you know that "convoy system" means.

You have an attitude and an opinion. But you do not want to accept facts you don´t like.

To say it direct: a single ship escorted by a single escort (bad equipped and ill trained) is NOT a convoy.

Player USE the convoy system. This explains it . But you dislike these facts. So you blame the game. It seems not useful to discuss things with people who want only to hear what they like.

IF the game produces to many kills (it dosen´t matter if the attacker are american or japanese), the system needs some changes.
But only in this case.

Not because the statistics from you say the japanese side has to loose so and so many ships.

con·voy   /v. ˈkɒnvɔɪ, kənˈvɔɪ; n. ˈkɒnvɔɪ/ Show Spelled[v. kon-voi, kuhn-voi; n. kon-voi] Show IPA
–verb (used with object)
1.to accompany or escort, usually for protection: A destroyer convoyed the merchant ship.
–noun
2.the act of convoying.
3.the protection provided by an escort.
4.a ship, fleet, group of vehicles, etc., accompanied by a protecting escort.
5.an armed force, warship, etc., that escorts, esp. for protection.
6.any group of military vehicles traveling together under the same orders.
7.Citizens Band Radio Slang. two or more CB-equipped vehicles traveling together.

QED.

Your move, Ace.

I am no ace...

for your list.
You try to bring in some smoke. A good sign for "no arguments"

You know what a convoy is.

The japanese behaviour in the pacific war in 1941-1945 wasn´t a convoy.

Maybe you learn a bit about real convoys.. the thing the allies did in the northern atlantic and the thing the japanese player repeat in the game

After learning something you come back. Oh, if you learn to be politie, this could improve your image.
Thank you.

[Adnan Meshuggi]

ORIGINAL: Bradley7735

ORIGINAL: Mynok

ORIGINAL: Bradley7735

No matter what, once you get a ship that has depth charges to 75/75 (or more) exp, it will become a sub killer. That may be almost realistic when you're talking about USN DE's in 45. But, it's not realistic for any navy in 41, 42 or even 43. And, the fact of the matter is, there are a lot of Japanese ships at start with those exp values. There are none that I know of in the Allied navies.

Are you serious? Do you really, honestly think there are Japanese PBs, PCs, SCs, or DDs with those ratings? Really? Honestly? Have you even started a GC as Japan and played a few turns? ONE FREAKING TURN!?!?!?!

[8|][8|][8|][8|][8|][8|][8|][8|][8|][:@][:'(]

I've done quite a bit of exp examination of WITP AE ships. I've mostly examined combat ships (DD's and larger). I know that most ASW ships are not DD's. Most ASW ships start around the teens to 30's in exp. But, Every Japanese combat ship starts much much better experienced than their Allied (US at least) counterparts. Until 1/1/43. At that point in the game, all ships enter the game with the same averages. Of course, most of the stuff that matters happens in 42.

The Yamato, who couldn't find her ass throughout the entire war starts her career with double (on average) night experience and about 20% more day experience as the USS Washington, who proved her ability in her first combat. It takes an average of 200 days for the average US ship to get to the same night experience as Japanese combat ships get from day 1.

What are you trying to accomplish here? Are you saying that both sides should kill 30+ subs in 42? Are you trying to figure out the definition of Convoy? Are you just trying to argue with anyone who trys to say that some number in the game might be off a bit, especially if it's Japanese?

In 42, Japan conducted a couple of hundred depthcharge attacks and killed at most, 3 subs. In my own games, vs the AI, I lose a magnitude of order greater subs to ASW vessels. and, I don't have very many subs on patrol. It's too tedious for the results and I lose too many. I've even toned down accuracy and effect data and it's still too many losses.

But, I can't figure out the best combination of numbers when number and type of devices, accuracy, ammo, effect, and experience all play a part.

Well, i think a player who use the USS Washington or the Yamato as an Escort makes a few mistakes

[Adnan Meshuggi]

ORIGINAL: FatR

ORIGINAL: Adnan Meshuggi
Well - the time bullwinle speaks about is 1942.
Also, the japanese never established a real convoy system - only in late 44, as it was too late.

This is wrong, as I noted above. Check TROMs of Japanese DDs and escorts on combinedfleet.com for examples. Will you say Allies never established a real convoy system because a lot of shipping on secondary routes away from combat zones was running without convoys throughout the war? And it was, you know.

ORIGINAL: Adnan Meshuggi
You know the difference between attacking one lonly ship with one ore two escorts and attacking a convoy with 20 ships and 5-10 escorts? Sure.

Using 20 ships and 5-10 escorts for every cargo-hauling task the opponents had in the Pacific is physically impossible. Period. The Allies never did so, despite having much more escorts . For example, note now not one of the ships sunk by the infamous I-8 in the summer of 1944 (in Indian Ocean, not some extemely remote area, like South Athlantic) was escorted:
http://www.combinedfleet.com/I-8.htm

And this is not an isolated case. I-26 (which, by the way, scored the first hit against an US ship in the war) had similar experience:
http://www.combinedfleet.com/I-26.htm

ORIGINAL: Adnan Meshuggi
In the game british destroyers should be the experts... they fought against the german uboots and know a thing. So their experience in asw should be twice of the americans or japanese. At last they fought for 2 years a serious anti-sub-war and learned a lot.

They were losing this anti-sub war by early 1942, though.

EDIT: And british DDs in AE are the finest ASW ships early in the war.

I know that the allies had unescorted ships that got sunk by axis subs. The german IX-Boats in late 1943 achieved some minor succsess even after the neckbreack in may, cause the allied anti-submarine-capabilities in the indian ocean was weak.

But - big but - we cannot compare historical events with gameplay.

As i wrote - and many others (without beeing a fanboy) - in a game the player will try to ignore historical failures. A japanese player will avoid his "nonexisting" escort-failures.
Many japanese ships, esp. merchants had zero escorts. Others with escorts were as helpless as without, cause the escorts couldn´t do a thing.

If the player use "convoy" (i mean the british way of convoing - you put some nice kill-groups with able ships in it) -system the fun is over.

If you say you need the "fun" even if the japanese player do 100x more as the japanese did historically then you haven´t understood gameplaying at all.

We - the player - want to avoid mistakes. Not defending your ships against submarines - is a BIG mistake. Cause - if you kill the attacking subs they are no longer a problem. But you can only kill em if you find em. The pacific is big.

We had a lot gamey playing in witp... you take 2000 Ki49 and Ki21 with 85exp-Pilots on naval or asw-search. No fun for american subs.


Some pepole here (not you!) belive, that the war in the pacific should work like they want it to work. They have an opinion (mostly by Propaganda-movies with john wayne, singlehandle sinking the japanese war fleet) and if their opinion isn´t shown in the results they cry.

In other threads some people playing japan will cry.

This game isn´t history in second1 if you play the game. Like every game since the first game existed.


About the brits:
in spring 42 they there in big trouble. Sure. But they know how to hunt and kill subs. The americans just did not know what a "sub" was (compared to the experience of the brits, canadians... ) The doctrine was bad and they lacked real training. Arrogance leaded to the same failures the brits made in 1940 and early 1941. Why should they get any bonus?
And yes, it is good that they are the finest asw-platforms in the game. Sounds good.

@all AFBs:
What is the solution?
Japanese ships should not hit any sub? Take the asw-capability away from them. so everybody is happy.
Real players will ignore you, fantasy players too (cause their opinion about the theme is "no japanese merchant ever should be sunk. Lets make the dud-rate 99%"). Now you just need another afb that play the japs... have fun [:D]


@devs: can someone explain a few facts about the "historical" results in the game? Say, the japanese escort their ships never ever with experienced dds and ignore subs after they had attacked.

As far as i know the japanese asw isn´t really good. Only if you collect your best ships and best comanders. In this case american subs are dead if they try to attack (here i see the asb´s crying. They "know" that his should be forbidden.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Mark Weston

But that is the correct definition of convoy (or at least, the definition of a convoy that actually works). The statistics and OR were clear on this; the primary value of convoy is simply that it denies the raider intercepts and targets. Instead of sitting in a nice shipping lane and seeing targets every other day, he has to make sure he finds the one monthly convoy. If he misses, it's tough luck 'til next month. The statistics from World War I showed that convoys of that type - even when unescorted - reduced the number of sinkings.

WWI statistics are worthless in a WWII context due to airborne asset usage in spotting and prosecution. Not to mention lack of sonar.

And I continue to disagree with that being the only, acceptable definition of "convoy." I've offered the dictionary definition, which should be decisive. Allied WWII Atlantic operations do fall under that definition, but they are not the only reasonable execution of the convoy concept.

The Japanese faced an entirely different geographical problem than the Atlantic Allies. If they had needed to ship raw materials from Halifax to Murmansk, manuacture them into finished arms, and then re-ship those arms to South America you'd have an analog. The Japanese not only needed to get raw materials home from Indo-China and the DEI (where large convoys were efficient), they needed to distribute the resulting arms OUTBOUND to many small garrisons, and outlying large bases such as Truk and Rabaul. These were not efficient large convoy routes, yet they are where a great deal of USN submarine sinkings occurred. (Read Blair.) Those were convoys as well. Why? They were merchant ships escorted by ASW assets, supported by airborne assets.

I know it sounds low-tech, but a lookout's binoculars were a perfectly acceptable "sensor" in an age when the submarine relied on his periscope to know where his target was, and many still made their attacks on the surface. I think you overstate the value of allied SONAR tech here; not that it wasn't useful, but it wasn't a case of machine-guns against spears. Especially when you remember that the primary value of the depth-charge (and the ASW escort) is not destruction, but suppression. Killing the sub is secondary to keeping it away from he merchants. (Another lesson of the WWII operational research; if you define the goal of ASW as killing submarines you lead yourself up all sorts of tactical and doctrinal cul-de-sacs).

Binoculars are useless at night, the favored USN attack posture. Daytime surface attacks simply did not happen when escorts were present.

Allied sonar tech was instrumental in turning the ASW war in both theaters; it surprises me that any student of the subject could equate it to binoculars. Neither was allied doctrine aimed at suppresion, certainly not in the Atlantic. The Hedgehog is not a suppression weapon for certain. In mid-1944 the USN overtly changed doctirne to include submarine-based ASW, with remarkable results. I'm not sure what "cul-de-sacs" you speak of. This was in response to the devastation wrought on the existing Japanese ASW asset inventory as well as merchant fleet. The IJN essentialy abanndoned non-ASW shipbuilding from late 1943 onwards due to Allied submarine efforts. When new ASW ships came on line, we sank them too.

See this link. It's published by the Office of the CNO; I think it's pretty definitive:

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/hi ... paign.html

A quote:

"The submarine offensive gravely weakened a second pillar of Japanese power: the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). As previously discussed, 30% of total Japanese Navy losses were caused by U.S. submarines. Submarines played another important role in reducing IJN capabilities. Damage to ships, caused in part by submarines, significantly increased ship repair time in Japanese shipyards, thereby reducing opportunities for new construction. The Japanese Navy spent 12% of its construction budget on ship repairs in 1943 and 1944; the figure increased to 34% in 1945.(29) Additionally, the submarine campaign had two important second order effects on the Japanese Navy. First, the necessity to build merchant ships to replace losses resulted in a reduction of potential naval construction. Private shipyards devoted to naval construction fell from 44% of the total in 1942 to 30% in 1943.(30) Secondly, the requirement to build escort ships and naval transports (also to replace merchant losses) reduced the potential to build more powerful combatants. As a result, while the IJN used 14% of its construction budget for escorts and transports in 1941, the percentage shot up to 54.3% in 1944.(31) More astonishing, the need for escorts and merchants was so grave, that after 1943, the Japanese Navy started construction on no ship bigger than a destroyer!(32) Finally, the American stranglehold on imports, in this case, iron ore, proved fatal to any long term ability to build adequate numbers of warships to replace losses.(33) By September 1944, the Japanese had so little steel that naval construction fell precipitously.(34)

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Mike Solli

I had to check. Here are the high and low crew experience for both the Japanese and Allied DDs on 7 Dec 41 in Scenario 1:

Japanese High: 74/69
Japanese Low: 55/52
Allied High: 73/58
Allied Low: 52/35

If I had to guess, I'd say the average Japanese is in the mid-60s and the average Allied is in the upper-50s. That's just a guess though.

I'm not as conversant with game stats as others, so I have to ask. Are those numbers "crew" experience, or "crew ASW" experince? DDs do a lot of things other than ASW. I suppose only the coders know which algorithms insert these figures and where and how modified, but I'd always assumed those numbers influenced lots of things, including damage control, load speeds, system damage accumulation, and probably other areas of basic ship operation and seamanship.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Mynok

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: Mynok


Definitions notwithstanding, no sane person understands 'convoy' in those terms. It is an organized group of many ships including escorts and transports. Not some rusting trawler escorted by a sub chaser.

Definitions matter if you're making an argument. The burden is on the party asserting that the Japanese did not convoy to prove that this was the case. Therefore, EXACTLY how many escorts and how many escorted vessels, and of what type, must be present for "a convoy" to exist? And once those numbers are asserted, what is the historical support?

I've stated that, if the practices common in the Atlantic comprise the definition (they don't, but if they did), then the Japanese did not convoy. They did not collect hundred-ship formations at one continental port and send them en masse to another continental port. However, that's a LONG way different than asserting that Allied submariners in the PTO were merrily plinking away at hundreds of single-ship ducks tooling along with their shirt-tails hanging out, at no danger to themselves, which is the ultimate conclusion raised by these specious claims.

I posted the JANAC results links. Since there WERE ASW escorts sunk by Allied subs in 1942, let alone 1943-1945, no such absolute claim can be made. I'm simply waiting for:

1) a definition of "convoy" in specific terms, and
2) evidence that "most" (50% +1) Japanese ships attacked in 1942 were traveling alone, without any escorts.

I'll wait.

And you'll keep waiting. Which is what you want I suspect. What fracking data could you possibly suspect would satisfy your demands. Good God in heaven! [8|][8|][8|][8|][8|][8|][8|]

Removing the histronics, I'm waiting for those asserting historical "facts" I know to be incorrect, to prove them. The evidence is in secondary sources such as Blair. All one has to do is accumulate them.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: SqzMyLemon

I believe every game for what ever reason is different. I would call my Japanese ASW capabilities into mid February/42 subpar at best. Allied subs often get a first strike in either hitting an escort or a transport. My escorts often respond with "can't find target" or don't respond at all (escorts are anything from E's to PB's to SC's to DD's). And it is rare I even record a hit if they do launch a DC attack. I've lost 50 ships confirmed to Allied subs, if it wasn't for the dud rate, I'd be looking at roughly 70-80 ships sunk in just over 2 months. I believe my opponent has changed as many of his submarine commanders as possible to high skill and aggressiveness levels. The Dutch submarines have been particularly effective as well as the S boats. I can't explain the success of his submarines, and I can't explain the poor showing of my ASW efforts.

Part of your answer is contianed in what you wrote above. Your opponent has historical hindsight and knows that many of the pre-war USN COs didn't cut the mustard. He relieved them within days. In RL, most made at least two patrols before they were canned, some more.

Whoever in these forums first said that RL results can be only partly relied upon due to hindsight made the truest statement of all.

[Mike Solli]

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: Mike Solli

I had to check. Here are the high and low crew experience for both the Japanese and Allied DDs on 7 Dec 41 in Scenario 1:

Japanese High: 74/69
Japanese Low: 55/52
Allied High: 73/58
Allied Low: 52/35

If I had to guess, I'd say the average Japanese is in the mid-60s and the average Allied is in the upper-50s. That's just a guess though.

I'm not as conversant with game stats as others, so I have to ask. Are those numbers "crew" experience, or "crew ASW" experince? DDs do a lot of things other than ASW. I suppose only the coders know which algorithms insert these figures and where and how modified, but I'd always assumed those numbers influenced lots of things, including damage control, load speeds, system damage accumulation, and probably other areas of basic ship operation and seamanship.

The numbers above are raw crew experience. They are modified by the percentages mentioned earlier for ASW warfare.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Mike Solli

The numbers above are raw crew experience. They are modified by the percentages mentioned earlier for ASW warfare.

OK, that's what I thought. So, the ASW question is "polluted" by the raw crew experience decisions of the devs, and those are open to debate until the end of time. What makes a crew, of any navy and of any class vessel, better or more experienced than another? Re the ASW arena in game, the base experience levels should be the debate, not the escalators. And if you ask a veteran of the IJN, the USN, the RN, the Dutch navy, etc., each one is going to have had the "best" crews. I wouldn't want it any other way.

[Local Yokel]

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: Mynok

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58



Definitions matter if you're making an argument. The burden is on the party asserting that the Japanese did not convoy to prove that this was the case. Therefore, EXACTLY how many escorts and how many escorted vessels, and of what type, must be present for "a convoy" to exist? And once those numbers are asserted, what is the historical support?

I've stated that, if the practices common in the Atlantic comprise the definition (they don't, but if they did), then the Japanese did not convoy. They did not collect hundred-ship formations at one continental port and send them en masse to another continental port. However, that's a LONG way different than asserting that Allied submariners in the PTO were merrily plinking away at hundreds of single-ship ducks tooling along with their shirt-tails hanging out, at no danger to themselves, which is the ultimate conclusion raised by these specious claims.

I posted the JANAC results links. Since there WERE ASW escorts sunk by Allied subs in 1942, let alone 1943-1945, no such absolute claim can be made. I'm simply waiting for:

1) a definition of "convoy" in specific terms, and
2) evidence that "most" (50% +1) Japanese ships attacked in 1942 were traveling alone, without any escorts.

I'll wait.

And you'll keep waiting. Which is what you want I suspect. What fracking data could you possibly suspect would satisfy your demands. Good God in heaven! [8|][8|][8|][8|][8|][8|][8|]

Removing the histronics, I'm waiting for those asserting historical "facts" I know to be incorrect, to prove them. The evidence is in secondary sources such as Blair. All one has to do is accumulate them.

Moose, I don’t understand why you say the onus of proof falls upon those who assert that the Japanese did not convoy rather than on those who say that it did. Why should such a burden fall on either party to such an argument? I think Mynok is probably correct in saying that data on this is something for which you’ll have to wait indefinitely.

There is a certain amount of data available about convoys that the Japanese did run, particularly those notorious for their losses, e.g. HI-71. However, even if you had access to a comprehensive catalogue of Japanese convoy movements, detailing composition, escorts and casualties, the overall ‘picture’ of Japanese losses to submarines would remain incomplete because you could would still have a yawning void in your information about merchant ships on independent passage. You would need to have an equally comprehensive catalogue of such independent sailings in order to put the convoy movements and losses in context, and I think it’s improbable that such a catalogue could now be assembled from the records that remain available.

We can draw some conclusions from the accounts given by authors such as Mark Parillo and Cpt Oi Atsushi (who wrote ‘Kaijo goei sen’ – a standard work on escort of Japanese merchant shipping in the war). What comes across from those accounts is that in 1942 few Japanese ships proceeded in convoy - however that expression is defined - and that when widespread introduction of convoy began in 1943 it met much the same resistance from Japanese merchant skippers as that of their British equivalents in 1917 when the Admiralty ordered wholesale convoying of ships in the face of the unrestricted submarine warfare then begun by the Germans. Hence Parillo’s conclusion that: “Consequently, except for military transport operations, Japanese merchant convoys were an exceptional occurrence before 1943.”

When the Japanese did implement convoy, both Oi and Parillo imply that ten to fifteen merchant ships was the maximum convoy size. Parillo cites Oi’s essay “Why Japan’s ASW failed” for his conclusion that the Japanese regarded any larger number as being ‘unmanageable’ but Oi actually says no such thing in those terms. Parillo says some quite disparaging things about Japanese masters’ inability to operate their ships properly within a convoy environment, but every merchant ship that went to war probably had difficulties with station-keeping and the other unfamiliar essentials of convoy operation at first, and I suspect that a Japanese failure to operate larger convoys was due more to a lack of institutional will to do so.

In any case, I cannot see how the issue of whether Japanese ships were proceeding in convoy or not when attacked has anything more than an incidental connection with the degree of danger to which US submarine crews were exposed. Surely the degree of such danger depended more on whether or not any accompanying Japanese escorts were effective ASW practitioners?

[vettim89]

Wow. Just finished all 13 pages of this thread. If I may interject a little here

1. I whole heartedly agree that the IJN should be sinking subs at a higher than historical rate. As has been well pointed out, the Japanese player should not be required to repeat the mistakes of his RL counterparts. It is just common sense to expect that if the IJN is more active in ASW in 1942-43 that more Allied subs will be sunk. Get over it.

2. Back at the beginning of the thread it was pointed out that a possible problem may be the high ratings for the IJN commanders (not ship commanders but TF commanders). It was pointed out that the leader ratings meant IJN ASW TF's were more aggressive in prosecuting Allied subs. If the problem is the leaders this can be fixed much more easily than overhauling the entire ASW system.

I have no problem with the crew ratings being higher for the IJN at the start. The Japanese had been preparing for war for years. The aggressively trained and exercised in near wartime conditions. The USN at the same time was building ships but the Depression limted funds for fuel, spare parts, and everything else necessary to conduct aggressive fleet training exercises. PH was not attacked on a Sunday without reason. The Japanese knew that peace time training schedules meant most of the ships would be undermanned and unprepared.

The early war IJN should be able to sweep the Allies aside because they were ready and the Allies were not. If the Allies would have been forced to fight the entire war in the condition they were in on 7 Dec 1941, it would have been far bloodier. The introduction of RADAR was a great equalizer and basically nullified the IJN superior training especially at night. That said the USN especially learned very quickly how to fight. After Savo Island the US won or fought to a draw in all but three of the remaining major surface battles of the war ( call Tasafronga, Kula Gulf, and Kolombangara losses). Three of those battles were extremely losided US victories (Vella Gulf, Cape St George, and Surigao Strait). I feel there is an important element to this: when the USN forces were led by non-flagged officers, they won more often than they lost often obliterating similarly led IJN forces. During 1942-43, the presence of a true FLAGship usually spelled disaster for the USN. Only Lee and Merrill performed well during this time.

My point being that USN Captains, Commanders, and Lt. Commanders should not be noticably lower in there leadership rankings than there IJN counterparts. The historical record does not bear this out. The USN was a professional navy at war's start. Most of the commanders were "ring knockers". These were filled as the war went on with Reserve, OCS, and ROTC officers. That said the USNA commisioned over 3300 officers in WWII. What the USN officers lacked was experience and their training showed through when they got it. The USN admirals are a different story. In fairness to them, the interwar USN required administrators more than fighters. Advancement also was highly political and is to this day.

The point being that IJN mid-grade officers should be a little better than their USN counterparts but not substantially. If this were corrected, perhaps some of this ASW problem would be resolved.

[Shark7]

And to add to Vettim89's excellent points:

USN Admirals in the early war were of the old 'Battleship Fleet' mentality. Japan largely had the same problem, but had been planning for a while. So if you are wondering did this affect things, of course it did. Players do not have the Battleship Fleet mentality, and act accordingly.

Historically, the first few days, weeks and possibly months would likely have followed a 'War Plan Orange' course. This plan went out the window with the majority of the BBs sunk at PH. From that ponit on, the USN was reacting, not taking the initiative and this did not really change until Coral Sea. One has to look at the use of subs under a War Plan Orange scenario to understand how they historically behaved. I don't see many Allied Players adhering to War Plan Orange. [;)]

And my ponit to all this: Neither player is going to act historically. We have all the info we need to not make the same mistakes, or be stuck in a Battleship 'Queen of the Fleet' frame of mind. We also know exactly how devastating submarines can be and both Allied and Japanese players are going to 1) use submarines agressively from the start, and 2) be very agressive in ASW effots.

In the end, you can throw the historical results out when dealing with the game...the game will NEVER mimic the real war for this reason: We know the blunders that were made and won't repeat them. [:D]