But Rommel doesn't know that they've been so reinforced.
He knew there losses could be replaced, based on previous experience. Time and again British tank forces had been depleted in the field, and time and again they had been rebuilt.
With what Rommel knew of the magnitude of the Tobruk and Gazala victories, it was not an unreasonable decision to press on.
I think the victories at Gazala and Tobruk had a limited impact on the strength of the 8th Army. The main problem is that the army became disorganised and needed to have its armoured strength rebuilt- but neither of these problems was particularly serious, and both had been fixed before without much difficulty by a withdrawal similar to that made to Alamein.
Furthermore, that the 8th Army was then reinforced at Alamein had a lot to do with logistics in itself. Real life isn't like TOAW- one cannot put twelve divisions a thousand miles into the desert as easy as one can put two; the improved logistical situation meant that a larger force could be supplied in action.
For what it's worth, Rommel was certainly right to close up to the Alamein line. However at that point he should have immediately focused on his defensive preparations.
"What did you read at university?"
"War Studies"
"War? Huh. What is it good for?"
"Absolutely nothing."
But Rommel doesn't know that they've been so reinforced.
He knew there losses could be replaced, based on previous experience. Time and again British tank forces had been depleted in the field, and time and again they had been rebuilt.
Those were the largest losses they ever suffered in the campaign. And it doesn't change my point, that the desision to press on is dependent upon the Axis assessment of the CW force level. One can't just look at the logistical difficulties and conclude from that alone that it can't be done.
One can't just look at the logistical difficulties and conclude from that alone that it can't be done.
Not necessarily in this context, but there comes a certain point at which logistical problems make the size, quality and moral of your force irrelevant.
This rather elegantly ties in with another debate ongoing over at TDG.
"What did you read at university?"
"War Studies"
"War? Huh. What is it good for?"
"Absolutely nothing."
Golden: You make several elagant points. And I do agree with you- As a politician, Rommel was on a par with Dan Quale. [:'(]
"Ideological conviction will trump logistics, numbers, and firepower every time"
J. Stalin, 1936-1941...A. Hitler, 1933-1945. W. Churchill (very rarely, and usually in North Africa). F. D. Roosvelt (smart enough to let the generals run the war).
I just read a book titled Tobruk, published in Australia this year. The author is a bit more willling to get into the nastier side of people than most historians I read, so he does talk about Rommel and Hitler. At least according to him Rommel had a very good relationship with Hitler which made him unpopular with many senior German officers.
Hitler wanted to promote him but most of the generals did not want him around so North Africa was perfect because it allowed Hitler to have his way and the other generals to have thier way at the same time. Plus it generated lots of good propaganda for Geobels.
I also agree with the group opinion, and I think Rommel has really been analysed to the point where anyone who is interested can easily discover his strengths and weakness.
What always amazes me is the bad opinion people have of Montgomery. He took an army which wanted to fight in an amatur way, wanted to fly to pieces across the desert and had done so repeatedly, and he won with it. He had his flaws as well, but all the generals before him had failed, and he succeeded. I would argue that is because he was able to find a way to make a deeply flawed army fight effectively and that deserves some credit.
Rommel on the other hand was a very effective commander of a superb army. Obviously a brilliant general, but can you imagine him doing as well if he had been in charge of the British?
I just read a book titled Tobruk, published in Australia this year. The author is a bit more willling to get into the nastier side of people than most historians I read, so he does talk about Rommel and Hitler. At least according to him Rommel had a very good relationship with Hitler which made him unpopular with many senior German officers.
Several times, Rommel went directly to Hitler in order to get his orders overriden. Though sometimes effective, this wasn't a very professional approach as it undermined the authority of his direct superiors.
What always amazes me is the bad opinion people have of Montgomery. He took an army which wanted to fight in an amatur way, wanted to fly to pieces across the desert and had done so repeatedly, and he won with it. He had his flaws as well, but all the generals before him had failed, and he succeeded. I would argue that is because he was able to find a way to make a deeply flawed army fight effectively and that deserves some credit.
The desert theatre maximised the strengths of the Germans in general and Rommel in particular, and until Autumn 1942 there hadn't really been a British reaction to that. The position at Alamein maximised the 8th Army's strengths. Though Montgomery didn't chose the position, he did plan a battle that fitted the way the British Army worked rather than trying to out-German the Germans, which was never going to work.
"What did you read at university?"
"War Studies"
"War? Huh. What is it good for?"
"Absolutely nothing."
"Out German the Germans," is a stock phrase thatseems to appear in wore WW2 history books than, "Montgomery was the best WW1 General in WW2." I have even seen the darn cliche (but it does have a catchy ring to it [:'(]) in a history text or two! (American, of course). Just a guess, but probably coined by an English historian after the war. The seemed to be the first nationality to admid that there were Germans that did things other than shoot inocent civillians.
If anyone knows WHO said it first (Please not Stephen Ambrose), I would appreciate hearing it. It is never quoted or footnoted, but someone had to think of it first. [;)]
"Ideological conviction will trump logistics, numbers, and firepower every time"
J. Stalin, 1936-1941...A. Hitler, 1933-1945. W. Churchill (very rarely, and usually in North Africa). F. D. Roosvelt (smart enough to let the generals run the war).
One musn't forget Monty had a huge advantage...ULTRA. Which in a way may have led to Rommel's reputation as a great General, he rarely followed orders!
Well this is what I suggested earlier in the thread- that Rommel's effect should be much more localised. Of course this is difficult to do in TOAW.
I tried this in my scenario "Germany 1813", what I did was very simple in fact, I put in the equipment of the unit labelled "Napoleon" a good number of guns, range 1 hex, so that they could support any adjacent unit.
RE: Rommel: Up to El Alimen he had the "Good Source" (Fellers Reports) PLUS Alfred Seeboms 613th (or some number around thereabouts) Radio Intercept Company providing excellent tactical intelligence. Plus a couple of good agents in Cairo (No, no The Key To Rebecca, but along the same lines). And the small size of his Panzermee kept him in the "Operational Level" so that he was operating at his peak level of performance, able to "lead from the front". Also the Italian military code was unbroken.
A really excellent general at even corps level, particularly given a theater where he was far removed from interference from Berlin. [:'(]
"Ideological conviction will trump logistics, numbers, and firepower every time"
J. Stalin, 1936-1941...A. Hitler, 1933-1945. W. Churchill (very rarely, and usually in North Africa). F. D. Roosvelt (smart enough to let the generals run the war).
I tried this in my scenario "Germany 1813", what I did was very simple in fact, I put in the equipment of the unit labelled "Napoleon" a good number of guns, range 1 hex, so that they could support any adjacent unit.
The trouble is Napoleon then has a fixed effect- the 50,000 men of Wellington's (?) remark. It should be related to the size of the force he commands.
"What did you read at university?"
"War Studies"
"War? Huh. What is it good for?"
"Absolutely nothing."
And the small size of his Panzermee kept him in the "Operational Level" so that he was operating at his peak level of performance, able to "lead from the front".
Even at this level it caused problems. See Mellenthin's Panzer Battles. He complains of Rommel's constant unavailability.
"What did you read at university?"
"War Studies"
"War? Huh. What is it good for?"
"Absolutely nothing."
It is not exactly fixed, you know it is dependant on supply, losses, and as the unit is entirely consisteny¡t of passive equipment it is easily overrun if not backed by friendly units, so it can be "killed" or evenb "Wounded" if you allow it to reconstitute. i know it is not perfect, but I think it is better than global shock
I HAVE read "Panzer Battles", as well as "Lost Victories", "The German Genarals Talk (and talk, and talk...)", Von Luck's Memoriors, and darn near every book written by an influental German WW2 Tank General that is available in english. "Leading from the front" (a la Rommel) certainly had its disadvantages, including being out of communications with Operations, making bad decisions based on incomplete information (from being out of communications with operations [:'(]), and just plain bad decisions with no one to advise you (see: Dash To The Wire). Certainly Rommels method was not perfect, but it worked well (in general). Nowdays, with improved comms, GPS, computers and the like, it would be outmoded. In WW2, I would use the analogy of an expert quarterback calling audibles. He is "on the field" and Rommel certainly had an intuitative feel for both the battlefield, his opponents, and their weaknesses.
Probably the best example is one of his worst decisions, the "Dash To The Wire". Rommel thought he was still facing Cunningham, who indeed wanted to retreat back into Eqypt. In fact, Cunningham was releived, and replaced by the THEATER Commander, "The Auk". This is the same General who stopped Rommel at First Alimen.
Had Cunningham remained in command (or Ritchie, later) things may have turned out differently. (I do NOT mean the Germans could have won, but the African Campaign might have lasted a hell of a lot longer.
Rommel had his weaknesses. He could be arrogant, delusional (capturing the oilfields), he passed the buck on many mistakes (firing officers for his mistakes), and tended to ignore logistics. However, he adopted a style of command that played to his strengths.[:D] His elnisted men adored him, his troops were trained to a razor sharp edge, and he had an astonishingly quick, intuitative grasp of a very fluid situation. Particularly since he lacked General Staff training, and had to pick up armor tactics and command skills on the fly, I would certainly rate him at least #2 (behind Guderian) in command of an Armored Division, or (small) Corps. In love for his family, troops, and country (no matter how despicable the government he served), I would rate him way abover Guderian, who served on the "Court of Honor" which expelled men from the army so that they could be tried by the "Peoples Court" for their part in the "Bomb Plot" of July 20.[:-]
As a Panzer General, I would give Rommel 5 stars. AND he was smarter than Rundstedt on defending France against invasion. [;)]
"Ideological conviction will trump logistics, numbers, and firepower every time"
J. Stalin, 1936-1941...A. Hitler, 1933-1945. W. Churchill (very rarely, and usually in North Africa). F. D. Roosvelt (smart enough to let the generals run the war).
Certainly Rommels method was not perfect, but it worked well (in general).
As I've said, it worked better when he had a smaller command. By 1942 it was making life difficult for his staff.
Nowdays, with improved comms, GPS, computers and the like, it would be outmoded.
I'm not so sure- couldn't one say the same thing about the Second World War, with the wide availability of radio communications? I wouldn't be too surprised to see leading from the front next time we have a proper conventional war.
AND he was smarter than Rundstedt on defending France against invasion.
Perhaps. Bear in mind that most of those tanks which were to be concentrated on the beaches would be concentrated on the wrong beaches.
"What did you read at university?"
"War Studies"
"War? Huh. What is it good for?"
"Absolutely nothing."
I am a Rommel fan, but I think it's fair to say that he pretty much made life difficult for everybody (on both sides).[:D]
"Ideological conviction will trump logistics, numbers, and firepower every time"
J. Stalin, 1936-1941...A. Hitler, 1933-1945. W. Churchill (very rarely, and usually in North Africa). F. D. Roosvelt (smart enough to let the generals run the war).
...Rommel on the other hand was a very effective commander of a superb army. Obviously a brilliant general, but can you imagine him doing as well if he had been in charge of the British?
As opposed to Italians? You do have a point, but the Afrika Korps didn't just come to Rommel as a great formation ready-made. He fired division commanders, ignored superiors, and led his units to become the great fighting instruments they were.
Conversely, the British under O'Conner had displayed lots of dash, elan, and all that stuff. They weren't utterly impervious to good leadership. One suspects that if Rommel had commanded them they would have been in Tripoli by Christmas 1941.
I am a Rommel fan, but I think it's fair to say that he pretty much made life difficult for everybody (on both sides).[:D]
Yeah. I don't know if anyone has mentioned it, but as far as I'm concerned, one of the more comic episodes of World War Two was what happened when Rommel first appeared in Africa.
One reason the British were caught napping and hustled so easily out of Cyrenaica is that they knew exactly what Rommel's orders were: he was to remain on the defensive.
Never occurred to them that Rommel would simply ignore his orders. One of Ultra's less ballyhooed successes.
