Übercorsair and übercap

[mdiehl]

The Marine fighter squadron at Midway was pretty roughly handled to say the least:

However the Zeros had a 4:3 advantage in overall numbers and 3/4ths of the Marines were flying F2As rather than F4Fs. The Marines were generally inexperienced and IIRC 15 were shot down with most of the rest rendered hors de combat.

There is one little but though: the Zeros failed to protect their charges particularly well. Tellingly Hiryu's Torpedo Squadron lost half its strength either shot down or shot up so badly as to be unflyable upon return to Hiryu.

All of this is spot on. In particular it will be interesting to look at the contexts (in the PTO a.c. project) in which a.c. enter engagements. The qualitative impression is that fixation on intercepting particular enemy types -- for example trying to evade escorts and attack strike aircraft -- made fighters more vulnerable. Identifying and tracking all the correct intangibles is the key.

That said, the F2 was no one's idea of a decent a.c. It really was outclassed by the Zero, regardless of the pilot.

[mdiehl]

Would the same be true of IJN pilots coming down from Rabaul?

Not sure. I have never read that the Zeros went into combat at Guadalcanal operating at low power settings. Most sources indicate that the Zeros had about 7-10 minutes of high power setting time to have fuel enough to return to Rabaul. Most A2A combats, however, lasted less than that from moment of observation to moment of "wtf where did everyone go?" One way to approach that question from the flank is to ask how many Zeroes were ditched en route back to Rabaul proportional to numbers engaged, and how many of these were ditched primarily because of battle damage rather than an empty tank? If that number is not unusually high (number ditched due to dry tanks) then it's an important "intangible." If not, then it's an unimportant intangible, at least for that campaign.

[pauk]

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

Of course, the main question that these Steakhouse Morons always refuse to answer is:

"Why do you care so much about a game that you don't own and don't play?"

Doggie? mdiehl?? Beuller??? Anyone????

Chez, dont be so harsh... perhaps diehl finally bought the game[;)][:D]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

I know alot more about how WitP works than you know about World War Two history.

[mdiehl]

Agree that Bloody Shambles falls short on the reference side of things, whether his fault or the publisher - indeed this is true of a good deal of avaition literature. But could you outline these instances you've come across?

@Timtom

For example:

Shores et al. describe the 19 February combat over Java as 1 Zero lost in exchange for 7 P-40s shot down. The official US Hisotry of the Army Air Forces of WW2 (p.391) (see: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/I/AAF-I-10.html ) has no P-40s shot down and claims 4 Zeros shot down (over Malang, Java). Now, I'm not willing to credit the USAAF official history's numbers vis a vis Zeroes shot down as accurate. But I will assume that the USAAF history is a more authoritative source than Shores et al. vis a vis actual numbers of American a.c. shot down. I'm still trying to resolve the discrepancy, but the complete absence of references cited in text (or end notes, or footnotes with citations) makes resolving Shores et al. a very challenging effort.

Also, their accounts of AVG pilots lost to enemy a.c. rather than ground fire or operationally seem incorrect. But I have to dredge out a copy of Ford's book somewhere (Shores et al. don't seem to match Bond's diary, although Bond may not have known exactly how AVG a.c. stationed at other bases may have been destroyed since he was operating on the scuttlebutt circuit... some of his accounts are quite detailed and others are of the "I just heard that so and so was lost" variety).

[bradfordkay]

Could it be that those were Dutch or british pilots in the P40s and thus weren't counted in USAAF records? I'm still waiting for my Vol 2 to arrive, so I can't check it right now...

[mdiehl]

What's been your experience with these fighters in your games?

That the USN should not engage enemy CVs prior to August 1942. Beyond that I have not played the game. I regard the air combat model as rather hopelessly snagged.

[mdiehl]

Yes, clearly. And now you have fallen into my trap! Don't you feel silly?

No I don't. All I wanted was for you to admit that you are a troll. Now that you have, you can be ignored and no reasonable person will feel compelled to take you seriously.

[spence]

Could it be that those were Dutch or british pilots in the P40s and thus weren't counted in USAAF records? I'm still waiting for my Vol 2 to arrive, so I can't check it right now...

Pretty sure no Dutch, British or Australian pilots were in P-40s in the DEI or even had them (Kittyhawks) up to that point.

[pauk]

modest request for moderators... get this thread locked, because just don't need that "Stekhause Moron" calling other persons troll... in fact, he is only troll here.

Please mdihl go back to the your little community back again where you can find an audience for yours "Sherman was better than Tiger", "Werner von Braun was irrelevant for mission on Moon" and other nonsenses....

[mdiehl]

@various: (to find my reply to you, pick yer quote out of the list)

But you're right... I am ignorant of your version of WWII history... you know, your version of history that says the Japanese should never have won a single battle anywhere, anytime or in anyway. To hear you tell it, Pearl Harbor should have been a resounding Amercan victory. And to think the rest of us have been reading all those lies by Lundstrom, Shores, Bergstrom, Parshall et al.

I've never made any of those claims or anything remotely like 'em. If you could provide a quote, your credibility may be restored.

(Speaking of Shores, where is that breakdown of aerial losses you promised us from Shores books? I can only assume that your failure to post it must have been because it didn't support your version of history. Could that be it? Or were you just lying about doing the work?

Asked and answered. There are numbers, then there are accurate numbers. Shores et al. are proving difficult to verify.

quote:

Ah.. So that's what's going on. Oh, I see the plan now... discredit the sources first... good idea!

I see no need to "discredit the sources." Vis a vis Guadalcanal and the early war campaigns my posts on Richard Frank's and John Lundstrom's works proves the point that the A6M+pilot vs the F4F+pilot combinations were pretty much equals. I've never made any other claim than that. The USN vs IJN naval battles have the F4Fs winning by a margin of about 1.5:1, but as these are small actions I am not sure one can even claim they are "statistically significant." The Guadalcanal actions put the zero ahead at a rate of about 1.2:1. The challenge, then, is to figure out how other intangibles such as force ratios, perceived mission (fixation on intercepting bombers to the detriment of defending self, and that sort of thing), range, secure non-combat area, &c, fit into the mix. It's not the sort of thing one does in a few months, not even if one limits oneself to the USN campaigns and Guadalcanal, unless one does this sort of thing for a living.

Oh, can't have that can we? Got to throw out any fact that slews the result away from your preconceived notion, right? Just like you wanted to throw out the air combat over Darwin with the P-40s and Zeros.

Look, we all know that you are adept at attempting character assasination, even though you make a poor job of it. But the fact is I never said I wanted to throw out the air combat over Darwin. Find any place where I did. What I said was that there are intangibles. You and, as I recall, Nik, seem to think that Zeroes operating at long range to Guadalcanal was an important intangible that subtantially adversely affected A6M performance there. It is a reasonable claim to make, albeit one that I think is overstated based on the evidence. But if it is fair game to note such intangibles, where they adversely affect the Japanese, it is also fair game to track the ones that adversely affected the Allies.

As to Darwin, see: http://home.st.net.au/~dunn/darwin02.htm

By my reading that's 36A6Ms at full power setting attacking a CAP of 5 P-40s, with 5 more P-40s on the ground refueling, and five P-40s bounced while scrambling to take off. Not exactly any intelligent person's idea of a meeting engagement or even a meeting of aircraft on roughly even terms, even if we ignore the 7:1 initial force ratio advantage favoring the Japanese.

That's why intagibles matter.

What do you call someone who fails to produce those statistics that he said he would?

A busy person, doing a careful job.

(oh, darn... and I was going to take the high road!)

Why would you start now? It's against your nature.

The vast majority of Japanese naval pilots lost after 1943 were very inexperienced, most having only 10-20 hours in type upon leaving flight school.

That is not correct. In any case, in the Marianas engagement most of the Japanese pilots from the IJN CVs were extensively trained. Not as extensively experienced as their forerunners of the Kido Butai of 1941-1942, but substantially trained nonetheless. How they compare in training vs the slight experienced and highly trained American pilots who comprised TF58/38's regular air crews is not easy to quantify.

These were the pilots that were slaughtered in places like the Marianas and the PI and that was due more to their lack of training than any major deficiency in their aircraft.

The Zero was an utterly deficient aircraft by 1944. Dangerous yes, but deficient as well. A Sopwith Camel would be a dangerous aircraft too, under the right circumstances, but you would not want to fly in one against a well trained CV pilot of any era. The plain fact is that a Zero in 1943-1945 had a couple of cannon that were, when brought to bear at close range, quite lethal if they could stay on target long enough. But during the same interval, the likelihood of a Zero being in a good position to attack a USN fighter was low, under "normal combat circumstances." I don't doubt that a Zero could shoot down an A-10 warthog if the Zero was in a high energy dive and the A-10 just taking off. The "danger" thus imposed by Zeros in the late war was even more contingent on the need for favorable position than it was in the early war.

Pilots like Sakai, Iwamoto, Okumura, Okabe and Kanno all held their own against the best the US had to throw at them in 1944 and 1945 and they were flying these antiquated Zeros.

Many of 'em lived. I'm otherwise not sure what you mean by "hold their own." Their units were slaughtered around them, and their late war successes seem to have been few.

Of course, you probably won't do that because it doesn't fit your preconceived notions that thinks inexperienced US pilots blasted every experienced Japanese pilot in every encounter.

Define "inexperienced." So far I've pretty much limited my discussions in the WitP and GGPW fora to 1942. The only claim I have made (contra the boldfaced part of your straw man assertion, above) is that the USN F4F pilots achieved a favorable kill ratio against A6Ms in the 1942 campaigns, and the USMC a slightly inferior kill ratio. I've stated that if it is true that Japanese pilots were substantially better combat pilots than American ones, and if the A6M was a substantially better plane than the F4F, then one would expect the kill ratios to substantially favor the Japanese. Yet they do not. It logically follows that one or both of the assumptions (that the Japanese pilots were better combat pilots, or the Japanese planes were better combat planes) is incorrect.

I suppose a third option is that guys like you think an unfavorable loss ratio against an opponent that you know can vastly outproduce you and outlast you in a long war is a metric predictive of a successful conclusion.

And you would know about WitP ubercap in every iteration how? What is your experience with mid-late war ubercap? Just from reading the forum probably... certainly isn't from playing the game.

I know it's an early war problem by experience. I know it's a late war problem by reading the AARs. Deny it if you like. But the AARs and pretty much the constant discussion of the Uber Cap problem are there for all to see.

The problem with WitP is that it doesn't matter how large the strike is against a US carrier TF once the Corsair arrives. 10 planes or 500 planes attacking.

What makes you think the Japanese could have coordinated anywhere at any time in WW2 a single airstrike of 500+ planes?

They will all be shot down regardless of the experience level of the pilots involved and that my dear uninformed friend is the crux of the problem with the game.

Again, I don't view them all being shot down as a historical error. I might agree that fewer of the a.c. should be shot down by Corsairs and more of them shot down by flak, but I think the ballpark results vis a vis Japanese losses are correct. I think the Allied losses in the engagement that initiated this thread are generous to the Japanese, by comparison with historical outcomes.

You claim that the "Kido Butai Death Star" in WitP has the same effect in 1942. I submit to you that you don't know what you are talking about. You have no basis for comparison, certainly no personal experience with which to compare. KBDS can be deadly to be sure to those players wishing to impale themselves upon its sword.

In other words, KBDS *does in fact* have the same effect in WW2, or at least it can. I am not sure what you mean by "players wishing to impale themselves on its sword." Coming from you, it seems like you are suggesting that the Allies should never challenged Kido Butai. As a matter of game mechanics and outcomes, I think you are correct, if that is what you are saying. But at no time during WW2 did the USN fear the KBDS as the Allied player MUST in WitP, and there is no reason to believe that six Japanese carriers massed in early 1942 could be as effective as they are in WitP. Save Pearl Harbor. A surprise attack on a suite of airbases with no warning, no combat air patrol, and a harbor full of parked ships. If that is your idea of a typical meeting engagement... well.. nuff said.

But KB's CAP is not invincible at any point in the game, unlike the late-war US CAP which is impervious to all strikes of any size.

How many aircraft did the Japanese lose in the Battle of the Phillippine Sea? Four hundred something? How many US aicraft shot down during the same interval? The facts seem to indicate that late war US TF38/58 was rather impervious. If your complaint is that not enough picket ships and the occasional CVE and very rarely an Essex Class CV get sunk, you probably have a fair point. But I do not see that being particularly problematic, given the relative invulnerability of early war Japanese massed-CV TFs.

BTW, did you ever return that copy of WitP you "borrowed" and delete the game from your harddrive?

Yes.

I assume that this is a comprehensive compilation that you are willing to post online in this forum for all to see.

I've already covered, in detail, with page numbers and exact tallies, the 1942 USN and Guadalcanal actions in these fora (including GGPW). Twice now actually. The rest will be covered in the Steakhouse Council of War forums, where rules of decorum are enforced.

I also assume that if you have such a comprhensive compilation that it includes date, time, place, pilot, aircraft flown and most importantly your references so that we may see you aren't using just Martin Caidin???

Indeed it will. That is one of the reasons why this is such a large endeavor.

But to say that experienced Japanese pilots in A6Ms could not be successful against Hellcats and Corsairs is to ignore history as Sakai along with several other aces demonstrated on several occasions over Iwo Jima and the home islands in late 44 and 45.

I never said they could not be successful. I said that the balance greatly favored the Allies. I would be the first to concede that a combat pilot veteran of the previous six years of war could shoot down an American a.c., even in a Zero. But the number of late war victories, even for guys like Sakai, wasn't very great.

The Hellcat and Corsair were outstanding aircraft and when piloted by experienced aircrews were something to be feared by the average Japanese fighter pilot. These aircraft however were not invincible.

No one said they were. But outcomes like the Battle of the Phillippine Sea aren't events that I have made up just to get into an argument with you. 400+ Japanese a.c. shot down vs, IIRC, 29 American a.c. shot down isn't "invincibility" -- but it is compelling just the same.

Indeed the US lost 189 Corsairs to the IJNAF in air-air combat in 1944 (This does not include losses to AA or ops).

I'd like to see the detailed combat by combat breakdown on that.

Japanese standards for pilot applicants were far more rigorous than were those in the US and the IJN pilot training program took over 2.5 years to complete whereas the prewar US pilot training program was less than 2 years.

That is true. What is missing here is any rational analysis that indicates that the Japanese rigoruous standards necessarily gave them better pilots. There is no compelling evidence to support that claim at least not in WW2 real life combat stats vs the USN.

Japanese standards of pilot "acceptability" seem to dwell properly in part on the characteristics of good pilots, and in substantial part also on some strange concept of the invincible superman samurai. The stature, bearing, and PT routines seem to me not to be the criteria necessary for produciong acceptable pilots, but over the top constraints that merely hampered the Japanese war effort without producing a substantially better product. They remind me of all the astronoaut "fitness tests" that were conducted in the early days of the Mercury program... criteria and tests imposed, according to Deke Slayton, not because anyone knew that these tests made for better astronauts, but rather because no one knew what would make for a good astronauts. That's rather how I view the "selection criteria" of early war Japanese pilot recruitment and training programs.

It wasn't until mid-42 when the Japanese loosened applicant standards and cut their pilot training program down to 10-12 months that US pilot training equalled the Japanese.

I think you have conflated unrelated phenomena. Yes, it was only mid 1942 (or even later, perahaps, IIRC) that the Japanese loosened the application and retention standards. But USN pilots trained in 1939-1942 were as well trained as any Japanese naval pilot at any time in the history of the Japanese navy.

And once the US advanced fighter schools opened in late 42, the Japanese pilot training program would never again be comparable to the US.

On that at least we agree. The advanced fighter schools had a general elevating effect on the combat performance of rookies that the Japanese never attained at any time.

[mdiehl]

Please mdihl go back to the your little community back again where you can find an audience for yours "Sherman was better than Tiger", "Werner von Braun was irrelevant for mission on Moon" and other nonsenses....

Find any place where I've made either of these claims. Please be specific. Quote and provide link.

Vis the Sherman and the Tiger all I've said was that the 76mm armed Sherman held its own against the Tiger, and in some respects (particularly operational longevity) was a better tank. One on one, the Tiger was better. Of course, at the weight and cost to manufacture, and with the Tiger's reliability problems, the Tiger was never going to meet Shermans 1 on 1.

Von Braun was a key scientist in the US space race. Had he not been there, the US probably could have solved the R&D issues in roughly the same amount of time. Von Braun's chief design contribution was to the Mercury program. The Saturn V wasn't the rocket that Von Braun wanted the US to build. (To understand the subject you need to do some background reading on "Earth Orbit Rendezvous" and "Direct Ascent" -- which were the two ways WVB thought you could get to the moon, and then read about "Lunar Orbit Rendezvous" -- which was the brainchild of John Houbolt of the Lunar Mission Steering Group).

But we digress. You weren't really interested in a discussion of facts pertaining to Tigers, Shermans, or Apollo missions, I think.

[Rainer]

mdiehl's useless "discussions" are fueled by people who innocently fell into his traps, and create a reply.
Locking his threads won't help I'm afraid.
A much more productive way is to use the green button.

[Feinder]

Some people argue, just to argue.  It's an attention grabber to attempt to validate one's own lacking self-worth. 
 
I knew a guy like that back in college.  Irony being, he -actually- was/is very intelligent, and would have had plenty of value insights to contribute to a conversation.  Except he was so busy arguing over every detail that he lost sight of the greater discussion, and folks just ended up shrugging him off and completely disregarding -anything- he had to say (which in turn made him argue so much the louder).
 
I actually felt bad for guy.  Not -THAT- bad, but I still felt badly for him.
 
-F-

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Doggie

Since when is documented historical fact "bait'?

When it isn't.

American pilots were able to hold their own against the supposedly superior Japanese even when equipped with the allegedly "inferior" P-39s, P-40s, and F-4Fs. All three of these "obsolete" aircraft remained in production until the end of the war.

The British pilots held their own against the mighty Luftwaffe in 40 too, using Hurricanes in the majority.

The F-6F and F-4U could literally fly rings around the A6M. It wasn't even a contest; the kill ratios speak for themselves.

Kill ratios never speak for themselves. They require serious interpretation due to all the variables involved. Ask your storm trooper, Diehl.....he always manages to comes up with, or manufacture an excuse in the form of a variable to explain unfavorable kill ratio results that do not favor his worldview.

[Terminus]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

Kill ratios never speak for themselves. They require serious interpretation due to all the variables involved.

Training, experience, tactics, communications, quality of fuel, weather, POM, Murphy's Law, gremlins...

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

But I will assume that the USAAF history is a more authoritative source than Shores et al. vis a vis actual numbers of American a.c. shot down. I'm still trying to resolve the discrepancy, but the complete absence of references cited in text (or end notes, or footnotes with citations) makes resolving Shores et al. a very challenging effort.

So in other words, you googled a website (which are not peer reviewed) vs. actually going through the records as Shores, Cull and Izawa did for years in compiling their information.

Besides which you've transposed it wrong....intentionally no doubt. Here is what your "website" says:

The 19th had been marked by heavy blows directed against Java from the west as well as the east. Thirty enemy fighters roared over the Buitenzorg airdrome to destroy two transport planes and three Hudsons caught on the ground. Another formation of thirty planes hit Bandoeng, where five of the few remaining Dutch pursuits were shot down and two B-17's just in from the United States were destroyed on the field. The American P-40's met with some success in breaking up a bomber formation headed for Malang. They counted no bombers shot down, but in a furiously fought engagement they destroyed four enemy fighters and lost three of their own. Here and there the Allies could take pride in an individual victory, but the day clearly belonged to the Japanese

Myself, I'll always take an acredited book source over a website, but even here if we go with your stated preference, (allegedly going with loss records of each side (regardless of source)) the actual loss rate described by the website was 3:1 in favor of Tainan Air Group. Shores' and co's account is more detailed and lists pilot names as well.

Also, their accounts of AVG pilots lost to enemy a.c. rather than ground fire or operationally seem incorrect. But I have to dredge out a copy of Ford's book somewhere .

Let me know when you do. I have Ford's book too.

(Shores et al. don't seem to match Bond's diary, although Bond may not have known exactly how AVG a.c. stationed at other bases may have been destroyed since he was operating on the scuttlebutt circuit... some of his accounts are quite detailed and others are of the "I just heard that so and so was lost" variety).

So Bond's "diary" will be useful but an Axis pilot's would be useless given the source. Its hard to keep up with these inconsistancies in your M.O.

[mdiehl]

Kill ratios never speak for themselves.

IMO it depends on the time scale. For small actions and single engagements they don't. For campaigns, to a certain degree, especially for modeling a consim (where all the little details are almost never captured by a set of game rules), they actually seem to work quite well. The awful challenge, for a game, is when the game tries to capture all of those little details. 'cause then they have to try to get them all, make sure that their effects are correctly modeled, and gauge them against historical results.

Ask your storm trooper, Diehl.....

Snort. Was I a storm trooper I'd not be so generous with you as I am.

he always manages to comes up with, or manufacture an excuse in the form of a variable to explain unfavorable kill ratio results that do not favor his worldview.

That's baloney and you know it. Indeed, you are the fellow who constantly brings up the effects of air range and pilot fatigue in the Guadalcanal campaign as a kind of way to lead a conclusion that the Japanese should have done better. It is possibly a fair observation. But when I pointed out that the US pilots at Henderson being in a state of siege, and under direct fire from snipers (often) and under CA/BB bombardment at night wasn't exactly good for pilot's fatigue levels, compared to the secure surroundings of airbases at Rabaul, you seemed to imply that the Allied pilots had no issues there.

So make up your mind. Do the intangibles matter or don't they? I think they do, but if you really want to just reduce it to loss ratios it can be analyzed that way as well. If the intangibles DO matter, as your statement states, then you have to be comprehensive in your effort to account for them, rather than cherry picking the intangibles that you claim hampered the Japanese, and ignoring the ones that worked against the allies.

[mdiehl]

So Bond's "diary" will be useful but an Axis pilot's would be useless given the source. Its hard to keep up with these inconsistancies in your M.O.

There are no inconsistencies. Bond's diary will be useful to account for AVG losses, not for IJAF losses. Japanese diaries would likely be useful to account for Japanese losses, but not for AVG losses. As I have stated many times, and as you have routinely ignored, pilot claims, even "confirmed kills" awarded to the pilot by their own intel services, aren't worth much. As a best guess, Japanese overclaims ran in the 3:1-10:1 range. American overclaims ran in the 2:1-4:1 range, although both sides on occasion made accurate estimates of the results of particular combat actions.

On 19 February Shores et al. diverge by 1 plane. It's hard to reconcile the difference, since they don't provide a citation. And that is problematic. The source that you casually dismiss as a mere "internet" site is merely a reprint (an HTML version) of the USAAF Official History. So when you dismiss the web site, you're basically saying that the USAAF official history isn't a credible source regarding the number of USAAF a.c. lost in any given engagement. And that is a very strange assertion. No one wants to dismiss Shores, but the USAAF version simply takes logical precedence. Which leads one to wonder whether or not Shores numbers are accurate for the RAF/RAAF units. Perhaps they are. It is entirely possible that the RAF/RAAF losses mentioned by Shores et al. are very reliable and the USAAF losses less so. In that case, it is still a greater effort to accurately compile the numbers.

Which is why the project will be done when it's done. I make no promises about timetable for delivery.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Kill ratios never speak for themselves.

IMO it depends on the time scale. For small actions and single engagements they don't.

Odd statement given how much you highlight alleged kill ratio results in single engagements. More inconsistancy.

For campaigns, to a certain degree, especially for modeling a consim (where all the little details are almost never captured by a set of game rules), they actually seem to work quite well.

Except that your not interested in the game.

Snort. Was I a storm trooper I'd not be so generous with you as I am.

Thank you. My peace of mind is re-assured.

That's baloney and you know it.

really?

ORIGINAL: mdiehl
I don't expect the results from the SoPac and CenPac to change substantially, although more intangibles may be noted. In particular engagement of one of the US wings (VF2) at low power setting at Coral Sea owing to the extreme range of the combat. Absent that, I suspect, the USN's victory ratio vs A6Ms at Coral Sea would have been something like 2:1.

Problem here is that the majority of F4F's lost at Coral Sea were lost over their own carriers, defending them at High Power.

ORIGINAL: mdiehl
By my reading that's 36A6Ms at full power setting attacking a CAP of 5 P-40s, with 5 more P-40s on the ground refueling, and five P-40s bounced while scrambling to take off. Not exactly any intelligent person's idea of a meeting engagement or even a meeting of aircraft on roughly even terms, even if we ignore the 7:1 initial force ratio advantage favoring the Japanese.

Actually the 5 P40's were initially ambushed by 1 Zero which shot down 4 of them and forced the 5th to dive out of combat. After the rest of the Zeros arrived you can cite superior numbers, and the other 5 were not bounced as they were taking off. It was indeed a low level combat though which would have robbed the P-40's of their greatest weapon against Zeros, being able to dive out of combat. Observers will also not have forgotten that in the last thread you graced, you claimed ALL of the losses at Darwin were due to them ALL being in a landing pattern, itself another "variable" excuse you use often.

Well....using your methodology I guess we have to erase two more Zeros shot down over Coral Sea by F4F's as valid, given that the first was abushed at low power, at low altitude, bounced from behind having never seen his attacker, or the other Zero at low altitude shot down while attacking a torpedo bomber. Indeed....its all very complicated.

Indeed, you are the fellow who constantly brings up the effects of air range and pilot fatigue in the Guadalcanal campaign as a kind of way to lead a conclusion that the Japanese should have done better.

Indeed I am, because both Lundstrom and Frank state it....in writing, in their respective books. The Japanese accepted battle under very disadvantagous conditions and it hurt them and helped cost them the campaign.

But when I pointed out that the US pilots at Henderson being in a state of siege, and under direct fire from snipers (often) and under CA/BB bombardment at night wasn't exactly good for pilot's fatigue levels, compared to the secure surroundings of airbases at Rabaul, you seemed to imply that the Allied pilots had no issues there.

Incorrect. I never said they had no issues. You are free to attempt to prove otherwise. They had issues but they were far less in terms of combat fatigue vs. what the Japanese faced.

So make up your mind.

About what? I said intangibles only appear to matter for you when they can be used to either beef up your world view or discredit a situation that doesn't. I stand by it.

, rather than cherry picking the intangibles that you claim hampered the Japanese, and ignoring the ones that worked against the allies.

Attempting to cover up the fact that your sourceless again i see. Yes indeed.....i am CHERRY PICKING out of sources i've spent the money on and taken the time and effort to research. whatever you say Diehl. [8|]

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

There are no inconsistencies. Bond's diary will be useful to account for AVG losses, not for IJAF losses.

Perhaps. As always there are no absolutes as you yourself have attempted to state numerous times whenever the source was Axis.

Japanese diaries would likely be useful to account for Japanese losses, but not for AVG losses. As I have stated many times, and as you have routinely ignored, pilot claims, even "confirmed kills" awarded to the pilot by their own intel services, aren't worth much.

Except during those times in the past when you tried to insert US official claims as accurate. I know I know, i'm full of shit. Your a tresure trove of honesty in the four+ years you've camped out on a board dedicated to a wargame you've never owned or played.

As a best guess, Japanese overclaims ran in the 3:1-10:1 range. American overclaims ran in the 2:1-4:1 range, although both sides on occasion made accurate estimates of the results of particular combat actions.

For the AVG side the overclaims were pretty much even from what i've read. Interestingly enough, during the SRA fighting a number of Japanese claims proved to be very accurate. Just goes to show one has to be wary of tossing generalities out there.

On 19 February Shores et al. diverge by 1 plane. It's hard to reconcile the difference, since they don't provide a citation. And that is problematic.

Its only problamatic to you because you don't like the result.

So when you dismiss the web site, you're basically saying that the USAAF official history isn't a credible source regarding the number of USAAF a.c. lost in any given engagement.

No, I believe what i said was that you googled a website, your usual method of "research" and that I prefer acredited, peer reviewed book source over a website that isn't.

No one wants to dismiss Shores, but the USAAF version simply takes logical precedence. Which leads one to wonder whether or not Shores numbers are accurate for the RAF/RAAF units.

You've been trying to dismiss Shores from day one. Like during the first time you tried to justify the AVG's 20:1 claimed kill ratio and I brought out Shores for the first time. I believe your exact quote was "Shred it and smoke it." A beautifully petulant response from a google search warrior.

Which is why the project will be done when it's done. I make no promises about timetable for delivery.

If your going to disprove Shores then you need to use his and Brian Cull's and Yasuho Izawa's same methodology and go to the direct sources to compile, compare, research and interview participants. Googling websites doesn't cut it. Should take you quite a few years like it did them. Do you have a publisher yet?