Question with no answer

[LeeChard]

There's the possibility that the BB fleet gets to sea but could not have gotten far. I think they would have stayed together, not scattered. Imagine what would have happened if they were spotted by search planes from KB. Think of Prince of Wales and Repulse. More than 200 Kates and Vals available would have left a lot of the US BB fleet lost forever.

[1EyedJacks]

ORIGINAL: tigercub

What if japan started its attacks in the philippines on dec 6 1941 in the late after noon and carried out its dec 7 attack at pearl would they be any more ready on that sunday morning?

I think they have only a few more planes in the air but not more at best?

your view?

I think American aircraft were no match for the Zero. Even with CAP. Even with radar identification of the strike. No one had gone up against the Zero B4 and no air combat tactics to take advantage of the weaknesses of the Zero had been implemented.

I think the carriers would have returned to Pearl @ full speed.

I think all ships would have recalled their troops and boilers would be hot. I don't think American warships would leave the port in this time frame - I think most of the captains would have been tied up in meetings or getting their ships ready for war. I think the Americans would still be planning initially for a naval response that featured battleships as the king of the seas.

If the carriers are at Pearl I think America would have lost a carrier or two - they were the primary target for the attack on Pearl Harbor. And their aircraft would fare poorly against a Zero. And the air-to-air combat training available to navy pilots was less then to be desired. I also think that if Nagumo knows where the carriers are and the American carriers were successfully attacked in the first strike there would have been a second air attack to go back against any remaining battleships.

I think Japan would have lost more aircraft but that total surprise would not be the greatest factor in the attack - the superior training of the Japanese pilots that had been training and planning for this mission would be the biggest influence in outcome.

[HansBolter]

ORIGINAL: tigercub

good points Hans but I am not really talking about the game so much as what they would really have done 7 hrs after the attack in the Philippines ,I think they still would have been very slow to get up to speed...and not as ready as some would think.

but it is a Question with no real answer.

Tigercub

My comments included a mix of RL and game. Th reference to having a different take on spotting the so called incoming B17s on radar was RL all the way. I only made the reference to the game as I have played a first turn without surprise and it isn't pretty for the KB. Granted a player will react in very different ways than Kimmel and Short would have, but it's fair to assume that they would have at least had CAP up and search out. How well they performed after that is anyone's guess.

Some one else did a good job of pointing out how skittish Nagumo was and how he might have reacted to being spotted.

[Alfred]

Another thread with an American centric viewpoint.

Castor Troy hit THE essential point in post #26. There was zero possibility of Japan launching uncoordinated attacks which is what the OP is posing.

1. Against Japanese military doctrine to not take out main enemy force in a surprise attack.

2. Japanese military SOP was to launch attacks on Western nations on least prepared day viz a Sunday/public holiday, this being consistent with surprise attack doctrine.

3. Irrelevant what level of better preparedness might have been achieved by the defenders, the fact is that they would have been better positioned to respond with any sort of prior warning. Why make the task unnecessarily harder for yourself by not following standard national military doctrine.

4. An early attack on the Philippines would have unnecessarily complicated the diplomatic negotiations and ultimate fig leaf of the war declaration.

5. Absolutely no benefit gained from achieving surprise in the Philippines. There was never any doubt that the IJN would easily deposit the troops on the beaches. Had there been any doubts then (a) the strike against Manila port would not have been delayed until 10 December, and (b) all the landings would have been scheduled early rather than the staggered timeline which ensued.

6. The real target was the economic resources of the SRA. The American fleet and the Philippines were targeted to allow access to the SRA resources. Targetting the Philippines first definitely risked Operation Matador being implemented. If that had occurred there was a very good chance that Malaya could have been successfully held until the reinforcements arrived. Nor would there be any certainty that Force Z would be lost. Plus to compound the matter, the already spotted invasion fleet might have been hit from the air before reaching the beaches. All unkowns made possible by not adhering to the national military doctrine.

7. Delay in Malaya makes defence of Sumatra and Java much easier. What sealed the fate of those two key islands was the logistical isolation imposed by losing Force Z, Singapore and the Timor/Bali airbridge.


Japanese military planners had to take into account many other factors other than the location of American units. The genius of Yamamoto was that he devised a plan which simultaneously dealt with the whole gamut of conditions. He had no margin for error which is why he adhered to the national military doctrine. To do otherwise merely invited gremlins to intrude and dislocate the finely honed plan.

Alfred

[witpqs]

Just an interesting side note, the Wikipedia article on Operation Matador has the monsoon season backwards!

[CV 2]

The only thing that would have maybe changed ANYTHING about the attack was the mini-subs. That might have been taken seriously and caused a fleet reaction and alert hours before the attack.

Remove the mini-subs from the equation, and I think the attack at Pearl would have been just as effective as it was.