Biggest German East front mistake

[Golf33]

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

There is a theory that Barbarossa was launched to prevent a Soviet offensive reputedly planned for summer 1941. I'm attaching a copy. Please note that I acquired the article from a site where many of the articles carry an anti-semitic bias so I'm not vouching for the articles accuracy but it does make for an interesting read.

Just on a quick skim of the first couple of pages the author seems to be basing his argument largely on statements by Hitler before and during the war, by the various Nazi generals and functionaries in their Nürnberg defences, and Suvorov, whose reputation is a matter of quite a lot of debate.

I'll try and read it in more detail later, it's certainly interesting, even if only as an exercise in critical analysis.

Thanks
33

[warhead2]

ORIGINAL: JallaTryne

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames
The other fundamental error made was in the way Russian civilians, particularly those in the Ukraine were treated. With a bit of thought and a bit of foresight the Germans would have had at worst a subservient if resentful population to control in their rear areas. As it was they fanned the flames of resistence tying up resources which could otherwise have proved very useful (if not decisive) at the front.

Also, they did not realize the full potential of drafting soldiers from occupied areas. There were plenty of men who would fight the russians on the german side.

from what I understand,somewhere in the neighborhood of 250,000 outside of germany fought for the waffen SS. Not to mention the 20,000 strong spanish blue division. many joined the pan-european crusade against stalinist/bolshevist USSR. as for mistakes,its hard for me to say in the opening months of barbarossa,given that I have the benefit of hindsight. Colin Wright pointed out some time ago that the Germans had very solid reasons to believe they could topple the USSR relatively quickly.
1) the dismal performance of the russians in WWI
2) the dismal performance of the USSR in the winter war
3)the outstanding performance of the whermacht thus far in the war
IMO overall,the greatest mistake was not realizing they couldn't win after stalingrad
they should have pulled back and consolidated the front and used the refurbished panzerwaffe to act as linebackers to squash a soviet breakthrough,instead of squandering them at kursk

[warhead2]

ORIGINAL: Dave Briggs

IronDuke:

The other fundamental error made was in the way Russian civilians, particularly those in the Ukraine were treated. With a bit of thought and a bit of foresight the Germans would have had at worst a subservient if resentful population to control in their rear areas. As it was they fanned the flames of resistence tying up resources which could otherwise have proved very useful (if not decisive) at the front.

I agree totally with this. And I would even go out on a very long limb and say that the German army lost the war way back in 1933 when they swore their souls to Hitler and the National Socialist party. They were afraid of the "Red Scare" then, little realizing how the "Red Scare" would really hit them in the winter of 1941. From the beginning of WWII, . Soon after the invasion of Russia it became clear that Hitler was a complete imbecile when it came to military affairs, totally locked into his Teutonic dreams. If the German High Command could have done what they wanted they wouldn't have invaded Russia in the first place.

My six bits.

perhaps I'm getting a bit ahead,as I'm sure someone on this board has pointed out your idioctic ramblings for what they are.
I ask you wtf do you think Hitler's primary objective was?
OK,maybe it was a dead heat betw the irradication of the Jews and communism,otherwise known as bolshevisim. Why the hell did he operate as he did in '39?
"Hitler's initial "brilliant victory's" were possible because of thier blantent audacity and sheer luck and also because of the temerity and unpreparedness of the Allies"
you're a fool,with little knowledge and understanding of the environment then,from whatever perspective you choose
the "red scare",well you got that right,but explain to me why Hitler's "audacity" caused him to differ from his primary nemisis of stalin?

[Brigz]

ORIGINAL: warhead2

ORIGINAL: Dave Briggs

IronDuke:

The other fundamental error made was in the way Russian civilians, particularly those in the Ukraine were treated. With a bit of thought and a bit of foresight the Germans would have had at worst a subservient if resentful population to control in their rear areas. As it was they fanned the flames of resistence tying up resources which could otherwise have proved very useful (if not decisive) at the front.

I agree totally with this. And I would even go out on a very long limb and say that the German army lost the war way back in 1933 when they swore their souls to Hitler and the National Socialist party. They were afraid of the "Red Scare" then, little realizing how the "Red Scare" would really hit them in the winter of 1941. From the beginning of WWII, . Soon after the invasion of Russia it became clear that Hitler was a complete imbecile when it came to military affairs, totally locked into his Teutonic dreams. If the German High Command could have done what they wanted they wouldn't have invaded Russia in the first place.

My six bits.

perhaps I'm getting a bit ahead,as I'm sure someone on this board has pointed out your idioctic ramblings for what they are.
I ask you wtf do you think Hitler's primary objective was?
OK,maybe it was a dead heat betw the irradication of the Jews and communism,otherwise known as bolshevisim. Why the hell did he operate as he did in '39?
"Hitler's initial "brilliant victory's" were possible because of thier blantent audacity and sheer luck and also because of the temerity and unpreparedness of the Allies"
you're a fool,with little knowledge and understanding of the environment then,from whatever perspective you choose
the "red scare",well you got that right,but explain to me why Hitler's "audacity" caused him to differ from his primary nemisis of stalin?

Well beat me with a swastika. What's the matter little boy, did I insult your hero Hitler? Let's see: "Idiotic ramblings" -- "you're a fool"... such masterful debating skills. You'd fit right in with the Nazi's. When you graduate from Junior High School, write me again and, maybe, I might try and explain it to you, but based on your obvious immaturity it would be quite impossible and foolish for me to even try. Go bait someone else, I don't reply to pre-teen BS anymore. It's such a waste of my time. Seig hiel!

[freeboy]

The above posts are both out of line and diminish the enjoyment of others, be angry but don't take it out on the rest of us who are here to read and be informed or not....

[warhead2]

Hell,I was in beer drinking fightin' mode. Didn't even remember my second post. I apologize to Dave for my bad taste assault. Its really not my style. I was fresh from a heated discourse on a bodybuilding board which I frequent,and was kinda "riled up".
And for the record,I have been recently in love with a Russian gal,and have dated a Jewish psychologist with a PHD from Boston U.

[Brigz]

ORIGINAL: warhead2

Hell,I was in beer drinking fightin' mode. Didn't even remember my second post. I apologize to Dave for my bad taste assault. Its really not my style. I was fresh from a heated discourse on a bodybuilding board which I frequent,and was kinda "riled up".
And for the record,I have been recently in love with a Russian gal,and have dated a Jewish psychologist with a PHD from Boston U.

Apology accepted. If you can argue bodybuilding while sh*t-faced on beer, then I guess it's understandable how you temporarily lost your mind. And I say that in an understandable and friendly manner.

As to your question about Hitler and Stalin... well, let's put it this way. If I had to choose whether to live in Stalinist Russia or Hitler's Third Riech, there's no doubt, I'd much rather live under the Nazi's. Of course that's easy for me to say, because I'm not Jewish, homosexual or a Jehovah's Witness. Hitler was a very brilliant person and probably had a very high IQ. He was a superb political strategist even considering his anti-social and ruthless world view. His rise from poverty and obscurity to leader of one of the most powerful nations in history is nothing short of miraculous. His manipulation of European leaders prior to the invasion of Poland was masterful. But once hostilities broke out and the initial successes against virtually no opposition (Checkoslovakia, Poland, France, the Balkans and Barbarosa) were conluded, almost all his military decisions were primarily based on Nazi dogma and not sound military doctrine. He firmly believed that proper "National Socialist ardor" would always prevail because of the "innate superiority of the aryan race". Because of this unalterable and blind viewpoint, almost all of his military decisions after the winter of 41/42 were disasterous. If Hitler would have butted out and left the war to his Generals, then the Germans could have probably won the Russian war. At least they would have still had most of those 100,000 troops that Hitler left to rot in Stalingrad or the men and armor wasted in the ill fated assault on the Kursk salient.

As for Stalin. Hitler was a saint compared to this guy. Stalin had the same mental capacity as a serial killer. The man was a homicidal maniac with extremely dangerous phobic and irrational behavior. If the German's would have invaded Russia as liberators instead of conquerors, then I doubt if Stalin would have been able to rally his poplulace as well as he did. I have to give Stalin credit for that, he did rally the Soviet people to rise up and defeat the Nazi's. If Hitler would have been a sound military strategist, then that might not have happened. But then this is all conjecture, because Hitler was Hitler, and you can't change a tiger's stripes.

Okay, that's a lot of rambling but maybe you can get an idea of where I'm coming from whether you agree or not. And I did it all without one drop of beer or flexing one muscle.

[Error in 0]

ORIGINAL: Dave Briggs

ORIGINAL: warhead2

Hell,I was in beer drinking fightin' mode. Didn't even remember my second post. I apologize to Dave for my bad taste assault. Its really not my style. I was fresh from a heated discourse on a bodybuilding board which I frequent,and was kinda "riled up".
And for the record,I have been recently in love with a Russian gal,and have dated a Jewish psychologist with a PHD from Boston U.

Apology accepted. If you can argue bodybuilding while sh*t-faced on beer, then I guess it's understandable how you temporarily lost your mind. And I say that in an understandable and friendly manner.

As to your question about Hitler and Stalin... well, let's put it this way. If I had to choose whether to live in Stalinist Russia or Hitler's Third Riech, there's no doubt, I'd much rather live under the Nazi's. Of course that's easy for me to say, because I'm not Jewish, homosexual or a Jehovah's Witness. Hitler was a very brilliant person and probably had a very high IQ. He was a superb political strategist even considering his anti-social and ruthless world view. His rise from poverty and obscurity to leader of one of the most powerful nations in history is nothing short of miraculous. His manipulation of European leaders prior to the invasion of Poland was masterful. But once hostilities broke out and the initial successes against virtually no opposition (Checkoslovakia, Poland, France, the Balkans and Barbarosa) were conluded, almost all his military decisions were primarily based on Nazi dogma and not sound military doctrine. He firmly believed that proper "National Socialist ardor" would always prevail because of the "innate superiority of the aryan race". Because of this unalterable and blind viewpoint, almost all of his military decisions after the winter of 41/42 were disasterous. If Hitler would have butted out and left the war to his Generals, then the Germans could have probably won the Russian war. At least they would have still had most of those 100,000 troops that Hitler left to rot in Stalingrad or the men and armor wasted in the ill fated assault on the Kursk salient.

As for Stalin. Hitler was a saint compared to this guy. Stalin had the same mental capacity as a serial killer. The man was a homicidal maniac with extremely dangerous phobic and irrational behavior. If the German's would have invaded Russia as liberators instead of conquerors, then I doubt if Stalin would have been able to rally his poplulace as well as he did. I have to give Stalin credit for that, he did rally the Soviet people to rise up and defeat the Nazi's. If Hitler would have been a sound military strategist, then that might not have happened. But then this is all conjecture, because Hitler was Hitler, and you can't change a tiger's stripes.

Okay, that's a lot of rambling but maybe you can get an idea of where I'm coming from whether you agree or not. And I did it all without one drop of beer or flexing one muscle.

"Virtual no opposition" is a little harsh to say. After all, the French army was the larges army in the world. One should not underestimate that the easy victories was due to german brilliance.

Agreed on hitler. He was convinced that pure WILL was superior to INTELLECT, even in a military situation. It was OK as long as the enemy was unused to the german tactics, but not really so great when the enemy learned from their mistakes (i.e East front). Without Hitler, Mansteins plan for the attack on France would not have seen the light of day.


JT

[Brigz]

ORIGINAL: JallaTryne



"Virtual no opposition" is a little harsh to say. After all, the French army was the larges army in the world. One should not underestimate that the easy victories was due to german brilliance.

Agreed on hitler. He was convinced that pure WILL was superior to INTELLECT, even in a military situation. It was OK as long as the enemy was unused to the german tactics, but not really so great when the enemy learned from their mistakes (i.e East front). Without Hitler, Mansteins plan for the attack on France would not have seen the light of day.


JT

The French army may have been the largest in the world but with inept leadership it was rendered useless and the BEF was a classic case of too little too late. The German army was much smaller but aptly led and motivated. I'm not saying the German's were totally brilliant but prefer to say they where brilliantly opportunistic and that had a lot to do with Hitler. That was the brilliance of Hitler prior to the Russian war. He saw an opportunity and recognized it and acted on it. As you said, he was far-sighted enough to understand the plan for the attack on France but he didn't formulate it. The General Staff did. That's precisely my point. When Hitler started formulating strategy instead of leaving it up to his Generals, that's when things started to go wrong. He was a visionary, not a strategist. Even during the French campaigne, Hitler made a monumental error by allowing the Brits to extricate their soldiers from Dunkirk. To this day I'm not sure why that happened but I believe it was the first nail in the Nazi coffin and helped steel the British people for the Battle of Britain. And of course, not conquering Britain became a terminal cancerous growth for the Third Reich.

[Error in 0]

ORIGINAL: Dave Briggs

ORIGINAL: JallaTryne



"Virtual no opposition" is a little harsh to say. After all, the French army was the larges army in the world. One should not underestimate that the easy victories was due to german brilliance.

Agreed on hitler. He was convinced that pure WILL was superior to INTELLECT, even in a military situation. It was OK as long as the enemy was unused to the german tactics, but not really so great when the enemy learned from their mistakes (i.e East front). Without Hitler, Mansteins plan for the attack on France would not have seen the light of day.


JT

The French army may have been the largest in the world but with inept leadership it was rendered useless and the BEF was a classic case of too little too late. The German army was much smaller but aptly led and motivated. I'm not saying the German's were totally brilliant but prefer to say they where brilliantly opportunistic and that had a lot to do with Hitler. That was the brilliance of Hitler prior to the Russian war. He saw an opportunity and recognized it and acted on it. As you said, he was far-sighted enough to understand the plan for the attack on France but he didn't formulate it. The General Staff did. That's precisely my point. When Hitler started formulating strategy instead of leaving it up to his Generals, that's when things started to go wrong. He was a visionary, not a strategist. Even during the French campaigne, Hitler made a monumental error by allowing the Brits to extricate their soldiers from Dunkirk.

Hitler was never a fan of military theory. It is a collossal work behind a plan like the invation of france, and I doubt very much Hitler could understand much of it. However, he did understand the opportunistic part of it, like you say, and coupled with his belief that pure will and faith is superior anything, he was convinced of a victory. Im sure his astrologer also told him it was a great plan [:)].

To this day I'm not sure why that happened but I believe it was the first nail in the Nazi coffin and helped steel the British people for the Battle of Britain. And of course, not conquering Britain became a terminal cancerous growth for the Third Reich.

I have read (somewhere) that Hitler were in great admiration of the British, and that he saved BEF as a sign of goodwill in hope of some kind of treaty-negotiations later on.

[IronDuke_slith]

I think the BEF got away because Hitler got nervous. He ordered Guderian et al to halt at the coast because he wasn't quite as sure and confident about German arms as some people believe. The long extended flanks of the Panzer troops left him nervous and the British counterattack at Arras, although small in nature, provided evidence to back up his fears.

I have seen comment he wasn't all that interested in humiliating Britain because he did actually admire us, and felt we would make peace quite happily after expulsion from the continent. I think he also (in a peverse kind of way) didn't like the prospect of anarchy within the British Empire if Britain were militarily emasculated.

I think the answr lies somewhere in between, he didn't consider the prize of the BEF worth the potential risk, couldn't believe the victory the Wehrmacht was handing to him, and got a case of cold feet.

The downside of this was it made him arrogant once he had won. Blitzkrieg (not a good term, but a handy one to use because everyone knows what you mean) was not suited to the Russian interior. Hitler attacked on the assumption it was. The biggest mistake of Barbarossa was therefore twofold.

Firstly, he underestimated the opposition. Not just their fighting capabilities, but also their ability to recruit and field new armies like there was no tomorrow. The fundamental flaw in Barbarossa was that it was predicated on the belief that once you knocked over five million Russian soldiers in six months, it was over. It wasn't, and it cost him the war.

The other side of the coin was that he overestimated what the Wehrmacht could accomplish. The Wehrmacht was bigger in June 41 than it was in May 1940, but not by a huge amount, and it didn't field many more tanks. He took too few men into a far more hostile environment than they were used to, against an enemy with vaster resources whose military machine was more suited to the environment. He didn't have the logistical infrastructure to back up the troops he did send, and they were ill equipped in many areas for the task at hand. That they got so far was credit to the operational skills of their commanders, the tactical skills of their troops, and the ineptness of large parts of the opposition.

That said, if he was going to do it, Mid 41 was the best time. The Russians were in the midst of military improvements which were incomplete at that time, but would have caused the Wehrmacht greater headaches had they been completed. The purges were still fresh and the Russian Officer Corp pretty hopeless. This would have improved with time and had detrimental effects on any invasion.

Most other mistakes become secondary, I think, because from 42 onwards, the Germans simply could not win. They didn't possess the resources. Stalingrad as a battle was the result of too few troops trying to do too many things. That it turned into a military disaster doesn't alter the fact that the Blau offensive aimed too few troops at too many objectives.

I agree that Kursk was not a good battle to fight, but not fighting it only hastened the end. It didn't make it inevitable. As important, I believe, was the increasing operational capabilities of Soviet Commanders who planned and executed better offensives after the battle than they did before. This would still have been a factor had Kursk not been fought.

Regards,
IronDuke

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: Golf33

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

There is a theory that Barbarossa was launched to prevent a Soviet offensive reputedly planned for summer 1941. I'm attaching a copy. Please note that I acquired the article from a site where many of the articles carry an anti-semitic bias so I'm not vouching for the articles accuracy but it does make for an interesting read.

Just on a quick skim of the first couple of pages the author seems to be basing his argument largely on statements by Hitler before and during the war, by the various Nazi generals and functionaries in their Nürnberg defences, and Suvorov, whose reputation is a matter of quite a lot of debate.

I'll try and read it in more detail later, it's certainly interesting, even if only as an exercise in critical analysis.

Thanks
33

I agree, 33, having had a look. I think it may in part be based on the fact that I think certain russian Commanders adocated a first strike as they weren't fooled by Hitler's buildup. I think Stalin, however, understood his troops were 18 months to two years away from being ready for war, and I suspect that is why it looks like he was caught completely by surprise. He worked so hard to give Hitler no excuse to attack as he knew he wasn't ready. All it did, though, was make the attack worse when it came, because he wasn't ready for it.

Regards,
IronDuke

[baevans99]

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

The downside of this was it made him arrogant once he had won. Blitzkrieg (not a good term, but a handy one to use because everyone knows what you mean) was not suited to the Russian interior. Hitler attacked on the assumption it was. The biggest mistake of Barbarossa was therefore twofold.


Regards,
IronDuke

ID, I am trying to figure out what you mean by the terrain being unsuited to Blitzkrieg tactics?

On the surface, the Russian terrain seems well suited to fast moving encirclements, but I am sure not all areas are like this.

Thanks in advance for your help.

[Real and Simulated Wars]

ORIGINAL: baevans99
ID, I am trying to figure out what you mean by the terrain being unsuited to Blitzkrieg tactics?
On the surface, the Russian terrain seems well suited to fast moving encirclements, but I am sure not all areas are like this.
Thanks in advance for your help.

Hello,
Encirclements in Russian territory must have been a hard thing to accomplish. Despite it happened repeatedly, Russians were able to squeeze through the blocking forces.

[Real and Simulated Wars]

German mistakes in the East Front. I am just citing what I read, and I am a bad reader, so feel free to correct my mistakes. Here I go:

Barbarossa related:
-At the end of 1941, not taking Moscow and diverting to the Ukraine (I still debate with myself is this is actually a mistake: could the Germans afford a vulnerable south flank?)

Stalingrad related:
-Not allowing a withdraw of the 6th at Stalingrad
-Forming a defensive line accross the Don with Rumanian and Italian troops, allowing the Russians to almost cut off the rescue force

Kursk related:
-Waiting almost 2 months for the Panthers to be ready for Kursk
-Submitting elite, mobile, shock troops to attrition warfare (attack of a heavily fortified position)
-Not completing the job (or what it could be done for that matter) because the Allies were landing at the Mediterranean. It feels like stoping using the extinguisher at a kitchen fire because somebody is knocking the door.

Cheers,

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: baevans99

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

The downside of this was it made him arrogant once he had won. Blitzkrieg (not a good term, but a handy one to use because everyone knows what you mean) was not suited to the Russian interior. Hitler attacked on the assumption it was. The biggest mistake of Barbarossa was therefore twofold.


Regards,
IronDuke

ID, I am trying to figure out what you mean by the terrain being unsuited to Blitzkrieg tactics?

On the surface, the Russian terrain seems well suited to fast moving encirclements, but I am sure not all areas are like this.

Thanks in advance for your help.

baevans99,

The terrain could often be open and flat, which was not a problem for German forces tactically. However, the Russian interior was simpy too large and the road network too poor for the relatively poor German logistical system to keep Blitzkrieg supplied. Contrary to the image of Blitzkrieg, German forces mainly marched into battle, and the huge expanses meant the Infantry divisions often had too far to travel too quickly in order to be able to complete the encirclements early.

In France, the road network was better, there were even gas stations along the way the Germans could use, and the roads themselves were off a better quality. In Russia, Panzers wore out more quickly putting even more strain on the rear area services.

The rail network was initially useless to the Germans because it was of the wrong gauge, and with rain that brought rivers of mud in the autumn and cold that meant engines wouldn't work in the winter, it was all a bit grim.

Some of this was down to German deficiencies to be sure. However, in Western and central Europe, these deficiencies didn't cause as many problems as they did in the east. I should probably have said "not suited to German blitzkrieg". Tactics like this practised by larger numbers of more motorised troops (backed by a western style logicstical system) would have had more joy. However, no one in the world fielded as many Infantrymen in the war as the Germans did, so if they couldn't do it, nobody would.

Regards,
IronDuke

[IronDuke_slith]

Barbarossa related:
-At the end of 1941, not taking Moscow and diverting to the Ukraine (I still debate with myself is this is actually a mistake: could the Germans afford a vulnerable south flank?)

I think you're right to debate. Moscow was never what Barbarossa was about until very late in the day. Kiev was. To ignore Kiev would have left over half a million enemy troops on an open flank that stretched for hundreds of miles. Rundstedt in the south would never have eliminated this threat alone, not with 11th Army and a chunk of the Rumanians tied down around Odessa and the Crimea.

Stalingrad related:
-Not allowing a withdraw of the 6th at Stalingrad
-Forming a defensive line accross the Don with Rumanian and Italian troops, allowing the Russians to almost cut off the rescue force

Whilst a mistake, the use of Italian and Rumanian troops was probably unavoidable. Whatever deficiencies they had on the defence, these were only magnified on the attack. Static defence of flanks from prepared positions was probably all they were suited for. The German mistake was in allowing Blau to run away from them forcing them to commit more and more German troops to the primary objectives, rather than watching the extending flanks.

I disagree re Stalingrad. A large number of Russian troops were tied down surrounding and reducing the place over several weeks. This brought time for the troops in the Caucasus to get out and reorganise. A number of forces (eg 2nd Guards Army) were diverted from other offensive operations in the area to help reduce the Stalingrad Kessel, and prevent its relief. All of which took pressure off the weak Southern front which was all the Germans could present to the enemy at that time. I suspect 6th Army did have the strength to break out provided it went early. However, with German forces deep into the Caucasus that would have put the new front line in a position perilously close to cutting the Caucasus units off. The Russians were attempting further envelopments to do this whilst reducing Stalingrad. These failed because of exellent work by 11th Panzer amongst others, but weren't helped by the draining of resources away to the Stalingrad area.

A tough call either way, though.

Kursk related:
-Waiting almost 2 months for the Panthers to be ready for Kursk
-Submitting elite, mobile, shock troops to attrition warfare (attack of a heavily fortified position)
-Not completing the job (or what it could be done for that matter) because the Allies were landing at the Mediterranean. It feels like stoping using the extinguisher at a kitchen fire because somebody is knocking the door.

Cheers,

Kursk was a mistake, although I don't think completing the objective was ever on. The Southern pincer may have been within a few days of it's objective, but the northern pincer was stopped dead. Manstein in the south couldn't have encircled the Kursk pocket without them. I agree re shock troops to some extent, but ultimately, no one else was going to get any further. Not only were they mobile, but as you point out they were elite. Standard German infantry formations would have got nowhere. To succeed, the Germans had to contcentrate and commit their best, even though the battle was not one the best were designed to fight.

Regards,
IronDuke

[baevans99]

ID,

Well thought out with specific examples even. Thanks for the info.

[:'(]

[Real and Simulated Wars]

Hi ID, and thanks for the feedback.

ORIGINAL: IronDuke
The Russians were attempting further envelopments to do this whilst reducing Stalingrad. These failed because of exellent work by 11th Panzer amongst others, but weren't helped by the draining of resources away to the Stalingrad area.

The use of General Balck's 11th during the battles you refer to is my favorite example of how a PzDiv has to be used in a defensive posture.

Kursk was a mistake, although I don't think completing the objective was ever on. The Southern pincer may have been within a few days of it's objective, but the northern pincer was stopped dead. Manstein in the south couldn't have encircled the Kursk pocket without them. I agree re shock troops to some extent, but ultimately, no one else was going to get any further. Not only were they mobile, but as you point out they were elite. Standard German infantry formations would have got nowhere. To succeed, the Germans had to contcentrate and commit their best, even though the battle was not one the best were designed to fight.

I always wondered why the Germans, even totally aware that the Kursk salient was fortified to no end, didn't choose to shift their axis of attack more into the east. I wonder if an action like that would have forced the Russians to evacuate the Kursk salient. They were famous for the so-called indirect approach (?).

[EricGuitarJames]

ORIGINAL: Chelco

I always wondered why the Germans, even totally aware that the Kursk salient was fortified to no end, didn't choose to shift their axis of attack more into the east. I wonder if an action like that would have forced the Russians to evacuate the Kursk salient. They were famous for the so-called indirect approach (?).

Hitler, basically. He couldn't conceive of the Red Army being able to defeat a German summer offensive and simply believed that if there were more Russians in the salient the more decisive the victory would be!