Incorrect. IIRC, my argument earlier was that Americans hereabouts weren't listening to the troops because Americans hereabouts persisted with the Sherman was fine argument.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
You seem to have lost track of some of your previous arguments in this thread ID...so I think you "IIRC" wrong...
I haven't lost track, you just haven't been listening. However, now for a little of the rhetorical deviousness, the absence of which I so praised earlier.
Re the Sherman and the absence of American uber AFVs, I think it is more complicated than just blaming McNair and the Infantry Branch.
America could do best and most. With the Sherman, she merely did most. With the M-26, I am sure she didn't manage most in time to make a difference, and I'm not sure she did best either.
The Mafia in this case was just about everyone. McNair came up with TD doctrine, but he was Marshall's man so the Joint Chiefs would have backed him as well. Infantry branch didn't want uber tanks, and neither did the cavalry.
What does all this prove? The first statement was partly rhetorical, it was in response to you claiming the sherman came with a water cannon because they were listening to the folks on the ground. Not quite what you said, but what's a little rhetorical deviousness amongst friends [;)].
I can't believe you took it as the central theseis of my argument given it was clearly a dig at those hereabouts who ignore without comment all the anecdotal evidence provided from individual tankers right on up to Brad and Ike. (You may still comment now if you want to explain why they thought the Sherman was outclassed).
It was why I said "Americans hereabouts". It is rhetoric to juxtapose it the way you have. I take it as encouragement [;)].
The other three statements are perfectly consistent are they not? The first one says it wasn't McNair and the Infantry Branch alone, the third says Marshall and the Cavalry branch also didn't want uber tanks. Where is the contradiction? The third one you have agreed with your pro attrition statements so whaere is the issue.
It is disingenuous to take the first statement and try and turn it into something that contradicts everything else.
Firstly, overall American style simply never suited American armoured doctrine. Broad front offensives which lacked operational concentration were simply not conducive to the breakthrough. When breakthrough finally came in NW Europe, it was tellingly at that point the last German in front of 3rd Army had been shot and bombed into submission. Therefore, Allied armour in general tended to fight in situations its doctrine didn't ask it to. It is no surprise it was found wanting.
Secondly, it didn't have the sustained lesson learning its foes had in the east. When it did try and learn lessons, it generally did it poorly or slowly or both. Evaluation of the Tiger in Tunisia was lamentable and flawed, experience of the Panther limited. What experience it could learn from (primarily British experience in 41-42 in Africa) tended to reinforce doctrinal belief rather than knock it. The M4 and Grant squitted themselves well against the best German designs in theatre indicating there were no real issues facing german Tanks technically, and Rommel made extensive use of AT gun lines to defeat British armoured thrusts reinforcing the opinions gained from Spain that AT guns had the edge where they met armour.
I also said this. The first set of statements show why Shermans were persevered with, the second set why they struggled from the broad point of view, eschewing facts and figures we've already been over.
What is your point here? (Apart from proving you can speak rhetoricese with the best of them [;)])
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
So it seems you did start out criticizing not just those 'hereabouts' but those 'back then' too.
C'mon, Paul, this is poor. I made a rhetorical point about the Alliedfans on this board and you have created a shopping mall of straw out of it. Besides, I was partially defending the adoption of TD doctrine, pointing out why it was understandable (there are better quotes for illlustrating this than the ones you have quoted). It is Alliedfans who generally go overboard telling you how flawed it was.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
You seem to appreciate the pro-Sherman argument, since you make it.
Yes I do.
the Sherman suited America because it was relatively quick and manoeuvrable which suited American doctrine. It was easy to make which suited American industry. It was relatively light and easy to transport which suited American logistics and strategic planners and it was relatively straightforward to maintain and fight which suited the American Citizen Army. At the sharp end, though, it had some issues.
But where is the inconsistency? You've quoted two passages of mine so far on doctrine. One says American doctrine liked the Sherman. The other that American doctrine struggled because of their operational method (which therefore exposed the sherman). How does one in any way contradict the other? All I am saying is I understand why American doctrine favoured the sherman, but I can also (unlike some others) appreciate the problems it had and hypothesise some reasons why.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
And when facing an IS-2 so did the Panther, and it was not in as much "harmony with the system" by the above criteria either. Yet it appears beyond criticism simply because it could take a Sherman one on one. Same is true of a T-34, yet it too seems to escape criticsm.
[&:] What does this mean? I haven't mentioned the T34. Where on the western front did the Panther face these? The argument has developed into a discussion of the Sherman's abilities vis a vis German Tanks in 1944. Why would I mention the T34?????? You surely can't criticise me for not mentioning something that wasn't even on the radar? [X(]
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
The apparent inconsistency in your arguments is what got me involved in the thread.
I disagree. As I've illustrated above, there is nothing inconsistent in anything I've said as long as you don't wildly extrapolate out through a series of suppositions a mild dig at the Americans on this board. I said they weren't listening, and you've built the Empire state building on top of it. If I speculated why you got involved, I think the thread would go even quicker downhill, so I won't.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
If you simply meant to argue "A typical Panther will beat a typical Sherman in a 1-1 encounter" I would have had no problem with that statement, becasue it is true.
[&o]
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
All the rambling inconsistent musing about WHY that situation existed and the perception that it was somehow criminal leading to the Sherman being "crap" that is the issue.
Rambling inconsistent musing you haven't tried to contradict so far in this post. For it to be rambling and inconsistent, you need to demonstrate it.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
You got the "right answer" but justifying it, it appears in many ways your analysis of the situation that lead to that fact is flawed - or at least too steeped in cnspiracy theorizing and implied culpability.
Only if you haven't read what I've written and instead tried to rhetorically twist it to deflect the argument.
Well, if I'm going to use A Tiger or Panther and you are going to use a Sherman, why can't we compare?
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
Well why can't we make the same sort of argument about the Panther vis-a-vis the IS-2?
You can. I just didn't because I didn't see what relevance it had in an argument about the sherman and the Panther. My apologies for not predicting your train of thought here.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
The same argument for the Sherman being "outclassed" by the Panther makes the Panther outclassed by the IS-2 (the M with 120@60 glacis plate and 122mm gun anyway).
As above, when did the Americans field these?
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
Is your argument situational and the Panther "out of its depth" on the Ostfront?
We'd have to explore it. My argument was that the Sherman was out of its depth. You've introduced the Ostfront and the IS II as a rhetorical hail mary into the endzone. Where did this ever get raised. Surely, you should raise these as points, not use the failure of them to be raised out of the blue thus far as some sort of minus point for me. If you want to extrapolate the argument out to include the Ostfront, go ahead, but it didn't require this sort of rhetorical aggressiveness. Besides, saying the IS II is better than the Panther says what about the Sherman exactly?
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
IT appears by:
Only if you take as read that tank statistics are the only factor. I don't so the above doesn't follow. Superior tactics and C3 would have had an effect on the Russian front.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
that it is not... That is a problem for your argument as it appears to allow for "other factors" where the Panther (or T-34) is outclassed, but hold eh equation constant on the Western...again consistency in analysis is all that is being asked for.
But those other factors are all operational directly affecting how the vehicle performs in combat. Your other factors (which you know I agree with since you quoted me) are strategic (i.e. The US Army liked "more") which seek to make up for tactical issues. I also think that C3 was less of an issue on the Western front because neither Army lacked for radios or decent training (most of the time). In the east, the situation could often be different.
I've already alluded to these sorts of issues, pointing out the Panthers at Lorraine were factory fresh and driven by very green and ill trained crews. We can widen the discussion again if you like but again you seem to be making up stuff to be snippy about. If you want to call it a day here, do so, but this is unwarranted.
These figures are partially skewed by the late war though when German armour was in very short supply.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
No, that is true only if you are ignoring the part of the casualty equation that relates to rate of engagement and focus ony on the part that relates to exchange rate per engagement. You can change the casualty rate by changing the exchange rate per engagement, or the engagement rate (in this case by atritting the Panthers faster than they could be replaced, and bringing in Shermans faster than they are being lost. Form a "big picture standpoint" if the trend is going down becasue of one relationship, might that not make up for issue trying to adjust the other?
But you were using the stats to show German Tanks didn't kill that many allied tanks because things like mines and infantry weapons killed loads. I pointed out that infantry weapons became more prevalent late war because there weren't many tanks left to shoot with. If the statement above (and I'm not convinced I follow it, feel free to quote this bit and say something condescending) is saying that the exchange rate was offset by the superior American engagement rate, why didn't you just say the Americans had more tanks?
I don't see how. Logic suggests to me that it is better to get off two shots that might kill something than three shots that won't. The demand for the Firefly and 17 pdr suggests that on the ground (whatever our models 70 years on might suggest)
the Firefly made a difference.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
Because it my have lead to a tactic where rather than trying to outflank the Panther and byass it, to instead go toe to toe with it. You assume that "everything will remain the same" afer you make a major perterbation to the differential caluculus. You can't change one variable and effect their to be no operations effect. It may have been for the best, but it may not. We dont know.
In my humble opinion, it would have made a world of difference. Not least illustrated by the popularity of the Firefly. In other words, we have evidence on the ground of this "major peturbation to the differential calculus" in action and the eyewitnesses thought it a good peturbation, because having seen it they wanted to peturb more often. The Americans appealed for Fireflies at least twice during the campaign and the British crews couldn't get enough. the Germans also shot them first in engagements wherever possible suggesting they weren't too happy when the 17 pdr peturbation was in full swing either. I dispute the notion "we don't know" because I think the evidence allows us to make a sound judgement.
Standard German doctrine and aggression demanded as much. Facing shermans made them cocky at times, but I don't think you can abandon your entire doctrinal base that quickly. Besides, without offensive action, you don't win.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
You treat the Western Front in a vacuum again.
Is this because this is all the discussion has centred on it or have I missed something?
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
The East saw that exact thing happen and the Germans adopted the "hedgehog" defense.
I thought they did this in the winter of 41, but standard German practice didn't, surely. They attempted to operate along standard lines wherever possible. The reason they adopted the hedgehog where they did was troop density. This method meant they didn't have to man a continuous front (which they couldn't because they lacked the manpower) and hedgehogs interfered with enemy movement enough to buy time for more mobile reserves to intervene.
In addition, German defensive doctrine also emphasised firepower and its utilisation. Hedgehogs were not inconsistent with that since the spaces in between could be targeted by artillery and long range fire. Secondly, I don't think the Germans ever stuck tanks in the middle of these hedgehogs as standard, so I think you're way out here. The British sometimes did in their "boxes" but not the Germans.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
Why would they not do that in the West?
Well, firstly, I just don't follow this entire line, disagreeing with your analysis of German defensive doctrine in the east and failing to understand how it relates to the Tank issue.
My initial reaction to the hedgehog argument in general would be that the Germans had the manpower in Normandy to man a continuous front and revert to more conventional methods. German defensive doctrine emphasised depth above all else, and they certainly had that in places like Goodwood.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
An argument can be made that with a lessor tactical advanage they may have chosen rather than to "shoot their wad" trying to keep the Allies in Normandy, and then disintigrate back to Germany, to use a more Eastern front OPLAN and fight a much more defefensily oriented campaign across the depth of France. Would tht have resultd in fewer casualties?
I don't follow this line, so I'm not sure. The Germans adopted a hedgehog or strongpoint system as early as 1941 to allow small numbers of troops to control larger tracts of front. We should note that it only worked in 1941 because Stalin got overambitious and let the Germans off the hook. It was an expedient, however, not a tactical choice. It wasn't the Germans saying "lets build hedgehogs, it is the best way to stop Ivan". It was the Germans saying "lets build hedgehogs as it is a better way of hindering Ivan given the shallowness of our front. What other choice have we got?".
In the winter of 1941, it also allowed what was left of then Germany Army to congregate on the few villages and towns where there might be some semblance of shelter, and it also allowed them to exert some control on the road net in the poor weather that had a disprortionate effect on russian operations than holding a similiarly sized piece of ground somewhere else might.
As the war progressed, it also occasionally allowed the increasingly ill trained and inferior German soldier to defend better, because it required less aggression, initiative and effort than the standard doctrine of elastic defence in depth.
In other words, it was a tactical expedient of necessity, not one of choice. They would have preferred defence in depth, outposts, forward lines, MLRs and rear positions and much else. They didn't have the manpower, so hedgehogs it was.
In Normandy, the Germans had different issues. Part of the attraction of fighting forward was a narrower front, much narrower than they would have faced anywhere else in france allowing greater depth which in turn meant hedgehogs weren't required. Secondly, hedgehogs would have been of limited use in the bocage because you couldn't command the spaces in between as they were shielded by foliage. Thirdly, Allied stand off firepower made densely packed hedgehogs problematic. Monty would just have crushed one after the other for as long as he had to. fourthly, they did sometimes buy time to deploy mobile reserves in the east, but that wasn't as easy in the west because the Germans lost air parity much earlier and much more completely making operational movement to counterattack breaches much harder. The list goes on, but I simply don't think your analysis correct right from the off here so I'm not adding anything by continuing.
They only have so many of these, though. Your argument suggests they had choices. I think ultimately, they had very few. What made their Tanks effective was the tactical and limited operational mobility that allowed them to take a hand on the battlefield from a reserve. Guns and mines don't have this.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
Of course they had choices, and they made different choices in the East when on the other side of the coin.
no, they sometimes made different choices in the east (I don't think hedgehogs were universal or preferred policy) but that is explainable by unique conditions on the Ostfront. I think you've completely misread this and having done so, tried to build something complicated on top. It had nothing to do with the armour match up.
This is best illustrated by the Rommel V Schweppenburg argument. Rommel knew Allied aerial firepower, so wanted to deploy reserves forward and fight on the beach. Schweppenburg was the tip on the iceberg of a whole raft of Ostheer who arrived in Normandy from January 1944 inwards and brought eastern methods with them. This emphasised defence in depth (something the Westheer also tried to practise - Goodwood etc - it was standard German defensive doctrine) and mobile reserves held centrally for counterattack. In other words, the entire defensive argument in the west was based on Ostfront veterans trying to deploy as doctrine required, and Rommel trying to deploy otherwise because he had seen Allied airpower in Africa.
The Ostheer didn't bring different methods, they brought German methods, and they brought them without knowing much about Allied capabilities via a vis Tanks. Rommel wanted to try something different based upon tactical and operational experience.
Hedgehogs are irrelevant because they were a tactical and operational solution where troops were thin on the ground, not a doctrinal solution. They weren't adopted because of anything to do with Tanks, but because of troop density issues on the ground. They weren't adopted because Germans wanted to, but because Germans had to. You are taking operational necessity and turning it into operational choice, and then building another argument on top of it. It doesn't follow.
In Normandy, at times, the Germans got to practise defensive doctrine as they wished and things went fairly well (Goodwood being the prime example).
Ultimately, what have you got against victory with a better exchange rate like GWI or GWII? This is a very narrow argument. Which was the better Tank?
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
Nothing - but your assumption that if the Americans say deployed 76 armed tanks in stead of 75sand 17lbers insead of 76s and had Pershings supporting, that the Germans would have cnducted an IDENTICAL campaign agaisnt them is naive to say the least. And that the notion that the different sitution would have automatically resulted in fewer casualties is something the East at least raises issues with.
I don't assume, I just don't see what the east has got to do with it. As I've said, I think you have misinterpreted how things worked there. You have then extrapolated that misinterpretation out to start talking about Tanks. I personally don't think the Germans would have employed a different campaign because German defensive doctrine didn't drill down to the level of relative Tank firepower. It drilled down to a basic set of rules that taught you where to try and position pieces and how to behave.
The proof of this is in their counterattack doctrine. They hit back at every opportunity, despite the fact that the allies had their measure and handed them some fearful punishment. They didn't change doctrine because of it, indeed, one of the things that cost the Germans dear was doctrinal inflexibility. However. this rules out being flexible because of relative tank statistics of the Opfor does it not?
Try Wray's
Standing fast, it deals with the early period on the Ostfront but says much that remains true throughout and in other theatres. Hedgehogs are a red herring.
Did German tank casualties go down when the Panther was introduced? Or did other factors change in response?
the real question is did the Sherman/Panzer casualty exhange go up as MK IVs were replaced by Panthers.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
To follow your GW anaology what if we had produced less Shermans and more P-47s? Or would it have been better to produce les P-47s and get the Pershing fielded sooner? this is one of the reasons GGWaW is so fun - you can explore asymmetric strategies
Yes, but the discussion thus far has been about a realtively narrow question. You can broaden it out, but the narrow question remains a valid one even if you do so. Which was the better Tank?
No. The Sherman wasn't a better fighter than the Panther,
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
It could not have beaten a Panther, just like Sugar Ray would have needed an analogous "lucky hit" to KO Ali. Yet people still make the "pound for pound" argument he was better.
Yes, but Sugar Ray never needed to get in with a man Ali's size, the Sherman did. Therefore, who was the better fighter suddenly became irrelevant because rather than a "middleweight" and a "heavyweight" in the same ring together they were "boxers" - or MBTs following my earlier argument - and what counted was punching power, ability to take a punch etc. Sugar Ray wasn't helped in this instance either because Ali was faster and more maneurable.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
You can claim that is not a good argument, but that is simply your opinion.
And this is simply yours.
it just means he wins by clever use of numbers.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
Scoreboard. I'll take winning by any means over "losing with style"...in ar anyway!
Attrition hath no advocate like a Civilian or Military historian [;)]. This argument began with Sven arguing America could have had scoreboard and better Tanks to boot. In my experience, when the latter don't turn up, the scoreboard argument gets wheeled out. We won in WWI. It doesn't mean the Somme was particularly clever.
If the sherman was only a "medium" why was it mixing it with the heavier German designs? Ultimately, it was mixing it because "medium" or not, it was first and foremost a Tank and the Germans didn't make allowance when fighting vehicles that were lighter than them. The Sherman, when deployed in armoured formations using fire and maneuver, and likely to face enemy armour, was a Main Battle Tank.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
Why did the T-34 mix it up with the Panther and the Panther with the IS-2?
Because these were the vehicles being fielded.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
The Sherman was not an MBT an he notion that just becasue it happend to meet what was probably the first of that class that it therefore was one is strained.
No, it isn't because MBT was a role. You were one if you attempted the role. If I climb in with Ali, I am a pugilist, despite the fact only he has trained to be one. The argument the Sherman struggled because it wasn't an MBT but had to be one argues for its obselescence doesn't it?
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
Were the M-10 and Valentine MBTs becauue they mixed it up" with Panthers? How about a KV-1? The Sherman was an infantry support tank desinged to attack enemy infantry formations and drive through them.
and
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
but that ignores its intended and the role it was most used in - infantry support and rapid advance.
So you are saying it was both infantry support and Cavalry Tank.
In other words it fulfilled all roles, which effectively made it an MBT did it not? What other missions did armour ever have during World War II aside from recce and I think the British used the Churchill in a few of their recce regiments as well.
Ultimately, I think it was more Cavalry Tank because Devers chose the engine for reliability but the 75mm makes a powerful argument for infantry tank. Either way, once you start using it for everything, how do you designate it? A main battle tank is simply a Tank designed to fulfill any role you assign it. therefore, your description of the Sherman sounds tailor made for an MBT.
Therefore, I haven't ignored anything, you have said it wasn't an MBT, then outlined its roles which make it clear it effectively was an MBT.
It was outclassed in that role by around a third of the Germans it faced, and had its handfull with the other two thirds.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
I'll agree withthe former...but that ignores its intended and the role it was most used in - infantry support and rapid advance. It can be argued that with a heavier tank the drive across France would have taken longer
Maybe by a few days, but there was no serious resistance so the drive was slower because they couldn't move as fast but that was all. I also don't see that it would have made any difference. the Germans would have stopped where they did, and we would have drawn up to the line where we did. In other words, a heavier Tank would not have impacted operationally.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
and the response to the Bulge may not have been as effective. (Fuel for the rather efficient Shermans was problematic as it was - extensive deployment of a "panther equivlent" would have required a LOT more fuel...again adaptive and emergent nature of war makes "single variable analysis" problematic.
But I thought two of the spearhead divisions that Patton drove on Bastogne with were infantry fighting Germans Volks formations. The Allies could easily have stood other formations down to provide the fuel (they frequently did anyway) and the net result would merely have been anyway, that German Tanks might have run out of fuel slightly further west than they did. I don't think the Allied response was inspired so much as solid. Monty blocked the endzone and Patton tried a clumsy sack.
The BAR was a squad light support weapon. As was the bipod MG42. Regardless of their design histories etc, in the squad support role, one had advantages. You can't explain away deficiencies by saying something was a medium. The Sherman was an MBT not a medium tank.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
And one had other advantages... Two men with a bopod MG42 can engage one target but two men each with a BAR can engage two. So which is better?
The MG42 because the Americans didn't deploy two BARs per squad so were not capable of engaging two targets, and the MG42 could attack wider targets more forcefully with its high ROF. It also had a belt feed allowing for more sustained firing and better suppressive qualities. Machine guns are not always deployed to kill, but to suppress so others can kill. The MG42 far outperformed the BAR in this role.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
If you have one target to suppress the MG2, if you have 2 the BAR. .
But having made the option situationally dependent, you seem to want to make it TOE independent.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
'Better' is situationally dependant.
Okay what if you have two targets, two BARs and two MG42s (as the Germans did employ in some of their squad TOEs)What do you want then?
You are attempting to narrow the gap and make easy choices difficult by creating notional situations and stacking the parameters in favour of your preferred choice. The BAR or the MG42 is an easy call. It is easy to say two BARs rather than one MG42s, but then why can't I have two MG42s if you're going to have two BARs? The choice is a straightforward match up. You obfuscate the issue by creating situations in which the odds get stacked.
In other words, whether I have two targets to engage or one, the number of light MGs I have to deploy is likely to be the same since it is governed by TOE, so the choice remains a simple one. Do I engage two targets with an MG42 or a BAR. Everything else is theoretically interesting but practically irrelevant.
Besides, I seem to remember the Germans had a drum for the MG42 as well, so I'll take two of those...[;)]
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
Like The MG 42, the BAR decendants live on today as the FN MAG. One was an automaic rifle, one was a machine gun. That they were two different ways to provide squad light support in two different ways doesn't mean that certain advanages of the MG automatically trump the the others advatages as an autmatic rifle in all circumstances. That one say has a higer ROF is not relevant when you can't keep its high rate of fire fed with ammo.
But it is when you can. IIRC The average German supply quota had three times as much ammo as an American one despite being much smaller in overall weight. You work to offset the disadvantages of your weapon, not accept them. You also work to maximise its advantages.
As an example. The later Churchill had much thicker frontal armour than the Tiger, very much thicker than the Panther and weighed around the same as the Panther if memory serves. Could it duel with the Tiger or the Panther? No, because it's 75mm weapon was designed to support infantry and its armour would't generally protect it against the 75 and 88. Therefore, despite being a British "heavy", the same size as the German "Medium", it was not much good as an MBT. Under your argument, we should be comparing these vehicles because both were "mediums" of similiar weight.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
So medium infantry support tanks and heavy infantry support tanks are not MBTs. Good eye. You are correct. The late Churchill with upgraded 75mm and heavier armor was able to give a Panther a run for its money but was not used as an MBT and therfore was not one, despite "mixing it up" with one. If you dislike me classing a Panther as "heavy" (despite it being as heavy as other countries heavy tanks) then I will call it the first "MBT" and say that you STILL can't directly compare it to tank destroyers, heavy tanks, light tanks, infantry support tanks or tank busting aircraft and artillery just becasue ay of the atter can find itself "mixing it up" with a Panther.
Yes, but the Churchill wasn't because it didn't but the Sherman was because it did. You've already said the Sherman was used in several roles. What is an MBT if not that? Note the Panther was drawn up at a time when the Germans were no longer fielding in a role specific manner, they wantefd one Tank fit all, but emphasised anti armour operations. But they were fielding an all purpose weapon because it didn;t come with a companion vehicle with a weapon optimised for infantry support.
Had the Sherman been used exclusively in the independent Tank battalions attached to the infantry divisions, then it was clearly just an infantry support Tank and we could have made light of its inability to tackle Panther, but the fact it almost exclusively equipped Allied Armoured Divisions as well is irrefutable proof it was an MBT. An MBT is just a Tank which gets asked to perform a range of missions and not asked to specialise in one.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
Again - your argument that an individual Panther will far more often that not, take out a single Sherman or T-34, or Valentine, or Churchil III, or Stuart, or Cromwell, or alot of other tanks running around in 44 is fact. So will a Tiger. But it will find itself in trouble against an ISU or IS-2, Does that make the ISU and IS-2 better MBTs than a Panther?
Possibly, but this isn't a Panther love in so much as a Sherman reality check. We can change to discuss this issue if you want, but it isn't relevant to the issue at hand.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
And interestingly the descendent of the Sherman, upgraded and couped with "MBT" doctrine as the Isherman handed the IS-2 descendant the T-55 its ass in 67. Fancy that. All manner of circular and extrapolatory arguments can be made. What does it 'prove'?
Easy. It proves that if you upgrade the Sherman with a gun capable of defeating enemy armour it can perform as an effective MBT. This is exactly (in part) what this thread has actually been exploring with regards the arguments over the 76mm.
In reality, what mattered was its role, not its size. It was an infantry support weapon and as such not designed to duel, and therefore it is excusable for it to not compare, although if the British had filled out the Guards Armoured with them and sent them into Goodwood, we would have had reason to compare them because the Churchill was being asked to perform as an MBT not infantry support.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
So it is only those Shermans unucky enough to bump into a group of Panthers that are "outclassed" - as long as they "know their place" and do what they were designed to do, they are acceptable. Er "excusable". What matters is exactly the "role" and the "role" of allied medium tanks was NOT to be an "MBT".
But an MBT is just a multi role Tank. You've already said the Sherman performed multiple roles. What further evidence do you actually require? Secondly, if the style of armour was changing during the second world war, and producing a different style of Tank, then it further illustrates the sherman was struggling because when it stepped up to fill the role, it won by attrition rather than quality.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
So one is left with the absurdity that had Shermans run away from Panthers and not engaged them, they would not have "mixed it up" with MBTs and therefor not been comparable.
No it would have made them poor MBTs because they wouldn't been able to fight the enemy.
What about the case - as often happened when Panthers engaged an unspecting group of (insert tank to be morphed into an MBT here). The Cromwells 'assulted" by Wittman by this argument were heavy tanks and damn poor ones at that becasue a Tiger chewed them up and spit them out...
These were traditional Cruiser Tanks. Little can be gained from citing British Tanks because they were generally poor until the comet (Firefly accepted). however, I do think the Cruiser Tank was the one that had to evolve because the first thing an exploitation Tank required was the ability to defeat counterattacking armour. the Cromwell didn;t have that.
But surely, even if we are saying that all Tanks effectively became MBTs as the war progressed, the fact the Sherman struggled is proof it was becoming obselete.
Becoming obselete doesn't make you bad, it just makes you no longer good. the Sherman had a good record up till June 44. That doesn't disappear because it got a pasting after that.
For a further example, the Sherman when used in recce regiments was better in one respect than the M5 because it was better able to drive off light German resistance that it came across. The M5 was less survivable and aggressive recce of this sort was beyond it. However, its "medium" status is irrelevant, what we are weighing are the attributes and how they fit the given recce role. The M5 had other qualities and weighing up the better recce tank would have to take those into combat.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
One wonders what nomenclatural metamorphasis would have ocured if these Shermans operating in a recon role (better than light tanks!) had met a group of Panther trying to fend of an air attack while supporting an infantry assault. The fabric of the universe seems intact so luckily it must not have happened...[:'(]
It is possible to support an argument by dreaming up complicated theoretical paradoxes, but impossible to prove one [;)].
When weighing up the better Main battle tank, speed, manoeuvrability, armour and armament are all relevant and in this regard the Sherman was adequate until late 43, increasingly obselete after that. However, whilst a variety of factors go into explaining why this was the case (eg One of its issues is that battlefield experience comfirming that was rather later in coming.) none of those mitigating factors alter the fact it was obselete. They merely help explain why.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
I was starting to wonder just where your argument was leading, but we are back to your fixation on the "Panther as MBT" - Given that its users pretty much invented the role, and the SHerman wasn't one, I submit that the Panther was a "better MBT than the Sherman". But then on the eastern front, by the same argument, the Panther was 'obsolete' and the IS-2 was a better one.
Now we're moving.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
My argument is that while the Panther was a "better MBT" - one v one - the production, logisitical support, operational employment, and doctrinal integration of a "Panther class" class MBT by the US Army may not BY DEFINITION have lead to a faster end to the war or fewer casualties overall then our use of the Sherman.
No, but then all I've said was that...
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber & now IronDuke
the Panther was a "better MBT" - one v one
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
The fact that the Panther was a better MBT than the Sherman doesn't mean it was more appropriate for US use, or the Germans would not have pursued a diferent strategy if they faced it.
No but it doesn't mean it wasn't. The fact that the Allies scrambled to provide upgunned versions and eventually got the M26 suggests that a better MBT (whether that was a Panther or something else is irrelevant) did fit okay because they went after these in the first place. German strategy was in a comfort zone where they could stand off with impunity. Robbing them of that option could not have done anything other than disadvantage them. The only other option to standing off is mixing it up or getting in close. Against heavier american weapons, neither was any better than standing off.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
Whether sufficient numbers, with suffient fuel, integrated appropriately with other combat arms, with required maintainability and ammunition suply could have been mainained via a transoceanic supply line would have been at least problematic.
But "sufficient numbers" would have been less had you deployed it. Remember, the central American problem was that their rounds bounced off around a third of German armour on an all too regular basis. This implicitly recognises they were making hits. Hits with weapons that penetrated would have left fewer enemy weapons to deal with.
Secondly, American industry fed a fixed number of divisions 89-90 depending on when the war was. therefore, the idea it couldn't supply something bigger in the required numbers doesn't hold water for me. Had it been providing weapons for the absolute maximum numbers of troops you could have deployed might have complicated the issue, but given the Americans were feeding three efforts (US, UK and USSR) it is not a given that feeding something bigger to the US Army was beyond them. I never got the impression that America switched to an absolute war economy that precluded any further effort.
As for POL, the Allies were like everyone else. They stockpiled then went. Given the problems they had supplying the Shermans, it is not unreasonable to expect they would also have had problems supplying a better bigger MBT, but then they had supply issues anyway and still won handsomely. The pace and nature of operations might have been different, but the USSR certainly went the Behemoth MBT route, and their operational advances were impressive to say the least.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
It might have lead to greater succes ith fewer casualties, but may have lead to understrength units, with insufficient fuel and ammo, used in a manner that did not fully employ their capabilities to best effect.
But the Allies were largely depicting the tempo of operations. Understrength armoured units are only an issue when you are outnumbered. When dictating the initiative, you can simply wait until you are up to strength before going. Remember, the Americans adopted the cheap and cheerful approach with infantry replacements and suffered higher casualties as a result.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
"Better" has more than one context - yours is individual capability "1 on 1" and mine considers the system of production, support and employment. Yours is one set of assumptions and measures, mine is a diffferent one. I understand yours, I simply ask that you try to understand mine.
I understand yours, but I just don't accept that the Americans had to make the choices you believe. As proof, you quoted me at the top of this thread saying:
the Sherman suited America because it was relatively quick and manoeuvrable which suited American doctrine. It was easy to make which suited American industry. It was relatively light and easy to transport which suited American logistics and strategic planners and it was relatively straightforward to maintain and fight which suited the American Citizen Army. At the sharp end, though, it had some issues
This is the crux. It may have suited America, but it was a poorer weapon. One can argue it was in America's interests (because of the above) to field a poorer weapon, but whilst that may make the weapon strategically acceptable, it doesn't make it tactically better. Indeed, modern American Armoured forces have POL hungry uber modern equipment. Different people call the plays these days.
Regards,
IronDuke
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