This is very simply answered, but the weirdness of a raid being at the home base, and then magically appearing at the target is the root of the problem, which I suppose nothing can be done about. How is this simply answered? Have you ever played BTR or USAAF? Even when having fully functional radar for the Germans, you play the game in a visual manner, such that if a raid is just before the Belgium coast when it's first spotted, you have to make up your mind what you think the target will be. IRL, the same thing happened, even if you had absolutely no radar network, that is, everytime one is spotted, you have to make up your mind if you intercept it and from where, especially when the raid is likely to cross one or more land areas before hitting the target. In WITP, that's impossible, yet bombers of all sides skirt by with never having interceptors enroute to the target (or flak enroute for that matter). It doesn't matter if they put up large numbers from other airfields from the historic perspective, because everyone knows they could. And even if the target covered quite a lot of enemy land territory to get there, and the fighters may not have had enough time to get up and intercept them, in such a case they would certainly have enough time to hit them on the way back (which doesn't happen in WITP either).ORIGINAL: rtrapasso
For some time, some folks have been harping on "aircraft interceptions" between bases... can anyone actually give any evidence where this occurred in significant numbers by the Japanese (or shoot, even the Allies) in the Pacific Theater during the war?? The only ones i know about were on Guadalcanal by the Allies, and most of the successful interceptions actually depended on coast watchers more than the radar (coast watchers gave more lead time) and even then, the interceptions occurred mainly within a few miles of the base.
i've only found isolated examples by a few planes on occasion where they (the Japanese) actually SAW planes by chance and attacked away from a base ... from what i've read, most Japanese took radios out of their fighter planes to improve performance , which sort of defeats the idea of vectoring in aircraft to make an interception. Some "leader" aircraft retained radios, but making subordinates follow hand signals, etc. was more than a little problematic.
Perhaps i am unaware of large scale interceptions, but:
1) Most US city bombing occurred at night, and there were barely any night fighters available.
2) The city bombing/firestorm model is broken in the game (not sure what AE will do with it) which gives the Japanese a non-historic advantage in the game.
Unless someone can show where the events that are proposed to be modeled actually happened (i.e. - interceptions of formations more than 60 miles from a base, or 45 miles for AE), should we even be debating the question of how to implement something like this??
I've just started reading bits of my old Kamikaze book by Edwin P. Hoyt and he mentions in the early B29 days that IJ had put up 4 squadrons up against them on one raid, so I think that qualifies as possibly not just being squadrons drawn up at the target area, because, afterall, all along the way, assuming there's a good deal of land enroute, and in the early days with the B29's being so far away, they certainly couldn't afford a lot of manuevering around land masses and still get to the target. But again, this just isn't an IJ problem, as any nation that has seen bombers with their own eyes, has to consider that the raid might be hitting their area and not go further.