Debunking the Glantz myth

[Tarhunnas]

ORIGINAL: Apollo11

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: Tarhunnas

I stopped reading Beevor when I realized he doesn't know what a Nebelwerfer is.

It is mist thrower... you know that Air Conditioning system for outdoors (i.e. mist cooling device... [8D]




Leo "Apollo11"

That was funny!

[Tarhunnas]

ORIGINAL: Michael T

Any reasonable and sensible person who has been around the WITE forum since the game was released would recognize that there is a very strong bias toward the Soviet cause by a core group of very bullish and boorish people. These same people consistently cite Glantz in their one-sided diatribe as gospel that supports their bigoted views on the German Soviet war. A typical scenario is that some guy will put forward an idea, theory or view on the game or history that does not run with the said bullies or Glantz's view of the war. The poster is then bombarded with a pile of crap that is mostly irrelevant to his original argument, but it has the desired effect in driving them away from the site.

I don't agree with you. Sure, Glantz is quouted now and then, but by far the most vocal group in the forum IMHO is and has been those that feel that the Germans cannot win. Ironically, I feel the Axis now have inflated offensive capabilities that necessitate unhistorical Soviet withdrawal strategies.

Further, In my experience, suggestions and ideas put forth in a reasoned and open manner on this forum are in the vast majority of cases met by constructive comments, debate and critique. Many exchanges here have been very informative and educating.

[gids]

just back from vacation so i HAD to buy a book from Glantz after reading all posts here ,bought the Kharkov offensive ,it should be interesting

[76mm]

ORIGINAL: gids
bought the Kharkov offensive ,it should be interesting

heh, don't count on it...

[Flaviusx]

Tarhunnas, it's really case of the game systemically inflating the offensive at the expense of the defense. Also, the game lacks any kind of surge replacement capacity for the Soviets in 1941 in the face of pocketing. Both in terms of replacements and the ability to get dead units back from the pool. It's very hard to recover from disasters. In real life the Sovs could bounce back from being hit with monster pockets in Kiev and then Typhoon (combined 1.3 million losses there in a space of a month or so, and that's not including losses elsewhere), here not so much.

The initial release was very rough on the Axis, though. Not so much in 1941, but from 1942 on. 42 got fixed, but I fear we broke 1941 in the process.

[Captain]

wanting to "balance a game" has to be the silliest reason I have yet seen to try to rewrite the history of the Eastern Front. [:)]

In between WW2 Nazi/Soviet propaganda, Nazis/German generals/Soviet politicians trying to cover their butts, Right/Left-wing fanatics who have a political ax to grind, its hard enough just trying to figure out what really happened.

The Eastern Front has been a passion of mine for a long time and over the years I have read many authors from Carell to Glantz, yet I still have problems answering the essential question: How did the Soviets beat the Germans?

On paper, the 1941 Soviet Army was a disaster waiting to happen. It should have collapsed in a few weeks. That it managed to not only survive, but turn itself into a force that could beat the Germans at their own game is still hard to explain.

Most explanations fall into two broad theories:1) the Germans were overwhelmed by masses of Soviet troops/equipment; or 2) the view pushed by Glantz, that Soviet military leadership improved to the point were they could beat the Germans in 43-45. The truth probably lies somewhere in between, however, no matter which theory you subscribe to, the end result is still the same: Germany loses.

I have been playing this game on and off for year, always as the Nazis, I still can't say if its an accurate portrayal. My gut tells me it is probably too easy for the Germans in summer 41, although I still haven't come to a definitive opinion.

One thing that is clear to me though is that this is the best Eastern Front game I have ever played, it does a great job of simulating German mechanized warfare and giving you a sense of the huge challenge the Germans had.

[swkuh]

Appreciate your questions and insights. Yes, this is a fine game, although I really don't understand its techniques in detail.

Believe that the Soviet victory was due in large part to political discipline and the scope of Russian territory (always room to retreat and discipline to regroup.) German side should have thought about their ability to move equipment as far as needed to defeat a determined opponent. Did the Germans realize the effort to get to the Urals across the entire front? Don't think so. Might add, the Master Race Mentality didn't help Nazi strategic planning.

When Soviets were ready with competant equipment in great quantity and adequate leadership with clear lines of command, the Nazis were cooked.

And of course, Sovie political command was ready to accept great losses in civilian and military people.

[Great_Ajax]

The Germans have always relied on quick victories in order to win their wars with quick overwhelming knock out blows to prevent long and drawn out campaigns. They had to be quick to respond to threats from multiple directions. This strategic thinking formed the basis of their military culture for hundreds of years. The German military culture focused on operational and small unit tactics and superior leadership to deal with these neighborly threats. Because of this focus, it almost completely neglected logistics and strategic intelligence and any strategic warfare capability. Once the knockout blow against the Soviet Union passed, Germany didn't have a chance for a total victory in my opinion with few options and capability to wage a strategic war. The Soviets had enough manpower, material, and space to survive the initial assaults. Then, it learned to fight back.

Trey

ORIGINAL: Captain

wanting to "balance a game" has to be the silliest reason I have yet seen to try to rewrite the history of the Eastern Front. [:)]

In between WW2 Nazi/Soviet propaganda, Nazis/German generals/Soviet politicians trying to cover their butts, Right/Left-wing fanatics who have a political ax to grind, its hard enough just trying to figure out what really happened.

The Eastern Front has been a passion of mine for a long time and over the years I have read many authors from Carell to Glantz, yet I still have problems answering the essential question: How did the Soviets beat the Germans?

On paper, the 1941 Soviet Army was a disaster waiting to happen. It should have collapsed in a few weeks. That it managed to not only survive, but turn itself into a force that could beat the Germans at their own game is still hard to explain.

Most explanations fall into two broad theories:1) the Germans were overwhelmed by masses of Soviet troops/equipment; or 2) the view pushed by Glantz, that Soviet military leadership improved to the point were they could beat the Germans in 43-45. The truth probably lies somewhere in between, however, no matter which theory you subscribe to, the end result is still the same: Germany loses.

I have been playing this game on and off for year, always as the Nazis, I still can't say if its an accurate portrayal. My gut tells me it is probably too easy for the Germans in summer 41, although I still haven't come to a definitive opinion.

One thing that is clear to me though is that this is the best Eastern Front game I have ever played, it does a great job of simulating German mechanized warfare and giving you a sense of the huge challenge the Germans had.

[Aurelian]

Here's one. It's from a review of Beevor's Second World War.

"Beevor's interpretations are debatable and important explanations are missing. As an example, tens of thousands of French civilians packed-up and fled to the southwest away from the coming Germans, jamming the roads with refugees, and Beevor declares, "Once again it was the women who bore the brunt of the disaster and who rose to the occasion with self-sacrifice and calm. The men were the ones in tears of despair." Wow, that's a broad and questionable statement to make about those refugees. As another example, Andrew Roberts (Storm of War) explains how Hitler made a serious mistake in ordering the German tanks to stop from advancing into Dunkirk (because of perceived soft ground and ideological reasons), letting the British armies escape, while Beevor just briefly says Hitler stopped because his advancing forces were thin...."

And another review:

Iwo Jima has two listings in the index, Malta has fifteen and Hong Kong eleven. In fact he uses more ink criticizing American general Joseph Stilwell's conduct than he devotes to Midway.

He's confused about the Pearl Harbor attack. The Japanese planes did not take off at 6:05am on Sunday Dec. 8, but on Sunday Dec. 7 local time. Oklahoma sailors were not trapped "beneath the hull" but rather inside it.

Likewise he claims that MacArthur in Manila immediately called a staff meeting but then "hesitated" to give Brereton orders to bomb Formosa, when it is widely and well documented that MacArthur's staff wouldn't even let Brereton meet with their boss.

Beevor bizarrely characterizes Eisenhower as "politically naive". Ike's been criticized for many things, but his political savvy is one area most agree on.

He cites a story about American general Mark Clark having to board a British submarine near Algiers without his trousers as a "minor humiliation" and "undignified". Interesting that he chose to mention this rather than the many humiliations that the British suffered.

He even makes careless mistakes when writing about the British. Rommel certainly did not have "10,000 vehicles" at the beginning of his May 1942 offensive in North Africa, concealed by sandstorms or otherwise.

What was perhaps most disturbing was Beevor's apparent refusal to state that Hitler was aware of, let alone ordered, the specifics of the Holocaust. Very early in the book Beevor writes that Hitler had a "dismissive attitude toward administration," and claims that underlings "seizing on a random comment from the Fuhrer, or trying to second guess his wishes..would initiate programs." This excuse might have been useful to Thomas a Becket's killers, but is shameful in this case. A third of the way into the book, Beevor writes that Hitler "still does not appear to have made an irrevocable decision on a Final Solution" (in Dec 1941), even though Beevor wrote that "the Polish Diaspora had begun" in 1939 and mentions Hitler's specific orders to kill those with developmental disabilities.


Guess we can dismiss all of Beevor's work then.[:'(]

[Michael T]

Aureilian, who are you trying to convince that Beevor is crap? Has anyone claimed he is the best authority on the war in Russia? Once again you show your incapacity to comprehend what people write on these forums. Rarely if ever can you remain focused long enough to write anything that is relevant to the issue at hand. This is your MO. Cloud the forum with a half assed arguments that are not even about the issue.

Once again, just for you. My claim is that people should read widely and not rely on one source/writer. Its an established academic paradigm for research. To rely primarily on one writer/source, especially one who has a bias is foolish.

There are literally hundreds of other historians I can source that have accounts on the war in Russia. I don't rely on one source. But I will discount a source if I think it's not credible.

I stated that I would not bother with Glantz again. The reasons being his tedious style of writing, his bias to the Soviets, his limited research and his inability to draw the correct conclusion from the information available. That’s my personal opinion. You, and anyone else can do as they please and can continue to place him above all other writers on the subject. Feel free.

I expect some other disconnected riposte from you or some other ignorant buffoon, but I am finished with this. I have nothing more to say on the matter.

[carlkay58]

Glantz is currently the best known english speaking researcher into the Soviet Archives. I have some extensive Soviet OB work done for me by Charles C. Sharpe about 10 years ago and there are some differences between his work and Glantz's - but not really enough to matter.

Glantz is good at the straight translation work but some of his interpretations, such as Operation Mars, is exactly that - interpretations. In reality, the dual operations of Mars and Uranus were typical Soviet strategic planning and duplications of planning two or more concurrent operations of those scales can be seen through out the war.

I will agree Glantz is probably overly quoted in these forums - but that is simply because he is the researcher that most of the people here are familiar with.

[Seminole]

Antony Beevor on Operation Mars: June 19, 2012:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vNjQw3a7 ... =endscreen

[turtlefang]

Michael T

Any reasonable and sensible person who has been around the WITE forum since the game was released would recognize that there is a very strong bias toward the Soviet cause by a core group of very bullish and boorish people. These same people consistently cite Glantz in their one-sided diatribe as gospel that supports their bigoted views on the German Soviet war.

While I'm a newcomer to this forum, and it's apparent that several of the people here have differences going back a ways, I have to say the implications of this statement demostrate a complete lack of understanding of Glantz and his works. Glantz, if he has a bias, is definitely anti-Soviet, not pro-Soviet. And anyone referencing him to support the pro-Soviet side of things either hasn't read very much of Glantz or doesn't understand his major conclusions. Glanzt's major conclusions, and he has provide creditable evidence to back up for his POV include the following regarding the Soviet Union in WW2:
1) Stalin execised immense control over the operation aspects of the Soviet Union from day one and continue to execise this continue through out the war; this control resulted in massive Soviet losses and defeats that could have been avoided.
2) Stalin learned very little from his mistakes and repeated the same mistakes over and over again.
3) Stalin favored offensive action across the entire Eastern front, even when it was beyond the abilities of the Soviet Army.
4) The Russian army came closer to "cracking" than anyone in the West ever understood and only the most brutal displine stopped it from breaking.
5) The controlled withdrawal in the Summer 42 was actually more of a running fight that the Soviets lost. And then Hitler fumbled away the advantage after the Soviets lost the fight by over reaching.
6) Stalin interfered with production of tanks, artillery and aircraft - demanding quanity over quality and ignored the advice of his troops/commanders to make changes earlier like correcting the turrent on T34, adding radios to tanks and aircraft sooner, etc...In fact, Stalin was known to keep daily/weekly production records of critical factories and, on occasion, make phone calls to the general manager running the factory if they weren't hitting the production targets with threats.....This sometimes resulted in even more shortcuts and quality problems to "avoid" the phone call
7) Stalin was more interested in grabbing territory post war than conserving troops, potentially prolonging the work by three to four months to take a run at Austria, Greece and Yugosalvia

And the list goes on. Glanzt doesn't make the Soviets look like "brilliant" strategist or great tactiticans. He does show that they were not willing to accept defeat and would do whatever it would take to beat the Germans. And that the Germans, despite a brilliant opening campaign, made enough mistakes that the Soviets could and did win.

And he uncovers a lot of original research to back up his points. Plus, as others have pointed out, he's not the easiest read in the world.
[:)]
But to imply he has a pro-Soviet bias is extemely funny..........[:)]

[Aurelian]

If he was pro Soviet, his book "Stumbling Colossus" would not of shown just how incapable the Red Army was of taking the offensive.

So far, it's also the only book I've read cover to cover. Don't count "When Titan's Clashed" as he had a co-author.

[Flaviusx]

ORIGINAL: Seminole

Antony Beevor on Operation Mars: June 19, 2012:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vNjQw3a7 ... =endscreen

Heh, rumors of Glantz' death have been greatly exaggerated, Mr. Beevor.

Ok, this is interesting, but somewhat sketchy. Beevor is claiming, near as I can tell, that Stalin perpetrated a leak to the Germans disclosing details of Mars to attract their attention and make sure their reserves would be held in place in AGC. Furthermore Zhukov wasn't made aware of this deliberate leak. That sounds kind of crazy to me, but with Stalin, anything is possible.

Still, it doesn't make complete sense. If Mars had worked rather than failed, it would have held AGC's reserves just as well. Except without the 200,000 casualties.

Also, using Zhukov in a purely maskirovka role wasn't Stalin's typical MO. He saw Zhukov as his chief crisis manager and sent him to the hot spots of the front. (Zhukov was even named deputy supreme commander.) This was true in Leningrad, Moscow, the Ukraine (after Vatutin died he took over 1. Ukrainian Front), Belorussia and finally Berlin. (Where Konev very nearly stole the show, but I digress.)

Zhukhov was his fighting general and the deputy supreme commander, and rather wasted in this role, if that's what happened. It'd be a bit like Lincoln sending Grant to fight and lock down Lee in order to distract the south to make it possible for Sherman to march to the sea. That's the way it worked out, sure, but it wasn't intended as a deception.

I'm not particularly persuaded by this artillery shortage business.

The entire story is a bit far fetched and sounds like a bad piece of spy fiction. Doesn't mean it's not true, but...

[Michael T]

Again I am drawn back here, hopefully for the last time.

Mr Fang. Again, reading and comprehension. Where did I state that Glantz is pro Soviet? I wrote he has a Soviet bias. If you can't fathom the difference between those two statements then I suggest a refresher course in basic comprehension of the English language.

FWIW, all those points you so eloquently list, well none are new or original conclusions derived by Mr Glantz. I have read all of those conclusions previously by other authors. Thank goodness I did not need to read all Glantz's works to acquire that knowledge.

[Aurelian]

How much of a diversion could op Mars have been. If it worked it would of been followed up by Op Jupiter.

[Flaviusx]

It did lock down all of the AGC reserves. To that extent it succeeded as a diversion. But that begs the question: was it actually intended as a diversion? Or was it a failed offensive that nevertheless had major side benefits? And could have it succeeded as a diversion at less cost in blood and treasure than actually happened?

According to Beevor's sources, it was not only a diversion, but a maskirovka directed at the very highest levels, i.e., Stalin, and hidden from the general in charge of the offensive -- and the Germans were being fed information about it by a Soviet double agent to insure they'd respond to it. This is astonishing if true, and completely new information. But I am skeptical.

[turtlefang]

Mr Michael T -

For one attempting to give basic English comprehension and reading lesson, prehaps you should take one or two lessons first. My comment on your statement clearly stated "I have to say the implications of this statement demostrate a complete lack of understanding of Glantz and his works." Clearly makes it an implication, not a declarative statement - and since it followed by a period, that represents a complete thought. Which separates it from the next sentence, which is clearly my statement, not yours. So if your going to give reading and comprehension lessons, at least learn the meaning of basic punctuation before you attempt give lessons or distort someones postings.

As far as the findings I outline go, you may not have read them by Glanzt, but every one of them trace directly back to him as the ultimate western source. Which means that a) your didn't read them from the primary source, and b) you didn't get them from the closest source to the primary source (Glanzt). And as every historian knows, every time you get one more degree away from the primary source, it get less accurate.

1) This only came to light after 1991 achieves were released. And Glanzt provided the primary sources and translations on this, which has been sources by every other English writer either directly or indirectly. Prior to to this, Stalin did not allow this to be documented as he did not want to be associated with the heavy Soviet losses and the official history was re-written, after Stalin, vairous other official history de-emphasized the roles Stalin played to reduce his importance. If you have other sources, provide them.

2 & 3) Both are original theories of Glanzt. A lot of people now agree with him but no one proposed these before him. These, BTW, remain his most controverial theories, and they are theories. Too many documents are still missing or haven't been released to prove these.

4) Original research by Glanzt. First published in 1996, then written by him and others in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Still denied by the official Russian historicans but Glanzt literally uncovered the original documents showing the average executions, penal battalions, floggings, etc.... Again, while displine was considered harsh in the Russian Army before Glanzt, it was nearly always based on the famous quote - “In the Red Army,” noted Marshal Georgi Zhukov, “it takes a very brave man to be a coward.” I would say always, but I haven't read every work on the Eastern front.

5) Glanzt provided most of the proof for this, although Erickson made hints at this. Not accepted by most historicians prior to Glanzt and his Red Army loss review in his 1996 papers. The official RMG history is that this is still a controlled withdrawal. Interesting enough, even German General Halder, in his post war review for the Allies, believed that the Soviets enacted a systematic withdrawal based on German Army records and the counterattack at Stalingrad.

6) While virtually everyone knew about the IL-2 phone call Stalin made - its a famous story in the history first told by Churchill in the West - what people didn't know was extensive and how detailed Stalin tracked the factory outputs or his input into the technical details of the production models. Glanzt uncovered the executive briefings, the telephone minutes, and the orders to the factories in his 1996 research. Prior to that, Stalin's near weekly/daily involvement in factory production simply wasn't know. Again, if you have earlier source, provide them.

7) Glanzt proved this when he uncovered the Feb 9 executive order redirecting the armies from marching on Berlin to redirecting them to Hungary and Austria. This was a major historical find and it explained a lot of the Soviet Army movements in 1945. Prior to this, speculation existed but the official Soviet historians denied it - then Glanzt uncovered this order, and the others that followed which delayed the Battle of Berlin for 2.5 months. Again, if you have sources that uncovered this before Glanzt, provide them.

[Seminole]

Mr Fang. Again, reading and comprehension. Where did I state that Glantz is pro Soviet? I wrote he has a Soviet bias. If you can't fathom the difference between those two statements then I suggest a refresher course in basic comprehension of the English language.

Your condescension is unbecoming.
Can you not understand how saying someone has a 'Soviet bias' can and will be interpreted as suggesting someone is 'pro Soviet'.

bias - a particular tendency or inclination, especially one that prevents unprejudiced consideration of a question; prejudice
pro - in favor of a proposition, opinion, etc.

Now, you may have a particular consideration of the word 'bias' or 'pro' in your mind, but to suggest their conflation is failure of on the part of the reader is a bit much.

It's a message forum, misunderstanding a disagreement are the order of the day. Always try to be the better man and explain instead of insult. There's no advantage in the latter. You come off smaller no matter how you do it.