Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged?????

[Mr.Frag]

When testers reported they had reinforced Wake, was that with non-historical starts?

There are two possibilities. One is the Vary start. Midway/Wake can be reinforced. The other is Non-Historical where the player probably sent thos troops down to Rabaul instead.

[j campbell]

Mike,

i agree with the Dolittle raid as merely a publicity stunt-and a risky one at that considering what there was to gain vs. lose. It ended up costing the Chinese about 250,000 lives as a direct result of American action. Chiang had no illusions about what the doolittle raid was going to cost but Roosevelt did not listen/care. it did however, cement the japanese decision on the Midway operation-hence leading to the destruction of 4 japanese CV-but who whould have known this before the raid?

[Speedysteve]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

I love this quote: "The American Army doesn't solve its problems. It overwhelms them."

That's one of my favorites too. I first saw it in "An Army at Dawn." Any idea when the sequel is supposed to come out?

IIRC this is Rick Atkinsons book?

If so I thoroughly enjoyed it. I too am eagerly awaiting the 2 other releases. It's been a while since "An Army at Dawn" was released but i've heard nothing more on the sequels...........

[jhdeerslayer]

I believe the 2nd book is coming in 2005 and the final 2008. Says the schedule somewhere in Volume 1 I believe.

[mdiehl]

Why would the US have risked almost the entire carrier forces afloat if they did not think they could win at Midway?

Immaterial to the discussion at hand. The original thrust was that the US player should not be rewarded for doing that which the JCS intended to do. Sit around and wait for a great opportunity to strike a blow. Midway was exactly such an opportunity. Unless you are going to require that the Japanese player send an understrength TF to a remote, substantially built up island with a potentially robust aircraft contingent, far from Japan's logistical bases, and also require that the Japanese player set all air units in that TF to "airfield attack," then it is inappropriate to demand action from the Allied player.

Every time this trivial notion comes up it is a transparent AF ploy to fabricate of whole cloth circumstances that merely generate VP for the Japanese player. Just admit that you want to handicap the Allied player and be done with all the badly informed notions about 'that which history requires.'

And why even attempt to thwart the Japanese at Coral Sea if the JCS could wait to take offensive until '43? The fact is they couldn't wait and events bore that out.

Your one sentence demonstrates a failure to understand Coral Sea. It was not an offensive operation. It was purely a defensive operation. The JCS DID in fact wait until 1943 to take the offensive in New Guinea.

Not to mention Doolittle or the Rabaul raid.... It was for exact moral/political reasons that you offhandedly dismiss as "garbage".

The Rabaul raid had absolutely nothing to do with "political" reasons. It was done solely and exclusively to test Japanese defenses along the perimeter and upset Japanese operational planning. It was an excellent strategic move, and any allied player would likely pull the "raid and fade" trick a couple of times, simply to keep the Japanese player committing assets to remote areas. But if the Allied player is risk averse, I see no reason to demand that the Allied player attempt such operations. The Doolittle raid was more of the same. An effort to upset Japanese operational plans, force redeployments, new commitments and loss of face in the chain of command. It was NOT at any point conceived primarily as a pr stunt for political consumption by the American home public. Anyonw who believes otherwise does not understand what it means to attack your opponents mindshare.

The fact that the Japanese were building an airstrip on Guadalcanal forced the US to take action or have lines of communication with Australia threatened. Which is what the Victory Points kind of approximate, they force you to take some action as the Allied player and not hide in a shell.

Why not prevent the Japanese player from hiding in a shell with his CVs and sitting around wating for a 6 on 3 CV battle. I guess we should require that Japan attempt to invade San Francisco by rewarding large numbers of VPs to the Allied player for possessing San Francisco.

The Japanese advance forced the hand of the Allies, who by winning (Midway), or coming to a draw with the IJN (Coral Sea), took the initiative in '42 and gained valuble experience and confidence that carried over to huge gains of '43.

Right. So unless the Japanese player is required to lose 4 CVs in an ill-advised blunder, it follows that one should not require the Allied player to sacrifice resources in ill-advised blunders (which a Guadalcanal campaign would likely be unless you have substantially depleted Japan's CV force).

It'll be up to the Allied player on how to respond to the IJN player.

Agreed. That is why I'm coming around to Mike's POV that the VP scoring system simply be ignored. Maybe there should be an option to disable the VP count. It'd be interesting to see how strategies differe between a VP game and a non-VP game.

And it's just a disingenous stab at someone to say that political considerations in the early part of the Pacific War were bunk.

Actually, it is a disingenuous stab to suggest that such claims were bunk. Political considerations were not the driving force behind any early PTO Allied raids. CVs were much too valuable to place them under undue risk solely for PR footage. That is why Hornet and Enterprise turned back from the Doolittle raid at the first sign of potential risk, and why Spruance's orders at Midway were to engage only if there was a likelihood of inflicting greater damage on the enemy. The US was in the Pacific War for the long haul, and the op-planners knew that defeating Japan was merely and solely a matter of time. Claims that the public would have demanded a negotiated peace had none of the victories of 1942 occurred are AF self-serving whole-cloth fabrications based on nothing at all.

[Speedysteve]

ORIGINAL: Deerslayer

I believe the 2nd book is coming in 2005 and the final 2008. Says the schedule somewhere in Volume 1 I believe.

Ok great. Do you know the action theatres of the last 2 books?

[jhdeerslayer]

I believe the rest of the Mediterean (sp??) campaign and then Western Europe.

[Mr.Frag]

Funny enough, the longer you completely hide your CV's as The Allied player, the more of an effect it has on Japan's ego. Not knowing is worse then knowing. Having to always wonder if you are going to get bushwhacked seriously screws with your head.

The Japanese player knows from playing that towards the end of Jan there will be 4 fully stocked Fleet CV's *somewhere* on the map waiting for a chance to spank him because he advanced too fast. This plays with his mind. It is a valuable tool to keep this mind pressure running. Should your CV's show themselves, he now knows where they are *not* and can quickly free up lots of resources that were tied up *in* *case* you showed up.

[mdiehl]

Funny enough, the longer you completely hide your CV's as The Allied player, the more of an effect it has on Japan's ego. Not knowing is worse then knowing.

You've got a point there. But to keep the threat credible the Allied player is likely to show up once in a while, hit hard, and disappear. Hence the "raid and fade." Keeps the Japanese player on a sort of alert state with air units deployed at their limits, etc.

[ColFrost]

Mike Scholl said
"As long as you realize that the arguments for early Allied offensives are pure garbage,
and that it was not only considered "acceptable" to wait for 1943, but it was the Joint
Chiefs express plan and strategy to do so. That's what "Germany First" meant........It looks like the game's "victory points" are going to force much the same kind of
nonsense on the Allied Player (Midway or no Midway), so you should be pleased. But
please don't try to cloak it in any robes of "Historical Necessity". Original US strategic
planning would have had the war with Japan going into 1946 if necessary..., and no
one was worried about the Japanese "winning" in the interim. ""

And

"When I said GARBAGE, I meant that in the terms of the overall strategic planning and
outlook of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, OFFENSIVE action was not a priority in the Pacific
Theatre. When the War broke out, certainly DEFENSIVE measures in the Pacific were
a priority (The Brits and Commonwealth at least had that covered in Europe and the
Atlantic, and would find some assets for India)........."

I apologize. I should have been more clear. I meant not doing /any/ operations, not offensive operations. I was speaking of allowing , for example, the Japanese player to take everything they wanted until the Allied player had a technological advantage. I would think that the American public couldn't handle the laundry list of defeats month after month without a Doolittle or a Gaudalcanal (which was excessively hyped as "America takes it back to the Japs!").

But seriously, (especially Mike Scholl, mdiehl, and Mr. Frag, who I always seem to run afoul of), do you think the US could have not tried to do anything until 1943, including defend points in the south Pacific, without perhaps a negative opinion forming, and a 'negotiated settlement possible?" I may be wrong, but if I don't ask, I won't know. [:)]

Look forward to your response.

[kaleun]

To add to your question, there were election s in the US in 1944 IIRC. I wonder, if no offensive action had been taken in 1942-43, under a wait for absolute supremacy policy, would FDR have still won in 44? Actually, so shortly after Normandy, he probably would have, but would he have run the risk? After all they couldn't be certain that Overlord would be launched in the summer of 44. If Overlord had been delayed due to weather, and if there had been no successes at Midway, Guadalcanal, How would that affect the US political arena for the elections in 44?
Could spark (probably will) a ton of posts.

[Mr.Frag]

do you think the US could have not tried to do anything until 1943, including defend points in the south Pacific, without perhaps a negative opinion forming, and a 'negotiated settlement possible?"

They did not have the troops available for offensive operations earlier. Had Coral Sea/Midway not pretty much eliminated the Japanese navy, there would have been very little the USA could do. Anyone would has played the scenario 19 as in UV gets about a quarter of what Japan could really have thrown into the mix.

As war will always show, the attacker controls the tempo until the defender is strong enough to block all attacks *AND* have enough left over to attack with. This does not happen until '43.

All the ships and planes in the world will not win a land battle. Troops win those.

[ColFrost]

ORIGINAL: Mr.Frag

do you think the US could have not tried to do anything until 1943, including defend points in the south Pacific, without perhaps a negative opinion forming, and a 'negotiated settlement possible?"

They did not have the troops available for offensive operations earlier. Had Coral Sea/Midway not pretty much eliminated the Japanese navy, there would have been very little the USA could do. Anyone would has played the scenario 19 as in UV gets about a quarter of what Japan could really have thrown into the mix.

As war will always show, the attacker controls the tempo until the defender is strong enough to block all attacks *AND* have enough left over to attack with. This does not happen until '43.

All the ships and planes in the world will not win a land battle. Troops win those.

Yeah, but the if the defensive 'victories' at Coral Sea and Midway had not happen, do you think their would have been political pressure on the home front? In 1942, Europe wasn't a done deal (maybe it was statistically, but they didn't know that).

Anyway, in my original post I was referring to Allied tactics about hiding until a technological advantage. Which I know is a good tactic, but is going to make turns May 42 to December 42 rather dull. It was not supposed to be a serious point as to history.

[Mike Scholl]

Very well, COLFROST. A serious question deserves serious discussion. Yes, there
would certainly be "pressure" of various sorts and from varying sources to "do some
thing" in the Pacific. Many of the first wave of volunteers into the Armed Forces after
7 December joined with the expressed goal of "killing some Japs". Workers being ex-
horted to put in more hours will eventually want to see some return on their efforts.
And the "loyal opposition across the aisle in Congress" isn't going to miss a chance to
do some "sniping". But the fact was that the great majority of the American Public
knew that war had come on them before they were ready, and much needed to be done
before the full weight of American strength could be brought down on the heads of the
"evil doers"

Those that joined to "kill Japs" realized quite quickly that they didn't really know how to
accomplish that goal, and needed some serious training and practice before they went
into action. People building planes and ships soon realized that even when they had
done their part, other folks had to train to make use of them. Even the Republicans
realized that they had to step cautiously or be confronted with their previous opposition
to "war readiness" legislation. The Newspapers, of course, were free to shout about
whatever they wanted..., but they too needed "access" to the stories and were dependent
on the War Dept. for that access.

The Joint Chiefs were in place to look at the "Big Picture"---and the Big Picture said that
Germany, with access to most of the resources of Western Europe, was the threat that
couldn't be ignored. Japan and Italy were never going to be in that league. And for a
"front man", they had FDR..., a truely skillful politician who had actually managed to
make the "depression" sound like a tough family outing that we would all pull through
if we just stuck together. Certainly there was a desire to "hit back" at the people who
brought us Pearl Harbor even on his part (enter Doolittle---which wasn't as risky as a
lot of people seem to believe). But there is no sound basis to say that continuing a
primarily defensive stance in the Pacifit until even mid-1943 was going to produce a
willingness to deal with the Japanese. The defense would still offer plenty of opportunities
for exciting stories about "our boys" fighting off hordes of fanatics, with pictures of our
bombers "pounding" various unnamed instalations, and some medel ceremonies for our
valiant submariners sinking (or being credited with sinking) some Battleship or another.
Just look at the "Colin Kelley" story if you want an example of WWII "spin doctoring".

The US couldn't just give up and hide in San Diego---but there was no pressing need to
re-take Buna or Guadalcanal or a lot of other places 98% of Americans had never heard
of. Japan was going to "get theirs" sooner or later..., that was one thing 98% of Amer-
icans COULD agree on.

[kaleun]

That was a very good and cogent summary. Thank you.

[ColFrost]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

Very well, COLFROST. A serious question deserves serious discussion. Yes, there
would certainly be "pressure" of various sorts and from varying sources to "do some
thing" in the Pacific. Many of the first wave of volunteers into the Armed Forces after
7 December joined with the expressed goal of "killing some Japs". Workers being ex-
horted to put in more hours will eventually want to see some return on their efforts.
And the "loyal opposition across the aisle in Congress" isn't going to miss a chance to
do some "sniping". But the fact was that the great majority of the American Public
knew that war had come on them before they were ready, and much needed to be done
before the full weight of American strength could be brought down on the heads of the
"evil doers"

Those that joined to "kill Japs" realized quite quickly that they didn't really know how to
accomplish that goal, and needed some serious training and practice before they went
into action. People building planes and ships soon realized that even when they had
done their part, other folks had to train to make use of them. Even the Republicans
realized that they had to step cautiously or be confronted with their previous opposition
to "war readiness" legislation. The Newspapers, of course, were free to shout about
whatever they wanted..., but they too needed "access" to the stories and were dependent
on the War Dept. for that access.

The Joint Chiefs were in place to look at the "Big Picture"---and the Big Picture said that
Germany, with access to most of the resources of Western Europe, was the threat that
couldn't be ignored. Japan and Italy were never going to be in that league. And for a
"front man", they had FDR..., a truely skillful politician who had actually managed to
make the "depression" sound like a tough family outing that we would all pull through
if we just stuck together. Certainly there was a desire to "hit back" at the people who
brought us Pearl Harbor even on his part (enter Doolittle---which wasn't as risky as a
lot of people seem to believe). But there is no sound basis to say that continuing a
primarily defensive stance in the Pacifit until even mid-1943 was going to produce a
willingness to deal with the Japanese. The defense would still offer plenty of opportunities
for exciting stories about "our boys" fighting off hordes of fanatics, with pictures of our
bombers "pounding" various unnamed instalations, and some medel ceremonies for our
valiant submariners sinking (or being credited with sinking) some Battleship or another.
Just look at the "Colin Kelley" story if you want an example of WWII "spin doctoring".

The US couldn't just give up and hide in San Diego---but there was no pressing need to
re-take Buna or Guadalcanal or a lot of other places 98% of Americans had never heard
of. Japan was going to "get theirs" sooner or later..., that was one thing 98% of Amer-
icans COULD agree on.

Thank you for your response. [:)] Very well thought out.

At least I'll know that if I ever play you PBEM as the Japanese, that I'll need to worry about your submariners most of all, until '43.[;)]

[mogami]

Hi, You know all these players who plan on sitting back as the Allies are really just waiting for the Japanese player to stick his neck out and get his head chopped off. Lose 4 fleet CV as Japan in early/mid 1942 and see if it takes till 1943 before the USN shows up to land on one of your bases.

What they mean is in Dec 1941 they have no offensive plans. They are going to go after the IJN. Once they get it knocked down to the proper size they will start looking for places to send the USMC.

If the Japanese land in New Guinea (and we all know they will) these players will send Allied divisions to New Guinea. Once they get the Japanese in retreat they are going to follow them as far as they can.

[hithere]

ORIGINAL: j campbell

Mike,

i agree with the Dolittle raid as merely a publicity stunt-and a risky one at that considering what there was to gain vs. lose. It ended up costing the Chinese about 250,000 lives as a direct result of American action. Chiang had no illusions about what the doolittle raid was going to cost but Roosevelt did not listen/care. it did however, cement the japanese decision on the Midway operation-hence leading to the destruction of 4 japanese CV-but who whould have known this before the raid?

I normally don't get involved with these arguments because it is a lose/lose situation. But I have to disagree with you here. 250,000 Chinese did not lose their lives as a direct result of American action, they were murdered because of direct result of Jap action. The Japs directly shot them in the back of the head, the Japs directly burned them alive, the Japs directly clubed a bayonetted men, women, and children. To blame the U.S. for doing what JAPAN asked, waging war, is just un-believable. So Tokyo got bombed, thats war. Should the U.S. just not done anything???? If the Japs murdered the locals In some of the Island chains (any they did by the way) that we invaded, would that have been our fault? They killed all the CIVILIAN engineers on Wake because they were losing the war and basically starving. was that the U.S.'s fault?
If these seems harsh it is bacause THEY STARTED IT. Not only that, they committed some of the most horrible atrocities of the war. Another 250,000 was just that much closer to their goal.

thank you for your time

[kaleun]

DARN RIGHT!

[dwesolick]

ORIGINAL: hithere

ORIGINAL: j campbell

Mike,

i agree with the Dolittle raid as merely a publicity stunt-and a risky one at that considering what there was to gain vs. lose. It ended up costing the Chinese about 250,000 lives as a direct result of American action. Chiang had no illusions about what the doolittle raid was going to cost but Roosevelt did not listen/care. it did however, cement the japanese decision on the Midway operation-hence leading to the destruction of 4 japanese CV-but who whould have known this before the raid?

I normally don't get involved with these arguments because it is a lose/lose situation. But I have to disagree with you here. 250,000 Chinese did not lose their lives as a direct result of American action, they were murdered because of direct result of Jap action. The Japs directly shot them in the back of the head, the Japs directly burned them alive, the Japs directly clubed a bayonetted men, women, and children. To blame the U.S. for doing what JAPAN asked, waging war, is just un-believable. So Tokyo got bombed, thats war. Should the U.S. just not done anything???? If the Japs murdered the locals In some of the Island chains (any they did by the way) that we invaded, would that have been our fault? They killed all the CIVILIAN engineers on Wake because they were losing the war and basically starving. was that the U.S.'s fault?
If these seems harsh it is bacause THEY STARTED IT. Not only that, they committed some of the most horrible atrocities of the war. Another 250,000 was just that much closer to their goal.

thank you for your time

Well said. You might have added the Rape of Nanking, which happened in 1937 (200,000-500,000 Chinese murdered), over four years before the Doolittle Raid. How was America responsible for this?
Japanese conduct prior to and during WWII was nothing short of barbarous. It irritates me greatly that the sins of Germany are constantly (and deservedly) examined, while those of the Japanese often get buried. The Japanese, like the Germans, started a brutal war of conquest/extermination and, like the Germans, paid a terrible and well deserved price.
We wargamers tend to sometimes lose sight of the moral issues surrounding WWII when playing our games and this is, of course, understandable since they only deal with purely military matters. But it is helpful, on occasion, to stop and imagine a world in which the Axis powers wound up victorious. A horrifying prospect to say the least.