Why was Patton so great?

[EricGuitarJames]

ORIGINAL: mavraam

I wonder if Deep Breakfast had any idea what he started when he posted this! [:D]

Probably[;)]. Like I said, discussions on Patton bring out strong passions in the interested parties. He and MacArthur are the two most controversial of the Allied commanders in WW2, they would wilfully disregard orders, seek short term 'glory' at the expense of long term strategic objectives, tactlessly criticise both superiors and subordinates - they were certainly not 'team players'. On the other hand, they were natural soldiers, brave almost to the point of foolhardiness, great tacticians and were regarded by their troops with genuine affection (most of the time anyway).

[mavraam]

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

ORIGINAL: mavraam

I wonder if Deep Breakfast had any idea what he started when he posted this! [:D]

Probably[;)]. Like I said, discussions on Patton bring out strong passions in the interested parties. He and MacArthur are the two most controversial of the Allied commanders in WW2, they would wilfully disregard orders, seek short term 'glory' at the expense of long term strategic objectives, tactlessly criticise both superiors and subordinates - they were certainly not 'team players'. On the other hand, they were natural soldiers, brave almost to the point of foolhardiness, great tacticians and were regarded by their troops with genuine affection (most of the time anyway).

Speaking of Patton and MacArthur, this is a great story which I read originally in one of Patton's biographies:

On the afternoon of September 12, 1918, in the midst of a bloody battle between the American Expeditionary Force and the German Army, two American Army officers, a thirty-two year old lieutenant colonel and a thirty-eight year old brigadier general, greeted each other on a small exposed hill. On either side of them infantry and tanks maneuvered forward to the French town of Essey, a quarter mile to the north. Small arms fire and an occasional artillery burst kept the air alive and dangerous.

The lieutenant colonel sported a Colt .45 pistol with an ivory grip and his engraved initials. A pipe was clenched in his teeth. The brigadier wore a barracks cap and a muffler his mother knitted for him. As they spoke to each other, a German artillery barrage opened up and began marching towards their position. Infantrymen scattered and dove for cover, but the two officers remained standing, coolly talking with each other.

The Lieutenant Colonel, George S. Patton, had been in the Army for nine years, and the Brigadier General, Douglas Mac-Arthur, for fifteen, but the two West Pointers had never met. Their careers had taken them in different directions until this day during the First World War. Both officers became famous for their bravery and daring in the Second World War, yet both set the precedent for courage under fire in the First. That Patton and MacArthur did remain standing while an artillery barrage passed over is historically accepted, but what they said to each other as the shells began to drop remains a point of controversy. Only by examining the various stories that developed out of this chance encounter can some of the myths be eradicated.

http://www.armyhistoryfnd.org/armyhist/ ... _type_id=3

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Iron Duke:

My apologies. Nothing should be taken personally [:)] We are only having a discussion.

No offence taken. My apologies if I gave the impression it had. It was getting late and I was tired [:)].

In your post above you have clarified what you have read.

As I mentioned previously, you entered this discussion with your mind already made up about Patton. It is not my job to convince you otherwise.

Before I read anything about Patton, I was fairly lukewarm about him and his accompishments. Having read several books about him, I have since formulated a very favourable impression of him and what he did.

My point is the same. I had no real opinion of Patton before reading about the same career you did. I came to the completely opposite conclusion.

Patton, like MacArthur, had a lot of enemies in higher command and elsewhere, who took every opportunity to downplay their accomplishments no matter what they did. To some, a glass is half empty; to others it is half full.

McArthur is another one I have issues with, but simply because they made enemies does not mean the criticisms those enemies made were wrong. Being critical does not make you an enemy. It merely makes you a critic. Patton also has many critics amongst professional historians. McArthur maybe even more so.

If I disliked any leader in history, I could easily make them look like incompetent fools. This can be done by anyone. It's called having an agenda.

I have no agenda, just an opinion. I have no personal stake in whether Patton is remembered as a genius or a fool. An agenda ascribes me motivations I simply do not have. It isn't fair. We both read several books (would you be willing to cite your sources?) yet you enter the conversation having "forumulated an opinion", yet I enter it with "an agenda".

Patton had many critics. But this does not diminish what he accomplished.

Having critics diminishes nothing, this is true. Except, in this instance, the critics don't think he accomplished much to diminish.

Bradley, who despised Patton, criticized him at every turn (even though many historians are unkind to Bradley's tactics in Europe). However, Patton was the ONLY Allied commander the Germans feared. I think this speaks volumes.

Bradley despised Patton because he had worked with him. It is easy to say Bradley's opinions were coloured by his animosity, but ask yourself why he felt this way? He served both under and over Patton, he had more experience of him than anyone, and his opinion can not be lightly dismissed.

You have written a lot in your post above, but there are still many inaccuracies in what has been written. However, I'm not going to bother to correct them.

With the greatest of respect, you let yourself down here. I took the time to correct what I perceived were your innaccuracies. However, it's a cheap shot to simply say I'm wrong but be unwilling to say why. If I am wrong, point out my nonsense for all the forum to see, allow me the chance to defend myself, but to simply say "you're clearly wrong but I can't be bothered to tell you how"... well.....[8|] What is the point of this forum if not to discuss. Why are any of us here is not to debate, and part of debate is exposing the errors of the other's argument. Simply saying someone is wrong is not an argument, I pride myself in the accuracy of the facts I use to back my arguments, so if I am wrong, I would truly welcome anyone who would correct and enlighten me, as I'd rather be corrected by (and discover) the truth, than be left in the dark with my errors.

You don't think much of Patton, that is your right. But your opinion of him still does not diminish what he accomplished.

It does if I am right, because my argument is he didn't accomplish much.

Cheers!

And to you, Sir.

regards,
IronDuke.

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

ORIGINAL: mavraam

I wonder if Deep Breakfast had any idea what he started when he posted this! [:D]

Probably[;)]. Like I said, discussions on Patton bring out strong passions in the interested parties. He and MacArthur are the two most controversial of the Allied commanders in WW2, they would wilfully disregard orders, seek short term 'glory' at the expense of long term strategic objectives, tactlessly criticise both superiors and subordinates - they were certainly not 'team players'. On the other hand, they were natural soldiers, brave almost to the point of foolhardiness, great tacticians and were regarded by their troops with genuine affection (most of the time anyway).

I agree with everything you said (a nice precis of the two men) except where you said "great tacticians".
I don't think either was particularly good operationally. Had they been good operationally, I think they would have gone down as the greatest Allied Commanders of WWII. Their faults would have been overridden by those qualities you describe so succinctly. As it was, I don't think they do. As to who was, well.....[&:]

[EricGuitarJames]

Mavraam, thanks for the link, I've added it to my files so I can read it at my leisure.

I agree with everything you said (a nice precis of the two men) except where you said "great tacticians".

Well they must have had something[;)]. Both lacked the capacity to see the 'bigger picture' and so squandered opportunities to follow up successes, something which diminishes what they were able to achieve. But again this is all part of why they're such controversial figures - for every moment of brilliance, an act of crass stupidity.

The greatest Allied Commander of WW2, maybe we should start a poll[8D]. My vote would go to Slim.

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

Mavraam, thanks for the link, I've added it to my files so I can read it at my leisure.

I agree with everything you said (a nice precis of the two men) except where you said "great tacticians".

Well they must have had something[;)]. Both lacked the capacity to see the 'bigger picture' and so squandered opportunities to follow up successes, something which diminishes what they were able to achieve. But again this is all part of why they're such controversial figures - for every moment of brilliance, an act of crass stupidity.

The greatest Allied Commander of WW2, maybe we should start a poll[8D]. My vote would go to Slim.

Patton had speed and drive, although not necessarily much idea how to drive. McArthur, well, I like him less.

As for the greatest, I think the allies were blessed with a largely uninspiring bunch at Army and Army Group level. At Division and Corp level, they had some good Officers, Urquart, Gavin, Taylor, Ridgeway, Collins, Horrocks, early O'Connor to name just a few. Above that, a series of Generals who on the whole were either disappointing (MontGomery, Bradley and Patton) or really disappointing (Clark).

Slim is a good choice and a contender. I thought Nimitz had a good war. Overall, the man with the hardest mission, who accomplished it with some skill at times, was Eisenhower. Not a Combat expert (although not quite the amateur some would have us believe) he nevertheless did his assigned role with some skill.
I'd be tempted to nominate him. If you want the Allies keenest operational mind, it gets a little harder.

Britain and America had a number of good Admirals, and I'd probably look here. Cunningham, Ramsey, Pound, Nimitz, all very able men.

Slim or Eisenhower get the land vote. I've never really warmed to Zhukov because of his methods, although I appreciate they probably suited the theatre he was in and the pressure he was under.

Regards,
IronDuke

[Von Rom]

IronDuke:

When I mentioned the fact that many critics usually start out having an agenda, I was not referring to you. I was referring to critics in general (usually those individuals who take the time to write and publish books).

As for Bradley despising Patton: Patton's long-time staff had been with Patton for a long time and they remained steadfastly loyal to him. The hundreds of thousands of soldiers who served under Patton, loved him. Even the soldiers Patton slapped said they deserved to be slapped.

Contrary to what was shown in the movie, when Patton was forced to apologize to Third Army (for the slapping incident), all his soldiers cheered loudly, so that Patton could not utter his apology. They (the soldiers of Third Army) felt that the General did not have to apologize to them. This act brought tears to Patton's eyes.

I would take the opinion of 300,000 men (who trained under, and fought for, Patton) over Bradley's opinion, any day of the week. . .

Patton was not alone in being the victim of petty jealousies: Rommel had his critics too, while he fought in North Africa. And those same critics were instrumental in keeping reinforcements from getting to him.

This ends my discussion on this topic.

Have a nice day [8D]

[frank1970]

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

IronDuke:

When I mentioned the fact that many critics usually start out having an agenda, I was not referring to you. I was referring to critics in general (usually those individuals who take the time to write and publish books).

As for Bradley despising Patton: Patton's long-time staff had been with Patton for a long time and they remained steadfastly loyal to him. The hundreds of thousands of soldiers who served under Patton, loved him. Even the soldiers Patton slapped said they deserved to be slapped.

Contrary to what was shown in the movie, when Patton was forced to apologize to Third Army (for the slapping incident), all his soldiers cheered loudly, so that Patton could not utter his apology. They (the soldiers of Third Army) felt that the General did not have to apologize to them. This act brought tears to Patton's eyes.

I would take the opinion of 300,000 men (who trained under, and fought for, Patton) over Bradley's opinion, any day of the week. . .

Patton was not alone in being the victim of petty jealousies: Rommel had his critics too, while he fought in North Africa. And those same critics were instrumental in keeping reinforcements from getting to him.

This ends my discussion on this topic.

Have a nice day [8D]

I do not want to make you feel bad or so , but people cheering an idiot is not seldom and was not seldom at that time. Otherwise Hitler must have been the greatest general of all.

[Von Rom]

ORIGINAL: Frank

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

IronDuke:

When I mentioned the fact that many critics usually start out having an agenda, I was not referring to you. I was referring to critics in general (usually those individuals who take the time to write and publish books).

As for Bradley despising Patton: Patton's long-time staff had been with Patton for a long time and they remained steadfastly loyal to him. The hundreds of thousands of soldiers who served under Patton, loved him. Even the soldiers Patton slapped said they deserved to be slapped.

Contrary to what was shown in the movie, when Patton was forced to apologize to Third Army (for the slapping incident), all his soldiers cheered loudly, so that Patton could not utter his apology. They (the soldiers of Third Army) felt that the General did not have to apologize to them. This act brought tears to Patton's eyes.

I would take the opinion of 300,000 men (who trained under, and fought for, Patton) over Bradley's opinion, any day of the week. . .

Patton was not alone in being the victim of petty jealousies: Rommel had his critics too, while he fought in North Africa. And those same critics were instrumental in keeping reinforcements from getting to him.

This ends my discussion on this topic.

Have a nice day [8D]

I do not want to make you feel bad or so , but people cheering an idiot is not seldom and was not seldom at that time. Otherwise Hitler must have been the greatest general of all.

You're right, Hitler was an idiot.

I didn't see soldiers cheering for Hitler in 1944. I believe Hitler spent most of his time in a bunker, hiding. In fact, many of Hitler's own generals (Rommel included) wanted to kill him.

And obviously, you are also referring to Patton as an idiot. Hmmm, Patton the Idiot, the man the German High Command feared the most. . . heheh

The soldiers and officers of Third Army, those who actually fought for Patton, continued to love him, even 50 years after the war was over. . .

And Patton was buried at the head of the fallen soldiers of Third Army. . .

Have a nice day.

[Von Rom]

Here is an excellent website that helps to explain Bradley's hatred for Patton:

http://www.pattonuncovered.com/html/bradley.html


Here is an excerpt:

Patton is the only clear voice that remains from WWII without need of deciphering. We are extremely lucky that Patton followed General Pershing’s advice and kept a diary. Without Patton’s diary, we would not have clear proof of his incredible “sixth sense:” his accurate guesses as to the intention of the enemy. It is easy for a commander to say, years after the war, that he “knew all along” the enemy was about to attack. That commander must be able to prove that he knew – and the best proof is a day-to-day account in a war diary.

In “A Soldier’s Story,” Bradley praises Patton with what would seem mollified respect. But in 1983 Bradley wrote another vicious book that fiercely attacks Patton called, “A General’s Life.” The tone used in describing Patton, while in the first book admiring, has changed to bitter hatred. In his second book, Bradley attacks Patton where in the first book he seemed to approve. Read these two passages describing the same event.

“Patton telephoned me that evening from Lucky Forward near Laval. ‘We’ve got elements in Argentan,’ he reported. ‘Let me go on to Falaise and we’ll drive the British back into the sea for another Dunkirk.’‘Nothing doing,’ I told him, for I was fearful of colliding with Montgomery’s forces. ‘You’re not to go beyond Argentan. Just stop where you are and build up that shoulder. Sibert tells me the German is beginning to pull out. You’d better button up and get ready for him.’” “A Soldier’s Story,” by General Omar N. Bradley

“I had a sharp telephone exchange with Patton that morning. He further infuriated me with his boastful, supercilious attitude. ‘Let me go on to Falaise and we’ll drive the British back into the sea for another Dunkirk.’ I replied coldly and firmly, ‘Nothing doing. You’re not to go beyond Argentan. Just stop where you are and build up that shoulder.’” “A General’s Life,” by General Omar N. Bradley

And while in the first account Bradley seems happy that Patton recalled Haislip “without a word,” in the second account, Bradley is “furious” that Patton did not ask to advance Haislip in the first place. There is a very clear difference in Bradley’s attitude towards Patton in both books. Why?

It first must be realized that Bradley lived into the 1980s – long enough to see the collapse of the post-war reputations. Bradley had lived a long and prosperous life. He had commanded in Korea and had been promoted to five-star general. Bradley knew that he had risen higher than Patton would ever have been allowed to go. Yet Bradley must also have known that he was eclipsed by the genius of the man whom he had commanded. Bradley must have read many of the books by historians who had begun to realize that Patton had been unjustly cheated of many opportunities – like Falaise – for winning the war.

Bradley lived to read books by historians who had uncovered evidence that Eisenhower and Montgomery were bad commanders who had purposely “lost” files pertaining to their disasters. “Patton’s Gap,” with its evidence that Bradley had changed his version of events to match Eisenhower’s, had been published as well. There were some cloudy circumstances around his own Hurtgen Forest and Battle of the Bulge, too.

Patton had emerged the true hero of WWII – Bradley was only a five star general who had survived the war. Historians already knew that one of the reasons Bradley was promoted was because he was so weak-kneed. Did Bradley read the books that proved Patton was denied gas for his attacks? Or the books that showed he had ignored Patton’s timely advice predicting the Battle of the Bulge? It would have been difficult for Bradley to ignore the evidence that Eisenhower’s, Montgomery’s, and his own reputation were not going to last beyond his lifetime.

[Von Rom]

Here are some comments about Patton by high ranking German Officers:

The Germans respected Patton’s strategy and admired its genius, calling him the Allies' "most modern" commander.

German Major General Schimpf of the 3rd Paratroop Division called Patton’s campaign in the Palatinate "phenomenal."

Rommel wrote that, "We had to wait until the Patton Army in France to see the most astonishing achievements in mobile warfare."

Von Rundstedt simply called Patton our "best."

General Fritz Bayerlain, the able commander of the Panzer Lehr Division and a veteran of North Africa, assesses the escape of Rommel's Panzer Armee Afrika after Alamein: "I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily (as Monty had)" (D'Este, p.815).

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

IronDuke:

When I mentioned the fact that many critics usually start out having an agenda, I was not referring to you. I was referring to critics in general (usually those individuals who take the time to write and publish books).

Indeed, but you must recognise that this is as likely to be the case with D'Este's admiring biography as it it with anyone else, or is your suggestion that only those who dislike Patton have this agenda?

As for Bradley despising Patton: Patton's long-time staff had been with Patton for a long time and they remained steadfastly loyal to him. The hundreds of thousands of soldiers who served under Patton, loved him. Even the soldiers Patton slapped said they deserved to be slapped.

Contrary to what was shown in the movie, when Patton was forced to apologize to Third Army (for the slapping incident), all his soldiers cheered loudly, so that Patton could not utter his apology. They (the soldiers of Third Army) felt that the General did not have to apologize to them. This act brought tears to Patton's eyes.

Irrelevant, for a couple of reasons. Firstly, as I've said already, Monty's men loved him, many Generals could claim the same. I've even seen Haig remembered fondly by survivors of the Great War. It doesn't prove anything except their men liked them. I don't think this is unusual in combat units. Given Patton's tendancy to lead from the front and take the same sort of risks as his men, I'd be surprised if he wasn't popular. This doesn't make him some sort of strategic genius (which I thought was the essence of this thread) it just means his men liked him.

Secondly, loyalty is also not uncommon. Monty's key staff were with him for years. Ulltimately, you keep people on because you work well with them, you respect them, and you like them. In those circumstances, I'd again be surprised if many generals were heavily criticised by their staff. Many German Generals had criticims to make, but then they lost the war, and such criticisms come easier to them.

I would take the opinion of 300,000 men (who trained under, and fought for, Patton) over Bradley's opinion, any day of the week. . .

I wouldn't, not when it came to operational matters. As someone else pointed out, many men fought to the death for the Fuhrer, whose grip on strategic reality by 1944 was fast becoming tenuous at best.

Patton was not alone in being the victim of petty jealousies: Rommel had his critics too, while he fought in North Africa. And those same critics were instrumental in keeping reinforcements from getting to him.

Debateable. It's interesting to note that as late as 1944, Rommel still had direct access to Hitler over his nominal Superior Von Rundstedt. Hitler liked him, and the real cause of the fallout between them was Hitler, not anyone in his headquarters.

What kept reinforcements from Rommel was a strategic situation in Russia that demanded all resources available. Africa was never more than a sideshow. Since the german supply situation in Africa was perilous at best, even if he had had such forces, they would have been stuck in some north african port witing for the fuel to drive out to reach him at El Alamein. Reinforcements are only good if you can feed them, transport them, and provide them with ammunition to shoot. If Hitler refused him reinforcements, it was not because of intrigue against Rommel.

This ends my discussion on this topic.

This I know to be nonsense, and what is more, I can prove it. [:D]

Regards,
IronDuke

[Von Rom]

To paraphrase: "Just when I thought I got out. . . they pulled me back in. . ." [;)]

Rommel In North Africa:

Yes, I am aware of Rommel's supply problems.

However, you seem to have over-looked Rommel's personal and political enemies, GeneralOberst Jodl and Field Marshal Albert Keitel, who had Hitler's ear during the time of Rommel's command in North Africa, and whom Heinrich Himmler said he believed played a "higher part" in Rommel's death.


D'Este's Book "Patton: A Genuis for War":

On the whole it is a fairly balanced book - looking at all the evidence and presenting the good with the bad.

This is not so with Bradley's second book, the object of which, was to go out of its way to pour vindictive upon Patton's name. See the above post for some reasons for this vindictive approach on Bradley's part.

Some reviews:

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/de ... 1?v=glance

http://stonebooks.com/archives/951127.shtml



Anyway, I have said all I need to on this topic. I posted the above info for others' reading.

Signing off. . .

[ShermanM4]

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Here is an excellent website that helps to explain Bradley's hatred for Patton:

http://www.pattonuncovered.com/html/bradley.html


Here is an excerpt:

Patton is the only clear voice that remains from WWII without need of deciphering. We are extremely lucky that Patton followed General Pershing’s advice and kept a diary. Without Patton’s diary, we would not have clear proof of his incredible “sixth sense:” his accurate guesses as to the intention of the enemy. It is easy for a commander to say, years after the war, that he “knew all along” the enemy was about to attack. That commander must be able to prove that he knew – and the best proof is a day-to-day account in a war diary.

In “A Soldier’s Story,” Bradley praises Patton with what would seem mollified respect. But in 1983 Bradley wrote another vicious book that fiercely attacks Patton called, “A General’s Life.” The tone used in describing Patton, while in the first book admiring, has changed to bitter hatred. In his second book, Bradley attacks Patton where in the first book he seemed to approve. Read these two passages describing the same event.

“Patton telephoned me that evening from Lucky Forward near Laval. ‘We’ve got elements in Argentan,’ he reported. ‘Let me go on to Falaise and we’ll drive the British back into the sea for another Dunkirk.’‘Nothing doing,’ I told him, for I was fearful of colliding with Montgomery’s forces. ‘You’re not to go beyond Argentan. Just stop where you are and build up that shoulder. Sibert tells me the German is beginning to pull out. You’d better button up and get ready for him.’” “A Soldier’s Story,” by General Omar N. Bradley

“I had a sharp telephone exchange with Patton that morning. He further infuriated me with his boastful, supercilious attitude. ‘Let me go on to Falaise and we’ll drive the British back into the sea for another Dunkirk.’ I replied coldly and firmly, ‘Nothing doing. You’re not to go beyond Argentan. Just stop where you are and build up that shoulder.’” “A General’s Life,” by General Omar N. Bradley

And while in the first account Bradley seems happy that Patton recalled Haislip “without a word,” in the second account, Bradley is “furious” that Patton did not ask to advance Haislip in the first place. There is a very clear difference in Bradley’s attitude towards Patton in both books. Why?

It first must be realized that Bradley lived into the 1980s – long enough to see the collapse of the post-war reputations. Bradley had lived a long and prosperous life. He had commanded in Korea and had been promoted to five-star general. Bradley knew that he had risen higher than Patton would ever have been allowed to go. Yet Bradley must also have known that he was eclipsed by the genius of the man whom he had commanded. Bradley must have read many of the books by historians who had begun to realize that Patton had been unjustly cheated of many opportunities – like Falaise – for winning the war.

Bradley lived to read books by historians who had uncovered evidence that Eisenhower and Montgomery were bad commanders who had purposely “lost” files pertaining to their disasters. “Patton’s Gap,” with its evidence that Bradley had changed his version of events to match Eisenhower’s, had been published as well. There were some cloudy circumstances around his own Hurtgen Forest and Battle of the Bulge, too.

Patton had emerged the true hero of WWII – Bradley was only a five star general who had survived the war. Historians already knew that one of the reasons Bradley was promoted was because he was so weak-kneed. Did Bradley read the books that proved Patton was denied gas for his attacks? Or the books that showed he had ignored Patton’s timely advice predicting the Battle of the Bulge? It would have been difficult for Bradley to ignore the evidence that Eisenhower’s, Montgomery’s, and his own reputation were not going to last beyond his lifetime.

Thats a brilliant conclusion Von Rom. It sounds like you've done some very good research into this subject. However, I did not realize that Eisenhower and Bradley held a sort of celebrity status as the brilliant victors of the war while Patton experienced a temporary eclipse. A good point all around.

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Here is an excellent website that helps to explain Bradley's hatred for Patton:

http://www.pattonuncovered.com/html/bradley.html


Here is an excerpt:

Patton is the only clear voice that remains from WWII without need of deciphering. We are extremely lucky that Patton followed General Pershing’s advice and kept a diary. Without Patton’s diary, we would not have clear proof of his incredible “sixth sense:” his accurate guesses as to the intention of the enemy. It is easy for a commander to say, years after the war, that he “knew all along” the enemy was about to attack. That commander must be able to prove that he knew – and the best proof is a day-to-day account in a war diary.

In “A Soldier’s Story,” Bradley praises Patton with what would seem mollified respect. But in 1983 Bradley wrote another vicious book that fiercely attacks Patton called, “A General’s Life.” The tone used in describing Patton, while in the first book admiring, has changed to bitter hatred. In his second book, Bradley attacks Patton where in the first book he seemed to approve. Read these two passages describing the same event.

“Patton telephoned me that evening from Lucky Forward near Laval. ‘We’ve got elements in Argentan,’ he reported. ‘Let me go on to Falaise and we’ll drive the British back into the sea for another Dunkirk.’‘Nothing doing,’ I told him, for I was fearful of colliding with Montgomery’s forces. ‘You’re not to go beyond Argentan. Just stop where you are and build up that shoulder. Sibert tells me the German is beginning to pull out. You’d better button up and get ready for him.’” “A Soldier’s Story,” by General Omar N. Bradley

“I had a sharp telephone exchange with Patton that morning. He further infuriated me with his boastful, supercilious attitude. ‘Let me go on to Falaise and we’ll drive the British back into the sea for another Dunkirk.’ I replied coldly and firmly, ‘Nothing doing. You’re not to go beyond Argentan. Just stop where you are and build up that shoulder.’” “A General’s Life,” by General Omar N. Bradley

And while in the first account Bradley seems happy that Patton recalled Haislip “without a word,” in the second account, Bradley is “furious” that Patton did not ask to advance Haislip in the first place. There is a very clear difference in Bradley’s attitude towards Patton in both books. Why?

It first must be realized that Bradley lived into the 1980s – long enough to see the collapse of the post-war reputations. Bradley had lived a long and prosperous life. He had commanded in Korea and had been promoted to five-star general. Bradley knew that he had risen higher than Patton would ever have been allowed to go. Yet Bradley must also have known that he was eclipsed by the genius of the man whom he had commanded. Bradley must have read many of the books by historians who had begun to realize that Patton had been unjustly cheated of many opportunities – like Falaise – for winning the war.

Bradley lived to read books by historians who had uncovered evidence that Eisenhower and Montgomery were bad commanders who had purposely “lost” files pertaining to their disasters. “Patton’s Gap,” with its evidence that Bradley had changed his version of events to match Eisenhower’s, had been published as well. There were some cloudy circumstances around his own Hurtgen Forest and Battle of the Bulge, too.

Patton had emerged the true hero of WWII – Bradley was only a five star general who had survived the war. Historians already knew that one of the reasons Bradley was promoted was because he was so weak-kneed. Did Bradley read the books that proved Patton was denied gas for his attacks? Or the books that showed he had ignored Patton’s timely advice predicting the Battle of the Bulge? It would have been difficult for Bradley to ignore the evidence that Eisenhower’s, Montgomery’s, and his own reputation were not going to last beyond his lifetime.

And you don't think that this man has an pro-Patton agenda?

Yet Bradley must also have known that he was eclipsed by the genius of the man whom he had commanded.

or

Historians already knew that one of the reasons Bradley was promoted was because he was so weak-kneed.

He claims that Bradley was embittered after reading Patton's diaries, but it might equally be that after years of being polite, Bradley realised Patton's true feelings and decided to get his own true feelings off his chest.

The best bit is

“His success is due to his lack of backbone and subservience to those above him. I will manage without him. In fact, I always have; even in Sicily he had to be carried.” Patton’s Diary

True, but undoubtedly infuriating to its subject.

Given the discussion we've already had, it's clear that Patton spent most of Sicily improving his own reputation with a massive attack that achieved precisely nothing (except good headlines). In these circumstances, Patton's comments make no sense. The Author of your website seems to decry Bradley's literary efforts, but accept as authentic and unbiased Patton's diary entries. This has agenda written all over it.

As for the origins of Bradley's problems with Patton, read this from D'Este:

Since the invasion he [Bradley] had grown increasingly disenchanted with his mercurial Boss....Since the invasion he had grown critical of Patton's direction of the American ground effort, and both the boundary line incident and the Palermo opoeration had buttressed Bradley's conviction that Patton was turning out to be a poor commander. [Bradley] believed that Palermo, and now the fixation with Messina, were thinly disguised ploys for headlines at the expense of his troops.

Bradley thought the Palermo operation glory hunting and strategically pointless, he was appalled by some of the things that happened later on the road to Messina. At one point, Patton demanded an amphib operation at Brolo. Bradley (and the General slated to lead the attack) wanted a postponement because the necessary artillery and troops to support the amphib attack behind the German lines was not going to be ready. Patton exploded, insisted the attack go ahead because correspondents would be with the Amphib foces and a delay would look bad. The attack went ahead, and nearly failed. Bradley was appalled later when Patton's HQs insisted a second amphib attack take place, because the landing point was behind American lines. The troops jumped off the boats to be met by an American General on the beach.

To round it off, Patton ordered no attempt to take Messina until he was in the area to lead the triumphal entry. Bradley reports how he had to hold his men in the hills around Messina waiting for Patton rather than storming into the town to capture as many of the fleeing Germans as he could. Truscott reports how an Italian who entered American positions offered to surrender the town, and Truscott had to refuse, as he was waiting for Patton. You previously told us Patton was a man who took many prisoners, and made long sweeping pincer movements. Here, Americans sit idly by unable to take the key town of Messina because George and his cameraman have not yet arrived. [8|]

Your new website's assertion that we can take Patton's diaries as the truth because they were contemporary and never meant for publication is also interesting. At the beginning of the Sicily campaign, two american GIs massacred 73 Italian POWS. Patton was told of the incident and wrote in his diary that Bradley (who was horrified) should tell the Officer responsible to certify that the dead men had been snipers or prisoners attempting to escape as the press would kick up a stink otherwise.

An eyewitness to the time when Patton was told reports that George actually said: "Try the $%^&$%^&".

Clearly, his diaries are not quite the historical mine of information it is sometimes claimed. They have no more validity than Bradley's post war reminisinces.

Patton is perhaps not the second world war's "only clear voice".


Regards,
IronDuke

[freeboy]

Diaries need to be read as a non objective view on reality... take Ceasars diary accounts, he knew they would be read and took great pains to make his fabulous feats even more so. Patton was a flawed man, no one claims other wise.. but the issue really is leadership and generalship. He ranks at the top because his troops performed, and he was a daring commander who looked to beat his oppenent not safely advance to the next town.
The comparrison to Bradly is excellent. Both West pointers... one an excellent manager.. beans and bullets but inspired leadership? The other was all about the big picture...
Perhaps our debate here has more to do with who WE are than who these figures where?????

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Here are some comments about Patton by high ranking German Officers:

I have some as well.

The Germans respected Patton’s strategy and admired its genius, calling him the Allies' "most modern" commander.

Please cite source.

German Major General Schimpf of the 3rd Paratroop Division called Patton’s campaign in the Palatinate "phenomenal."

Interesting. I think it was Chester Wilmott who pointed out that Von Rundstedt's Panzer divisions had been withdrawn from the area. The line was already largely shattered when Patton jumped off and there were no reserves left to restore the situation. Once again we have Patton in his element, driving through a defeated enemy. I've already stated he could drive tanks like no one else in the Allied Army provided there was nothing to block his way. He was a logistician.

Rommel wrote that, "We had to wait until the Patton Army in France to see the most astonishing achievements in mobile warfare."

We've discussed this in detail. You are yet to illustrate that Patton did anything more than what I basically described above. A fast armoured drive through a shattered enemy (an enemy shattered by others). The drive was flawed as the joy ride through Brittany illustrates and the advance of Montgomery through France after Falaise was closed was also impressive.

As Guderian writes:

There was a great shortage of troops that could not be made up. Hence Patton in his race across France found no real resistance

Von Rundstedt:

Von Rundstedt simply called Patton our "best."

Whether true or not, this doesn't mean he was good. Merely that the Allies were generally poorly led at Army level.

General Fritz Bayerlain, the able commander of the Panzer Lehr Division and a veteran of North Africa, assesses the escape of Rommel's Panzer Armee Afrika after Alamein: "I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily (as Monty had)" (D'Este, p.815).

No Allied Commander would have pursued Panzer Armee Africa as poorly as Montgomery did. It was beaten, I've already stated that Patton could drive Tanks. This statement is probably a true reflection. He would have chased a lot harder. In Monty's favour, Patton would have had more problems breaking down the German positions at El Alamein.

I could also quote Max Simon speaking specifically about 3rd Army:

The tactics of the Americans were based on the idea of taking down a wall by taking out one brick at a time. They did this with tanks against which we had nothing to employ. However, since your attacks were divided amongst several local attacks instead of being concentrated at one point, we, with adequate equipment could have repelled these attacks and rejoined our broken line.

Simon is pointing out that "our best" did not know how to employ armour when attacking defended positions. There was no concentration, no Schwerpunkt, just attack everywhere. You see it time and again with Patton. A wide assault into the weak German lines on the southern shoulder of the Ardennes. Pointless frontal attacks on Metz. Again in November 1944 in the Saar area, against a weak German front line, Patton could only attack everywhere. No real point of concentration. As a result, these weak German defences could only be pushed back 15 miles in 8 days. With every unit attacking, Patton could not and did not concentrate his artillery to allow a decisive breakthrough.

Patton himself wrote to his wife explaining what he had attacked the German front line at it's strongest point:

because a straight line is the shortest distance between points

Does anyone think that Guderian, Hoth, Kleist, Rommel, Manstein, Balck and a hundred other recognised exponents of armoured warfare would ever have thought like this??????

On the debit side, he had so many bad points that ultimately, History's judgement can not be favourable.

For the record, Patton had no equal on the Allied side in pursuit of a beaten enemy. Put him in front of a front line that was at least cohesive and he had no more success than anyone else. Anyone who believes otherwise, please cite an operation that we can debate. Please lets not go on quoting other sources saying the same things. We can only discuss this by analysing his operations, I refuse to accept that someone was good or bad merely because someone else said so.

regards,
IronDuke

[IronDuke_slith]

Thats a brilliant conclusion Von Rom. It sounds like you've done some very good research into this subject. However, I did not realize that Eisenhower and Bradley held a sort of celebrity status as the brilliant victors of the war while Patton experienced a temporary eclipse. A good point all around.

Sherman,
Eisenhower, Bradley and Patton (and Montgomery for that matter) all held celebrity status after the war. Patton did not experience a temporary eclipse, he was too good at managing the photo opportunity to be eclipsed. He also had Scott's sympathetic film in later years, I'm not aware of any of the other major Commanders being portrayed on screen so famously.

The post war Allied problems largely erupted for two reasons. Firstly (and this wasn't Patton's fault, he died shortly after the war ended) most of the major participants led by Monty I think, went into print. Monty was scathing about just about everyone. this caused everyone to rush to print to defend themselves.
This is where controversies over Falaise, the broad front strategy, Ike versus Monty etc really started.

Secondly, a number of post war historians began to question Allied performance in the field. This inevitably led to an examination of the Major operations and the Generals concerned. There was never an eclipse of Patton. I don't think any of the Commanders have come out of the war on the Allied side particularly well. You can find scathing comments on them all.

There was no conspiracy about Patton, save that his Peers (Bradley and Eisenhower) never liked him. In Sicily, both men came to dislike and distrust him. Bradley in particular. His dislike was not a product of his post war memoirs, it was merely the place it found it's expression.

For the record, Patton was a first class logistician, he could drive men and perform feats of movement that the Germans would have appreciated. However, he was no tactician or strategist, and he had numerous personal faults that a man of his rank should not have had.

I'm sorry if you find Von Rom's research better than mine. I can only stress that I am making a serious attempt in every post to analyse Patton's actions, not just other's opinions. I have attempted to analyse his actions as I think it is the clearest way of working out whether he was any good.

Regards,
IronDuke

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

To paraphrase: "Just when I thought I got out. . . they pulled me back in. . ." [;)]

Rommel In North Africa:

Yes, I am aware of Rommel's supply problems.

However, you seem to have over-looked Rommel's personal and political enemies, GeneralOberst Jodl and Field Marshal Albert Keitel, who had Hitler's ear during the time of Rommel's command in North Africa, and whom Heinrich Himmler said he believed played a "higher part" in Rommel's death.

You do not understand these men. These men were yes men. They held their commands because they did as they were told. They wouldn't even wake Hitler up on D-Day, so how you think they could have exercised any influence on Hitler concerning Rommel would be interesting to see. Do you have a source for this we could discuss.

On the more general point, you seem to agree that Rommel could not supply any more troops even if he had them, yet still say they were denied him because of petty jealosies. Might it have been that Keitel and Jodl realised more troops would be wasted in Africa because of the supply situation? Since Rommel could not have done anything with the reinforcements except surrender them, then surely they did the right thing (whatever the reason) in denying him them (if it was indeed them).

I seem to remember that Rommel frequently got promises of more support from Hitler, but that Hitler never fulfilled them. As the war in the east turned against the Germans, I'm not surprised.

D'Este's Book "Patton: A Genuis for War":

On the whole it is a fairly balanced book - looking at all the evidence and presenting the good with the bad.

This is not so with Bradley's second book, the object of which, was to go out of its way to pour vindictive upon Patton's name. See the above post for some reasons for this vindictive approach on Bradley's part.

Some reviews:

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/de ... 1?v=glance

http://stonebooks.com/archives/951127.shtml

What surprises me is that anything complimentary is published and referenced, anything which isn't complimentary is "vindictive". Were Patton's diaries vindictive about Bradley, and just about everyone else? The weblink you listed might equally be described as "vindictive" about Bradley.

D'Este, your "looking at all the evidence and presenting the good with the bad" book quotes very freely from Bradley's work. Evidently D'Este felt that Bradley had something worthwhile to say, but you don't?

Indeed, I've made several quotes from D'Este that reveal he felt there were severe flaws in Patton. Let me sign off with this quote from the "looking at all the evidence and presenting the good with the bad" book.

Patton's achilles heel (which would be painfully evident later, in Lorraine) was that rather than cut his losses, he would attempt to storm his way out of a bad situation in the name of prestige. One of his critics scornfully notes that: "The third Army's wild rampage through Brittany obscured one central fact...west was precisely the wrong direction. Patton's greatest deficiency as a tank Commander: [was] his tendancy to think as a traditional Cavalry tactician and to care little what direction he was attacking in as long as he was attacking. "

Another biographer has written that Patton was "at his best and most successful only when he could apply his brillian loose rein cavalry tactics against an already confused and mostly mediocre enemy. This was to be the lesson of the Brittany campaign.

In the campaign in Sicily and North West Europe, this can be evidenced again and again and again. I've tried to discuss some of the examples in detail.

You may believe that the above description means Patton should be mentioned alongside Rommel, Guderian et al in any list of great WWII Generals. If so, then we will have problems discussing this because we do not share the same definition of a great General.

Regards,
IronDuke

[IronDuke_slith]

Von Rom,
One last thing (unless provoked) I promise. The web page you refer to is one section of a larger site. The site is called

"The George S Patton Home Page". It also has this book to peddle concerning Patton's removal from command "Patton uncovered". If any web page ever had an agenda, this is it. How can you dismiss Bradley, yet quote freely from this page as if it is fact. These are Patton fans.

Regards,
IronDuke