CV strike composition

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: irrelevant


Yabbut. Let's put some examples in the air.

Based on my (possibly flawed) understanding from previous discussions:

Assume 6 VF units in a hex. Each with 24 a/c. Each set on Escort with 70% CAP. In this case the "already airborne group" consists of 24x6x0.7 = 108 a/c. These are all available to intercept any inbound airstrikes. The "second group" consists of the other 36 fighters in these 6 groups. These are also available, subject to the limitations that you mention. My point is that the "already airborne group" should have some checks to pass, as historically there were significant obstacles in the way of effectively deploying a standing CAP, particularly in the early part of the war.

Your analysis seems a bit flawed..., so let me make a stab at it. Say we have 4 CV'seach of which have a group of 24 fighters. With the fighters set on 50% CAP,
48 of the 96 would be on the CAP mission, while the other 48 would be on another
mission (such as Escort).

Now of the 48 on the CAP mission, not all will be in the air at any one time. The
average might be more like 16 fully deployed in the air, another 16 in "ready"
position on decks for immediate reinforcement in the event of an attack, and the
other 16 "in reserve" being serviced while the crews eat and rest. This last third
will become the "ready" force when the middle third is launched to meet an attack.

A/C have to be "rotated" on such a mission to maintain effectiveness and full time
coverage. The more "warning" recieved of an incoming raid, the larger percentage
of the CAP can be launched to meet it. But even with the best of warnings, some
will need to be kept in reserve to meet the threat of a second or third attack arriving
when the CAP that met the first was low on ammo/fuel or dispersed from combat.
This constant need to rotate means that the maximum CAP that actually meets an
incoming raid will virtually never be much in excess of 70% of the A/C allotted, and
in cases where warning is brief and the raid at high altitude might not be more than
30%.

The primary mission of the CAP is to "break up" incoming strikes and prevent them
from delivering unimpeded and effective attacks. Shooting them down is one way
good way to do this, but just breaking up the formations and forcing the attacks to
be made piecemeal is a major contribution (it enables the Flak to deal with smaller
numbers of targets at any one time). The job of escorts with the raid is to prevent
this.

By mid-1943 the US was bringing a combination of early warning radars with a "Fighter-
Direction Center" to co-ordinate the CAP's efforts into operation that would make life
a misery for Japanese attacks in 1944-45. The ability to send out a "measured response"
to incoming strikes to meet them well beyond the horizon, giving them more time to
break up the attacks and shoot down planes; and to vector in additional support where-
ever needed, at altitides and attitudes of advantage, made events like the "Turkey Shoot"almost inevitable.

[Ron Saueracker]

If the game more or less correctly models defensive fire against air strikes ... then the above will work ... however if the game has been "balanced" to require a-historically large strikes to obtain damage then the above may result in carrier battles that result in lots of strikes but no damage. In this case we should probably just abandon the existing CV coordination rule. If strikes against TF in non-base hexes are still too large ( producing a-historical results ) then put a hard cap on strike size as well of say 216 ( largest documented strike ) or some similar number.

Good point here. The game overstates CAP effectiveness, yet also incorporates strike coordination or lack of it. Overall effect is that CAP is possibly 2x-4x as effective as it should be.

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: irrelevant


Yabbut. Let's put some examples in the air.

Based on my (possibly flawed) understanding from previous discussions:

Assume 6 VF units in a hex. Each with 24 a/c. Each set on Escort with 70% CAP. In this case the "already airborne group" consists of 24x6x0.7 = 108 a/c. These are all available to intercept any inbound airstrikes. The "second group" consists of the other 36 fighters in these 6 groups. These are also available, subject to the limitations that you mention. My point is that the "already airborne group" should have some checks to pass, as historically there were significant obstacles in the way of effectively deploying a standing CAP, particularly in the early part of the war.

Your analysis seems a bit flawed..., so let me make a stab at it. Say we have 4 CV'seach of which have a group of 24 fighters. With the fighters set on 50% CAP,
48 of the 96 would be on the CAP mission, while the other 48 would be on another
mission (such as Escort).

Now of the 48 on the CAP mission, not all will be in the air at any one time. The
average might be more like 16 fully deployed in the air, another 16 in "ready"
position on decks for immediate reinforcement in the event of an attack, and the
other 16 "in reserve" being serviced while the crews eat and rest. This last third
will become the "ready" force when the middle third is launched to meet an attack.

A/C have to be "rotated" on such a mission to maintain effectiveness and full time
coverage. The more "warning" recieved of an incoming raid, the larger percentage
of the CAP can be launched to meet it. But even with the best of warnings, some
will need to be kept in reserve to meet the threat of a second or third attack arriving
when the CAP that met the first was low on ammo/fuel or dispersed from combat.
This constant need to rotate means that the maximum CAP that actually meets an
incoming raid will virtually never be much in excess of 70% of the A/C allotted, and
in cases where warning is brief and the raid at high altitude might not be more than
30%.

The primary mission of the CAP is to "break up" incoming strikes and prevent them
from delivering unimpeded and effective attacks. Shooting them down is one way
good way to do this, but just breaking up the formations and forcing the attacks to
be made piecemeal is a major contribution (it enables the Flak to deal with smaller
numbers of targets at any one time). The job of escorts with the raid is to prevent
this.

By mid-1943 the US was bringing a combination of early warning radars with a "Fighter-
Direction Center" to co-ordinate the CAP's efforts into operation that would make life
a misery for Japanese attacks in 1944-45. The ability to send out a "measured response"
to incoming strikes to meet them well beyond the horizon, giving them more time to
break up the attacks and shoot down planes; and to vector in additional support where-
ever needed, at altitides and attitudes of advantage, made events like the "Turkey Shoot"almost inevitable.

Yeah,but...is any of this modelled? From what I can see, and I tested the CAP process during Beta and was of the view that it (CAP) was still too effective because it did not seem to suffer from many of the above stated points, and still doesn't.

[Mr.Frag]

My point is that the "already airborne group" should have some checks to pass, as historically there were significant obstacles in the way of effectively deploying a standing CAP, particularly in the early part of the war.

What makes you think they don't have to pass a bunch of checks? [:D]

[jwilkerson]

From LST

Translated into WitP:
1a. CAP penalty for JN and/or CAP benefit for USN growing with time
1b. related to this, penalty for JN strike escorts (hand signals, few radios), none for USN
2. limit of numbers of a/c that can be launched per given time per carrier
3. limit on number of CVs that USN can operate in one TF early in the war
4. JN strikes tending to be bigger, but prone to miss the target entirely, USN strikes tending to split up in uncoordinated smaller strikes (some of which failing to find target)

From Nikademus

Prior to the war, the USN had no multi-carrier doctrine. Even coordination of a strike from a single carrier was subject to problems … Pearl Harbor is probably the best example of a massive and well coordinated set of strikes

…

Not all IJN "strikes" were suberb examples of coordination and not all USN strikes were discombobulated messes, but the tendancy for discoordination was far more likely with a USN strike, the more carriers involved the greater the chance vs an IJN group in 1942.




From TIMJOT

I believe the applicable "POINT" isnt the numbers of aircraft "LAUNCHED" but rather the number of aircraft put "ON TARGET" in a "COORDINATED" Strike.

…

Not sure it can be tied to pilot experience/moral, since at the same time USN suffered from strike coordination/cohesion there SBD pilots for example were quite good at placing bombs on target. So unless strike coordination/cohesion has a much higher experience requirement threshold than individual pilots tactical strike ability it would tieing it to experience/moral would really work.

Restatement.

There are several points of discussion on the table.

1. Whether the game should impose a limit on the number of carriers in a task force ( LST #3 ).
2. Whether the game should impose additional ( hard base + random# ) limits to the maximum number of planes one TF can launch ( without penalty ) based on the number of planes in the TF ( THE RULE ).
3. USN Carrier doctrine versus IJN as relates to number of carriers in one TF.
4. Relative ( and absolute ) abilities of USN and IJN carriers to launch coordinated strikes.
5. Issues with CAP over TFs.

For the moment I will not address #5 a number of other have done so and I’d like to limit the already too long length of this message – so I’ll skip #5 for now.

Note that #1 is essentially the game related end of #3 and #2 is essentially the game related version of #4.

So we really have 2 topics.

A. USN versus IJN Real Life constraints on # of CV in a TF and how to model in WITP.
B. USN versus IJN Real Life constraints on # of planes which can effectively strike from a CV TF and how to model in WITP.


Before resuming the data driven discussion I’d also like to point out a few intangibles that I haven’t seen anyone else raise yet. When we compare what happened historically to what can or should happen in the game – some things should be remembered.

i. We have more detail in English about the USN carrier operations than we do about the IJN carrier operations. At least 3 reasons for this. The victors write the history ( i.e. Americans are more interested and motivated to write down and to discuss the details … though certainly there have been Japanese who have done so ). More of the concerned parties on the Japanese side did not survive the war. We read in English and not all pertinent Japanese historical documents have been translated into English.
ii. The closer we look at carrier operations the more flaws we will see. Within every feat of accomplishment there are many rough spots that may not be visible from a distance … hence the expression “Don’t watch a Doctor being made”. This concept combined with (i) above means it is easy to be more critical of US operations because we have more detail and hence can more easily see the flaws.
iii. We can’t always match real life data to the game. For example at Coral Sea at the time the enemy strikes were received, the US carriers were 10 miles apart, the IJN carriers were 8 miles apart. Whether we say they were in two single carrier task forces or one 2 carrier task force – clearly their deployment was structurally very close and should probably be represented as the same in the game.
iv. Some times strikes will be launched at slightly different times or arrive at slightly different times – but it is problematic to determine when historical strikes should be modeled as separate strikes in the game and when they should be modeled as one strike. For example, at Midway, the Yorktown launched about an hour after the Enterprise and Hornet. Yet the Hornet’s SBD missed the IJN fleet and the Yorktown’s SBD arrived over the IJN fleet at essentially the same time as the Enterprise’s SBD. If we put the Hornet and Enterprise in a 2 CV taskforce and the Yorktown in a separate TF … in game terms we still probably want to have the Hornet’s strike miss and the Yorktown’s strike join up the Enterprise. And should all of the attacks which went in against KIDO BUTAI on the morning of the 4th of June be represented in game terms as one wave ? They hit over about a 90 minute time frame and totally about 200 aircraft ( from the 3 US carriers and Midway ). At least maybe.
v. Point of (iv and v) is that it is not always clear when a real world apparent multi-wave strike is a game multi-wave strike nor when a real world multi-carrier task force is a game one.

Ok, back to the data.

IJN early strikes.

Pearl Harbor – 183, 167
Darwin – 188
Tjilatjap – 180
Colombo – 180, 88(sea)
Trincomalee – 85, 90(sea)

Sources include Willmott “Empires in the Balance” [NIP]and Dull “Imperial Japanese Navy” [NIP]

Notice two patterns. When striking land bases, the 160-190 number used by KB. When striking mobile targets at sea – the 85-90 number is used.



Four carrier battles to be considered.

Coral Sea. IJN 2 CV, 1 CVL, USN 2 CV …

7 May
USN 93 Planes launched against Shoho, Japanese, 60 Planes launched against Neosho and 27 Planes launched in “night attack” that obtained no results.

8 May
USN 75 Planes launched against Shokaku, IJN 69 Planes Launched against Yorktown and Lexington. Shokaku damaged, Lexington sunk.

Midway. IJN 4 CV, USN 3 CV.
IJN 108 Planes Launched against Midway 36 planes were assigned to CAP leaving 126 planes for all other duties, thus an 80-90 plane anti-shipping strike capability remained as per the Ceylon attacks. Also after the American attacks 24 and 16 planes were launched in 2 waves from Hiryu against Yorktown.

USN 116 planes launched from Enterprise and Hornet while Yorktown launched 35. These strikes … while having some difficulty finding the enemy, destroyed 3 CV.

Eastern Solomons, IJN 2 CV, 1 CVL, USN, 2 CV
IJN 37 planes in first wave. 36 in the second which failed to find the US fleet.
USN 38 planes sank the Ryujo.

Santa Cruz. IJN 3 CV, 1 CVL
IJN - 62 and 44 and 29 in 3 waves, Hornet sunk.
USN – 74 planes in perhaps 3 waves. Damaged 1 CV and 1 CVL.

Had the Japanese launched “in time” at Midway, with the reserve force, the attack would have numbered around 100 planes.

Thus, I still see nothing to indicate THE RULE accurately reflects the historical data. The rule allows the Japanese to get 100% strikes by KB for up to about 4 CV and about 80% for all 6 CV. The US on the other hand suffer increasingly worse percentages if they increase the CV per TF over 1. Further the system is pretty tough on small strikes ( small being like 15-40 planes ) probably more so than history ... hence exarcerbating the gap between big strike capable forces and non-big strike capable forces to a greater extent than historically.

If it truly desired to restrict the number of CV per TF … then why not just have a rule that says attempting to add more than 1 ( or 2 … or 6 ) CV ( or CVL ) per TF is not allowed. That is much easier to code.

Also note that UV doesn’t have THE RULE. But instead uses lower USN experience levels to achieve the desired effect of indicating reduced US effectiveness vis-à-vis the IJN. Why was this abandoned ? In WITP the IJN CarDv 1 and 2 air crew are exp 90 with the USN carriers being average 85 and the IJN 5 Cardv being 80. In UV the USN were lower.

I still believe THE RULE should either apply evenly to both sides in 1942 or be removed.

CPT Hughes a USN Operations Researcher and Tactical Instructor has produced a model which represents accurately the results of the WWII carrier battles and his includes that 1942 capability “qualitatively” was even ( between the USN and the IJN ).

The results argue the same.

There are many factors to consider, Intel, Radar, training, experience, equipment, re-arming facilities, launching facilities, airborne command and control … but models which attempt to represent all of these factors, such as WITP, should be able to produce roughly historical results, fairly regularly with repeated tested with historical tactics. The current RULE prevents the game from doing that.

[2ndACR]

I think too many people use the death star anyway. I have yet to lose a single fleet CV as the Japanese in any of my PBEM games. Had a bunch banged up in the 30-40 range and 1 real iffy.

I use the 2 CV TF mainly because I find that I have to cover a really big map. I may concentrate all my carriers in a single area (for example the south Pac area) but they will still be in seperate TF's and I do not like the follow command anyway.

I have had Allied carrier strikes come in against 2 Japanese CV's almost unopposed. Usually the last strike if it comes in piecemeal. I chalk that up to my fighters being out of position to intercept. And I have also seen my 2 CV TF's launch piecemeal strikes.

[tsimmonds]

Now of the 48 on the CAP mission, not all will be in the air at any one time. The
average might be more like 16 fully deployed in the air, another 16 in "ready"
position on decks for immediate reinforcement in the event of an attack, and the
other 16 "in reserve" being serviced while the crews eat and rest. This last third
will become the "ready" force when the middle third is launched to meet an attack.

A/C have to be "rotated" on such a mission to maintain effectiveness and full time
coverage. The more "warning" recieved of an incoming raid, the larger percentage
of the CAP can be launched to meet it. But even with the best of warnings, some
will need to be kept in reserve to meet the threat of a second or third attack arriving
when the CAP that met the first was low on ammo/fuel or dispersed from combat.
This constant need to rotate means that the maximum CAP that actually meets an
incoming raid will virtually never be much in excess of 70% of the A/C allotted, and
in cases where warning is brief and the raid at high altitude might not be more than
30%.

Mike: you're talking about the real world, I was talking about the game. But I will agree, if it works as I described, it is flawed.

[tsimmonds]

What makes you think they don't have to pass a bunch of checks?

The number of CAP that typically show up to intercept the first strike waves make me think that.[:'(]

Actually I'm sure that there are checks built in here, I'm just not sure that I agree with how they seem to be working.

[tsimmonds]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson


i. We have more detail in English about the USN carrier operations than we do about the IJN carrier operations. At least 3 reasons for this. The victors write the history ( i.e. Americans are more interested and motivated to write down and to discuss the details … though certainly there have been Japanese who have done so ). More of the concerned parties on the Japanese side did not survive the war. We read in English and not all pertinent Japanese historical documents have been translated into English.
ii. The closer we look at carrier operations the more flaws we will see. Within every feat of accomplishment there are many rough spots that may not be visible from a distance … hence the expression “Don’t watch a Doctor being made”. This concept combined with (i) above means it is easy to be more critical of US operations because we have more detail and hence can more easily see the flaws.
iii. We can’t always match real life data to the game. For example at Coral Sea at the time the enemy strikes were received, the US carriers were 10 miles apart, the IJN carriers were 8 miles apart. Whether we say they were in two single carrier task forces or one 2 carrier task force – clearly their deployment was structurally very close and should probably be represented as the same in the game.
iv. Some times strikes will be launched at slightly different times or arrive at slightly different times – but it is problematic to determine when historical strikes should be modeled as separate strikes in the game and when they should be modeled as one strike. For example, at Midway, the Yorktown launched about an hour after the Enterprise and Hornet. Yet the Hornet’s SBD missed the IJN fleet and the Yorktown’s SBD arrived over the IJN fleet at essentially the same time as the Enterprise’s SBD. If we put the Hornet and Enterprise in a 2 CV taskforce and the Yorktown in a separate TF … in game terms we still probably want to have the Hornet’s strike miss and the Yorktown’s strike join up the Enterprise. And should all of the attacks which went in against KIDO BUTAI on the morning of the 4th of June be represented in game terms as one wave ? They hit over about a 90 minute time frame and totally about 200 aircraft ( from the 3 US carriers and Midway ). At least maybe.
v. Point of (iv and v) is that it is not always clear when a real world apparent multi-wave strike is a game multi-wave strike nor when a real world multi-carrier task force is a game one.

Excellent food for thought.

Ok, back to the data.

[snip]

I still believe THE RULE should either apply evenly to both sides in 1942 or be removed.

There are many factors to consider, Intel, Radar, training, experience, equipment, re-arming facilities, launching facilities, airborne command and control … but models which attempt to represent all of these factors, such as WITP, should be able to produce roughly historical results, fairly regularly with repeated tested with historical tactics. The current RULE prevents the game from doing that.

I agree with this. I think the rule is an attempt to allow IJ to re-create the relatively large and well co-ordinated strikes they launched against bases in the early months of the war, while penalizing the allies for their well-documented screwed-up strikes in the four CV battles. As for IJN SNAFUs, we do know of some--the Neosho strike, the series of missed decisions at Midway--but we don't find much to read about any problems with IJ strikes forming up; did they not exist, or were they just not documented and pored over by posterity the way those of the USN were?

Striking bases was a much different proposition than striking ships at sea. The location of bases is known, and they do not move about. The location of TFs can be wildly misreported by scouting a/c, and by the time a strike arrives, a TF may move many miles. In addition to this, a strike vs a base typically received considerably more advance planning than a strike vs a TF could ever get. Detailed arrangements were worked out days in advance, zero hour was known, aircraft could be stood down and maintained to the highest standards, ordnance crews and handlers could work through the night organizing the air group into the most efficient "spot" for a mass launch early the next morning. Strikes vs bases were typically a best case. They should be easier to pull off than strikes vs TFs, which were often improvised on the fly using the a/c at hand. If modeling this was the goal, it could also be achieved by using different sets of modifiers for the two types of strikes. I think IJ is given a benefit due to the perception that their early strikes were better organized, and IMO they were better organized because of the nature of their targets. Their anti-shipping strikes were not discernably more cohesive than those of the USN.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker


Yeah,but...is any of this modelled? From what I can see, and I tested the CAP process during Beta and was of the view that it (CAP) was still too effective because it did not seem to suffer from many of the above stated points, and still doesn't.

RON I never made any claim that the game modeled the process I described above.
I was just trying to correct what I felt was some mis-information that IRRELAVENT
had posted. I would agree with you that CAP as it is handled in the game MIGHT
be an accurate potrail of US practice during the last year of the war, it's a pipe dream
in reflecting either side's capibilities in 1942.

[Mike Scholl]

If one thing HAS emerged from the pages of this thread, it's that Historically and Realistically
speaking, the rule which restricts the size of CV TF's Air Strikes in the game should either be
done away with, or apply to both sides in the case of Naval Strikes. The one-sided application
currently existing simply isn't justified by the facts.

The second thing that has emerged is that the game has made CAP overly effective, for both sides
in the early going. Only the US reached the state of being able to both fly massive and controlled
amounts of CAP in a hex, and it took them about 20 months of the War to get the system working.
EFFECTIVE CAP should probably be limited at start to something like 10% of a carriers total A/C,
with the US getting better as the war continues. How to do this is still under debate, but that some-
thing NEEDS to be done isn't.

[jwilkerson]

2NDACR -from the context of your message - I wonder if you meant "I DON'T think too many people use the death star ..."

I can't speak to what most people do - but I've never used DS in WITP or UV ( and have only played IJN against human in either ). For 2 reasons, the one you state ( gotta be in more than one place at a time ) and when facing main enemy concentration prefer to spread CV/CVL out across the AAA escorts and reduce vulnerability to strikes against one large TF.

Doctrine...a number of folks have commented on USN doctrine versus IJN doctrine, I went back and read a bit and here is what I'm seeing.

Pre-war the IJN was a battleship fleet like most others. 1st Fleet ( Battleline ) and 2nd Fleet ( Cruisers ) were to be supported by the carriers acting as scouting forces. The IJN did generally operate in pairs and formed Carrier Divisions ( 2 carriers ).

Interestingly - Genda was the primary pre-war inspiration for 4-6 CV Task forces. He got the idea from a newsreel he saw in late 1940 showing 4 USN CV operating together ! Shortly thereafter, 1st AirFleet was formed under Nagumo ( with 4 CV ).

In response to Yamamoto's request for a strike against Pearl Harbor, Genda insisted that the 2 new carriers be added to the strike for a total of 6 CV. In October 1941, the 6 CV unit was organized ... between this date and mid-Dec the following occured.

Kaga practices first at sea refuling of IJN carrier[Oct41].

The 6 CV conduct their one and only practice manuver as a 6 CV unit[Nov41]

Pearl Harbor attacked[Dec41]

10 Dec - 2 CV detached breaking up 6 CV unit, never to be reformed.

The Japanese operated 4 CV together often during Dec 41-Jun 42 ... and reached total of 5 once in April 42 during Indian Ocean raid . After Midway ... 1-3 CV/CVL per task force was the rule.

During the planning for Midway Yamaguchi proposed that 3 task forces of 3-4 carriers be formed with escorting BB/CA/DD. Yamamoto did not agree to this proposal [ the Japanese implemented this AFTER Midway, the Americans after they received their new carriers in Summer 1943 ].

On the USN side ... pre-war ... Battleship Admirals ran the show. The USN had run a number of maneuvers which had demonstrated the offensive power of carriers but the BB admirals still were able to keep CV subordinated to role of supporting BB. US "Doctrine" did not specify number of CV operating together ... in fact written doctrine was extremely vague "are mobile airplane bases whose use depends upon the employment of their aircraft" ... at least three manuvers I have data for involved task forces of 2 CV ... ( Panama Canal attack, Panama Canal Defense ... and an attack on 7 Feb on Pearl by a 2 CV task force ). Also apparently the CV sailed together in a 4 CV group at least once, since Genda saw them. There is nothing pre-war to indicate that the US could not operate 3 or 4 CV ( or 5 or 6 ) together if it wanted to.

Early war, US operated in 1 or 2 CV task forces in raiding period prior to May 1942 ... The attack on Lae and the Doolittle raid being the 2 cases of 2 CV task forces. During most of this period all CV in the Pacific were under unified command ( Halsey ). I have seen no indication that "doctrine" determined the size of the CV task forces. All statements I've seen indicate the size was due to desire to be in multiple places at the same time. Ted Sherman believed in the multi-CV task force and he was in command at Lae.

At Coral Sea, the 2 single carrier TF were combined into one 2 CV task force prior to the main battle ( morning 6 May ).

At Midway, Spruance had a 2 CV task force, Flecther had a single CV task force. No clear explanation has to why this 2 and 1 deploy has been seen by me. But Yorktown had to sail separately since she was under repair when Spruance sailed with Enterprise and Hornet ... Nimitz didn't want to wait for Yorktown. Fletcher may not have had a chance to re-combine or it may have been a conscious decision on his part or Nimitz's ... I haven't seen an answer to this.

After Midway, King ORDERED the USN to operate in single CV task forces due to fear of US losing multiple carriers in one strike .... after seeing what happened to the IJN at Miday. Preservation of the remaining carriers was foremost in his mind.

US had 3 CV operating together ( in single CV TF ) early in the Guadalcanal campaign... but after losing WASP to a sub ... number dropped to 2 CV.

Between Oct 42 and Jun 43 Ted Sherman and Duke Ramsey ( who both worked for Halsey ) commanded Enterprise and Saratoga ( the remaining US CV ) and had a heathly debate regarding doctrine. Sherman favored the multi-carrier task force, Ramsey the single. As the answer was somewhat moot ... Halsey continued to support the King order during this period.

After the arrival of significant numbers of new CV/CVL ... Towers facilitated a debate a Pearl amongst carrier commanders and the multi-carrier TF theory won. From that point forward, US used TF of 3-5 CV/CVL with 3-5 BB/CA/CL and 8-14 DD ( usually 20-25 ships per TG ). This offered a manageable size and enough power to operate indenpendently in many situations.

At Battle of PI Sea ... four of these US TG faced 3 superficially similar IJN TG ... the results were ... one minor hit by IJN ... 1 CV sunk by US carriers, 350 IJN carrier planes destroyed ... 2 IJN CV sunk by US subs.

Most of the above material came from

Reynolds, THE FAST CARRIERS [NIP] ... Sherman, COMBAT COMMAND [Bantam] ... Willmott, EMPIRES IN THE BALANCE [NIP]

In the game, I'd still like to see the 1942 CV Coordination penalty apply to both sides for Naval strikes for the duration and the 1944 penalty apply to both sides for landbase strikes for the duration.

Doctrine should be choice of players though accurate results should come from these choices.

[von Murrin]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

At Midway, Spruance had a 2 CV task force, Flecther had a single CV task force. No clear explanation has to why this 2 and 1 deploy has been seen by me. But Yorktown had to sail separately since she was under repair when Spruance sailed with Enterprise and Hornet ... Nimitz didn't want to wait for Yorktown. Fletcher may not have had a chance to re-combine or it may have been a conscious decision on his part or Nimitz's ... I haven't seen an answer to this.

If I were to take a shot at that one, I would say that Fletcher didn't have the same signal package as Spruance and didn't get it because Spruance had sailed and Yorktown was in port for all of no time at all. Just my personal WAG.

[mlees]

At Midway, Spruance had a 2 CV task force, Flecther had a single CV task force. No clear explanation has to why this 2 and 1 deploy has been seen by me. But Yorktown had to sail separately since she was under repair when Spruance sailed with Enterprise and Hornet ... Nimitz didn't want to wait for Yorktown. Fletcher may not have had a chance to re-combine or it may have been a conscious decision on his part or Nimitz's ... I haven't seen an answer to this

Admiral Fletcher was actually senior to Admiral Spruance, but Nimitz had placed Spruance in charge of the Midway operation while Yorktown was still limping into the yards.

Up to this point, Spruance had not commanded a CV TF, only cruiser divisions.

Fletcher was placed "in tactical" command of the two TF's when he arrived on the scene, but Spruance was still the operational commander. Brass Politics.

[Mike Scholl]

Enterprise and Hornet were Admiral Halsey's TF previously, while Yorktown and
Lexington were Admiral Fletcher's. Fletcher lost Lexington at Coral Sea, so only
Yorktown was left to go to Midway. Halsey was laid up with "shingles", which
allowed Spruance to assume command of his TF for the Midway operation.

[LoBaron]

really interesting discussion. [:)]
what strikes me is that noone mentioned another important factor neccesary for effective coordinated a/c handling: time
since im still waiting for my copy of WitP [:(] i can just make guesses but from reading the posts here it doesnt seem so far from UV that the idea couldnt work for both games.

it took the IJN a long time to plan and coordinate the 6 CV strike on pearl.

my idea would be:
*) use an experience system for strike coordination as in UV
*) based on a/c crew, ship crew and TF commander experience set up a time scale in which the ability to coordinate strikes is slowly increased as long as the TF stays together. this would simulate the ammount of training needed for executing the strikes.
*) significantly increase the neccessary timescale for additional carriers.
*) decrease it with crew experience, the year (with maybe later an advantage for USN CV´s)

this would give the IJN the advantage early (better pilots) on but would not make it impossible for the USN to compensate for this with multiple carrier TF´s working together over an extended ammount of time.

[LargeSlowTarget]

Mike, jw - please accept my surrender. I'm still not convinced that the USN could have formed their own Death Star in 1942 and although I would like to dive into the sources you have provided and to try to defend my point, due to real-life-commitments I don't have the time for this. Just want to say that I have advocated limitations and restrictions placed on the player not because I'm a fanboy of any side, but in order to counterweight the fact that while playing WitP we all profit from hindsight, whereas the actual events have been a learning process in which the USN slowly mastered the art of multi-carrier-operations. I still believe that in 1942 the USN was unprepared to form a multi-CV-TF like the JN had with Kido Butai, and that the JN had the edge in strike coordination. Whether this is modelled in WitP by THE RULE or other means I don't really care actually - so if you want to abandon THE RULE that's fine with me as long as there are other modifiers to reflect the early limitations of carrier ops and later improvements through the learning process.

[Halsey]

A reason for the US not forming Death Stars was one of caution. The military leaders in the Pacific didn't want to risk putting all their eggs in one basket. Their caution should not be "forced doctrine" for the Allies. The Japanese have been given "considerable" leeway in their's. So, why should the Allies be hamstrung.

[2ndACR]

Nope, I meant what i said. Too many people use the death star. That seems to be the main complaint that started this whole argument. Allied a/c cannot penetrate 80 Zeros.
And the japanese launch a huge strike back at them.

That is one of the reasons I have not really commented in this thread. I have yet to see this in any of my games, but probably because I use smaller CV TF's and keep them in seperate hexes most times. So I almost always see allied a/c get thru to hit me. And yes I have seen many a Japanese airstrike be launched piecemeal. It does happen.

The main thing that saves me is that I try and make the Allies launch at extreme range so that they have to carry 500 lb bombs, while I can still heft torpedos back at them. And then I can chase them down and finish them off.

I am not arguing whether it was really done in history. I know it was and it could have been, so that is moot.

[jwilkerson]

LST, I'll admit I've had to "pay" with some late nights to be able to read up.

Interestingly - mostly I've been re-reading things I've had for years - but I've never focused on this narrow issue, so didn't remember some importortant details. But I want to PLAY witp ... and get a pay check ... so I'm going to have to slow down as well.

I'd have to do some checking to produce the exact numbers, but in UV the IJN has carrier qualitative advantage WITHOUT the RULE. I think this is modeled with lower USN Air Unit experience levels(maybe too low !). Whereas in WITP the USN ( carrier group ) starting experience levels are around 85 ... with IJN CarDiv 1 & 2 at 90 and CarDiv 5 at 80. So overall the USN are about equal in front line experience for carrier pilots in WITP.

I'd drop USN experience by 5 points ( Carrier Groups ) in exchange for evening out THE RULE in 42 ... as this would probably reflect the "edge" that the IJN pilots had. While the USN had training equality, the IJN had China combat experience. And this should be reflected. IJN pilots got hits and were effective with smaller bombs.

Note that many of us ( myself included ) play with non-DS groups exclusively ( and again in UV and WITP I've yet to be able to play nonIJN against a human ! ) ... but some of us ( myself included ) still believe the concentration or dispersion decision should be made by the player not the system (as it was in UV).

We accept your support - but not your surrender !

( thanks -JoeW. )