Attack on the USSR

[spence]

While others caution against a winter campaign, one must remember that the Japanese have "owned" Manchuria for nearly ten years - enough time to become accustome to this harsh enviornment [men and equipment]

Garrison duty in a Manchurian city is just like attacking through deep snow in a trackless forest with the temperature hovering at -50C apparently.

[Rainerle]

ORIGINAL: Feinder

I certainly don't know anything beyond the historical records, but simply saying, "I don't believe the documentation." rather closes the discussion. "The documentation" is all we have. This isn't counter-intel being spun by a war ministry during a time of war. It is documentation by the powers that be, after the war is over.

Hi,
I'm sure that those records of the soviets were never documented by a second nation. Also this whole documentation goes the wrong way. It is argued that if 10 more Div. (i.e. all those that defeated the americans in the phillipines and britain/australia in Malaya) are brought into theatre that soviets still should not be beaten ??? Then what does beaten mean ? Many obviously think that if japan takes that little piece of Russia which is depicted on the WitP map would mean beaten. That's utter nonsense. I firmly believe that if war had broken out Stalin would just have withdrawn into Siberia and fed the japanese with space and more useless space to occupy until it's payback time when the germans are turned out of Soviet proper territory (i.e. european russia+ukraine and baltics). As for elite units at a peaceful border ... I don't think the germans had that many elite units at the swiss border.

[String]

ORIGINAL: spence

While others caution against a winter campaign, one must remember that the Japanese have "owned" Manchuria for nearly ten years - enough time to become accustome to this harsh enviornment [men and equipment]

Garrison duty in a Manchurian city is just like attacking through deep snow in a trackless forest with the temperature hovering at -50C apparently.

don't exaggerate. The attack would naturally take place along the few railroads and roads that are there, and those have small hamlets every 10-15km on them. Yeah. it's cold, but it also snow's in northern japan, and the cold in the middle of dry siberia is much easier to stand than the cold at the humid seacoast, where it can be REALLY wicked. The most likely time of attack, and the best time of attac ingame would be right after the DEI campaign conclusion, which places it in may 42 roughly, hardly a winter at that time, summer in siberia can be quite hot and beautiful

[String]

ORIGINAL: Rainerle

ORIGINAL: Feinder

I certainly don't know anything beyond the historical records, but simply saying, "I don't believe the documentation." rather closes the discussion. "The documentation" is all we have. This isn't counter-intel being spun by a war ministry during a time of war. It is documentation by the powers that be, after the war is over.

Hi,
I'm sure that those records of the soviets were never documented by a second nation. Also this whole documentation goes the wrong way. It is argued that if 10 more Div. (i.e. all those that defeated the americans in the phillipines and britain/australia in Malaya) are brought into theatre that soviets still should not be beaten ??? Then what does beaten mean ? Many obviously think that if japan takes that little piece of Russia which is depicted on the WitP map would mean beaten. That's utter nonsense. I firmly believe that if war had broken out Stalin would just have withdrawn into Siberia and fed the japanese with space and more useless space to occupy until it's payback time when the germans are turned out of Soviet proper territory (i.e. european russia+ukraine and baltics). As for elite units at a peaceful border ... I don't think the germans had that many elite units at the swiss border.

Indeed, didn't the soviets withdraw a lot of their siberian troops for their winter offensive in the west? Also, wouldn't the soviets be facing the german offensive vs Stalingrad in mid 42? Requiering vast amounts of resources and men to stop? And then the Japs stab them in the back? Afaik there weren't any major industrial facilities that far east, but I might be wrong. Hey, it might just happen that the japanese attack would break the back of the soviets and they will sue for peace.

[Andy Mac]

If the allies had all 6 pre war carriers and it was a May invasion could the US/ RN Fight a convoy through to Vladivostock ?

I am just thinking A US Corps say 1st Marines/ 24th Infantry and Americal plus a few Seabeas backed by 250,000 tonnes of supplies would make a hell of a difference to Russian Defence especially if you got some F4F's in there as well.

I would certainly be getting ready to transfer in Spitfires to assist in air defence from June.

Andy

[LargeSlowTarget]

ORIGINAL: moses

ohhh terrorists. Napalm to be sure!![:-] Let me add a little to that.

In ten years historians will say one of the following.

1.) The Iraqi insugent victory was inevitable.

2.) The Iraqi terrorists were inevitably doomed to defeat.

3.) Stalemate in Iraq was inevitable.

Anyone who disagrees that the historical outcome was inevitable will be simply shown what happened historically. Therefore the case is proven.

Actually you will find some historians postulating thesis 1.), some others backing thesis 2.) and a few others maintaining thesis 3.) - give three historians the same sources and they will come up with three different histories. That way the debate can drag on for years, which gives them a reason to be, regular pay checks and the stage for self-promotion - a nice job machine. [:'(]

[Rainerle]

ORIGINAL: LargeSlowTarget
... - a nice job machine. [:'(]

Huh, sounds like lawyers [:D]

[Feinder]

Well Rainerle,

It's back to "I don't believe the documentation. I believe that the Germans and Japs could have kicked Stalin's frozen ass."

Ok.

Good for you.

History proves otherwise.

-F-

[Rainerle]

Well, the documentation we're using nowadays is still the same one which was serves to the japanese by joseph stalin.
And btw I never said they would kick ass. Well I said if they make a major effort and bring 10 add. Divs they could take what is on the WitP Map but do you think Joseph Stalin does care if that little part of Soviet Union is gone ? Therefore it's curious (while still speculational) why 'elite' or 'crack' units should stay along the border during all the war when they would be needed elsewhere up until mid 1943. What's wrong with this assumption ?

[testarossa]

I vaguely remember reading something about Rihard Zorge (german commie and russian spy, working in Hitler's embassy in Japan), who provided info to Stalin that Japanese are going to attack US in Dec 1941, which allowed Stalin to bring several divisions from far east in time to save Moscow in Dec 1941.

So there were less "elite" units (elite in comparison to usual conscript qulity of soviet troops that time)available in 1942 than in OOB for 1941.

[Bliztk]

One word: Nomonhan

Copypaste from

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20 ... onhan.aspx

The Kwantung Army was still willing to escalate. On July 1, 1939 the IJA 23rd Infantry Division, under Lt. Gen. Komatsubara Michitaro, backed by two tank regiments, struck at the Russians dug in east of the river. The pushed to the Khalka River, and in the night, two regiments crossed the river, seizing the Baintsagan Heights on the west bank.

But in early June, an aggressive new Soviet commander arrived. He was Lt. Gen. Georgi K. Zhukov, age 42. On July 1st the 1st Front Army was organized under his command. As soon as he learned of the Japanese penetration, he launched a coordinated three-pronged counterattack by the 11th Tank Brigade, plus a motorized infantry regiment and a brigade of armored cars. The Japanese themselves launched a counter attack to try to hold onto their gains, but the Japanese anti-tank weapons were not adequate against Soviet armor. The Japanese, in desperation, resorted to suicide attacks with squads of men hurling satchel charges and Molotov cocktails, but they could not stop the Soviet onslaught. In two days of heavy fighting the Soviets retook the Baintsagan Heights and threatened the one pontoon bridge the Japanese had across the Khalkin Gol, forcing the Japanese to withdraw over the river.

The fighting went on. Between late May and July 25th the Japanese suffered some 5,000 casualties along a thirty kilometer front. Russian losses were higher, but the Red Army could call on greater manpower resources. The real battle was logistics, and here, Zhukov excelled. His nearest base, on the Trans-Siberian Railway, was 465 miles away across dirt roads. Zhukov estimated his needs at 18,000 tons of artillery shells alone, plus fuel and lubricants, food, and everything else needed to sustain modern warfare. Over the months, Zhukov built up a fleet of 2,600 trucks, including 1,000 fuel trucks.

Meanwhile the Japanese supply system was badly handled. Troops went for days without water in temperatures that reached 104 degrees Fahrenheit and more in the daytime. In general the Nomonhan area was inhospitable. With broiling hot days came cold, damp nights. Dust was everywhere, while swarms of flies and mosquitoes tormented the men. Bad sanitation and lack of water brought typhus and dysentery. Most importantly, the nearly 200 mile distance from their base of supply in Hailaerh and the lack of motorized transport created an insurmountable logistical bottleneck for the Japanese.

By early August the Japanese had some 75,000 IJA and Manchurian troops committed, including the 7th and 23rd Infantry Divisions, plus cavalry, artillery, and anti-tank units, supported by some 300- 500 planes in three Air Groups. On August 10th the Japanese organized their forces into the 6th Army under Gen. Ogisu Rippu. Gen. Ogisu planned an offensive, top begin on August 24th.

But the Soviets had also opted for a decision. Alarmed at Hitler's threats against Poland, Stalin wanted to be freed up from distractions in the Far East. Stalin was prepared to deal with Hitler, but he wanted to do so from as strong a position as possible. In early August, STAVKA, the Soviet high command, sent Zhukov an additional 1,625 trucks from European Russia. This gave Zhukov the logistical base he needed for a decisive stroke.

Decision:

At 6:00 AM, on August 20th, Zhukov struck. 100,000 Russian and Mongolian troops moved forward along a 48 mile front, supported by 500 tanks and 216 artillery pieces. Surprise was total. Soviet artillery outgunned the Japanese batteries, which were short on ammunition. Russian bombardments cut phone lines, isolated Japanese units, and blasted apart flimsy dugouts. 200 SB-2 bombers, heavily supported by fighters, struck Japanese defenses and lines of communications. The Soviet bombers could fly at 20,000 feet, too high for the Japanese fighter planes. Soviet air losses were high, but they were able to wrest command of the air over the battlefield from the Japanese.

The decisive factor was that Zhukov coordinated his armor with infantry, artillery, and air support. The Japanese in the 1930s were hampered by a limited manufacturing base. They could not build airplanes and tanks in sufficient quantities at the same time. The Japanese had opted to develop aircraft production. Now the Japanese paid the price, as Soviet T-26 and T-28 tanks chopped up the weaker Japanese armor. The Russians had learned, and countered the Japanese use of Molotov cocktails by converting their tanks to diesel fuel and putting wire mesh netting over vulnerable engine gratings.

In savage fighting the Soviets cut around the Japanese left (southern) flank, and then the Japanese right, in a double envelopment. Soviet tanks, now behind the Japanese, linked up at the village of Nomonhan, trapping the Japanese 23rd Division. The Japanese fought back with desperate courage. One Japanese regimental commander burnt his colors and committed seppuku, rather than surrender. Another died in a last, fanatic banzai charge against oncoming Russian armor. But it was all in vain. Russian tanks, equipped with flamethrowers, supported by infantry, took one entrenched Japanese strong point after another.

On August 26th a Japanese counter attack to relieve the trapped 23rd Division was halted by a Russian tank brigade. The next day, the Japanese 23rd Division made a last bitter effort to break out to the east. They were defeated. By August 31, 1939 the Japanese had been driven back out of the disputed territory. Of 60,000 Japanese troops committed, nearly 45,000 were killed. The IJA 23rd Infantry Division took 73% casualties. The 71st Regiment suffered over 93% losses. In contrast, the IJA took 28% casualties at Mukden, the most hard fought battle of the Russo-Japanese War.

[Sneer]

With a sizeable force already in Mongolia, the Soviet
Union assigned command of the Soviet forces to General
Georgi K. Zhukov on 2 June 1939. [15-156] While the
escalating border clashes continued, General Zhukov began a
stealthful force build-up along the Khalkin-Gol River. In
the 1904 Sino-Soviet War, Russia learned a bitter lesson
over its inability to maintain superior forces at the end of
a 4000 mile long logistics trail. [15-154] With the Trans-
Siberian railroad incomplete, Russia was unable to reinforce
and resupply Czarist troops by land or sea. [15-154] Zhukov
was determined to launch a crushing offensive against the
Japanese, but not before achieving a sizeable force ratio in
his distinct favor. Facing 30,000 Japanese soldiers.
Zhukov built his forces up to 35 infantry battalions and
over 57,000 men under rigorous security and deception
measures. [4-9]. He achieved a force ratio of 4:1 in tanks
and 2:1 in aircraft. [15-156] Although the front was
located 400 miles from the nearest railroad, he ensured
everything was trucked in during darkness. By late June, the
Soviets established air superiority in air battles involving
200 to 300 aircraft. [15-157] When he attacked the Japanese
on 20 August 1939, he achieved complete tactical surprise
and by 3l August, had driven back the Japanese with classic
double envelopment tactics using armor and heavy
concentrations of artillery. When the cease-fire took
effect on l6 September 1939, the Japanese had suffered a
phenomenal 75% casualties with over 17,000 men killed or
wounded. (13-15] The Soviets reported 9,284 killed or
wounded at the battle's end.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... 86/RMF.htm

BTW I found on net that russian losses were higher than given in this article up to 15-16k in killed and wounded

4:1 in Armor
2:1 in aircrafts
preplanned operation + logistics + suprise factor - should we think the result surprises us

[Feinder]

Agreed.

As you said, I'd wager that Soviet losses were higher than reported, but it still amounted to a stunning victory for the Soviets.

Again, it was Japan that approached the Soviets with a non-aggression pact (and stuck by it!), not the othe way around.

-F-

[Rainerle]

Well if you want to go to war in the east (America) it's good to have peace in the west, don't you think (don't know what this has to do with a hypothetical invasion of soviet far east in 1941/42 (with/without reinforcements)).

[Nikademus]

Interesting discussion. (and yes....the Russo-Japanese war was a serious contrast to 1939....in the former, it was the Japanese who used inovative and more "modern" tactics....particularily in regards to artillery use)

However, with respect, the quotings of the 1939 action really don't address the central issue, which is the status of the Russian Far Eastern forces in 1941 and 42.

Zukov succeeded primarily due to superior logistics (at the time) and more importantly use of mass armor to forment an enveloping pincer that eventually routed the Japanese army which was (again, in general) pretty much holding it's own up to that moment. The terrain also favored the pincer.

In 41/42, you have no Zukov (Russia had more than it's share of conservatives and boobs too in command thx primarily to Stalin), and there is serious debate over what the Russians actually had in the Far East at the time. Stalin was all about smoke and mirrors + the Germans were pressing the Soviets to the breaking point in the winter of 41.

For what it's worth, i agree with the poster that, push come to shove....Stalin would gladly sacrifice the Far eastern province until such time as it could be reclaimed. Lennin and Stalin had already done so once before immediately after WWI. Trading space for time is a Russian staple tactic.

[John 3rd]

Nikademus is dead right here. The Soviets might have lost in the early goings but would have pulled it out at the end.

Only way for the Japanese to really make this attempt would have been to totally settle into a defensive mode in China, move troops, and then attack. Moses is correct in thinking that you woould have to massively reinforce the Manchurian Army to get a quick victory. If the Japanese player gets bogged down there, the game is up.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: testarossa

I vaguely remember reading something about Rihard Zorge (german commie and russian spy, working in Hitler's embassy in Japan), who provided info to Stalin that Japanese are going to attack US in Dec 1941, which allowed Stalin to bring several divisions from far east in time to save Moscow in Dec 1941.

So there were less "elite" units (elite in comparison to usual conscript qulity of soviet troops that time)available in 1942 than in OOB for 1941.

Siberians did not "save" Moscow..., they were not committed until AFTER the German's had ground to a halt. They WERE the heart of the Soviet counter-attack after the Germans efforts had failed.

[AmiralLaurent]

One of problems here is that Soviet troops are positionned as they were in RL, while WITP units don't move at all like in RL. And any WITP player will never send troops there.

Also the Soviet industry and ressources in Siberia are probably far too high. And if they are historical, what is totally false is the fact that supplies, ressources and oil will pile up in Soviet bases. In RL any surplus here will be sent to the west to sustain the war. In WITP if you seize Siberia in late 42-begin 43 you will seize more than one million supply.
Currently in the game Okha oil remain where it is, so the 1500 Soviet HI do nothing except waiting for Japanese employees to come. Anyway Siberia produced each day 1500 ressources and 1200 supplies + the daily bonus, far more than what it needs. It also start with huge supply stocks.

I agree that probably no reinforcements would be sent to Siberia in 1942, or even in 1943. But they would in 1944. And there there is the problem of the map's edge, you can effectivelly elminate the Soviet from the game and see him never come back, even after VE-Day. Also Soviet troops won't retreat west, but will be eliminated in the last Soviet town.

An attack on USSR in spring 1942 may be realistic, if the Soviet player is allowed to move troops since December. And if the Japanese agrees not to take the last town, but left it in Soviet hands, under an agreement of the Soviet player to not come back until 2 years later, for example.

[moses]

Any Japanese attack on Russia is based on one thing really. Will Russia survive the 42 German offensives.

Those who believe Germany has already lost the War by Dec 41 will never accept that Japan has any chance.

Those who believe that there was still potential for a Russian collapse should believe that a Japanese offensive might have some chance or might even increase the odds of a Russian collapse.

Some will say that since Russia won the war that that proves that russia could not have lost. In their view Germany lost the day it invaded Russia, Japan lost it on Dec 7th, and the south lost the war the day it fired on fort Sumter.

Its hard to argue with those who believe this way as they will just keep showing you the final score and saying that that proves their case.

I hold the view that wars are fought by people and you never really know what people will do. They are always capable of screwing up even the most promising situations in the most creative ways. They are also capable of pulling off miracals on occasion in the face of great odds.

So I believe a range of outcomes were possible in this and other wars.

So I have no objection to Japan having a chance of victory. I object to them having a near certainty of a quick bloodless victory.

[6971grunt]

ORIGINAL: spence

While others caution against a winter campaign, one must remember that the Japanese have "owned" Manchuria for nearly ten years - enough time to become accustome to this harsh enviornment [men and equipment]

Garrison duty in a Manchurian city is just like attacking through deep snow in a trackless forest with the temperature hovering at -50C apparently.

I'm absolutely positive that the Japanese Army sat in their barracks, never fired a shot, never drove a tank, never flew a plane or conducted any type of winter maneuver at all during the ten years leading up to the war [>:] - it would be too samuri-like.