What if the Dutch had surrendered?

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RE: What if the Dutch had surrendered?

Post by bklooste »

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

ORIGINAL: JWE
Things back then things weren't facts, figures, and cyphers: they were people and attitudes and positions against the whirlwind.

Don't forget the dismal science (Economics) and Logistics, which is where the above run into a brick wall and are, perforce, shaped by.

Phil



300K tanker capacity with a 4 week round trip to the DEI is 12 * 300K or ~7M . Note they demanded 3.8M from the DEI .

"Although Japan had well over 587ktons of tanker capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War, the Navy required 270,000 tons of that [having ceased to build AOs in the 1920s], leaving only about 30000 tons for nonoperational purposes ... "

This quote has issues ..and even a simple reading says it absurd since 300K tons is not enough to fuel the economy in 1941-1942
Just before their attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan had only 49 merchant tankers of about 587,000 tons and [ in addition ] the IJN had but nine slow fleet oilers. Despite its prewar stockpiling of two years of petroleum products, Japan had to rely on imports from its conquered South Asia territories for survival.

Like all navies, oil was the lifeblood of the IJN. As a result, the IJN requisitioned 77 merchant ships from their owners for conversion to auxiliary oilers.


Thus the Navy createds its own oilers before the war as can be seen , all of the 8 AOs in the PH OOB are AOs converted from merchants and build in the late 30's.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/Yusosen.htm
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RE: What if the Dutch had surrendered?

Post by JWE »

ORIGINAL: aspqrz
Japan had 49 Tankers in 1940, of c. 350,000 tons capacity.

She imported 3.68 million tons in the last full year before the war.
Have a fairly complete list of names and specifications, including net, gross, deadweight tonnage, loa, lpp, construction date, operator, etc. for 87 of the 94 tankers registered as of June 1, 1941. The remaining 7 are bulk oil carriers configured to swap between heavy lift dry and bulk oil cargo.

Also have a fairly complete list again by name and/or specifications (mainly both) of almost 400 of the tankers constructed between Jan 1 1942 and July 1, 1944.
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RE: What if the Dutch had surrendered?

Post by bklooste »

ORIGINAL: Heeward

[font="times new roman"]History:

On July 21st 1941, the French Vichy Government accepted Japanese demands for air and naval bases in Southern French Indochina. Four days later President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced the embargo, including a freeze of all bank transfers. Great Britain followed the USA with the same measures the next day and on July 26th, the Dutch government in exile in London joined the embargo. Van Starkenborgh in Batavia had suggested to his government in London to ask for guarantees from the USA and Great Britain in case this embargo would lead to war with Japan but his suggestion came too late. On Monday, July 28th, 1941, the authorities in Batavia published a set of measures that resulted in fact in a stop of all trade with and payments to Japan. Two Japanese tankers, that had just finished tanking at Tarakan Island were allowed to leave but a third one that was entering the port was sent away.

Assumption for the scenario:

The US Isolationist force Roosevelt hand and or the State Department fails to get the word the Dutch Government does not receive the guarantee from the United States, Britain not will to act alone withdraws theirs due to over extending the forces.

The Japanese Government after the occupation of French Indochina believe the Dutch Government to be cowed and shortly thereafter represent the November 1940 demands to the Dutch Government with added stipulation of basing rights.
- adherence to Japans vision and policy in South East Asia, while other demands from the list were:
- unrestricted rights to explore and exploit minerals all over the Dutch East Indies
- unrestricted fishing and shipping rights in all the waters of the Dutch East Indies
- unrestricted rights to start all sorts of commercial enterprises
- Japans export to the DEI must be increased to more than 80% of all imports of the Dutch East Indies
- the demand for oil of to 3.800.000 tons
- airline and telegraph connections between Japan and the Dutch East Indies
- occupation and basing of Japanese forces for the protection of the Dutch colony.

The Dutch abandoned by the British and the American Governments succumb to the demands of the Japanese Government.

Having accomplished their immediate goal of securing resources and oil, the start of the War in the Pacific is delayed by four to six months, or Japan seeing how effete the west is continues to make demands on the western powers and over reaches herself starting the war six months earlier - Your Choice.


[/font] [font="times new roman"]
[/font]


Why would anyone have a war ? Japan is NOT going to start war with the UK and US ( even if it thinks its weak) unless it has to and in this case she has the oil - better to just develop.. The US wont start as their is no way you will get it through congress.
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RE: What if the Dutch had surrendered?

Post by Heeward »

It is my opinion that War in the Pacific was inevitable. This would have occurred even if the Dutch allow the East Indies to be occupied or Britain ceded Malaya to the Japanese Empire. Japan would have attacked the United States and Britain in their quest to establish the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere their version of Manifest Destiny. Direct conflict over the Philippines, and/ or India would have ensured war.
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RE: What if the Dutch had surrendered?

Post by bklooste »

ORIGINAL: Heeward

It is my opinion that War in the Pacific was inevitable. This would have occurred even if the Dutch allow the East Indies to be occupied or Britain ceded Malaya to the Japanese Empire. Japan would have attacked the United States and Britain in their quest to establish the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere their version of Manifest Destiny. Direct conflict over the Philippines, and/ or India would have ensured war.


Sorry disagree "East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" was created in 1940 and consisted of Japan, Manchukuo, China, and Thailand. It was extented when Japan attacked other countries.

Japan had their hands full with China and the Industralization of Manchuria was planned to take another 30 years of significant Japanese investment. Attacking 5 countries with big economies ( China , US , Australia , Canada , UK) was not on the agenda and unlike the US who did have plans to attack Japan , Japan had no such plans before the embargo.

While Japan was aggressive and had imperial ambitions they were not stupid and the only reason the war started was they couldnt lose face and withdraw from China as demanded by the Oil embargo . The US offered them 2 choices withdraw from China or have your economy collapse neither was acceptable and they chose the only culturally acceptable choice. There are many papers on why this stick only approach was very bad diplomacy.
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RE: What if the Dutch had surrendered?

Post by aspqrz02 »

ORIGINAL: bklooste

300K tanker capacity with a 4 week round trip to the DEI is 12 * 300K or ~7M. Note they demanded 3.8M from the DEI .

"Although Japan had well over 587ktons of tanker capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War, the Navy required 270,000 tons of that [having ceased to build AOs in the 1920s], leaving only about 30000 tons for nonoperational purposes ... "

If you're going to cite a quote that someone has given, then it behooves you to cite it correctly.

The original quote, directly from the book cited, was 300 ktons ... not the almost doubled figure you have ... accidentally ... changed it to.

If you disagree with the citation's source, which I provided, along with the relevant page number, so it could be checked, then that's fine ... provide your own citation (with title and page number too, so it can be checked as well ... turn about is fair play) that disputes it. Don't "accidentally" change the original so that your following arguments make more sense.
ORIGINAL: bklooste
This quote has issues ..and even a simple reading says it absurd since 300K tons is not enough to fuel the economy in 1941-1942

So? Just because you don't believe that the source is correct doesn't mean that it isn't. Given that books have to have a peer review to get published.

Of the two authors ...

Mark Peattie: Is a professor emeritus at the University of Massachusetts at Boston and a research fellow at the Hoover Institution. He was the visiting professor at the University of Hawaii in 1995.

Peattie is a reader for Columbia University Press, University of California Press, University of Hawaii Press, Stanford University Press, University of Michigan Press, and U.S. Naval Institute Press

The book has been well reviewed in academic circles and is 4.5 stars or so on Amazon.

So, unless you can provide something that casts doubt on the facts and figures it provides ... and which postdates its publication in the late 1990s (and which is therefore not based on outdated scholarship) ... I believe that the statement from Kaigun ... the original one, not the one you "accidentally" changed ... stands unchallenged.
ORIGINAL: bklooste
Just before their attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan had only 49 merchant tankers of about 587,000 tons and [ in addition ] the IJN had but nine slow fleet oilers. Despite its prewar stockpiling of two years of petroleum products, Japan had to rely on imports from its conquered South Asia territories for survival.


I never said this. The cite I provided refers to 300 kton of tankers, not 587 kton.

If you are citing someone else or some other source then you need to be clear who you are citing and, if a book or magazine article, the author, title and page number of the cite ... if a website, the URL.

Or is this an extended "accidental" misquotation of the original citation that I provided and which is easily checked to be found correct?

ORIGINAL: bklooste
Like all navies, oil was the lifeblood of the IJN. As a result, the IJN requisitioned 77 merchant ships from their owners for conversion to auxiliary oilers.

Thus the Navy createds its own oilers before the war as can be seen , all of the 8 AOs in the PH OOB are AOs converted from merchants and build in the late 30's.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/Yusosen.htm

[/quote]

And, if you'd actually read what I wrote rather than misquoting parts of it you would have noted that I said that the IJN did exactly that. The only thing we disagree on is the number and tonnage of tankers available ... and that seems to be entirely because you haven't actually read the source that you are citing.

And I can assure you that, if you check (Kaigun is available on Google books and is easily searchable), the citations I provided are close to word for word perfect. Certainly the figures are entirely correct.

I suppose that Prof Peattie could be deliberately lying and all of his reviewers are backing up his deliberate lies ... but, on balance, I doubt it.

Also note that your cite, combinedfleet.com, also states ...

"This page will cover the activities of 127 fleet and coastal tankers - 67 merchant tanker auxiliaries, 18 Navy fleet oilers and 35 civilian merchant tankers in Japanese national service and six captured and one German vessel in Japanese service."

Making it plain that the figures are for the whole of WW2 - and there is no breakdown as to how many were coastal tankers ... that is, ones that never left Japanese coastal waters and which, therefore, are excised from the total available in 1941 by Peattie et al as they are irrelevant to transporting oil back from the DEI or for operational use by the IJN, unless based in home waters.

You could also check out this page ... http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

Especially where it provides Merchant shipping production rates for the US and Japan ... which, of course, includes Tanker production ...

Year USA Tonnage Japan Tonnage
1939 ~376 kton ~320 kton
1940 ~528 kton ~293 kton
1941 ~1 megaton ~210 kton
1942 ~5.48 megaton ~260 kton
1943 ~11.45 megaton ~769 kton
1944 ~9.28 megaton ~1.7 megaton
1945 ~5.84 megaton ~599 kton
Totals ~34 megatons ~4.15 megatons

And, of course, that doesn't include British or British Commonwealth production.

The comment of the author of the page is telling ... "Every time I look at these number, I just shake my head in amazement. The United States built more merchant shipping in the first four and a half months of 1943 than Japan put in the water in seven years. The other really interesting thing is that there was really no noticeable increase in Japanese merchant vessel building until 1943, by which time it was already way too late to stop the bleeding."

Also note his comments on "Kaigun" in his review of the book ... yes, he reviewed it ... "This work fills a major gap in the Western literature concerning Japanese naval doctrine. No other study to date has covered this topic as completely. The authors, who are both Japanese linguists, make extensive usage of Japanese primary sources to support their arguments. The bibliography and back-matter are most impressive."

Phil

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RE: What if the Dutch had surrendered?

Post by aspqrz02 »

ORIGINAL: bklooste
While Japan was aggressive and had imperial ambitions they were not stupid and the only reason the war started was they couldn't lose face and withdraw from China as demanded by the Oil embargo.

Perhaps your definition of "stupid" is different to that which the rest of the world seems to use.

You are proposing that it wasn't "stupid" to take on an opponent who their own staff studies showed could completely crush them because they would "lose face"?

So they accepted millions of military and civilian casualties and the almost complete destruction of their economy and industrial base rather than "lose face" ... and this isn't "stupid."

Pardon me if I beg leave to disagree [:-]

Phil
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RE: What if the Dutch had surrendered?

Post by bklooste »

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

ORIGINAL: bklooste
While Japan was aggressive and had imperial ambitions they were not stupid and the only reason the war started was they couldn't lose face and withdraw from China as demanded by the Oil embargo.

Perhaps your definition of "stupid" is different to that which the rest of the world seems to use.

You are proposing that it wasn't "stupid" to take on an opponent who their own staff studies showed could completely crush them because they would "lose face"?

So they accepted millions of military and civilian casualties and the almost complete destruction of their economy and industrial base rather than "lose face" ... and this isn't "stupid."

Pardon me if I beg leave to disagree [:-]

Phil

That is your cultural value ( and mine) , in their culture it wasnt culturaly acceptable to lose face at ANY cost . As it is today if you work in Japan you will know . I must say western cultures have had their brushes with unusual cultures as well WWI comes to mind they could have got the same result and negotiated in 1916 ( with 300 sq limes less ) but didnt want the stigma or the french knights killing each other for the honor to impale themselves on the english .

But back to the question as i dont think this is going into a productive area :-) If they didnt need oil they wouldnt have attacked as their is no need to and defeat likely.
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RE: What if the Dutch had surrendered?

Post by bklooste »

I didnt accidentally change it i used a different source and i quoted it....Note the 2nd sentance is different.. Anyway my argument isnt about the 300 or 587 but merely that the IJN had its own AO which it converted from Merchant and was not part of the 49 - You subtracted this amount .

Note the 587 sounds too high as that is an average ship size fo 12K and i dont think Japan has 49 ships 10-14K there are a lot of smaller ones.

My quote ( as posted ) was

http://www.combinedfleet.com/Yusosen.htm
Just before their attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan had only 49 merchant tankers of about 587,000 tons and the IJN had but nine slow fleet oilers. Despite its prewar stockpiling of two years of petroleum products, Japan had to rely on imports from its conquered South Asia territories for survival.


2010 by

Mr. Robert Hackett is a military historian and researcher. Retired from the United States Air Force and later from the aerospace industry, he resides in the United States.

Mr. Peter Cundall is a maritime historian and researcher who specializes in merchant ships. He resides in Australia.


I suppose that Prof Peattie could be deliberately lying and all of his reviewers are backing up his deliberate lies ... but, on balance, I doubt it.

Also note that your cite, combinedfleet.com, also states ...

"This page will cover the activities of 127 fleet and coastal tankers - 67 merchant tanker auxiliaries, 18 Navy fleet oilers and 35 civilian merchant tankers in Japanese national service and six captured and one German vessel in Japanese service."

Combined fleet is a respected site where many of the book writers publish articles. I dont count ratings very much because inaccurate books which are a good read get nice ratings.

Please read slower and for balance not just to prove your point... Yes that is the whole war i didnt quote that , the pre war figure as quoted was 49 Merchant Tankers , nine slow fleet oilers and an unknown number of converted merchants. I also went to the Troms of some of these and determined they were Navy ships built in the 30s , taken and converted pre war to oilers ( and not part of the pre 20s oilers or Merchant fleet) . I checked the TROMS of the 8 ships at PH and they were not one of the nine slow tankers of the 49 Merchant tankers hence the IJN had its own capacity in addition to the Merchant fleet and in addition to the pre 1920s tankers . So the 49 ships being 300K total is also incorrect.
Especially where it provides Merchant shipping production rates for the US and Japan ... which, of course, includes Tanker production ...

Year USA Tonnage Japan Tonnage
1939 ~376 kton ~320 kton
1940 ~528 kton ~293 kton
1941 ~1 megaton ~210 kton
1942 ~5.48 megaton ~260 kton
1943 ~11.45 megaton ~769 kton
1944 ~9.28 megaton ~1.7 megaton
1945 ~5.84 megaton ~599 kton
Totals ~34 megatons ~4.15 megatons

Yes i know this and Japans problems .. it is not relevant at all to the point , i clarified that Japan did not have 30k oil shipping left ( after the Navy usage) pre war or early in the war ( you didnt say which ) as you claimed with your 300K - 270K used by the IJN figure. I couldnt believe Japan can run on 30K shipping and i know teh starting OOB so i wanted to checkit out.

From the Troms it obvious either the quote or the original author is wrong not because of the 300K but because there were additionaly Navy ships ( Personally i think both quotes are wrong and it shows the hazzards of adopting whats written in a book as gospel) Anyway the best way to find out is to look at the at start OOB since its based on real ships and where they are.
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RE: What if the Dutch had surrendered?

Post by mike scholl 1 »

ORIGINAL: bklooste
While Japan was aggressive and had imperial ambitions they were not stupid and the only reason the war started was they couldn't lose face and withdraw from China as demanded by the Oil embargo.


I think if you check the wording closely you will find that the US Oil Embargo required the Japanese to withdraw from FRENCH INDO-CHINA, not China itself.

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RE: What if the Dutch had surrendered?

Post by aspqrz02 »

ORIGINAL: bklooste

I didnt accidentally change

So, you deliberately changed my cite ... without checking whether the cite was correct or not and yet implying that it was my cite.

There is a name for that in academia, and not a pretty one, either.

I will assume that it was merely poor attribution, all evidence to the contrary.
ORIGINAL: bklooste

....Note the 2nd sentance is different.. Anyway my argument isnt about the 300 or 587 but merely that the IJN had its own AO which it converted from Merchant and was not part of the 49 - You subtracted this amount .

I did no such thing.

I cited a book where this claim was made. One reviewed by the author of your source quite favourably ... oh, and, btw, the author of your source actually provided the illustrations for said book. I think we can take it as read, given his favourable review of it and his active participation in aspects of its production that he thinks highly of it.

In any case, the material I cited did not subtract the AO tonnage from the TK tonnage ... show where it says that anywhere in what I cited or in Kaigun as a whole ... it seems to have cited overall AO/TK tonnage less coastal tankers ... the sort of tankers useless for operational support of the IJN/IJA outside of the Home Islands and equally useless for transporting oil from the DEI to the Home Islands.

So neither Kaigun nor your source actually contradict what I said, which, of course, was to cite Kaigun.

Yet neither your source nor Kaigun support your statement on the substantive matter of what tanker (i.e. AO + TK as is made clear from the cites) tonnage was available for potential operational use outside of the Home Islands or for shipping oil back to the Home Islands from the DEI.
ORIGINAL: bklooste

Mr. Robert Hackett is a military historian and researcher. Retired from the United States Air Force and later from the aerospace industry, he resides in the United States.

Interestingly enough Mr Hackett wrote, on the website you cite, a glowing review of "Kaigun" and also notes that he provided the illustrations for the book.
ORIGINAL: bklooste

Combined fleet is a respected site where many of the book writers publish articles. I dont count ratings very much because inaccurate books which are a good read get nice ratings.

See above.

So Combined Fleet is wonderful when you claim it supports your statements and piss poor awful when it doesn't.

Double standards? [X(]

Seems so.

Phil
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RE: What if the Dutch had surrendered?

Post by bklooste »

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1
ORIGINAL: bklooste
While Japan was aggressive and had imperial ambitions they were not stupid and the only reason the war started was they couldn't lose face and withdraw from China as demanded by the Oil embargo.


I think if you check the wording closely you will find that the US Oil Embargo required the Japanese to withdraw from FRENCH INDO-CHINA, not China itself.


That is probably correct ( and may be intended ) and probably would be done by Japan , but in the dip negotiations the US demanded China and Vietnam

" Through the diplomatic talks, the United States was to reopen trade with Japan if Japan withdrew from parts of China and Indochina"

http://www.associatedcontent.com/articl ... tml?cat=37


But FDR did not want to cut off oil. As he told his Cabinet on July 18, an embargo meant war, for that would force oil-starved Japan to seize the oil fields of the Dutch East Indies. But a State Department lawyer named Dean Acheson drew up the sanctions in such a way as to block any Japanese purchases of U.S. oil. By the time FDR found out, in September, he could not back down.

Tokyo was now split between a War Party and a Peace Party, with the latter in power. Prime Minister Konoye called in Ambassador Joseph Grew and secretly offered to meet FDR in Juneau or anywhere in the Pacific. According to Grew, Konoye was willing to give up Indochina and China, except a buffer region in the north to protect her from Stalin, in return for the U.S. brokering a peace with China and opening up the oil pipeline. Konoye told Grew that Emperor Hirohito knew of his initiative and was ready to give the order for Japan's retreat.

Fearful of a "second Munich," America spurned the offer. Konoye fell from power and was replaced by Hideki Tojo. Still, war was not inevitable. U.S. diplomats prepared to offer Japan a "modus vivendi." If Japan withdrew from southern Indochina, the United States would partially lift the oil embargo. But Chiang Kai-shek became "hysterical," and his American adviser, one Owen Lattimore, intervened to abort the proposal.


http://www.theamericancause.org/patwhydidjapan.htm

Here we see America not wanting to loose face by backing down twice... As i said a textbook case in how not to do diplomacy - a completely avoidable war and as can be seen Japan ( if there comments were to believed) was willing to give up much to avoid war... In fact the embargo gave the war party a lot of power.




Even before InoChina and the Embargo teh Japanese government were illing to negotiate
In April, 1941, a triumphant Matsuoka returned to Japan, convinced that he had played the role of world statesman. But Prime Minister Konoe had a surprise for Matsuoka. Through Japan's ambassador to the United States, Kichisaburo Nomura, Konoe had in hand what he believed to be a promising peace proposal from the United States. The proposal included American recognition of Manchukuo, the merging of Chiang's government with the Japan-backed government of Wang, withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and mutual respect for its independence, and even an agreement that Japanese immigration to the US shall proceed "on the basis of equality with other nationals and free from discrimination". A meeting for negotiation between Roosevelt and Konoe was proposed for Honolulu, to commence as early as May.

There was only one problem with the document. Each side believed that it represented the starting position of the other side, but in reality, it had been drawn up by two American Maryknoll priests and two mid-level Japanese officials. The Japanese Ambassador to the US Nomura Kichisaburo knew this, but managed to give each government the idea that the other had already agreed to the draft as the basis for negotiation. Konoe was elated by this development, and began to line up support for the idea of a summit conference in Hawaii. But Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Roosevelt had no intention of bargaining from this draft. Throughout the next six months, Konoe continued to hope that somehow he would convince Roosevelt to meet with him and settle differences—without having to give up Japanese hegemony in East Asia. He never succeeded.
... After the Embargo

Konoe made one more desperate attempt to avert war. He proposed a personal summit with Roosevelt–in the United States if necessary–to come to some understanding. Konoe secured backing from the Navy and the Emperor for this move. The Army reluctantly agreed, provided that Konoe adhere to the consensus foreign policy, and be prepared to go to war if his initiative failed. Konoe secretly confided to a friend that he intended to grant further concessions to the US, including withdrawal from China, using direct authority from the Emperor. His friend cautioned that he would be assassinated upon his return. Konoe agreed that this was likely, but felt that it was worth the personal risk.

Roosevelt and Hull played along, even though they felt that negotiations were probably a waste of time. They also doubted that Konoe could make an agreement that was both acceptable to the US and to the militarists at home. Time was what they wanted most. Time to build more airplanes and ships; time to manufacture munitions and train new soldiers; time to rush more supplies to Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Roosevelt told Ambassador Nomura that he would like to see more details of Konoe's proposal, and he suggested that Juneau, Alaska, might be a good spot for a meeting.

On September 5, Konoe met the Emperor with chiefs of staff Hajime Sugiyama and Osami Nagano. Alarmed, Emperor Showa asked what happened to the negotiations with Roosevelt. Konoe replied that, of course, negotiations were primary, and the military option was only a fall-back position if negotiations failed. The Emperor then questioned Sugiyama about the chances of success of an open war with the Occident. After Sugiyama answered positively, Hirohito scolded him, remembering that the Army had predicted that the invasion of China would be completed in only three months.[4]

The next day the policy about the preparation for war against "United States, England and Holland" was formally proposed at the Imperial Conference. Hara Yoshimichi, the Privy Council President, observed that the plan seemed to put military action ahead of diplomacy. Standing in for the Emperor, he asked if that was the case. The Navy Minister made a reply along the lines that Konoe had stated in his private conference. Then there was silence. No other figure, including Konoe, attempted to answer the question.

The Emperor then stunned the gathering by speaking out. He stated that Hara's question was an important one, and that it was "regrettable" that none of the senior leaders had addressed it. He then read a verse that had been composed by the Emperor Meiji:

Throughout the world
Everywhere we are all brothers
Why then do the winds and waves rage so turbulently?
He stated that he had often reflected on this verse, which represented the Emperor Meiji's desire for peace, a desire that he shared. Stung by this unexpected rebuke, Navy Chief of Staff Nagano rose to defend the policy, assuring the Emperor that this consensus document was not a decision to go to war and that priority would be given to negotiations.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fumimaro_Konoe

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RE: What if the Dutch had surrendered?

Post by JWE »

Here’s something interesting for you guys to argue over. A couple summary tables from Kindai Nihon yuso shi and Showa kokusei soran. As Evans and Peattie explain in their endnotes, their merchant data is derived extensively from Dr. Mark Parillo who, in turn, uses primary Japanese shipping company source material, just like the material below. Mark Parillo is still at KSU and is very accessible. You might also wish to look at S.C. Heal.

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RE: What if the Dutch had surrendered?

Post by bklooste »




I will assume that it was merely poor attribution, all evidence to the contrary.

It was , i probably wanted to retype it and remove the cite than forgot it
ORIGINAL: bklooste

....Note the 2nd sentance is different.. Anyway my argument isnt about the 300 or 587 but merely that the IJN had its own AO which it converted from Merchant and was not part of the 49 - You subtracted this amount .

did no such thing.

I cited a book where this claim was made. One reviewed by the author of your source quite favourably ... oh, and, btw, the author of your source actually provided the illustrations for said book. I think we can take it as read, given his favourable review of it and his active participation in aspects of its production that he thinks highly of it.
"Although Japan had well over 300ktons of tanker capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War, the Navy required 270,000 tons of that [having ceased to build AOs in the 1920s], leaving only about 30000 tons for nonoperational purposes ...

... Early in the Pacific War it became clear that ... Japan would have inadequate Tanker resources to transport the oil resources that were the chief object of its strategic ambitions in 1940-41 ..." -- Kaigun, pg. #405

In any case, the material I cited did not subtract the AO tonnage from the TK tonnage ... show where it says that anywhere in what I cited or in Kaigun as a whole ... it seems to have cited overall AO/TK tonnage less coastal tankers ... the sort of tankers useless for operational support of the IJN/IJA outside of the Home Islands and equally useless for transporting oil from the DEI to the Home Islands.


1.No it said Japan had 30K tons available for non operational purposes..and seems a blanket unqualified statement. The economy couldnt live on that
2. Also the coastal tankers Japan uses many are around 6K which is not that small.
3. Is this speculation on the authors intent or is this written and quotable ? . This may be corrrect and for the first few weeks of the war Japan needed long range shipping ( due to the long reaching operations like PH and Ceylon) but not before Dec 1941 and not after mid 42.

So Combined Fleet is wonderful when you claim it supports your statements and piss poor awful when it doesn't.

Double standards? [X(]


Phil

Hardly i said the 580K figure was probably wrong but the Trom information is good , i just said dont treat things written in books as gospel respected or not.

Anyway i think JWE has it best . Japan began the war with 94 purpose-built oil tankers (401,000 GRT), you can just tally them up from where they were and what they are.
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JWE
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RE: What if the Dutch had surrendered?

Post by JWE »

ORIGINAL: bklooste
1.No it said Japan had 30K tons available for non operational purposes..and seems a blanket unqualified statement. The economy couldnt live on that
2. Also the coastal tankers Japan uses many are around 6K which is not that small.
3. Is this speculation on the authors intent or is this written and quotable ? . This may be corrrect and for the first few weeks of the war Japan needed long range shipping ( due to the long reaching operations like PH and Ceylon) but not before Dec 1941 and not after mid 42.
It is all a matter of context. Japan constructed 22 tankers in the 10,000 gross ton range, and 6 tankers in the 8,000 gross ton range, between 1935 and 1939. 30k tons is only 3 or 4 ships, so there is a contextual nuance that is missing.

The IJN “designated” many commercial tankers as auxiliary oilers and provided deck fittings to permit them to function is this regard, as necessary. They were a “shadow grouping” if you will, that that functioned mainly for the commercial sector, but could be called upon for Naval service. The game’s PH replenishment group is a prime example of this.

The remaining ships (and tonnage) were mostly so-called coastal vessels. The term “coastal” is a word of convenience and means nothing as to routes and capabilities. These were in the range of 1,900 down to about 800 tons. These vessels were the primary carriers by Japan, Holland, Britain, and the US, for traffic throughout the China Sea area for decades before the war and provided much of the Japanese liquid lift from ’43 onward. Heal has a nice description of a 17 ship “coastal tanker” convoy (ranging from 820 to 1,460 tons) that made its way from Borneo, with stops in the PI and Taiwan, to its destination in Japan.

This is not speculation on the part of the authors. Peattie, Evans, Parillo, Heal, Nakamura do not speculate. But they do put their data in context. But it does take some background knowledge to make the context clear; they are scholars who write for those who have more than just a passing interest in the subject matter and who will be expected to understand certain contextual references.

Btw, and apropos of nothing at all, Dr. Mark Parillo has reviewed and vetted the Japanese merchant fleet (including the tankers) for the base AE scenarios.

And yes, according to every single scholar there is, Japan had substantial and sufficient liquid lift tonnage available.

Ciao. John
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RE: What if the Dutch had surrendered?

Post by RUDOLF »

ORIGINAL: JWE
ORIGINAL: bklooste
1.No it said Japan had 30K tons available for non operational purposes..and seems a blanket unqualified statement. The economy couldnt live on that
2. Also the coastal tankers Japan uses many are around 6K which is not that small.
3. Is this speculation on the authors intent or is this written and quotable ? . This may be corrrect and for the first few weeks of the war Japan needed long range shipping ( due to the long reaching operations like PH and Ceylon) but not before Dec 1941 and not after mid 42.
It is all a matter of context. Japan constructed 22 tankers in the 10,000 gross ton range, and 6 tankers in the 8,000 gross ton range, between 1935 and 1939. 30k tons is only 3 or 4 ships, so there is a contextual nuance that is missing.

The IJN “designated” many commercial tankers as auxiliary oilers and provided deck fittings to permit them to function is this regard, as necessary. They were a “shadow grouping” if you will, that that functioned mainly for the commercial sector, but could be called upon for Naval service. The game’s PH replenishment group is a prime example of this.

The remaining ships (and tonnage) were mostly so-called coastal vessels. The term “coastal” is a word of convenience and means nothing as to routes and capabilities. These were in the range of 1,900 down to about 800 tons. These vessels were the primary carriers by Japan, Holland, Britain, and the US, for traffic throughout the China Sea area for decades before the war and provided much of the Japanese liquid lift from ’43 onward. Heal has a nice description of a 17 ship “coastal tanker” convoy (ranging from 820 to 1,460 tons) that made its way from Borneo, with stops in the PI and Taiwan, to its destination in Japan.

This is not speculation on the part of the authors. Peattie, Evans, Parillo, Heal, Nakamura do not speculate. But they do put their data in context. But it does take some background knowledge to make the context clear; they are scholars who write for those who have more than just a passing interest in the subject matter and who will be expected to understand certain contextual references.

Btw, and apropos of nothing at all, Dr. Mark Parillo has reviewed and vetted the Japanese merchant fleet (including the tankers) for the base AE scenarios.

And yes, according to every single scholar there is, Japan had substantial and sufficient liquid lift tonnage available.

Ciao. John


oh [:D] Japan was really a 2nd world country.
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