Historical Lessons Learned from the Game

[crsutton]

The Kaga was not sunk by 500 lb bombs at the battle of Midway. Because heck, everybody knows that 500 lb bombs would never penetrate her flight deck.

[crsutton]

Paratroop engineer troops were too damn "fat" to fit into a parachute harness and were usually left at home.

[mike scholl 1]

My favorite "discovery" in the game was the little known program instituted by the Allied Powers to draft winos and borderline mental deficients into their Services, give them high level officer commissions, and place them in command of the great majority of air, land. and sea units that would be available to see acction during the first year of the war---thus forcing the Allied Player to expend the great majority of his "political points" (whatever they are) replacing these bozos with the competent officiers left sitting in the "O Club" when these idiots were given their commands.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

My favorite "discovery" in the game was the little known program instituted by the Allied Powers to draft winos and borderline mental deficients into their Services, give them high level officer commissions, and place them in command of the great majority of air, land. and sea units that would be available to see acction during the first year of the war---thus forcing the Allied Player to expend the great majority of his "political points" (whatever they are) replacing these bozos with the competent officiers left sitting in the "O Club" when these idiots were given their commands.

You've encountered the National Guard, where interwar promotion was often political.

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

My favorite "discovery" in the game was the little known program instituted by the Allied Powers to draft winos and borderline mental deficients into their Services, give them high level officer commissions, and place them in command of the great majority of air, land. and sea units that would be available to see acction during the first year of the war---thus forcing the Allied Player to expend the great majority of his "political points" (whatever they are) replacing these bozos with the competent officiers left sitting in the "O Club" when these idiots were given their commands.

You've encountered the National Guard, where interwar promotion was often political.

In AIR SQUADRONS and on SHIPS and SUBS? I don't think so. And not all land units were National Guard. Sorry Harry..., can't agree with you in this case. In addition, the USA (which fully trained more than TWICE as many pilots in 1941 as Japan), has Squadrons arriving with training levels in the 20's and 30's. No offense, but that's nonsense.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

My favorite "discovery" in the game was the little known program instituted by the Allied Powers to draft winos and borderline mental deficients into their Services, give them high level officer commissions, and place them in command of the great majority of air, land. and sea units that would be available to see acction during the first year of the war---thus forcing the Allied Player to expend the great majority of his "political points" (whatever they are) replacing these bozos with the competent officiers left sitting in the "O Club" when these idiots were given their commands.

You've encountered the National Guard, where interwar promotion was often political.

In AIR SQUADRONS and on SHIPS and SUBS? I don't think so. And not all land units were National Guard. Sorry Harry..., can't agree with you in this case. In addition, the USA (which fully trained more than TWICE as many pilots in 1941 as Japan), has Squadrons arriving with training levels in the 20's and 30's. No offense, but that's nonsense.

There's a cluster of skills that lead to promotion in peacetime. There's a second cluster of skills that makes a leader effective in wartime. They overlap minimally. Both the US Army and the US Navy had to cull their leadership in 1942-43. The British had been using the various colonies as a place to post their poorer commanders in 1939-1941. The manpower pool from which higher British commanders were drawn was very small and inbred, so the poorest leaders were still kept on as administrators. Luckily for the Allies, there was also a class factor in British postings, so there were decent Indian and Australian officers available to step in once the failings of the poorer British leaders were (slowly) accepted. However a mediocre British commander (Leese for example) was always preferred to a brilliant colonial (e.g., Slim). Slim just didn't 'smell' right and didn't fit in.

(The Brits still operate that way.)

[Blackhorse]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

My favorite "discovery" in the game was the little known program instituted by the Allied Powers to draft winos and borderline mental deficients into their Services, give them high level officer commissions, and place them in command of the great majority of air, land. and sea units that would be available to see acction during the first year of the war---thus forcing the Allied Player to expend the great majority of his "political points" (whatever they are) replacing these bozos with the competent officiers left sitting in the "O Club" when these idiots were given their commands.

You've encountered the National Guard, where interwar promotion was often political.

For the British and Australians it was the case of having most of their best and brightest off fighting the active war against the Nazi's, instead of letting them putter around on the chance that the Japanese might attack. I've yet to read a revisionist history that suggests that Percival or Brooke-Popham were underappreciated geniuses.

For the Americans, the leaders were untested. With the benefit of hindsight, we can know who rose to the occasion. But at the time, no one knew. However, the problem was not National Guard commanders. The Guard divisions had been federalized for well over a year, and one thing the War Department got right was ruthlessly pruning overage or underqualified guard officers from their posts. The US Army did try to distinguish between Commanders who could train a division, and commanders who could better lead a division in combat. In AE, each US Division starts with the first commander who took the division overseas.

As far as I can tell, a Regular Army division and a National Guard division formed at the same time, with similar training, was likely perform about the same in combat. The American system of Army mobilization was a textbook example of how *not* to do it, and many divisions in training had to provide 3 or more "drafts" of soldiers to form cadres for newer divisions. Those divisions that suffered more drafts, in some cases having to replace more than 100% of the original complement of soldiers, had far less unit cohesion, morale, and combat skills when they deployed.

[ilovestrategy]

ORIGINAL: sanch

Park a PT tender in some dinky port; shuffle it to the dock to reload supplies every couple weeks, and ...

Presto! a complete functioning PT-boat torpedo factory in said dinky port (smart natives I guess).

Polynesian cargo cults! [:D]

[Pascal_slith]

ORIGINAL: Blackhorse

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

My favorite "discovery" in the game was the little known program instituted by the Allied Powers to draft winos and borderline mental deficients into their Services, give them high level officer commissions, and place them in command of the great majority of air, land. and sea units that would be available to see acction during the first year of the war---thus forcing the Allied Player to expend the great majority of his "political points" (whatever they are) replacing these bozos with the competent officiers left sitting in the "O Club" when these idiots were given their commands.

You've encountered the National Guard, where interwar promotion was often political.

For the British and Australians it was the case of having most of their best and brightest off fighting the active war against the Nazi's, instead of letting them putter around on the chance that the Japanese might attack. I've yet to read a revisionist history that suggests that Percival or Brooke-Popham were underappreciated geniuses.

For the Americans, the leaders were untested. With the benefit of hindsight, we can know who rose to the occasion. But at the time, no one knew. However, the problem was not National Guard commanders. The Guard divisions had been federalized for well over a year, and one thing the War Department got right was ruthlessly pruning overage or underqualified guard officers from their posts. The US Army did try to distinguish between Commanders who could train a division, and commanders who could better lead a division in combat. In AE, each US Division starts with the first commander who took the division overseas.

As far as I can tell, a Regular Army division and a National Guard division formed at the same time, with similar training, was likely perform about the same in combat. The American system of Army mobilization was a textbook example of how *not* to do it, and many divisions in training had to provide 3 or more "drafts" of soldiers to form cadres for newer divisions. Those divisions that suffered more drafts, in some cases having to replace more than 100% of the original complement of soldiers, had far less unit cohesion, morale, and combat skills when they deployed.

IIRC there was the case of infantry battlions finishing their 'basic' on the ships crossing the Atlantic to Europe during troop crisis periods after D-Day. These units suffered badly, especially after the invasion of Germany proper.

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: Blackhorse
For the Americans, the leaders were untested. With the benefit of hindsight, we can know who rose to the occasion. But at the time, no one knew. However, the problem was not National Guard commanders. The Guard divisions had been federalized for well over a year, and one thing the War Department got right was ruthlessly pruning overage or underqualified guard officers from their posts. The US Army did try to distinguish between Commanders who could train a division, and commanders who could better lead a division in combat. In AE, each US Division starts with the first commander who took the division overseas.

This arguement is pretty much nonsense. You could say the same thing about the Wehrmacht in 1936 when it completed it's first wave of expansion. The US Army was also of a very limited size during the 20's and 30's until it was expanded when the draft was instituted in 1940, and it's officer corps was also quite professional. In one respect it was far ahead of the Germans. After the experiance of WW I, it maintained and constantly upgraded a list of civilian companies that could be mobilized to produce war material if/when Congress authorized the expenditures. Which made it much more effecient when it came time for America to become the "Arsenal of Democracy".

Of course every Military has it's weak links that only become obvious when push comes to shove..., but in this game the situation is rediculous. To think George C. Marshall would have allowed this situation to develope is to believe in the Easter Bunny.

[USS Henrico]

Somehow the history books left out:

Japanese High Command got the combat results first every day of the war and passed them on to the Allies. Admiral Nimitz woke up each morning to heartwarming comments from his counterpart along the lines of "Our submarine torpedoed your carrier. Nanana Banzai!"

[JeffroK]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

ORIGINAL: herwin




You've encountered the National Guard, where interwar promotion was often political.

In AIR SQUADRONS and on SHIPS and SUBS? I don't think so. And not all land units were National Guard. Sorry Harry..., can't agree with you in this case. In addition, the USA (which fully trained more than TWICE as many pilots in 1941 as Japan), has Squadrons arriving with training levels in the 20's and 30's. No offense, but that's nonsense.

There's a cluster of skills that lead to promotion in peacetime. There's a second cluster of skills that makes a leader effective in wartime. They overlap minimally. Both the US Army and the US Navy had to cull their leadership in 1942-43. The British had been using the various colonies as a place to post their poorer commanders in 1939-1941. The manpower pool from which higher British commanders were drawn was very small and inbred, so the poorest leaders were still kept on as administrators. Luckily for the Allies, there was also a class factor in British postings, so there were decent Indian and Australian officers available to step in once the failings of the poorer British leaders were (slowly) accepted. However a mediocre British commander (Leese for example) was always preferred to a brilliant colonial (e.g., Slim). Slim just didn't 'smell' right and didn't fit in.

(The Brits still operate that way.)

Interesting comments, name a few examples of "so there were decent Indian and Australian officers available to step in once the failings of the poorer British leaders were (slowly) accepted"

Slim was British, we bagged him after the war. Leese was a good Corps Commander, OK at 8th Army, out of his depth when sent to SEA.

IMHO, it was more a case of getting through those in higher positions at the start of the war and bringing on the up and coming Lt Cols who had to learn their trade.

A number of the British/Australian Commanders in Malaya were competent beyond their AE ratings, being in the wrong place at the wrong time, with undertained troops ans 2nd line equipment (especially artillery) with equally 2nd Line aircraft in support would make it hard for anyone.

[crsutton]

Wait a minute, this ain't funny anymore....You guys have "so" hijacked this thread..[>:]

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: JeffK

ORIGINAL: herwin

There's a cluster of skills that lead to promotion in peacetime. There's a second cluster of skills that makes a leader effective in wartime. They overlap minimally. Both the US Army and the US Navy had to cull their leadership in 1942-43. The British had been using the various colonies as a place to post their poorer commanders in 1939-1941. The manpower pool from which higher British commanders were drawn was very small and inbred, so the poorest leaders were still kept on as administrators. Luckily for the Allies, there was also a class factor in British postings, so there were decent Indian and Australian officers available to step in once the failings of the poorer British leaders were (slowly) accepted. However a mediocre British commander (Leese for example) was always preferred to a brilliant colonial (e.g., Slim). Slim just didn't 'smell' right and didn't fit in.

(The Brits still operate that way.)

Interesting comments, name a few examples of "so there were decent Indian and Australian officers available to step in once the failings of the poorer British leaders were (slowly) accepted"

Slim was British, we bagged him after the war. Leese was a good Corps Commander, OK at 8th Army, out of his depth when sent to SEA.

IMHO, it was more a case of getting through those in higher positions at the start of the war and bringing on the up and coming Lt Cols who had to learn their trade.

A number of the British/Australian Commanders in Malaya were competent beyond their AE ratings, being in the wrong place at the wrong time, with undertained troops ans 2nd line equipment (especially artillery) with equally 2nd Line aircraft in support would make it hard for anyone.

Slim was Indian Army. His commanders were mostly Indian Army. The losers included Irwin, Percival, Giffard (mixed reviews), and Leese (tried to get rid of Slim).

[zzodr]

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1


Of course every Military has it's weak links that only become obvious when push comes to shove..., but in this game the situation is rediculous. To think George C. Marshall would have allowed this situation to develope is to believe in the Easter Bunny.

Wait. what.. the Easter Bunny isn't REAL? [;)]

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: USS Henrico

Somehow the history books left out:

Japanese High Command got the combat results first every day of the war and passed them on to the Allies. Admiral Nimitz woke up each morning to heartwarming comments from his counterpart along the lines of "Our submarine torpedoed your carrier. Nanana Banzai!"

Tee hee....[:D]

[Insano]

The Japanese used aircraft engines to produce new aircraft but never used an engine to repair a damaged one.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Insano

The Japanese used aircraft engines to produce new aircraft but never used an engine to repair a damaged one.

Base forces had machine shops to make all the repair parts, bombs, and torpedoes they needed using bulk supplies from the homeland. The same bulk supplies could be converted to AVGAS. [;)]

[Pascal_slith]

When you give a move order to a unit in Australia, there are so many bars along thee coast that it takes them days to go 46 miles.

[Andy Mac]

Heath is a good example he was old but he was a proven commander with a successful period cmding 5th Indian Div (at Keren a tough and nasty battle probably the Italian Armies finest hour in WW2) are his rating understated maybe - but he failed to get on with his theatre commander (percival) so I marked them both down for that reason

As to the Div Cders take Murray-Lyon - based on his record 2 DSO's for leadership and a good war record I was manifestly unfair to him as he faced an impossible task but how else do you measure the performance of the individual units under his command.

ps funny thread