Does anyone else think the USA CV pilots are over skilled for 1941?

[UncleBuck]

Scanning my DD214 I never thought of that! Great idea , I will do it as soon as I get my PC up again.

UB

[UncleBuck]

I think it was more a mater of they had better planes than the P-40N in the arsenal and did not need to employ them i the Air to Air role. The P-40N was the last version of the P-40, late 1943/44. By this time they had the P-51D, P-47D-25, P-38L, as well as many longer ranged British planes. Also the P-40N was not designed as a High altitude interceptor, and on the Western front the Germans were not contestign the 9th air force and the low altitude attacks on ground untis. They were workign ont eh 8th AF and teh strategic bombers hitting the cities. The P-40N woudl have eaten ME-10G6's for lunch however below 20,000 feet. In Fact tehy woudl have been a better choice against ME-109G-10 TA-152 ME-109K's as well, below 20,000 feet. Those planes had all been optimized for use against teh high altitude bombers. The FW's after the A-5 woudl also have suffered badly against teh Later modle P-40's at mid to low altitude. They sacrifced much to much sped and manuverability for armor and firepower to again take on teh High altitude bombers.

On the Eastern Front teh Russians had planes that at the low to Mid level out classed every German fighter from 1943 onward period. The Russians decided to control teh immediate battlefield and not contest the much less important High altitude areas, since neither they or the Germans had strategic bomber assets. The Germans had some Excellent pilots with impressive kill scores. However the russians had quite a few as well and they were flying what you woudl call inferior planes, P-39Q's P-47's, La-5FN etc.

UB

[mdiehl]

And because of the superiority of the P-40, the USAAF employed the P-40N battling Me 109Gs...?

Uncle Buck pretty much summed up the argument. I will add that in North Africa in the documented engagements between P40s and Me109s, the P40s in fact DID regularly eat the Me109s lunch.

[Jon_Hal]

Okay. I somehow amalgamated Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz into one battle. When it was all over and the Sara and Wasp had been torpedo-ed (Sara only damaged), the USN had one fleet carrier (Enterprise) left in the Pacific versus 3 or four Jap carriers so at that point Jap carrier air was still ahead, so they were doing sort of okay.

In the context of this discussion I don't think you can bring up the Saratoga and Wasp being torpedoed, unless their were Japanese Naval Aviators skippering the Subs that attacked them. [:)]

For the four great Carrier Battles of 1942 Japan lost. Since this Thread's conversation was on the effecttiveness of USN carrier pilots I will restrict losses to air combat. Not other causes like subs.

Shoho (Coral Sea)
Akagi (midway)
Kaga (midway)
Hiryu (midway)
Soryu (midway)
Ryujo (Eastern Solomons)

Both the Shokaku and Zuikaku were heavily Damaged in the battles of Coral Sea and Santa Cruz respectively.

The USN Lost

Lexington (Coral Sea)
Yorktown (Midway) Finished off by another Japanese sub... otherwise she probably would have made Pearl Harbor and fought again
Hornet (Santa Cruz)

Enterprise was damaged twice, in the Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz
Yorktown was damaged at Coral Sea

In Carrier vs Carrier battles the USN would seem to come out one top. You state that the afterwards the USN had only 1 carrier to the Japanese 3-4 carriers. But it would be months before the Japanese air crew losses were replaced. A week after Santa Cruz the Enterprise was patched up and sailing south of the Solomons ready for action. The Might Sho and Zui reutrned to Japan for months to repair damage and replace aircrews. It was the Enterprise that tipped the scales in the Nov 12th third Japanese offensive on Gauldalcanal and slammed the Japanese invasion fleet.. No Japanese carriers were left to contest her.

Regards, Jon

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

In theory any tactics can be viewed as defensive and/or offensive in some degree. But you can't deny the fact that "Thach Weave" was primarily devised as a mean to save USN pilots when they encounter Zero fighters and dogfight occur (natural tendency for almost all pilots in all sides at that time in history was to enter circling dogfight)...

It was not the natural tendency of pilots to enter a circling dogfight. The beam defense was a way for two F4Fs to handle the enemy when outnumbered. The way of handling the enemy was to shoot the enemy down. Killing the enemy is an offensive move. The result of killing the enemy is that fewer of them increases your own safety. But as to the natural tendency to enter circling dogfights, for the USN that's just not the tendency. When you look in detail at the Coral Sea engagements you see F4F pilots flying boom and zoom tactics alot -- especially Thach and Flatley. You also see a high degree of situational awareness to not allow airspeed to drop and pilots routinely bugging out when they found themselves low on airspeed and returning to the combat after gaining speed and altitude. This does not mean that every pilot flew boom and zoom or that even good pilots did not at time find themselves out of airspeed. All it means is that the actual combats were, from the get go, much more complicated than the "Japan ruled the skies" point of view embraces.

I agree but my question to you regarding this is how many of all available USN F4F squadrons used this advanced tactics from the beginning of war?

Were they all immediately knowledgeable of advanced ways to beat the enemy (IMHO not because I remember reading that the "Thach Weave was introduced to all units only after several months of war)?

As for circling dogfight I still firmly believe that old habits die hard and fact is that fast monocock fighters were very very new inventory for all warring sides (very late 1930's). Pilots who learned their ways in old "cloth and wire" biplanes had certain habits that date from WWI...

think that Japanese did quite well against USN and against British (many BoB veterans were flying against Japanese) as first class opposition.

I guess.. if "quite well" means that more Japanese A6Ms were shot down by F4Fs at the Coral Sea than F4Fs were shot down, or that more Japanese A6Ms were shot down by F4Fs at Midway than were shot down. I honestly don't know how the IJN comes off looking "quite well" when in direct, head to head, fighter vs fighter engagements, they consistently lost more planes than they shot down. That doesn't strike me as a good record, even if the Japanese could have found enough replacement pilots to recover their losses.

What I meant was that Japanese did well in general because they were able to penetrate defense and execute attack (and sink USN CVs for example).

Japanese strike packages escorted by Zero's were thus successfully and, in that respect, they did what they were supposed to (and in my book that means that they overall "did quite well")...

Also being in combat is something that can only help

I fundamentally disagree. When you look at Coral Sea you can see some fine examples of veteran Japanese pilots losing their lives because they learned the wrong lesson in China. I can name three wrong lessons they learned as they died. 1. Don't cross ahead of an F4F within range, even at a high deflection angle, because unlike Chinese pilots, USN pilots can and routinely do kill you with a snap shot. 2. Don't engage an F4F in a head to head attack because the F4F can take what you can dish out, but the A6M can't take what the F4F can dish out. 3. Under the right circumstances, an F4F can and will turn with you or even ahead of you and kill you.

Sure thing... but this is two-sided thing... many F4F pilots also learned the hard lessons of first air combat vs. skilled enemy...

You can only see what soldiers are made of when someone is shooting at them and trying to kill them.

"You can only see what soldiers are made of" is hyperbole. There's no there there. In ground combat, veterans can crack and run like hell. Rookies can stand and fight. Unit morale and cohesion can be there, go away, and return. Training can and does make a huge difference even in the intangible things like morale, initiative, espirit de corps. Like other false "common sense" the "experience trumps all" perspective is just crap and demonstratably so in numerous circumstances. Consider the 20th Me. In one prior combat (Fredericksburg) their only mission was to advance across an open ground, be shot and die. Not much learning there since everybody knew that frontal assaulting a fortified position sporting artillery was suicide. In their second battle (Gettysburg Day 2 L. ROund Top) they executed a series of complex maneuvers in combat that most units never used in combat. They'd never used them in combat before. These included a doubling of the interval under fire, followed by refusing the left flank, followed by a bayonet charge that began with a left forward wheel. These things worked (and resulted in the capture of some 400 CSA veterans-of-numerous-battles) solely because of intensive training.

Yes of course this is big generalization.... there are many examples of both cowardice and heroism... I know... but you can't deny the fact that soldier who had combat experience will generally do much better in battle...

Training is great but only in combat you can see who is fit for war and who is not (especially true for commanders and pilots)...

It's true that combat provides the test of personal courage and skill. It is not necessarily true that surviving combat makes one either more skilled or more courageus. There's not much evidence that, for example, Montgomery, or McClellan, ver improved much as generals as a result of any lessons that they learned in combat. They started out utterly devoid of talent (McC) and mediocre (Monty) and stayed talentless and meidocre respectively.

Ahhh... shame on you... Montgomery is one of my famous generals... [;)]

had very poor Air force in 1940 - let's be honest here.

That is neither substantive in its scope, correct in the broadest sense, nor honest. It's also not "1941" as stipulated in the thread title. The USN pilots of 1940 were every bit as good as any IJN pilot in 1940 and better than most other nations' pilots (in part because of their unparalleled skill at deflection shooting). By 1941, even the USAAF had absorbed many of the lessons of the Battle of Britain in consultation with UK and Commonwealth air forces. IN 1941-e.1942 the chief disasters that befell USAAFFE and the PH contingents had *nothing* to do with pilot quality and everything to do with strategic position and logistics.

What I meant was the number of 1st class aircraft ready for service and number of pilots schooled to man them in general.

Since our discussion was widening (out of USN pilot scope) I introduced the "Air force in 1940" line - thus meaning USAAF and not USN.

The USN pilots were elite (just as Japanese IJN pilots were) and I have no doubt that they were of same skill (the Japanese having opportunity to fly combat in China and get some kills which most certainly helped).

Some pilots may have been training some advanced concepts but in general USA pilots at that point in time (i.e. history) were no different in mentality than pilots in other nations...

That is manifestly and documentably different for USN pilots. No other nation trained intensively at deflection shooting. That may be one of the reasons why F4F pilots facing Me109s in the North Africa campaign shot down three German veterans per F4F lost. Not bad considering that the Me109 was definitely a better plane than either the F4F or A6M.

As for the USAAF, the basic problem there remained the use of substandard aircraft in the PTO. In North Africa, unblooded USAAF pilots in P40s acquitted themselves quite well against veteran Luftwaffe units flying Me109G2s and Italian units flying the MC in-line thingie (MC 201 or 202 I forget which) which was a pretty good plane.

Do you know if all pilots (in all squadron) were trained in deflection hooting or just some?

As for P-40's in Africa... well... all statistics can be argued upon... Germans had some great pilots like Hans-Joachim Marseille who shoot down P-40's "like flies"...

Does this mean that Me-109G2 was superior or inferior to P-40?

IMHO the accomplishments of Chennault was much publicized for propaganda sake while actual results were not that great (and add to that fact that they did _NOT_ encounter Zero fighters although they constantly claimed so).

When you stop reading the propaganda written in 1942 and start reading about the AVG you will see that, discounting the "confirmed kills" and taking a realistic assessment of the claims and unit records, the AVG lost 1 aircraft in combat for every six Japanese aircraft shot down by P40s. That includes AVG pilots lost in ground attack. So "actual results were not that great" is the only remaining propaganda. The Zero question is more difficult to tackle. There are some good reasons to believe that Japanese units that faced off against the AVG in the CBO had some Zeroes. The debate is really extensive and not resolvable by us.

The thing is we can predict the outcome. The P40 boom and zoom tactics used by the AVG were every bit as effective against A6Ms when non-AVG units flying in New Guinea began routinely to employ them after mid-1942. Since the AVG pilots were that much better at it (having been trained in them at the get go), I think the results of deploying A6Ms rather than Ki-43s against the AVG would not have differed substantially. The Zekes would still have the snot shot out of them and would have acquitted themselves poorly, regardless of the experience of the Japanese pilots flying them, against the AVG.

In Japanese sources I read it was always claimed that no Zero fighters were stationed against AVG.

Also the question of real numbers AVG accomplished (and lost) is, similar to what you said, not resolvable by us...

What would be interesting to discuss instead would be question whether AVG was success or failure in whole (even as late as 1944 Chennault air force was unable to stop Japanese advances).


Leo "Apollo11"

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: Jon_Hal

I would disagree witht that statement. The Japanese did great against the USN up until Midway. There was only one other battle between USN carrier pilots and Japanese Carrier pilots. At Coral Sea. Remember the scope of this thread was US Carrier Pilots. According to John Lundstrom's research the USN to IJN ration was 14 Zeros shot down to 10 Wildcat losses for the total two Carrier battles Midway and Coral Sea. Where does the Statement the "Japanese did Great" come from?

There were CV vs. CV battles in Solomon campaign where Japanese used the Midway lessons and fought well.

Thus: Coral Sea, Midway, Solomons - all examples of good Japanese combat results (yes I count Midway in this as well).

I think there is a myth that the only way the US beat Japan was because either we were "Lucky" or outnumbered them with state of the art aircraft. Midway's luck was the result of a lot of hard work done in the intelligence area to get the US forces there in time to bushwack the Japanese. Any major battle can hinge on one of a million slightly different outcomes that you could chalk up to luck? Sure was lucky for the Japanese that the Fuel lines cuaght fire on the LEx in Coral Sea or else their might have been four carriers at midway. IT was "lucky" for the Japanese that none of the TBD's connected with a torpedo just as it was "unlucky" for them to be plastered by the SBDs.
The outcome was already decided in the Allies favor well before Corsairs, Hellcats and Helldivers swarmed the skies. Men flying Wildcats, P-40s and P-39s manged to beat the Japanese air force and break it's back over Gaudalcanal, Coral Sea and Midway. pretty impressive legacy to those fighting men, don't you think?

I agree. Every battle is complex mix of myriad of things (all of which can go "wrong" or "good").

But, in whole, it is hard to argue the incredible luck USN had at Midway (I know that "mdiehl " would disagree )...

Again thanks for an enjoyable thread.

Sure thing - same to you (and others)!


Leo "Apollo11"

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: JohnK

ORIGINAL: Apollo11

Japanese did great in all air battles vs. USN up until Midway

Then why is there no example of Zeros dominating USN Wildcats?

This is from my other message in this same thread (i.e. this is what I meant):

Japanese did well in general because they were able to penetrate defense and execute attack (and sink USN CVs for example).

Japanese strike packages escorted by Zero's were thus successfully and, in that respect, they did what they were supposed to (and in my book that means that they overall "did quite well")...


Leo "Apollo11"

[Jon_Hal]

This is from my other message in this same thread (i.e. this is what I meant):

Japanese did well in general because they were able to penetrate defense and execute attack (and sink USN CVs for example).

Japanese strike packages escorted by Zero's were thus successfully and, in that respect, they did what they were supposed to (and in my book that means that they overall "did quite well")...


Leo "Apollo11"

Leo, I assume by you saying that that the Japanese "did quite well" must then mean the USN did even better. Those sucessful strike package suffered worse losses then the USN in every carrier battle and collectively sank less Carriers then their USN counterparts and shot down less opposing fighters then the USN did.
I hope you don't get the impression I'm arguing that the USN pilots were superior in skill. I'm still talking about the basis of this whole thread that I feel the Exp. Ratings for USN and IJN carrier pilots seem correct to me. The USN carriers that fought in '42 faced the IJN air corp at the peak of it's ability and won(at a terrible cost), destroying Japanese naval superiority in the process. The Skill on both sides was exceptional and not to be seen again in World War 2, for by the time the carrier battles of 44 roll around the USN pilots were well trained but not up to the level of the elite pre-war corp. And the Japanese naval pilots were but a shadow of their former selves.

Regards,

Jon

[Hipper]

Mdiehl

rather suprised at your rah rah attatude to the P40 in its incarnation as the Tomahawk, the RAF was rather less impressed

of course the high quality of the P40 will be the reason all those USAAF squadrons were flying spitfires in North Africa in 1942 !

another point of view

By 1940, the RAF was accepting delivery of the new aircraft that they called the Tomahawk I. In comparison with the Messerschmitt Me-109 or the Supermarine Spitfire V it was decidedly inferior except in manouverability at low altitudes and having a tough construction. The Tomahawk was used in Britain as a trainer and an army cooperation aircraft. It was sent to the Orient, India and North Africa to augment the Hawker Hurricanes. This was the common solution to inferior aircraft, even if the Japanese, Germans and Italians were flying better fighters. The RAF, Royal Australian Air Force and the South African Air Force flew them as ground-attack aircraft in support of the 8th Army in North Africa. Unfortunately, for many pilots they were also forced to use this inferior aircraft as an escort fighter for light and medium bombers against Me-109s and Maachi 202s. It showed up badly against both aircraft, with a high loss rate. The P-40D, named the Kittyhawk I by the English and the Warhawk by the Americans, had an improved Allison engine that allowed for a shorter nose and had the fusilage mounted 0.50 caliber machine guns moved to the wings to allow for a hefty six 50 caliber machine guns that would become the standard suite of armament for all American fighters. A Packard Merlin-engined version was produced for export to Russia, but no models were received by the English, Australian or South African squadrons flying the Kittyhawk. Many versions of the aircraft were developed all in an attempt to improve the performance of the inadequate Allison engines (the one pictured above is a P-40M). None of the modifications made up for this engine's lack of power. Overall, the various models of the P-40 made it the second most numerous fighter aircraft produced by the Allies during WWII. They had a production run of some 13,738.

[mdiehl]

Hipper, don't be surprised at my rah rah attitude. Everyone else says I have one. Usually they manage to avoid discussing facts. Take your remarks about the RAF for example. The weren't to keen on the P40B/Cs deployed to the UK during 1940 in part because the earliest ones arrived without rubberized fuel tanks, the absence of oxy bottles in the initial deliveries, the throat mikes, and the armament -- 2x.50 and 2x.squirrel guns. By 1942 they were pretty happy with the P40 in North Africa. Now let's look to the PTO. Initially (Dec 1941-January 1942) the RAF pilots there despised the P40s because of their experiences in the BoB. Before you put too much stock in their opinions, however, you should consider that the plane that they really wanted, given the choice, and not having flown against Japanese a/c, was the Brewster F2A3 Buffalo. After a month of flying those coffins, and the marginally better Hurricrates, RAF pilots and RAAF pilots were clamoring for P40s and Spits.

Now back to North Africa. The overwhelming preponderance of USAAF FGs in North Africa flew the P40. That did not stop BuOrd, the USAAF, or US strategic planners from wanting comparative data on all the available a/c models. The USAAF swapped the RAF some P40s in the early going in return for a promise of later delivery of Spits that the USAAF dutifully flew in combat in order to see how it worked out with US pilots.

Now let's cut to the chase and cut out the hyperbole. What I've consistently said is that below about 17,000 feet the P40 was better than comparable models of the Me109 or Japanese A6M series, which is true on stats. It's also born out by the combat results in North Africa, and in the PTO in general after around March-April 1942 when USAAF pilots got the word on not turning with Zekes.

Why did the early USAAF pilots try to turn with Zekes where many (most?) USN pilots did not? If you think about it for a while the logic leads you to differences in USN and USAAF training. The USN drilled intensively in deflection shooting. The USAAF did not. For extra credit, you can tell us all why the degree of training in deflection shooting might affect a pilot's propensity to try to keep pace in a turning engagement.

[mdiehl]

I agree but my question to you regarding this is how many of all available USN F4F squadrons used this advanced tactics from the beginning of war?

I'm not willing to call it an "advanced tactic." IMO there was a tendency for USN pilots to not engage in turning fights from the outset. I think the answer has to do with training as I mentioned in my reply to Hipper above.

Were they all immediately knowledgeable of advanced ways to beat the enemy (IMHO not because I remember reading that the "Thach Weave was introduced to all units only after several months of war)?

The beam defense was first used in combat at Midway. Boom and Zoom used before that. Apparently enough pilots were versed in the basic tactics that in its first use, a rookie pilot who'd lost his section buddy attached himself to Thach's (or was it Flatley's I forget) section and at Thach/Flatley's command was able to immediately and successfully employ it based solely on theories discussed at the table and not practiced in drills. In that instance it was a 3-plane beam defense.

As for circling dogfight I still firmly believe that old habits die hard and fact is that fast monocock fighters were very very new inventory for all warring sides (very late 1930's). Pilots who learned their ways in old "cloth and wire" biplanes had certain habits that date from WWI...

Not really. That is, tactical fighter pilot theory was not the least bit stagnant in the USN in the interwar years.

What I meant was that Japanese did well in general because they were able to penetrate defense and execute attack (and sink USN CVs for example).

Well, OK, I never said they were talentless. By that standard the USN did quite well too.

Sure thing... but this is two-sided thing... many F4F pilots also learned the hard lessons of first air combat vs. skilled enemy...

Right. But in direct confrontations through Midway the USN F4Fs shot down more Zeros than Zeros shot down F4Fs. Also shot down more of those pop gun monoplanes in the Marshalls, even though they were far more maneuverable than the F4F at low speeds.

The USN pilots were elite (just as Japanese IJN pilots were) and I have no doubt that they were of same skill (the Japanese having opportunity to fly combat in China and get some kills which most certainly helped).

Yeah, throw in the USMC pilots and we're on the same page. But then IMO in practical terms it means that in a dfe simulation where EXP affects results the EXP of the USN and IJN at-start pilots should be comparable.

Do you know if all pilots (in all squadron) were trained in deflection hooting or just some?

All USN/USMC pilots were heavily trained in deflection shooting get this, according to Lundstrom, as a result of doctrinal changes made around 1925.

In Japanese sources I read it was always claimed that no Zero fighters were stationed against AVG.

That is likely true. But the planes deployed against the AVG were even more maneuverable than the A6M series. So, if the argument is that maneuverability trumps doctrine, and that more maneuverability is better than more doctrine, then compared to the, err, Ki-43 kills, the might well do even better against A6Ms.

What would be interesting to discuss instead would be question whether AVG was success or failure in whole (even as late as 1944 Chennault air force was unable to stop Japanese advances).

Maybe but that subject has nothing to do with doctrine, training, tactics or aircraft quality.

I think we're mostly on the same page on this.

[Bombur]

Leo, I assume by you saying that that the Japanese "did quite well" must then mean the USN did even better. Those sucessful strike package suffered worse losses then the USN in every carrier battle and collectively sank less Carriers then their USN counterparts and shot down less opposing fighters then the USN did.

-Yes, but when you take out Midway, the score of sunk CV´s is 2 CV´s for the IJN vs. 2 CVL for USN. In Midway, the Japanese CV´s were sunk before they even could have attacked the US carriers, and they still were able to sink a US CV with piecemal attacks (two waves of 10-15 bombers and no coordination between dive bombers and torpedo bombers). What defeated the IJN in Midway was lack of adequate intelligence, horrendous disposition of naval forces and absolutely inadequate air reconaissance, so I don´t think Midway results shouldn´t be counted when you want to compare the relative skills of aircrews. In the more symetrical CV vs CV battles (Coral Sea, Sta Cruz and Eastern Salomons), the IJN got a significant advantage, but it seems to be related to the better performance of Torpedo bombers, which in turn is related to the combination of aircraft (the Kate was better than the TBD), aircrews and the torpedoes themselves. I don´t know what were the results of fighter vs fighter combat in these three battles, but I would risk to say that most victories of F4F´s against A6M´s were obtained with the F4F´s flying CAP missions, a situation where they had significant advantage over the A6M´s (performing the same tasks) due to the US radar. So, I think that the results in those battles doesn´t say too much about the relative skills of aircrews due to the miriad of confounding factors involved in the analaysis, and the relative small number of fighter to fighter casualties (I think someone mentioned 14 A6M´s vs 10 F4F´s shot down in fighter vs fighter combat in Midway and Coral Sea). We also must notice that in Eastern Solomons, and particularly in Santa Cruz, the quality of IJN crews were already declining due to the crippling losses in Coral Sea and Midway. Also it´s possible that the pilots of CVL based A6M´s were worse than those operating from Kido Butai, and they could have took a disproportionate amount of losses. I´m not saying here that IJN or USN pilots were superior, just pointing to the obstacles in making a correct analysis.

[Bradley7735]

Yorktown was sunk by a sub. Also, I wouldn't just count the number of sunk ships when determining whether the US lost or won. In most of these CV battles, US CV's were either sunk or untouched (not heavily damaged). The IJN CV's were either sunk, very heavily damaged or undamaged after these battles. Taking out an IJN CV for 6 or more months was almost as good as sinking it. As someone pointed out, Enterprise was the only CV in the south pacific for a time. S & Z were still alive, but too damaged to give naval superiority to the IJN. If the US had better torpedo planes and torpedoes, there would have probably been several more IJN CV's on the bottom of the ocean in 42.

I think anyone would be hard pressed to argue that the US lost the overall 4 carrier battles of 42, even withholding Midway. They gave at least as much as they took. And, most importantly, they didn't call back an US invasion or fail to stop an IJN invasion.

I think the USN and IJN EXP in the game is pretty good.

[Yamato hugger]

Hey stupid. Kills doesnt translate to experience. The first P-51 group in the pacific. 2 pilots took off on a "check ride". Came back some time later. 1 pilot came in and landed, the other did victory roll after victory roll over the airfield and finally came in and landed. The people of the ground were pretty steamed that this SOB did 6 victory rolls over the airfield on a check flight, they thought he was showing off. No, explained the otehr pilot -- he got 6 and I got 2, but I wasnt sure how to do a victory roll, so I didnt try. Wish I remember the squadron.

[Caltone]

ORIGINAL: UncleBuck

Scanning my DD214 I never thought of that! Great idea , I will do it as soon as I get my PC up again.

UB

Oh definately. If you're anything like me, you will never find those kind of things when you need them.

[Onime No Kyo]

Kinda reminds me of that old USMC yarn about Guadalcanal after Bloody Ridge. I'm sure the leathernecks will correct me if I got it wrong.

A Marine patrol was coming back through friendly lines. One of the returnees noticed a buddy manning an MG in the line and raised his hand holding up to fingers. The buddy yelled back "Who in the hell aint shot 2 Japs?" The other guy yelled back at him incredilously "With one bullet??!!".

[Caltone]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Let me finish by saying that the xp of pilots feels about right in the game. In evenly matched encounters, we see 1 for 1 losses, as I'd expect. For Japan to win a carrier battle, they have to overwhelm the USN, as I'd expect.

We agree. But wait for the folks who will tell you that in any 1 for 1 CV encounter prior to May 1942 the Japanese should clean the slate. They're out there. And they're out there.

Extremists exist everywhere.

In a current PBEM, we're waging an air battle over Rangoon the past couple of weeks. My opponent has the AVG based there (and some badly wounded ships in port). Im running escorted Nell/Betty attacks on the port from Bangkok. It's turned into a real bit of hell in the overall campaign. The first few attacks there cost me dearly but the tide is slowly turning as I've reinforced my fighters. I'm pretty sure I'll win this battle but the AVG performed admirably, they are just getting overwhelmed. It's early Feb 42 and I've got more resources than he can weild at the moment. Like we discussed earlier, when the forces were even, we saw 1 for 1 losses. When he had a numerical advantage, I lost some damned good pilots. Now that I'm gaining numerical superiority, I'm wearing him down. Again, this feels about right. I suspect that his pilots have a slight edge in experience at this point. So far I'm satisfied with the air combat model.

Here's the report on the last battle, as you can see, my numbers are the difference. Also the claimed kills are very exagerated. I think this one actually turned out with 7 Zeros lost against 11 P-40's. I also lost a couple of Nells and bagged 3 Hurricanes. There are several pilots on both sides racking up some impressive kills. Other than the obvious value of Rangoon, I've trapped a couple of British battleships here from an earlier naval encounter.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on Rangoon , at 29,34

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 42
G3M Nell x 17
Ki-46-II Dinah x 1

Allied aircraft
Hurricane II x 3
P-40B Tomahawk x 17

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M2 Zero: 11 destroyed, 1 damaged
G3M Nell: 1 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
Hurricane II: 4 destroyed
P-40B Tomahawk: 22 destroyed, 5 damaged

Allied Ships
BC Repulse, Bomb hits 1, heavy damage


Allied ground losses:
49 casualties reported
Guns lost 1

Port supply hits 1

Aircraft Attacking:
8 x G3M Nell bombing at 8000 feet
3 x G3M Nell bombing at 8000 feet
3 x G3M Nell bombing at 8000 feet
3 x G3M Nell bombing at 8000 feet
----------------------------------------------------------------

This guy in particular has been a thorn

----------------------------------------------------------------
1LT Dunnigan C. of AVG/B is credited with kill number 6
1LT Dunnigan C. of AVG/B is credited with kill number 7
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But one my my guys in the 3rd Daitai stepped up to the plate [&o]

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PO2 Hagiri of F2/3rd Daitai is credited with kill number 3
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Only to have this happen [:@]

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1LT Dunnigan C. of AVG/B bails out WOUNDED and is RESCUED
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At least he's wounded, I only hope we got his trigger finger [:D]

[Jon_Hal]

-Yes, but when you take out Midway, the score of sunk CV´s is 2 CV´s for the IJN vs. 2 CVL for USN. In Midway, the Japanese CV´s were sunk before they even could have attacked the US carriers, and they still were able to sink a US CV with piecemal attacks (two waves of 10-15 bombers and no coordination between dive bombers and torpedo bombers).

Why on Earth would you take out Midway? Why not take out Coral Sea and Santa Cruz? You need to look at all the battles to get an broader analysis.

What defeated the IJN in Midway was lack of adequate intelligence, horrendous disposition of naval forces and absolutely inadequate air reconaissance, so I don´t think Midway results shouldn´t be counted when you want to compare the relative skills of aircrews.

It wasn't luck that put the USN in position to hit the Japanese Carriers. It was the skill of Code Breakers. Once the First Devastator attacks came in Nagumo knew he was fighting more then 1 USN carrier. You seem to be willing to grant the Japanese amazing skill for fighting back and getting past US AA and Radar. Yet you don't grant the same skill to the USN pilots that faced your vaunted Japanese aircrews and still sank four out of four. You can't say, "well the zeros were drawn low by the TBDs so it doesn't count" the superior Zero pilots should have know where torpedo bombers are Dive bombers are sure to follow.

but I would risk to say that most victories of F4F´s against A6M´s were obtained with the F4F´s flying CAP missions, a situation where they had significant advantage over the A6M´s (performing the same tasks) due to the US radar.

Jimmy Thach shot down his zeros over the Japanese task force, not the USN one. Check your facts but more then half of the Zero losses were over their own carriers. Radar proved much more effective to vector in WIldcats on Jap Bombers. They didn't need to tangle with the Zeros unless it got in the way of their mission to defend the Carriers, by shooting down bombers. Radar was one of the tools that USN aviators trained with. Why discount it? That's like saying you can't compair Zeros and Wildcats because the Zero was more manueverable!

So, I think that the results in those battles doesn´t say too much about the relative skills of aircrews due to the miriad of confounding factors involved in the analaysis, and the relative small number of fighter to fighter casualties (I think someone mentioned 14 A6M´s vs 10 F4F´s shot down in fighter vs fighter combat in Midway and Coral Sea).

In this area things get murky. You can't compair the pilots Apples to Apples. The historical fact is that in these Carrier battles the losses of Zeros and Wildcats turns out to be even. It shouldn't matter who's carriers they were over, not to elite pilots. I've never stated that USN pilots were superior or that IJN ones were. But I disagree strongly with the statement that the Japanese were vastly superior to their USN counterparts. The impression one gets from these message boards is that the USN pilots were horribly unskilled and the only way they ever survived was because of shear luck. History doesn't agree either.

We also must notice that in Eastern Solomons, and particularly in Santa Cruz, the quality of IJN crews were already declining due to the crippling losses in Coral Sea and Midway. Also it´s possible that the pilots of CVL based A6M´s were worse than those operating from Kido Butai, and they could have took a disproportionate amount of losses.

The Shokaku and Zuikaku both had excellent air wings made up of survivors from Midway and their original airwing at Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz. The horrific air losses suffered by the Japanese in Eastern Solomons and Especially Santa Cruz crippled the IJN carrier force so badly that no Japanese Fleet Carrier could contest the Enterprise after Santa Cruz.

I´m not saying here that IJN or USN pilots were superior, just pointing to the obstacles in making a correct analysis.

[/quote]

Ultimately we agree here. You are true. You can't make a quantitative statement either way. The interesting fact of these battles in any one of them could have been dramatically changed by the actions of a single pilot .


regards,

Jon

[m10bob]

These are notes from interviews with AVG and Naval pfliers,regarding their perception of their planes and the Zero.
http://yarchive.net/mil/zero.html
And here is a site which tells of the 1st captured Zero,(which was NOT the one in the Aleutians).
http://www.j-aircraft.com/research/WarPrizes.htm
A good site with info on the Pacific pilots and their planes..Very candid,(including John Thach's feelings about the F4F..)
http://www.acepilots.com/index.html#top
This is the U.S.Navy's official site,and sez the Wildcat had a kill to loss ratio of 7 to 1..
http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/hist-ac/f4f-4.pdf
And this site explains American tactical formation evolution,(and how John Thach developed the "Thach Weave" in the summer of 1941(before Pearl Harbor),using info provided by CBI evaluations of Japanese planes.
This site also indicates the kill to loss ratio was 1.5 to 1,F4F vs Zeroes,(for those who might want to know how many of the "7 to 1 ratio" were other than Zeroes)..

www.centuryinter.net/midway/appendix/ap ... vftac.html

[Hipper]

Mdiehl

I dont think at any time in operational service in north africa in 1941 or 1942 the RAF felt that the various models of P40 that they had were a match for the opposing marks of Me 109. I don't think they appreciated being boomed and zoomed. They compensated by using superior numbers and letting those "marginaly better hurricanes" try to take on the german fighters, of course the Hurricane II's were outmached as well.

Now I am interested in the P40's combat record after TORCH I dont think the record of the allied air forces in French North Africa was that good (apart from shooting down the French that is) untill 1943 when again numbers were begining to tell.
but I remain to be educated

The record of the P40 in the western desert does not bear out your proposition that it was a superior fighter compared to the opposing 109's , the real world has no height limits.

Now you can argue that the RAF's P40's were fitted with sand filters which restricted performance, however maintenence was the Lufftwaffe's achillies heel in the desert ( the germans had a low serviceability record for their desert fighters)

I take your point about the importance of deflection shooting, but have never doubted the effectiveness of us navy pilot training as air combat is the one thing you can train for effectively in peace (with the correct doctrine of course )

like the sig files btw










Hipper, don't be surprised at my rah rah attitude. Everyone else says I have one. Usually they manage to avoid discussing facts. Take your remarks about the RAF for example. The weren't to keen on the P40B/Cs deployed to the UK during 1940 in part because the earliest ones arrived without rubberized fuel tanks, the absence of oxy bottles in the initial deliveries, the throat mikes, and the armament -- 2x.50 and 2x.squirrel guns. By 1942 they were pretty happy with the P40 in North Africa. Now let's look to the PTO. Initially (Dec 1941-January 1942) the RAF pilots there despised the P40s because of their experiences in the BoB. Before you put too much stock in their opinions, however, you should consider that the plane that they really wanted, given the choice, and not having flown against Japanese a/c, was the Brewster F2A3 Buffalo. After a month of flying those coffins, and the marginally better Hurricrates, RAF pilots and RAAF pilots were clamoring for P40s and Spits.

Now back to North Africa. The overwhelming preponderance of USAAF FGs in North Africa flew the P40. That did not stop BuOrd, the USAAF, or US strategic planners from wanting comparative data on all the available a/c models. The USAAF swapped the RAF some P40s in the early going in return for a promise of later delivery of Spits that the USAAF dutifully flew in combat in order to see how it worked out with US pilots.

Now let's cut to the chase and cut out the hyperbole. What I've consistently said is that below about 17,000 feet the P40 was better than comparable models of the Me109 or Japanese A6M series, which is true on stats. It's also born out by the combat results in North Africa, and in the PTO in general after around March-April 1942 when USAAF pilots got the word on not turning with Zekes.

Why did the early USAAF pilots try to turn with Zekes where many (most?) USN pilots did not? If you think about it for a while the logic leads you to differences in USN and USAAF training. The USN drilled intensively in deflection shooting. The USAAF did not. For extra credit, you can tell us all why the degree of training in deflection shooting might affect a pilot's propensity to try to keep pace in a turning engagement.

_____________________________

Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.

Viet Nam kids then: "Mi Lai!"
Swift Boat VAKs now: "We Lie!"