The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII

[Dragoon 45]

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

I am a retired U.S. Army MSG. I do not particularly want to discredit Dupuy's work. In all fairness to him he did some masterful work on his models. What I am saying through all my comments is that I do not believe that he took all factors into account. I will maintain that some of the human factors can not be accurately modeled. Take morale of instance, the loss of one key leader can have an immense effect on morale, totally out of proportion of the effect of the loss of one individual in a let's say a 200 man unit. This effect can take place in the blink of an eye. I do not believe that this effect can be accurately modeled.

Dragoon 45,
I agree with you. I just don't see this as a factor that would affect only Allied forces. Some AXIS units will have suffered this as well, so if we were able to model it we would see improvements in the performances of both sides which might cancel each other out. Some German units might score even higher if this could be modelled. As I said earlier, I think it is the consistency of Dupuy's findings which require explanation. Any single one of the human factors might be thought to affect both sides, so it would not affect a consistently higher German score.

There are dangers in overestimating your enemy although most of the time not as severe as underestimating him. Col Dupuy's model as I have seen variations of it used in modern military planning tend to produce either underestimation or overestimation of the enemy's capabilities. While overestimation is not nearly as bad as underestimation, it can cause the misuse of forces that produce needless casaulities. Underestimation of the enemy normally will cost the forces involved a significant defeat if not the outright loss of the war. All modern military wargaming used in the Military Decision Making Process is based in a large part on Col Dupuy's work. Numerical values are assigned to the enemy in all areas, then values are assigned to friendly units, and then a ratio is calculated on the totals of each side's forces. If the ratio fits within the predetermined force ratio needed for the type of operation, the planners assume success for the operation. Because of the cumbersome nature in assigning these numerical values, essentially using human judgement calls in assigning the value, a true value is never quite achieved for either friendly or enemy units. Not getting an accurate value thus will either lead to underestimation of the enemy's capabilities or overestimation of his capabilities, with the dangers inherent to either course.

For almost 30 years I watched Col Dupuy's model being used in ongoing military operations. True the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) was only formally committed to doctrine a little bit over 15 years ago. But a variation of it was in use prior to that. Yes his model was modified to work in MDMP and possibly parts of it were ommitted. But from past experience, I have seldom seen it work correctly. There is always some factor left out of the equation. Weither that factor was the unknown and unknowable beforehand influence of a leader at the right place at the right time or was the mis-evaluation of an enemy capability, these types of problems occur quite frequently. Having practical experience using the model with the results I have seen, I do not believe that the model is near as accurate as most people believe. Yes it is a step in the right direction, but it still is not the end all and do all that it has been portrayed to be. All the failings I have seen have been Human failings. Misrepresentation of the effectiveness of intrinsic human qualities. With practical experience as my guide I therefore have misgivings on the results that Col Dupuy orginally published.

The fact that the Military use it to predict suggests to me it is abut as good as we are going to get. Likewise, Dupuy's model has been used in many additional analyses to those he originally did (which were from the Italian theatre, I believe). Those who do not find him believable don't seem to have any evidence, though, to prove him wrong. I haven't seen another model offered, or a critique of his model which shows a consistent weakness. As I have said, he is using hard data. Any of the intangibles you have come up with should be as likely to affect either side, therefore annulling any effect. The model itself does not have to be ultra accurate in prediction because there are many intangibles we don't know, however, in historial engagements we can find the intangibles out and factor them in.

You mentioned yourself earlier that you felt Dupuy may have started with a conclusion and worked his way back. Dupuy was an American soldier, I don't think he found his conclusions particularly uplifting. It seems to me this charge is best levelled at his opponents, who seem unable to accept the American GI was less combat effective and disparage Dupuy without being able to put their finger on exactly why. As I've said, I don't think this is anything to do with the Germans being some sort of supermen, but a combination of factors that all added up.

BTW in two engagements on the table attributed to Dupuy in Van Crevald's Fighting Power the 45th ID had as good as if not better rating than the 88th. According to this table the 45th outperformed the Germans in all but one engagement.

I understood from an article written by the Executive Director of the Dupuy institute that the US 45th Division finished with a CEV of .72, which was the lowest of the 6 US divisions tested. The 88th finished top of the US divisions.

Reghards,
IronDuke

On the 45th you have a source unavailable to me. All I have readily available to me is "Fighting Power".

In regards to the Dupuy model being used in MDMP, right before I retired there was talk of using a computer program to do all the force ratio calculations. I do not know if this has happened or what program is used, nor do I know what the program is based upon.

I do agree that German units outperformed American units on more occasions than not, probably 55-45 ratio. We can discuss the reasons for this probably for ever, without reaching an agreement as to what the particular reason for this to be. Currently the discussion has been going back and forth about Dupuy and his model. I will have to remain in the minority in that I believe it to be flawed. With 30+ years military experience I have developed a mistrust on any blanket statements about unit performance. That is why I have so vociferously argued the minority side on Dupuy.

You stated Dupuy's work is based on data from the Italian Campaign. This is where the Germans managed to maintain a core of personnel in their units. They had the best defensive terrain to work with, better than any other part of the German Army had throughout the war. These units did not take the kind of crippling losses that units on the Eastern Front or Units retreating from Normandy took. So it stands to reason that they would be very effective units. I will concede that part of it.

But back to the original issue of this thread, was the American Soldier more or less combative effective than the German Soldier? By using Dupuy's work we only look at the cream of the German Army. No Volks Grenadier Divisons are included, no Luftwaffe field divisions are included either. Dupuy's work is mainly done as you admitted evaluating U.S. Forces against Panzer and Panzer Grenadier Divisions with a very few Infantry Divisions also. But making a blanket statement that the German Soldier was more combat effective than the U.S. Soldier based only upon a portion of the German Army is misleading. Yes the German's had a manpower issue towards the end of the war, but so did all of the Allies. In the case of the British the manpower was not there, in the American case the trained manpower was not there. All the armies in Europe in WW II had significant problems with infantry replacements by late 1944 to include the Russians. There is no reason not to include the later Volks Grenadier Divisions into the issue also.

Where I think this discussion should have focused more on, were time frames during the war. I will freely admit that the German soldier was the most combat efficient in 1939-42, their victory record proves that. The initial forces sent to the continent by the Americans were undertrained green troops. But the American Soldier learns more quickly in battle than others. Even German commanders stated that, such as Rommel and von Rundestat. In 1943 the Germans still had an edge over the Americans. In 1944 the American Soldier I believe came even with the German soldier in effectiveness. And by 1945, the American Soldier had passed the German Soldier in effectiveness. Again I will cite the record of the Army in question in the only really authorative yardstick there is. Who won more victories, took more POW's, and won the war?

You touched upon it earlier. There is a sort of nostaliga for the German Army in WW II. It accomplished some amazing feats during the war, that by rights it should never have been able to. It endured many hardships and suffered massive casualities by war's end. And there is a tragic element there also in that it served an EVIL Master. The German Army fielded some impressive models of tanks and really developed the idea of close air support to its logical end. Also the German Army is not near as tainted with atrocities as the SS or Gestapo. Therefore I believe that a lot of historians and military buffs have developed an admiration of the German Army that sometimes blinds them to the accomplishments of the other Armies involved in WW II. How many times have you read a supposedly professional historian write about the overwhelming artillery barrages delivered by German 88's, William Breuer come to mind here? Michael Wittman has been elevated into some kind of superman in some circles due to his combat record. I personally will grant Wittman's record is impressive, but any well trained experienced tank crew who had the advantages he had should have been able to accomplish the same thing. When the Tiger ran, it was a very impressive piece of equipment.

There has been an almost unconscious need to elevate the German Army and its accomplishments in the modern world. I see this in the more recent books published on the subject. I do not know if this is to also raise the accomplishments of the Allied Armies to a higher level or not. Unfortunately as the World War II generation dies off, World War II with begin to take on some mythical connotations. It has already started in the United States with books like "The Greatest Generation" and others. I do not say this to downplay the accomplishments of the people who served in WW II but to further illustrate my point. World War II is regarded by a lot of people in the United States as the last popular war we fought. The vast majority of the population either served or contributed to the war effort. Also in the popular mind the Allied victory was not assured until late in the war. Setbacks for the Allies such as Market-Garden and the Bulge were easier to accept if one accepted that the German Soldier was somehow a much better soldier. Remember war news was tightly controlled by all the governments, and the public did not understand how a setback could occur to the advancing Allied Armies, this served to lessen the certainity of victory in a lot of peoples minds. In order to make a moral judgement on the war, it had to be fought for the highest moral reasons by a crusading army against a very very capable foe. That very capable foe in Europe was the Germans.

[JJKettunen]

ORIGINAL: tanker4145

I don't think you can ever truly quantify the combat effeciency of any forces in combat. There are too many variables which there is absolutely no way to quantify. Usually one side is defending which gives them an advantage on a man to man level (usually). Talking about the Hurtgen, Italy, and other dug in defenses as examples just doesn't cut it since you're talking about well dug in forces in good defensive terrain, of course the attacker will take more casualties. In the Bulge, the failure of intelligence, surprise, and a lack of forces (and green ones at that) faced the Germans initially. While I'd love to say the US was man for man the best, I don't think these arguments can ever go anywhere conclusive.

At the same time though, keep it up because it is quite interesting to read and a lot of good points are being made.

I hate to repeat myself, but unit posture is actually one of the quantified variables, and so is terrain, weather, suprise level etc. So an unit in well dug in positions in good defensive terrain gets huge "penalties" when its CEV is calculated. Comprehend?

Btw, the original comparison between German and American combat effectiveness comes from 78 battles of Italian Campaign, where Germans are on the offensive (or counterattacking) 19 times.

[JJKettunen]

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45


In regards to the Dupuy model being used in MDMP, right before I retired there was talk of using a computer program to do all the force ratio calculations. I do not know if this has happened or what program is used, nor do I know what the program is based upon.

You must be talking about the Alternative Courses of Action Display (ACAD) software. It's a battle plan assistant (for short-term decision making), and it utilizes Dupuy's combat models somewhat. From its introduction:

The first feature in the ACAD model is the subjective information of the military experts. The second feature is the heuristic knowledge base developed from the Colonel Dupuy’s (1985) combat models of war. Dupuy’s model was chosen because of two reasons. First, the knowledge base contains the salient characteristics of a general
battlefield. Second, previous validation studies by Dupuy indicated a 90 percent correlation between theoretical and actual outcomes.

The Dupuy’s combat model was reviewed and found to fall short of addressing modern information-centric warfare environments. Therefore, the VIE model was developed in ACAD (Ntuen and Park, 2003, in this volume) to recalibrate Dupuy’s combat parameters to modern digital weapons. The VIE’s algorithm converts Dupuy’s operational lethality index (OLI) to values in Battalion equivalents (BEs). OLI is a measure of the killing power of weapons ranging from the sword to the nuclear bomb. Dupuy provides tables of values as well as formulas for calculating OLIs of unlisted weapons for which certain characteristics are available. The OLI terminology is unfamiliar to many commanders who are more accustomed to the battalion equivalent (BE) concept. DOD (1997a) and DOD (1977b) have information for both American and Russian units in terms of BEs.

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
I do agree that German units outperformed American units on more occasions than not, probably 55-45 ratio. We can discuss the reasons for this probably for ever, without reaching an agreement as to what the particular reason for this to be. Currently the discussion has been going back and forth about Dupuy and his model. I will have to remain in the minority in that I believe it to be flawed. With 30+ years military experience I have developed a mistrust on any blanket statements about unit performance. That is why I have so vociferously argued the minority side on Dupuy.

I think it is a blanket statement to say that QJM produces blanket statements. [:D]

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
You stated Dupuy's work is based on data from the Italian Campaign. This is where the Germans managed to maintain a core of personnel in their units. They had the best defensive terrain to work with, better than any other part of the German Army had throughout the war. These units did not take the kind of crippling losses that units on the Eastern Front or Units retreating from Normandy took. So it stands to reason that they would be very effective units. I will concede that part of it.

As mentioned above terrain and defensive postures are taken into account in QJM. When German formations were on the offensive they were still more efficient on an average...and not only in Italy but in the Bulge battles too.

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
But back to the original issue of this thread, was the American Soldier more or less combative effective than the German Soldier? By using Dupuy's work we only look at the cream of the German Army. No Volks Grenadier Divisons are included, no Luftwaffe field divisions are included either. Dupuy's work is mainly done as you admitted evaluating U.S. Forces against Panzer and Panzer Grenadier Divisions with a very few Infantry Divisions also. But making a blanket statement that the German Soldier was more combat effective than the U.S. Soldier based only upon a portion of the German Army is misleading. Yes the German's had a manpower issue towards the end of the war, but so did all of the Allies. In the case of the British the manpower was not there, in the American case the trained manpower was not there. All the armies in Europe in WW II had significant problems with infantry replacements by late 1944 to include the Russians. There is no reason not to include the later Volks Grenadier Divisions into the issue also.

While German armor and mech divisions do figure quite prominently in the data presented in the original comparison, German infantry divisions had also a rather consistent advantage. This is especially shown in the Bulge battles (including VGs). If we assume that German armor and mech divs always received the best personnel, then the original results would have been slightly distorted.

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
Where I think this discussion should have focused more on, were time frames during the war. I will freely admit that the German soldier was the most combat efficient in 1939-42, their victory record proves that. The initial forces sent to the continent by the Americans were undertrained green troops. But the American Soldier learns more quickly in battle than others. Even German commanders stated that, such as Rommel and von Rundestat. In 1943 the Germans still had an edge over the Americans. In 1944 the American Soldier I believe came even with the German soldier in effectiveness. And by 1945, the American Soldier had passed the German Soldier in effectiveness. Again I will cite the record of the Army in question in the only really authorative yardstick there is. Who won more victories, took more POW's, and won the war?

Doesn't sound very valid methodology in estimating combat efficiency to me...only opinions and assumptions...and the myth about Americans learning more quickly than anybody else.

- Edit: The "victory record" part is of course not an opinion or assumption only, but since it is not a reflection of combat efficiency of individual soldiers or formations, it is not a valid point in this discussion.

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
You touched upon it earlier. There is a sort of nostaliga for the German Army in WW II. It accomplished some amazing feats during the war, that by rights it should never have been able to. It endured many hardships and suffered massive casualities by war's end. And there is a tragic element there also in that it served an EVIL Master. The German Army fielded some impressive models of tanks and really developed the idea of close air support to its logical end. Also the German Army is not near as tainted with atrocities as the SS or Gestapo. Therefore I believe that a lot of historians and military buffs have developed an admiration of the German Army that sometimes blinds them to the accomplishments of the other Armies involved in WW II. How many times have you read a supposedly professional historian write about the overwhelming artillery barrages delivered by German 88's, William Breuer come to mind here? Michael Wittman has been elevated into some kind of superman in some circles due to his combat record. I personally will grant Wittman's record is impressive, but any well trained experienced tank crew who had the advantages he had should have been able to accomplish the same thing. When the Tiger ran, it was a very impressive piece of equipment.

There might be nostalgia existing, but it is not a factor in QJM-calculations.

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
There has been an almost unconscious need to elevate the German Army and its accomplishments in the modern world. I see this in the more recent books published on the subject. I do not know if this is to also raise the accomplishments of the Allied Armies to a higher level or not. Unfortunately as the World War II generation dies off, World War II with begin to take on some mythical connotations. It has already started in the United States with books like "The Greatest Generation" and others. I do not say this to downplay the accomplishments of the people who served in WW II but to further illustrate my point. World War II is regarded by a lot of people in the United States as the last popular war we fought. The vast majority of the population either served or contributed to the war effort. Also in the popular mind the Allied victory was not assured until late in the war. Setbacks for the Allies such as Market-Garden and the Bulge were easier to accept if one accepted that the German Soldier was somehow a much better soldier. Remember war news was tightly controlled by all the governments, and the public did not understand how a setback could occur to the advancing Allied Armies, this served to lessen the certainity of victory in a lot of peoples minds. In order to make a moral judgement on the war, it had to be fought for the highest moral reasons by a crusading army against a very very capable foe. That very capable foe in Europe was the Germans.

So only for moral reasons some people claim that the Germans were quite combat efficient? It cannot be estimated in any scientific way?

[Dragoon 45]

Comments interspersed.

ORIGINAL: Keke

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45


In regards to the Dupuy model being used in MDMP, right before I retired there was talk of using a computer program to do all the force ratio calculations. I do not know if this has happened or what program is used, nor do I know what the program is based upon.

You must be talking about the Alternative Courses of Action Display (ACAD) software. It's a battle plan assistant (for short-term decision making), and it utilizes Dupuy's combat models somewhat. From its introduction:

The first feature in the ACAD model is the subjective information of the military experts. The second feature is the heuristic knowledge base developed from the Colonel Dupuy’s (1985) combat models of war. Dupuy’s model was chosen because of two reasons. First, the knowledge base contains the salient characteristics of a general
battlefield. Second, previous validation studies by Dupuy indicated a 90 percent correlation between theoretical and actual outcomes.

The Dupuy’s combat model was reviewed and found to fall short of addressing modern information-centric warfare environments. Therefore, the VIE model was developed in ACAD (Ntuen and Park, 2003, in this volume) to recalibrate Dupuy’s combat parameters to modern digital weapons. The VIE’s algorithm converts Dupuy’s operational lethality index (OLI) to values in Battalion equivalents (BEs). OLI is a measure of the killing power of weapons ranging from the sword to the nuclear bomb. Dupuy provides tables of values as well as formulas for calculating OLIs of unlisted weapons for which certain characteristics are available. The OLI terminology is unfamiliar to many commanders who are more accustomed to the battalion equivalent (BE) concept. DOD (1997a) and DOD (1977b) have information for both American and Russian units in terms of BEs.

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
I do agree that German units outperformed American units on more occasions than not, probably 55-45 ratio. We can discuss the reasons for this probably for ever, without reaching an agreement as to what the particular reason for this to be. Currently the discussion has been going back and forth about Dupuy and his model. I will have to remain in the minority in that I believe it to be flawed. With 30+ years military experience I have developed a mistrust on any blanket statements about unit performance. That is why I have so vociferously argued the minority side on Dupuy.

(KeKe)I think it is a blanket statement to say that QJM produces blanket statements. [:D]

I don't quite understand what you are referring to here. Is not the statement "Germans units were more combat efficient than American Units", a blanket statement?

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
You stated Dupuy's work is based on data from the Italian Campaign. This is where the Germans managed to maintain a core of personnel in their units. They had the best defensive terrain to work with, better than any other part of the German Army had throughout the war. These units did not take the kind of crippling losses that units on the Eastern Front or Units retreating from Normandy took. So it stands to reason that they would be very effective units. I will concede that part of it.

(KeKe) As mentioned above terrain and defensive postures are taken into account in QJM. When German formations were on the offensive they were still more efficient on an average...and not only in Italy but in the Bulge battles too.

The only Volks Grenadier Division that I know of the performed up to par in the Bulge was Kokott's 26th VG Division. Most of the VG Divisions in the Bulge were slaughtered making mass attacks on U.S. units by Artillery Fire. Advancing in column during an attack against an entrenched enemy armed with MG's and supported by a large amount of artillery is not my idea of combat efficiency. It is more like combat stupidity. KG Piper with most of 1st SS Panzer's combat power went for a long drive and was hemmed in by the American engineers blowing bridges on his routes. Then he was cornered near La Glieze Be, by the 30th Infantry Division and only managed to save some 600 men and no equipment. The Fuehrer Begleit Brigade was composed of veterans of the eastern front who had been seconded to the bodyguard of Hitler. They were committed in the Bulge and performed sub par at best. The 2nd Panzer was almost totally destroyed by the 2nd Armored Division near the Meuse River on 24-25 Dec. The German tanks were out of Gas and Ammunition. What is combat efficient in this? The 2nd Armored lost I believe 16 tanks in the two day period. The fact of the matter is that German Units lost combat efficiency as the war progressed because of a lack of supplies, lack of equipment, being out maneuvered, etc. Also American casualities declined as the war progressed into 1945. Therefore logic to me indicates that the Americans gained in combat efficiency and the Germans lost in combat efficiency. And yet again Dupuy did not account for the Vosges Mountains campaign of late 44-early 45. The American Divisions fighting there did not have any air support, were limited in the use of fire support due to the terrain, and at times were outnumbered by the defender, yet who steadily gained ground and lost less casualities? The Americans. Dupuy may have been correct at a certain period of time late 43-early 44 although I have my doubts.

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
But back to the original issue of this thread, was the American Soldier more or less combative effective than the German Soldier? By using Dupuy's work we only look at the cream of the German Army. No Volks Grenadier Divisons are included, no Luftwaffe field divisions are included either. Dupuy's work is mainly done as you admitted evaluating U.S. Forces against Panzer and Panzer Grenadier Divisions with a very few Infantry Divisions also. But making a blanket statement that the German Soldier was more combat effective than the U.S. Soldier based only upon a portion of the German Army is misleading. Yes the German's had a manpower issue towards the end of the war, but so did all of the Allies. In the case of the British the manpower was not there, in the American case the trained manpower was not there. All the armies in Europe in WW II had significant problems with infantry replacements by late 1944 to include the Russians. There is no reason not to include the later Volks Grenadier Divisions into the issue also.

(KeKe )While German armor and mech divisions do figure quite prominently in the data presented in the original comparison, German infantry divisions had also a rather consistent advantage. This is especially shown in the Bulge battles (including VGs). If we assume that German armor and mech divs always received the best personnel, then the original results would have been slightly distorted.

I will have to re-read Dupuy's original work, because the only reference to his tables I have available right now is Van Crevald's "Fighting Power" and the tables that he attributes to Dupuy in the book do not match what you are saying.

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
Where I think this discussion should have focused more on, were time frames during the war. I will freely admit that the German soldier was the most combat efficient in 1939-42, their victory record proves that. The initial forces sent to the continent by the Americans were undertrained green troops. But the American Soldier learns more quickly in battle than others. Even German commanders stated that, such as Rommel and von Rundestat. In 1943 the Germans still had an edge over the Americans. In 1944 the American Soldier I believe came even with the German soldier in effectiveness. And by 1945, the American Soldier had passed the German Soldier in effectiveness. Again I will cite the record of the Army in question in the only really authorative yardstick there is. Who won more victories, took more POW's, and won the war?

(KeKe) Doesn't sound very valid methodology in estimating combat efficiency to me...only opinions and assumptions...and the myth about Americans learning more quickly than anybody else.

- Edit: The "victory record" part is of course not an opinion or assumption only, but since it is not a reflection of combat efficiency of individual soldiers or formations, it is not a valid point in this discussion.

So then there is no gaining of combat experience in a Unit over a period of time? In the U.S. Infantry Divisions generally if a soldier survived his first combat experience without debilitating injuries he stayed with the Unit for the duration. His chances of becoming a KIA or WIA lessened with the increase of experience he acquired. Even quite a few WIA's were returned to their units after healing also increasing the experience level. So then even though the largest group of casaulities for the infantry were the new inexperienced men the units themselves never gained experience? In regards to the victory record is that not what orginally sent Dupuy on his work. He wanted to explain why the Germans won and when they were defeated why it cost the Americans so many casualities? Also who learns faster in combat the green inexperienced soldier or the seasoned veteran? You state it is a myth that American Soldiers learn faster in combat, yet I did not attribute this "myth" to American sources but to emminent German sources Rommel, von Rundestat, and others. They were the ones fighting against the U.S. and I for one would believe they knew what they were talking about.

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
You touched upon it earlier. There is a sort of nostaliga for the German Army in WW II. It accomplished some amazing feats during the war, that by rights it should never have been able to. It endured many hardships and suffered massive casualities by war's end. And there is a tragic element there also in that it served an EVIL Master. The German Army fielded some impressive models of tanks and really developed the idea of close air support to its logical end. Also the German Army is not near as tainted with atrocities as the SS or Gestapo. Therefore I believe that a lot of historians and military buffs have developed an admiration of the German Army that sometimes blinds them to the accomplishments of the other Armies involved in WW II. How many times have you read a supposedly professional historian write about the overwhelming artillery barrages delivered by German 88's, William Breuer come to mind here? Michael Wittman has been elevated into some kind of superman in some circles due to his combat record. I personally will grant Wittman's record is impressive, but any well trained experienced tank crew who had the advantages he had should have been able to accomplish the same thing. When the Tiger ran, it was a very impressive piece of equipment.

(KeKe) There might be nostalgia existing, but it is not a factor in QJM-calculations.

No but it might very well be a factor in the belief that Dupuy is correct in his work and also in the acceptance of his work as gospel by some.

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
There has been an almost unconscious need to elevate the German Army and its accomplishments in the modern world. I see this in the more recent books published on the subject. I do not know if this is to also raise the accomplishments of the Allied Armies to a higher level or not. Unfortunately as the World War II generation dies off, World War II with begin to take on some mythical connotations. It has already started in the United States with books like "The Greatest Generation" and others. I do not say this to downplay the accomplishments of the people who served in WW II but to further illustrate my point. World War II is regarded by a lot of people in the United States as the last popular war we fought. The vast majority of the population either served or contributed to the war effort. Also in the popular mind the Allied victory was not assured until late in the war. Setbacks for the Allies such as Market-Garden and the Bulge were easier to accept if one accepted that the German Soldier was somehow a much better soldier. Remember war news was tightly controlled by all the governments, and the public did not understand how a setback could occur to the advancing Allied Armies, this served to lessen the certainity of victory in a lot of peoples minds. In order to make a moral judgement on the war, it had to be fought for the highest moral reasons by a crusading army against a very very capable foe. That very capable foe in Europe was the Germans.

(KeKe) So only for moral reasons some people claim that the Germans were quite combat efficient? It cannot be estimated in any scientific way?

I was not implying moral reasons here per se. I suggest that most people have a need to believe they are fighting for some underlying moral principle: patriotism, protecting a family, protecting a religion, etc. For those people the more capable the enemy you fight, the more heroic the struggle that you have waged. So over a period of time that stuggle is magnified to a much higher level in their minds.

Then also I don't understand how the result's of Dupuy's work can be so accepted based on assumptions that are quantified as a mathmatical value, and the work of other's derided when they use the same methodalogy. I refer to Mosier and his "Myth of the Great War" and "The Blitzkrieg Myth". He used official casuality figures in "The Myth of the Great War" and found that the figures did not support the history as written by the victors. He offered a substitute theory and as far as I can tell has been roundly condemned for it. In "The Blitzkrieg Myth" he again offered historical facts, i.e. the German Panzers never really traveled any faster than the foot and hoof infantry divisions based on official German records, offered a differing theory and has been condemned for it too. Yet Dupuy's work which starts out with an assumption, a numerical value assigned by the researcher for a certain combat factor (morale, experience of troops, training level of troops, etc.) that is then plugged into a mathmatical formula with other numerical values some of which are again based on assumptions and yields a result from assumption after assumption, is so accepted. What if terrain had given the German soldier a much higher advantage than Dupuy assumed in his calculations?

[JJKettunen]

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45

Then also I don't understand how the result's of Dupuy's work can be so accepted based on assumptions that are quantified as a mathmatical value, and the work of other's derided when they use the same methodalogy. I refer to Mosier and his "Myth of the Great War" and "The Blitzkrieg Myth". He used official casuality figures in "The Myth of the Great War" and found that the figures did not support the history as written by the victors. He offered a substitute theory and as far as I can tell has been roundly condemned for it. In "The Blitzkrieg Myth" he again offered historical facts, i.e. the German Panzers never really traveled any faster than the foot and hoof infantry divisions based on official German records, offered a differing theory and has been condemned for it too. Yet Dupuy's work which starts out with an assumption, a numerical value assigned by the researcher for a certain combat factor (morale, experience of troops, training level of troops, etc.) that is then plugged into a mathmatical formula with other numerical values some of which are again based on assumptions and yields a result from assumption after assumption, is so accepted. What if terrain had given the German soldier a much higher advantage than Dupuy assumed in his calculations?

I've got a creeping feeling that you haven't understood a bit what has been written about QJM in this thread, and actually have never been familiar with the formulae. Until you can crasp its "mathmatical methodalogy" (sic), and can present some valid criticism, there's really no need to continue discussing it. Otherwise you just keep on presenting the same kind of BS arguments, other critics, who don't actually have a clue, but are just pissed off for an obvious reason, have already presented. Get this first: It is not a formula made to prove that the Germans had higher combat efficiency.

(I'm not familiar with the books you mentioned above, so I cannot comment them.)

[Dragoon 45]

ORIGINAL: Keke

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45

Then also I don't understand how the result's of Dupuy's work can be so accepted based on assumptions that are quantified as a mathmatical value, and the work of other's derided when they use the same methodalogy. I refer to Mosier and his "Myth of the Great War" and "The Blitzkrieg Myth". He used official casuality figures in "The Myth of the Great War" and found that the figures did not support the history as written by the victors. He offered a substitute theory and as far as I can tell has been roundly condemned for it. In "The Blitzkrieg Myth" he again offered historical facts, i.e. the German Panzers never really traveled any faster than the foot and hoof infantry divisions based on official German records, offered a differing theory and has been condemned for it too. Yet Dupuy's work which starts out with an assumption, a numerical value assigned by the researcher for a certain combat factor (morale, experience of troops, training level of troops, etc.) that is then plugged into a mathmatical formula with other numerical values some of which are again based on assumptions and yields a result from assumption after assumption, is so accepted. What if terrain had given the German soldier a much higher advantage than Dupuy assumed in his calculations?

I've got a creeping feeling that you haven't understood a bit what has been written about QJM in this thread, and actually have never been familiar with the formulae. Until you can crasp its "mathmatical methodalogy" (sic), and can present some valid criticism, there's really no need to continue discussing it. Otherwise you just keep on presenting the same kind of BS arguments, other critics, who don't actually have a clue, but are just pissed off for an obvious reason, have already presented. Get this first: It is not a formula made to prove that the Germans had higher combat efficiency.

(I'm not familiar with the books you mentioned above, so I cannot comment them.)

I do know the methodalogy of the formula's. You forget I used a variation of them everytime I participated in a round of MDMP, which in combat is an almost daily activity. Rarely have I seen the answers as calculated by MDMP which uses Dupuy's methodalogy work. Before you ask I have a CIB and have been on the sharp end of the stick more than once. I have watched people die for real not in some kind of abstract wargame or in some abstract realm of thought populated by people who believe all things can be covered by a mathmatical formula. In real life in a combat zone all these nice little mathmatical formulas go out the door. Dupuy's theories as used in MDMP reduce the soldier, a living breathing human being to a number. And using that number instead of that human being causes that soldier immense harm. "Oh, the force ratios were there, the operation should have worked" is not a good answer to tell someone why their loved one isn't coming home. What you and others can not accept is that I have seen Dupuy's formulas at work in the real world where the calculations have cost people their lives. I have tried to remain civil through out this thread and intended no disservice to anyone involved. But it seems that you took offense when someone disagrees with what you believe to be the unvarnished truth and try to paint their points as ignorance. I freely admitted earlier that it had been a number of years since I had read Dupuy. No I do not have his work in front of me nor do I own a copy as you obviously do. Having seen his formulas fail in actual combat I question if they are accurate for the original body of work. It could be the formula is not correct, the values could have been calculated wrong, there is some factor missing in the formula, or any other number of reasons. If something is not valid now based on your experience, then you have to go back and look at if it was valid earlier.

[KG Erwin]

Keke and Dragoon45, here's where we get to the heart of the matter--the attempt to actually quantify Combat Effectiveness, in every situation, and the reasons behind the theories. This is why I wanted Paul Vebber to weigh in, as games such as SPWaW factor in a subjective level of "base experience" and "base morale" for all nations. I would like to know the criteria that was used for setting these levels. No subsequent OOB team fiddled with these--we left them as they were, as these values were outside of our purview. Same goes for Panzer Leo's H2H Mod and the SPWaW Depot's OOB Revisions. These levels were left alone, because they are the most difficult to measure. They have a profound effect on game play, and I argued (successfully) for removing the elite designation for some USMC units at the beginning of the war.

As for the use of Dupuy's QJM in commercial wargames--who has actually used it? This is something I would like to ask of Jim Dunnigan, who designed many of the board games I grew up playing. He was one of the guys who automatically gave higher combat factors to German ground units to subjectively represent all of their early successes in WWII. He made an attempt to remedy this with the massive "War In The East" (yes, I have it), which had elaborate rules for the varying conditions of the war between 1941-45, different combat-results tables for the years, and stronger Russian units introduced from 1943-45 (the Tank & Mech Corps).

After all this, we still have no way to judge the human element, which is truly elusive and can't be measured objectively. This is why I play the tactical games, because you have individual squads commanded by leaders who may or may not perform to the standards necessary to ensure the safety of their men and the cohesion of the unit. The further down the chain of command one goes, the more uncertain the final result becomes, and the less you can rely on historical data.

Thus, we are in a quandary, in which neither historians nor wargame designers can offer a definitive conclusion. I offered my opinion, nothing more, as the answer is by definition impossible to measure objectively for a given situation. This topic serves to illustrate the mystery and ultimate futility of trying to quantify a human activity--it becomes simply an exercise in rhetoric. It is not that much different from trying to define why a person falls in love--it cannot be explained, quantified or measured in its extent or depth. [;)]

[IronDuke_slith]

Then also I don't understand how the result's of Dupuy's work can be so accepted based on assumptions that are quantified as a mathmatical value, and the work of other's derided when they use the same methodalogy. I refer to Mosier and his "Myth of the Great War" and "The Blitzkrieg Myth". He used official casuality figures in "The Myth of the Great War" and found that the figures did not support the history as written by the victors. He offered a substitute theory and as far as I can tell has been roundly condemned for it.

I think we touched on this earlier. He doesn't seem to have convinced anyone to be fair re the great war. He seems to have had an agenda all his own. Many in the AEF and on the German side felt the American infantry in WWI were brave but tactically naive.

In "The Blitzkrieg Myth" he again offered historical facts, i.e. the German Panzers never really traveled any faster than the foot and hoof infantry divisions based on official German records, offered a differing theory and has been condemned for it too.

I haven't read this work, so I'd be grateful for any further details you could give. I'd be interested because (if memory serves) Army Group Centre in Russia in 1941 (to name but one example) had to wait days on occasion for foot infantry to catch up with them and seal off the pockets they had created. Some of the distances being covered in the early days by Guiderian et al were so large, I wouldn't have thought it possible for foot infantry to physically march them to be honest. I do sometimes use a site that specialises in military history books, they often post reviews from people. I tend to trust them more than Amazon because this is a specific military history site. Anyway, I found the following, which I don't post as evidence but merely as background. I found it interesting, because I thought many of the same things about his work on the great war.

Mosier, an amature historian with little or no training in research methods (he's an English professor) produces half-baked conclusions based on insufficient research and faulty logic. He writes simply to provoke rather than inform, so the entire books is chock full of questionable statements resting on little or no evidence. Other conclusions are simply incorrect and can be made only after suppressing evidence or willfully misinterpreting it, which Mosier does constantly.

Avoid this book like the plague.

Some of the things the Amazon reviewer posted also hinted at a basic lack of understanding on Professor Mosier's part. Perhaps I could quote them and you could confirm whether I am being fair. The reviewer said of the Blitzkrieg myth (and the reviewer liked the book).

Mosier shows that, despite what we have been told, Germany did not have a clear superiority in tanks at the beginning of the war, and that the Germans did not subscribe to the "Blitzkrieg" strategy to invade Poland and France. Instead, he demonstrates how a large portion of German military funding before the war was spent on fortifications on the French frontier, much like the French did with the Maginot line (and which the French have historically been criticized for doing). Thus, German tanks were small in number (the French actually had more, despite conventional wisdom) and many were obsolete when the war started.

Firstly, I thought it was relatively common knowledge that German tanks were lighter and had less armour and firepower than french vehicles like the Char and that it was superior tactics that saw the Panzer Divisions defeat French Armoured forces where they encountered them. That Professor Mosier feels it is a surprise, suggests to me his target audience is not
fellow historians. Blitzkrieg was also not a German term for German strategy, I believe an Italian jounalist invented it, so what he means when he says that Germany didn't subscribe to Blitzkrieg is a mystery to me, because it wasn'y a theory as such, but a soundbite.

The reviewer goes on to say:

He also demonstrates that German military doctrine was far different then many have believed. They did not use armoured spearheads to inflict panic on Allied rear areas. Instead, they used a broad-front strategy, attacking in many different places at the same time, overwhelming the defenses and making it so they couldn't react. When they did attempt the Breakthrough strategy, it never worked or caused huge casualties when it did work (like the airborne drops on Belgium and Holland). In point of fact, Hitler was one of the few Germans who believed in the Breakthrough doctrine, and he attempted to use the strategy once he took over military affairs. He tried it twice (Avaranches in France and the Battle of the Bulge in Belgium), and both times resulted in the hastening of the German defeat. Allied generals who tried the strategy inevitably found that the Germans were able to quickly shift defenses to halt the attacks. If Hitler hadn't wasted German resources on futile offensives, the Germans could have held on a lot longer than they finally did.

The first sentence is a surprise. Guderian crossed the Meuse at Sedan in 1940 with three Panzer Divisions and one Motorised Regiment and fought his way to the channel coast handing over defence of his flanks to following Infantry divisions but keeping his armoured divisions in the vanguard. Avranches and the Bulge strike me as very selective engagements to pick out and attempt to prove a theory with, perhaps echoing the hostile reviewer when he said

Other conclusions are simply incorrect and can be made only after suppressing evidence or willfully misinterpreting it

Likewise, Rommel only had motiorised or Panzer elements in Africa until the arrival of the 164th (IIRC) and he travelled hundreds of miles. The Germans specifically grouped all their armoured and motorised divisions into Panzergruppe in June 41 in Russia and created huge pockets at Minsk, Smolensk, Kiev and Briansk by driving into the enemy rear and encircling the enemy's paralysed and slow moving formations. I would be very careful about this work, if what I am quoting is true.

Professor Mosier apparently goes on:

Mosier also attacks the concept of strategic bombing in the book, making a vivid case for how immoral it was. This was because it didn't work, but ended up killing hundreds of thousands of civilians anyway, despite having no real effect on the war. He shows that German industrial capacity did not go down in 1943, when the bombing process really began. It did start going down in 1944, but a large part of that can be attributed to the loss of natural resources in areas where the Allies were taking back territory and depriving the German war machine of these resources. Mosier attempts to discredit those who say the bombing campaigns contributed to the ending of the war, and criticizes those who massage the numbers (or completely ignore them) to make it look like it did have an effect.

German industrial capacity did not go down in 1943 for the reason that it was massively expanding. After Hamburg, Speer is quoted as saying that another six raids like this and Germany would fall. Speer was increasing production and gearing up a war economy (many german factories into 43 still only had one shift). Thus, Allied success is not measured in reducing capacity but restraining the increase. His comments about 1944 are incorrect. The chief effect of Allied bombing was to destroy the transport infrastructure. German factories had stocks of equipment that went undistributed because the German rail network had been knocked out by bombing. Resources were tighter, but it mattered not because the Germans couldn't distribute what they were producing.

I'd be interested in discussing this work further if you can provide more detailed descriptions of Professor Mosier's evidence.

Yet Dupuy's work which starts out with an assumption, a numerical value assigned by the researcher for a certain combat factor (morale, experience of troops, training level of troops, etc.) that is then plugged into a mathmatical formula with other numerical values some of which are again based on assumptions and yields a result from assumption after assumption, is so accepted. What if terrain had given the German soldier a much higher advantage than Dupuy assumed in his calculations?

Dragoon 45,
I have attempted to address this issue several times now. Dupuy's model has been used to study actions in which German soldiers were on the attack and on the defence. Since they emerge as more effective on both the attack and the defence, it doesn't matter whether Dupuy has got all the factors quantified correctly when looking at the broader results.

For example, using your terrain suggestion as an example. Underestimating the effect on terrain would improve the Allied scores when the Germans were attacking and the Allies defending, just as they would improve German scores when the Allies were attacking and the Germans defending. However, since the Germans perform better in each situation (on average) it doesn't matter whether Dupuy has got this right because in some cases it would improve Allied performance and in others make the Germans advantage even higher. Terrain affects both sides. To question his model, you need something that consistently only benefits the Germans.

So even if the re-evaluation of terrain narrowed the scores and made the differential smaller when the Allies were attacking, the German scores when they were attacking would also increase, making them look even better.

regards,
IronDuke

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: KG Erwin

Keke and Dragoon45, here's where we get to the heart of the matter--the attempt to actually quantify Combat Effectiveness, in every situation, and the reasons behind the theories. This is why I wanted Paul Vebber to weigh in, as games such as SPWaW factor in a subjective level of "base experience" and "base morale" for all nations. I would like to know the criteria that was used for setting these levels. No subsequent OOB team fiddled with these--we left them as they were, as these values were outside of our purview. Same goes for Panzer Leo's H2H Mod and the SPWaW Depot's OOB Revisions. These levels were left alone, because they are the most difficult to measure. They have a profound effect on game play, and I argued (successfully) for removing the elite designation for some USMC units at the beginning of the war.

I'd argue game experience has to set these. If your game can't recreate German advances in Russia in 1941, you have to tweak something to do it. TOAW allowed increased movement allowances for one side or the other, I seem to remember, to try and simulate speedy German advance.

As for the use of Dupuy's QJM in commercial wargames--who has actually used it? This is something I would like to ask of Jim Dunnigan, who designed many of the board games I grew up playing. He was one of the guys who automatically gave higher combat factors to German ground units to subjectively represent all of their early successes in WWII. He made an attempt to remedy this with the massive "War In The East" (yes, I have it), which had elaborate rules for the varying conditions of the war between 1941-45, different combat-results tables for the years, and stronger Russian units introduced from 1943-45 (the Tank & Mech Corps).

After all this, we still have no way to judge the human element, which is truly elusive and can't be measured objectively. This is why I play the tactical games, because you have individual squads commanded by leaders who may or may not perform to the standards necessary to ensure the safety of their men and the cohesion of the unit. The further down the chain of command one goes, the more uncertain the final result becomes, and the less you can rely on historical data.

Yes, but the human element can not be predicted, but its affects can be observed. In other words, the real value for Dupuy is not in predicting what might happen but trying to explain what did happen. Dupuy isn't about offering reasons why the German soldier was more combat effective, but pointing out that he was.

Thus, we are in a quandary, in which neither historians nor wargame designers can offer a definitive conclusion. I offered my opinion, nothing more, as the answer is by definition impossible to measure objectively for a given situation. This topic serves to illustrate the mystery and ultimate futility of trying to quantify a human activity--it becomes simply an exercise in rhetoric. It is not that much different from trying to define why a person falls in love--it cannot be explained, quantified or measured in its extent or depth. [;)]

Yes, but Dupuy offers a model that can be tested and critiqued. I haven't seen anything so far (my apologies if I have missed anything) from those who disagree with him that suggests why he is wrong. If you believe American soldiers have been more combat effective in the 20th century, you have to explain why. As I've said, The WWI AEF was no better than anyone else, and actually performed worse because it was not yet at the top of its learning curve when the end of the war was reached. They suffered the lkessons of WWI but did not really get chance to show they had fully learned them. I'm sure they would have performed better in 1919 had it gone on, but that is conjectire.

The American infantryman in WWII fares no better as a general rule. Dupuy's work is a big plank of that, but by no means alone.

Going further, I don't think American combat performance in Korea really stands out as sparkling. I would hesitate to move further forward in time because it would probably see the thread locked as we'd reach politically sensitive conflicts.

Perhaps we can turn this around and approach the question from another angle.

What evidence would you offer to suggest the average American GI of World War II was more (or even just equally) combat effective as his average Wehrmacht counterpart?

Regards,
IronDuke

[KG Erwin]

I hate to rely on stats, as they differ depending on the source, but Dupuy did the same thing, so I have a basis for comparison. The Wikipedia gave a figure of 8607 US dead compared to 17,236 German in the Battle of the Bulge. That's more than 2:1 in the Americans' favor. Another source, totalling all casualties, gave 82400 US/British vs 100, 000 German. This is for the German offensive/Allied counteroffensive phase.

These are raw figures, but what do they prove? It is a selective choice of numbers, just as Dupuy chose to do, so overall, the results are inconclusive. My point? Dupuy chose to be selective in his pre-conceived theory, so he chose the stats to prove his point. There was no objective POV at all, as the book he published these figures in, "A Genius for War", postulated that the Germans institutionalized military excellence through the creation of their General Staff. Now, this may have been true during the eras of victory in both world wars, but it ultimately failed them. The basic premise falls apart, as all the factors that play into combat effectiveness, such as training, morale, weapons effectiveness, logistical support, etc. are ignored. He falls into the trap of judging warfare as an academic exercise, devoid of human factors. His study is way too narrow, and this is where I have a problem with it.

To Iron Duke & Keke, we can argue these points into perpetuity, but I cannot offer statistics to back up my original assertion, other than production figures, casualty stats, budget expenditures, etc. By every measure of these stats, the Americans kicked the Germans' butts. In real terms, it doesn't matter. We outproduced and outfought our enemies in WWII, and in every war since then. I would include Vietnam, but that isn't the focus of our discussion. I will say, though, that it is a fact that the American miltary in the present day is the best in the world. The roots of this superiority lay in the lessons of WWII, not, as some have stated, in Vietnam. The value of training and providing the troops with the best weapons and communications equipment we could give them were national defense policy in the 1940s. We are not a militaristic society, and the structure of our democracy, until recent years, doesn't advocate maintaining military forces for the purpose of offensive operations. We succeeded in creating these forces from scratch in Korea and Vietnam, and now have another in being. This is another part of my basic argument. No other nation in the world has been able to produce such a high-quality offensive force at a moment's notice. We saw it in action in 1991, and in 2003.

My point--my main point--is that we established the capability to form high-quality modern forces like this, in a very short time, more than 60 years ago.

[JJKettunen]

ORIGINAL: KG Erwin

I hate to rely on stats, as they differ depending on the source, but Dupuy did the same thing, so I have a basis for comparison. The Wikipedia gave a figure of 8607 US dead compared to 17,236 German in the Battle of the Bulge. That's more than 2:1 in the Americans' favor. Another source, totalling all casualties, gave 82400 US/British vs 100, 000 German. This is for the German offensive/Allied counteroffensive phase.

These are raw figures, but what do they prove? It is a selective choice of numbers, just as Dupuy chose to do, so overall, the results are inconclusive. My point? Dupuy chose to be selective in his pre-conceived theory, so he chose the stats to prove his point. There was no objective POV at all, as the book he published these figures in, "A Genius for War", postulated that the Germans institutionalized military excellence through the creation of their General Staff. Now, this may have been true during the eras of victory in both world wars, but it ultimately failed them. The basic premise falls apart, as all the factors that play into combat effectiveness, such as training, morale, weapons effectiveness, logistical support, etc. are ignored. He falls into the trap of judging warfare as an academic exercise, devoid of human factors. His study is way too narrow, and this is where I have a problem with it.

What primary sources were used for the above numbers? One should use Allied records for the Allied casualties, and German records for the German casualties. It's the basic methdology many writers have not realized, but have used Allied estimates for German casualties. A couple of examples:

The staff of Patton's 3rd Army estimated that from 1 August 1944 to 29 January 1945 units from the 3rd Army had killed 96,500 enemy soldiers and wounded a further 269,000 (Patton, War As I Knew It). Actually, German casualties on the entire Western Front from 1 August 1944 - 31 January 1945 included 50,507 killed in action and 168,129 wounded (Wermacht Verlustwesen, file BA-MA RW 6/v.599). Clearly the estimates of the 3rd Army were compeletelly inaccurate.

Omar Bradley's intelligence officer estimated the Germans had suffered 250,000 casualties during the month-long battle in the Ardennes (Bradley, A Soldier's Story). Of these 36,000 were prisoners. Hence about 214,000 German soldiers were estimated to have been killed or wounded, which is almost five times too high.

As for the Dupuy's selective use of numbers, yes, he was selective, German records for the German casualties, and Allied records for the Allied casualties, just like any respectable historian would do, and to get as accurate results as possible. I don't know why you insist that his theory was pre-conceived, since you are not even familiar with it (only with its conclusions).

Regarding "A Genius for War", Dupuy tries to give more or less subjective answers why Germans, in his mathematical model, and to his suprise, were constantly more combat efficient than the Allied in average. He stated that the answer was in the traditions of the German General Staff.

Personally I don't understand why some people have hard time to understand that the military formations of a losing side
may have had higher combat efficiency overall than their ultimate victors. Wars are not sport events, there are a huge amount of factors outside single engagements, which affect the outcome of wars. Outcome of a war, or a battle for that matter, is not a direct measurement of skill, this many seem fail to understand.

ORIGINAL: KG Erwin
To Iron Duke & Keke, we can argue these points into perpetuity, but I cannot offer statistics to back up my original assertion, other than production figures, casualty stats, budget expenditures, etc. By every measure of these stats, the Americans kicked the Germans' butts. In real terms, it doesn't matter. We outproduced and outfought our enemies in WWII, and in every war since then. I would include Vietnam, but that isn't the focus of our discussion. I will say, though, that it is a fact that the American miltary in the present day is the best in the world. The roots of this superiority lay in the lessons of WWII, not, as some have stated, in Vietnam. The value of training and providing the troops with the best weapons and communications equipment we could give them were national defense policy in the 1940s. We are not a militaristic society, and the structure of our democracy, until recent years, doesn't advocate maintaining military forces for the purpose of offensive operations. We succeeded in creating these forces from scratch in Korea and Vietnam, and now have another in being. This is another part of my basic argument. No other nation in the world has been able to produce such a high-quality offensive force at a moment's notice. We saw it in action in 1991, and in 2003.

My point--my main point--is that we established the capability to form high-quality modern forces like this, in a very short time, more than 60 years ago.

As was expected, some people are just pissed off because Dupuy's model doesn't demonstrate that the Americans were better in all areas of warfare during WWII. That's why, instead of valid criticism, all we hear is patriotic humbug. I bet that if QJM was used in appropriate Vietnam engagements, it would show that most of the American units had higher combat efficiency than their Vietnamese counterparts? Did the Americans win the war?

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: KG Erwin

I hate to rely on stats, as they differ depending on the source, but Dupuy did the same thing, so I have a basis for comparison. The Wikipedia gave a figure of 8607 US dead compared to 17,236 German in the Battle of the Bulge. That's more than 2:1 in the Americans' favor. Another source, totalling all casualties, gave 82400 US/British vs 100, 000 German. This is for the German offensive/Allied counteroffensive phase.

I can only echo Keke's point about numbers. Both Keegan and Hastings (very good historians) have produced wildly innaccurate figures about German casualties in Normandy during World War II. They were putting the numbers in the half a million bracket. These figures are quoted everywhere from Montgomery's memoirs onwards. Zetterling showed (from OKH records) that the figure was around 210000. I think Allied historians have inflated German casualties in many instances because they have assumed when a division is all but wiped out that all 15000 souls (or whatever) were killed or wounded, when in fact a large chunk of these men would have been in the supporting arms and would have escaped. It was merely the rifle element that was wiped out that might number 9 or 10 battalions of 700 each etc.

In the first week of the Bulge, the US suffered around 25000 casualties to the German 20000. Within a week Allied forces opposing the Germans were three times tronger than when the battle started. Dupuy makes an assertion (that I confess I have not been able to check yet) that the German advance of 2 Panzer during the Ardennes offensive was quicker than Patton's spearheads during the first week of Cobra. You will know as well as I the differing conditions of these two advances. Ultimately, raw casualty figures mean nothing, because we know nothing of the context in which they occured.

Dupuy's figures were weighted to take account of the shape and dynamics of the battlefield. It is what makes them so compelling. He takes these figures and says what forces did both sides employ, what weapons did they use, what defensive posture were they in, what artillery and air support did they have? He published figures which showed on occasion American forces outfought German forces. He was not selective.

These are raw figures, but what do they prove? It is a selective choice of numbers, just as Dupuy chose to do, so overall, the results are inconclusive. My point? Dupuy chose to be selective in his pre-conceived theory, so he chose the stats to prove his point. There was no objective POV at all, as the book he published these figures in, "A Genius for War", postulated that the Germans institutionalized military excellence through the creation of their General Staff. Now, this may have been true during the eras of victory in both world wars, but it ultimately failed them.

He did the analysis, and the theory grew out of the analysis. Many engagements have been analysed, no one has been able to dispute his central point. Even the Bulge battles seem to have favoured the germans. I've mentioned this before, but the pre-conceptions about the American fighting man seem to belong to those who argue he was more combat effective, because they rubbish the only scientific model out there without good reason, because they seem unable to accept that the American fighting man was not the best.

The German General Staff failed for numerous reasons, but they are not really what combat effectiveness is about. Overwhelming odds and poor strategy essentially finished the Germans, together with a resurgent and overwhelming Soviet Military on one side, and the overwhelming firepower of the Western Allies on the other side.

The basic premise falls apart, as all the factors that play into combat effectiveness, such as training, morale, weapons effectiveness, logistical support, etc. are ignored. He falls into the trap of judging warfare as an academic exercise, devoid of human factors. His study is way too narrow, and this is where I have a problem with it.

Combat efficiency is not about this at all. Combat efficiency is about who kills most efficiently. The items you cite above such as training and morale etc, are the factors that go to make combat efficiency. It is what historians look to for an explanation when they have established who kills more efficiently. You could, for example, prove American weapons and logistics are better, but they would only be more combat efficient if you found they inflicted casualties more efficiently than their opponents.

The factors you mention above all come afterwards. Professor Van Creveld used many of these factors in his work on why the German Military were more efficient than the US Military during World War II. However, they came not as evidence that Germans were more combat efficient, but as the explanation of why they were more combat efficient. Combat efficiency is essentially established through Dupuy's work analysing raw data, and a good deal of circumstantial evidence.

To Iron Duke & Keke, we can argue these points into perpetuity, but I cannot offer statistics to back up my original assertion, other than production figures, casualty stats, budget expenditures, etc. By every measure of these stats, the Americans kicked the Germans' butts.

Production figures and budget expenditures merely prove who was the strongest. They prove the Americans were a heavyweight and the Germans a middleweight, but they do not prove who was the better pugilist. Dupuy's figures show the Germans were better boxers pound for pound. If you have a bigger population and a better and bigger economy, barring an equaliser like nukes, you're going to win. That is not what combat efficiency is about though. The Russians outproduced and outfought the Germans in the east far more than the US ever did in the west, but I have seen no studies indicating the Russians were more combat efficient than the Germans.

In real terms, it doesn't matter. We outproduced and outfought our enemies in WWII, and in every war since then.

Outproducing them is a function of size. Your essentially saying that if America was the size of France she wouldn't be all that powerful at all. This is fair enough. In real terms. it doesn't matter, you are right, but then this thread assumes that it does matter, to be fair, because that was the assertion that sparked the debate.

I would include Vietnam, but that isn't the focus of our discussion.

Vietnam is best left alone for all sorts of reasons. It is a complicated conflict and not one the world is ready to be entirely objective about.

I will say, though, that it is a fact that the American miltary in the present day is the best in the world. The roots of this superiority lay in the lessons of WWII, not, as some have stated, in Vietnam. The value of training and providing the troops with the best weapons and communications equipment we could give them were national defense policy in the 1940s. We are not a militaristic society, and the structure of our democracy, until recent years, doesn't advocate maintaining military forces for the purpose of offensive operations. We succeeded in creating these forces from scratch in Korea and Vietnam, and now have another in being. This is another part of my basic argument. No other nation in the world has been able to produce such a high-quality offensive force at a moment's notice. We saw it in action in 1991, and in 2003.

The American Military was not suddenly created in 1991 or 2003. It was always there, it just required someone to use it. The American Military of WWII was created through a massive and quick expansion (as was the AEF in WWI) and neither was nearly so successful. A large chunk of that was down to having an exellent opponent each time. I'd argue present American domination did grow out of Vietnam because America came to believe that she had lost there, and that she had lost because she fought with one hand behind her back (I'm not concerned with whether the US were right, merely that that was the lesson drawn). After Reagan, her thinking has essentially meant she has ensured that she has never fought without overwhelming advantages. In a way, her current strategy is 150 years old. US Strategy was essentially set by Grant when he overcame the south by simple and relentless application of the military power of the north. American strategy ever since has spent and produced big, deployed big and fought big. That is not combat efficiency, though.

My point--my main point--is that we established the capability to form high-quality modern forces like this, in a very short time, more than 60 years ago.

I'd argue you did this 20 years ago under Reagan. The American combat performance in WWI and WWII and Korea (leaving Vietname aside) do not support this conclusion. Germany increased her military strength more successfully in the period before 1945, and I don't see much evidence one way or the other during Korea and Vietnam.

Regards,
IronDuke

[Maliki]

Reading through this i think it's unfair to compare how forces performed and the casualties they recieved and inflicted,and how their opponents fared,as compared to other theaters.The ETO was as different from the CIB as the PTO was to the latter.Saying X was better than Y because they performed better,or worse than Z under a given set of circmustances.The USMC,being assault troops,could no more have sustained a large inland campaign against mechanized forces then the Germans,Russians,whomever could have had continued success against heavily defended amphibious objectives.

Wouldn't a better way of looking at things be to see what the units were trained to do and how they performed in carrying out their assigned roles?The USMC could have attempted D-Day,they could have even succeeded given their performance in other operations.They could not have carried out,without losing operational effiecency,the prolonged combat that ensued afterwards.

Also Naval and air bombardment of shoreline objectives was highly over-rated.Someone here said that the marines didn't have it that bad because they enjoyed a material advantage in firepower and pre-assault bombardment.This overlooks the fact that at the same time the US was refining its techniques of amphibious assault that the enemy,Japanese,were also refining their ways of withstanding it.The first wave at Iwo Jima was let ashore without heavy resistance because the Japanese commander wanted the beach head to become crowded before letting lose his firepower on it,thus giving away its posistions and leading to its eventual destruction,thereby maximizing the casualties when he played his ace.The war in the pacific and the battle for the islands there were not won because of superior firepower,and naval and air bombardment,but by very grinding and bloody squad based actions.The Japanese had to be expelled bloodily for every foot of ground they gave up.It was alot like WWI in a way because it was a battle of yards once the fight on the ground was joined.There was no room for manuever just slogging ahead until that strongpoint was secured and then on to the next one and the one after that.

[Maliki]

Oh yea.The largest amphibous operation of the war was not D-day.It was Okinawa.Just FYI.Though that was a joint army-marine operation.Though the US army did carry out the most amphibious operations of the war,including in the pacific.They also had a "navy" larger than any other force in the world.Strange..huh?

[MikeBrough]

ORIGINAL: Maliki

Oh yea.The largest amphibous operation of the war was not D-day.It was Okinawa.Just FYI.Though that was a joint army-marine operation.Though the US army did carry out the most amphibious operations of the war,including in the pacific.They also had a "navy" larger than any other force in the world.Strange..huh?

Surely not? What criteria are you using? The biggest Pacific War amphibious invasion but not bigger than D-Day.

Men landed on first day of each campaign: D-Day: 150,000 Okinawa: 60,000
Ships involved: D-Day: 2,807 plus 1,991 minor landing craft. Okinawa: don't know but less than 4,798, surely?


Source: http://www.naval-history.net/WW2Campaig ... bious2.htm

[IronDuke_slith]

I was conscious that we had focused heavily on Dupuy and his system which I do not feel has been seriously challenged. However, I do think there are other authorities and other reasons why the American Infantry struggled in World War II that go beyond Dupuy's methology. I was going to go through Dupuy and try and summarise his method for the thread more closely at some point as well, but firstly, I wanted to post a few comments on the American Army of World War II to illustrate why I think Dupuy found what he did.

firstly, and something close to the heart of the basic supposition of this thread that the US were consistently able to produce high quality forces, was the way the Army was initially increased in size.

Between 1940 and 1945, the US Army increased in size 25 fold. Now, it has been pointed out by some studies that this made the Army rich in experience of many things. Communications and logistics etc were all progressed within the US Army significantly because of this influx of outside expertise into the Military. However, the downside was that although well trained, the peace time Army had never trained its men in the duties or skills required of being an Officer or NCO. As the Army expanded many of these experiencd men moved elsewhere in the Armed services for easy promotion, and what this meant was that when they went into combat, most American units lacked not only combat experience, but also Officers and NCOs who had experience or thorough training of being an Officer or NCO. One solution to the greenness was to transfer men from the regular divisions to the newly raised formations, but this took men who had trained and lived together for years out of their parent units and thrust them into battle with strangers. Not a recipe for success.

Indeed, the entire American replacement system has been criticised for creating replacement depots which exacerbated the problem, by centralising replacements and assigning them out as required. This meant men frequently went into battle with strangers.

The second problem was the quality of the recruits. Many talented men were allowed to get out of service in the infantry, and most men with above average intelligence were usually assigned to the Air Corp, the technical branches or elsewhere. This meant that in addition to being green, and in addition to having few experienced NCOs or Junior Officers, most American units also contained an average quality of recruit that was not what it should have been. I can't find a reference to it, but I seem to remember a study from 1944 that found the average American infantrymen to have a lower IQ and shorter stature than his Air Corp equivalent.

Without experience, and with only inexperienced men to train and lead them at NCO and Junior Officer level, and an additional lack of experienced instructors during basic training meant units performed badly as a result. Patton famously said "The poorer the infantry, the more artillery it needs; the American infantry needs all that it can get." Marshall in 1941, and Patton in 1944 were famously complaining about the standard of junior officers.

The net result was that American arms compensated with firepower. Lots of artillery, massive air support and liberally sprinkled armour and TD units were all designed to compensate for the generally poor quality infantry. Take the breakout battles in Normandy where heavy bombers were used en masse to kill everything in front of the American units, as an example.

This was not a uniquely American problem. The British Army had problems of its own in terms of performance although for different reasons, and by the war's end the Germans were suffering as well, as the quality of recruit dropped and the Waffen SS expanded taking a disproportionate share of the better replacements. They found extra firepower was also required to try and compensate. They introduced the MP43/44, the worlds first Assault rifle to try and make up for it, in much the same way the Soviets mass produced and issued their submachine guns.

Even the Marines, who seem close to several hearts here, did not excape the war without criticism. The Marines have been criticised (a tag that has never left them) for preferring stand up fights and frontal assaults. One example I saw quoted was Pelieu Island where casualties ran to 56%. Marine landings often saw the men shake out into linear skirmish lines before heading inland. Take away the trees, and these tactics were familiar on the Somme. In the Pacific, you see the same use of concentrated firepower to compensate as you do in Europe.

All in all, the evidence against the American Army being particularly combat effective in World War II is pretty steep. Dupuy's work merely provides some statistical evidence. This isn't about questioning American bravery, which I'm sure stands comparison, but about their combat effectiveness, which is something else altogether.

Regards,
IronDuke

[IronDuke_slith]

I mentioned earlier in this thread that I'd post a description of Dupuy's method to allow people to make a judgement of their own on his value.

This is a very basic description, but the basic combat model used was devised not just By Dupuy but by some other Retired US Officers selected to represented the full range of activity. There was a Marine, an infantryman, armour specialist etc.

The first step is to quantify the weapons for qualities like rate of fire, range, lethality, accuracy, reliability, mobility, radius of action etc. Also included are the number of potential targets per strike (or target density). Further modifications are made for armoured vehicles for fire control and ammunition supply.

What you then had was a range of values for weapons called the Theoretical lethality indices (TLI). This was how good the weapons were (essentially) in proving ground conditions. The next thing to do was convert them to how effective they would be on the battlefield.

This was two steps.

Firstly, TLIs were converted to Operational Lethality indices by adding in the effects of dispersion. Essentially, an MG 42 pumped out enough bullets every minute to kill a thousands people, but it never did, because troops were dispersed. It is the history of dispersion (sometimes known theoretically as "The Empty Battlefield") which explains this. An MG 42 is far more accurate, reliable, long ranged and deadly than a musket, but casualty rates on battlefields have grown less over time, not greater despite better weapons. Dispersion is the key to this.

The second step was to take the OLIs and modify them by calculating the effects of variables. In addition to the weapons effects mentioned above, effects were identified and calculated for Terrain (6 different effects), weather (5) season (3), air superiority (4) posture (2) Mobility (2) vulnerability (5) tac air (6) and a further 18 covering a range of things including the effects of surprise, disruption, leadership etc. Some could not easily be quantified (such as combat effectiveness) and were perhaps best calculated after the analysis, as a factor that might explain a certain result.

Esssnetially, at the end, you had a complex formula in which you fed in troop strengths, the weapons used (modified by all the factors above) and got a combat power strength. This was compared to the enemy combat power strength to get a value.

So, if US Combat power was higher that German combat power, the US had an advantage and were expected to win. Remember, these values are not modified for terrain etc at this stage, because those modifications were made before the combat power value was reached.

So, Dupuy now had a theoretical result. The next thing was to quantify what the actual result was, and see if the theoretical matched the actual. The actual result was worked out using three factors. How close to achieving their actual objectives the two sides came. How effective they were at holding or taking ground, and how many casualties they inflicted.

The last step was to compare the theoretical with the actual result in another formula. To be fair, the values for many of the variables required a lot of thought, opinion and tweaking. However, when the final set of variable values were set and applied, it was found the model correctly predicted the outcome in over 90% of the 60 engagements from the Italian campaign. It was later validated against a further 21 battles from NW Europe and Russia with similiar results.

A US Army model called ATLAS in use in the seventies managed only 68%.

The issue about combat efectiveness came up when explaining some of the results.

EG: In engagement A, the combat power comparison suggests it should have been a big US win, but it actually turned out to be a narow US win etc. What was found, was that if you assumed (and calculated in) that German combat power was 120 - 130% of the Allied combat effectiveness, the model fit much better, and the narrow US win was explainable.

They essentially found that wherever a big Allied win was predicted, they won. Wherever the combat powers were equal, or narrowly in the Allied favour, the Germans won. Some of it they put down to a more effective utilisation of manpower in combat (essentially a smaller Geman "tail" and more people fighting) but it didn't account for it all.

As Dupuy himself states:

We didn't like one of the two conclusions this adjustment forced upon us - that 100 Germans were roughly the combat equivalent of 120 Americans or British - but we could not ignore the fact that our numbers demonstrated that this was so.

The Combat model was further validated by reference to the Arab Israeli wars of 1973, which found the Israelis more combat effective (not something I've seen seriously questioned, although the conclusion came from the same model).

Looking at values from WWI, Dupuy found a similiar sort of picture, which led him to conclude that Combat efficiency is slow to change for various reasons. The problems that American force of arms had in Korea and Vietnam back that conclusion up.

Finally, please remember, this doesn't question the bravery of the men concerned, just suggests (as commonsense dictates) that although two men may be equally brave, one may be a more effective soldier for a whole host of reasons unrelated to courage. Others have built on Dupuy's work to identify what those factors may have been.

Regards,
IronDuke

[Nemesis]

What an interesting thread this has been . But I must say that when talking about the individual soldiers, I'm partial to Finnish soldiers . Of course they lacked the equipment, air-support and sheer firepower that US Army and Red Army (for example) enjoyed, but as soldiers, I think they were top-notch. Hell, they faced second-largest artillery-barrage in the entire war together with massive Red Army attack... And in the end of they day, they were undefeated.

Related to this:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45

7. Also German doctrine for small units has not been addressed. It was SOP for the Germans to immediately conduct a counterattack anytime they were forced out of a position. Yes it was also the doctrine of the other armies, but was never adhered to like the Germans.

Finns did that as well. The SOP consisted of primary defensive-line backed up by secondary defensive-lines. If the primary line of defence was lost, counterattack to re-take it was expected. Command expected that after the battle the primary line of defence was intact and in friendly hands.

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: Nemesis

What an interesting thread this has been . But I must say that when talking about the individual soldiers, I'm partial to Finnish soldiers . Of course they lacked the equipment, air-support and sheer firepower that US Army and Red Army (for example) enjoyed, but as soldiers, I think they were top-notch. Hell, they faced second-largest artillery-barrage in the entire war together with massive Red Army attack... And in the end of they day, they were undefeated.

Related to this:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45

7. Also German doctrine for small units has not been addressed. It was SOP for the Germans to immediately conduct a counterattack anytime they were forced out of a position. Yes it was also the doctrine of the other armies, but was never adhered to like the Germans.

Finns did that as well. The SOP consisted of primary defensive-line backed up by secondary defensive-lines. If the primary line of defence was lost, counterattack to re-take it was expected. Command expected that after the battle the primary line of defence was intact and in friendly hands.

The business of tactics and small unit doctrine is interesting. However, I think it is essentially a result, not a cause, of better combat performance. Good soldiers with inferior tactics will beat bad soldiers with superior tactics. The point about the counterattack is an important one. To motivate troops who have just been ejected (presumably with some loss) to immediately counterattack requires first class infantry. If German tactics were better, it is because they had the troops to carry them out.

I think the essential cause of Wehrmacht ground superiority rests on a few points.

1. A bigger share of better material actually going into the Infantry. Statistics illustrate almost half of American ground troops came from the lowest categories of recruit identified before training.

2. Better training, organisation and a much better replacement system. German units were recruited from geographic areas (much like the British regimental system) and their replacements were trained in battalions linked to those units. Training was frequently done towards the end by men from the Parent division who had a vested interest in ensuring the men arrived at the front in some sort of state to fight effectively. Links were encouraged at all levels between the replacement units and the combat units and the results showed.

The American depot system essentially meant most recruits knew the unit they were in only at the very end, and were lucky to get much field training, instead relying on experienced Camrades to help them along.

3. Better small unit Leadership, and a doctrine better suited to modern war. At every level the Germans emphasised not how to do something, but what to do. Subordinates were not told how to do something, but were told what the objective was, and any additional mission paramaters, but were then left to get the job done as they saw fit within those mission and objective parameters.

American Field manuals tended to explain in greater detail how individual tasks could and should be accomplished. I think the result was that Germans approached a mission with a clean slate, looking at what would work best in the terrain and circumstances. Americans were more likely to play it by the book, and I think that can leave you predictable, and unwilling to gamble, seize opportunities as they arrive and be really aggressive.


The net result was that American operational doctrine stagnated, I think. Any desire to manouevre was lost amidst a drive to make up for the relative German superiority with the use of lavish amounts of firepower. In return, this provoked something of a vicious circle. The idea that lavish firepower is at hand to do the job will not encourage troops to get out of their holes and act aggressively. Manouevre becomes something you do to find the enemy, before fixing him and annihilating him with firepower. However, the old maxim that you need infantry to pull the other guy out of his hole is true, and the net effect of the above was that when Allied units (not just American) went over the top, they struggled to deal with the more tactically adept Wehrmacht.

Once again, none of this questions their bravery, merely their combat efficiency, which is something else entirely.

Regards,
IronDuke

[Yamato hugger]

Part of the reason the allies vs German troops over-all favored the allies was the doctrine. Allied formations were trained together, then as they experienced combat, they had replacements funneled into them and the experienced troops trained the replacements (more to it that than, but this is in essence what happened).

German units on the other hand were typically bled white, then pulled out of the line and filled up with replacements, effectively creating a whole new unit. Which of course explains the SS's performance in the Ardennes.

With some noteable exceptions Jap forces that encoutered allied forces from '42 onwards ceased to exist and therefore only had their prior experiences to fall back on, and those experiences couldnt prepare them for what they were about to face.