ORIGINAL: Alfred
vettim89,
Regarding your request for opinions on the contemplated redeployment of LCUs from Khota Bahru.
Firstly, the screen shot you attached in post #1016 shows a dark red Japanese garrison at both Johore Bahru and Singapore. Presumably this means that very large enemy garrisons are located at those two bases. It seems to me that little would be gained by reducing your forces at Khota Bahru to only a 2:1 advantage if in doing so you fail to release sufficient forces to enable you to assemble an overwhelming force to quickly capture Johore and Singapore. Those enemy garrisons are not going anywhere and if you get stuck there (as well as Khota Bahru) you are exchaning strategic flexibility for static besieging.
Secondly, I assume that you are interested in Singapore for its VPs. Whilst sizeable, at this stage do you really need the Singapore VPs in order to achieve an auto victory. Once you have air superiority over the Home Islands, strategic bombing will very quickly rack up the VPs. At this stage, grabbing the Singapore VPs makes sense if they can be gobbled up very quickly and do not interfere with the forward momentum of your Asian offensive which could move otherwise onto Palembang, or Thailand, or Indo-China etc. After all, Singapore is now largely a strategic backwater (I assume that it is lacking in supplies and aircraft etc and thus unable to sustain operations against your forces).
Thirdly, presumably you are of the view that completely eliminating all enemy resistance at Khota Bahru will be quite a lengthy process. If you could quickly eliminate the enemy pocket, then that would be my preferred option as it would then give you strategic flexibility. However by reducing your forces to only a 2:1 level, it seems that you would be achieving the worst of both worlds at Khota Bahru (and the possible risk identified in the first paragraph). You should either eliminate the pocket quickly using land combats, or maintain the absolute minimal Allied force and rely upon air force ground attack and artillery bombardments to steadily whittle down the pocket (and thereby accrue VPs by killing enemy army items) whilst incurring little Allied losses (and attendant lose of Allied VPs).
Alfred
Thank you for your input as always Alfred. The IJA stack up north is basically out of supply and highly disrupted. My attacks have been coming off with ratios in the mid to high teens to 1 (last one was 18 to1). Still I generally inflict equal or fewer casualties than I take. My base AS advantage is roughly 5000 to 1000. My units are not highly disrupted but their fatigue and morale are not good. They have spent roughly 18 months in the jungle now since leaving Rangoon in late 1943. The basis for considering a cahnge is that the reduction of this pocket will take a long time regardless of how much I devote to the task. My thinking was to fall into siege mode with a roughly 2 to 1 base AS advantage with constant artilery and air bombardment being used to grind the stack down. Attrition would be my primary mode of eliminating the Japanese units. If I move roughly 3000 AS south to meet up with the 2100 AS at Jahore Bahru I should be able to at least clear that hex. Larry has been clever and is rotating ID's in and out of Singapore so that the troops meeting the Allies always have low fatigue and high morale. He has never had more than 750 AS there; so the 3000 coming south would be more than enough to displace the Japanese.
Considering the retreating Japanese would then suffer 20% casualties and have 80 disruption, the defenders of Singapore would be seriously weakened. The real advantage of going for Singers now is not for VP but for the precious non-malarial hex status. Once suffering the effects of the Shock Attack associated from entering the hex, my units will be able to recover their strength much more quickly. Once Singapore is taken I could then reverse the process sending a significant force back north that would then be fully rested and reconstituted thus posing a much larger threat to the trapped units at Kota Bharu. I reduced all heavy industry and resource centers in the entire Malay penisula more than a year ago. My assumption is that there is just not much supply left for the Japanese. I, on the other hand have moved over 500 k of supplies into the battle zone. At present Singers has 18 units numbering 93 k. This force will obviously be much fresher than the one at Kota Bharu but is less than 60% the size. My best guess going by recon numbers is also that a significant portion of that 93 k is support troops
The hesitation is that the 140 k troops at Kota bahru represent a sizable VP cache to be harvested.
25 January 1945
My esteemed opponent got me again with a SCTF. A small convoy with two CB units arrived at Petro to be met by an IJN SCTF led by CL Oi. I lose two transports and 2/3 of one CB unit. I will break op security here and tell everybody what I am up to. About three weeks ago I move a small BF into Petro to see if by having a US unit there I could change commands of the base. DING!!!! Yes I can. So I am slowing moving ENG units into the base to build up the AB to level 5. Once that is done, P-51D's can reach every base on Sakhalin Island. Also B-24/Privateers can then interdict the SLOC into Okha and Larry's huge stack of units there will be doomed. I have about half a dozen CB units in the Aleutians that are not doing anything. If I can get them into Petro alone with some AV support, life becomes very hard for the Japanese on Sakhalin. That's the plan man. BTW, PT's inbound to Petro along with an AGP

"We have met the enemy and they are ours" - Commodore O.H. Perry