The end for Japan: Book review

[Neilster]

This is John Dolan's review of the book Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman and the Surrender of Japan from http://www.exile.ru/2006-June-29/book_review.html

I thought it might be of interest to many here. Warning: some of his imagery is...ahem....forthright. [;)]

We all know that it was the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki that ended WW II in the Pacific. We all know that the USSR only entered the Pacific War when Japan had already lost heart, and that the Soviet advance was a farcical beating of an already dead enemy.

Well, according to Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, who has spent decades reading the debates that swirled through the US, Soviet and Japanese elites during the last days of the war, much of what we all think we know about the leadup to VJ Day is simply wrong. Hasegawa's research shows that the Soviet Union's invasion of Manchuria was a far greater shock to the Japanese High Command: ":the Soviet entry into the [Pacific] war played a greater role than the atomic bombs in inducing Japan to surrender."

As Hasegawa says, all three major participants in the Pacific endgame have told self-serving, "parochial" versions of the bloody end of the war. The US sticks to its magic mushroom cloud fairytale, while the Japanese simply prefer not to discuss this period even among themselves. And, as Hasegawa notes, "American and Japanese historians have almost completely ignored the role of the Soviet Union in ending the Pacific War." Hasegawa demonstrates that in fact, "Stalin was an active participant, not a secondary player, as historians have depicted, in the drama of Japan's surrender."

To demonstrate why the Soviets were so vital in the final stages of the Pacific war, Hasegawa traces the debate within Japan's military elite over which war of conquest to pursue: either a showdown with the USSR for Eastern Siberia, or a Southern strategy pushing southward through China to the South Pacific. Defeated by Soviet forces in Manchuria in 1938 and again in 1939, the Japanese grew wary of taking on the Russians and decided to pursue the naval and air war against America and Britain, declining to attack the USSR even after the Germans invaded it from the west.

The high point of Japan's courtship of Stalin came in April 1941, when Japan signed a neutrality pact with the Soviets. Weirdly enough, the Japanese high command, cynical as it was about treaties and declarations in general, actually placed great faith in this agreement with Stalin, and counted on it even as their empire collapsed in 1945.

Hasegawa's reading of the Imperial junta's memos has shown that "the more [Japan's] military situation worsened, the more important the Soviet Union became in Japan's foreign and military policy." The Japanese command clung to a delusive vision of Stalin as last-minute peacemaker: "as the ruling elite of Japan became convinced of defeat, they came to rely more and more on the Soviet Union as the mediator for peace."

Hasegawa's story is soberly told, but he still does a fine job of revealing the sheer craziness of Japanese discourse during the last stages of the war. Debate had been stifled for decades, with dissenters silenced by assassination, resulting in what Hasegawa calls "a strategy of irresponsibility" in which the Emperor was assumed to be behind whatever mad military adventure the junta decreed. In this atmosphere, even bringing up the notion of ending the war could get you killed: "political figures who worked for peace might be assassinated" while pushing for obviously suicidal new attacks showed your loyalty to "the kokutai," the mystical ideal of Japanese nationhood in the name of which the military elite governed.

Managing to convey the thought processes, assumptions and biases of the Imperial elite is Hasegawa's greatest achievement. Like every decent historian, he starts with the willingness to see that these people had their own way of seeing the world. Sounds simple, but it's not so common among English-speaking historians. If it were, we wouldn't all be so smugly convinced that Japan surrendered because they feared annihilation.

The men in power in Japan in 1945 were very comfortable with the notion of suicide, personal or national; they feared losing face far more than annihilation. So Japan was unlikely to flinch merely because the B-29s could now unleash a more efficient form of death. Even after Germany had surrendered, with every city in Japan aflame and huge US flotillas closing in on the home islands, the Imperial elite insisted that "'Japan is not losing the war, since we have not lost any homeland territory.'"

Hasegawa quotes some truly stunning examples of the Kamikaze spirit among the elite, as when Army Minister Anami announces that the US may have as many as a hundred atomic bombs ready to drop on Japan's cities, then adds that he is absolutely in favor of continuing the war.

Some of Emperor Hirohito's comments are inadvertently comic in their psychotic understatement, as when he concedes that in the event of a nuclear holocaust, "protection of the kokutai would be difficult"-or his admission, in his surrender broadcast on August 15, 1945, that the current military situation was "not necessarily to Japan's advantage."

With delusion rampant in Tokyo, Stalin's envoys had an easy time portraying themselves to Japan's elite as the good cop to America's bad cop. After all, Soviet forces were not actually at war against Japan, and it was always Stalin's policy to keep smiling until the knife was actually deep inside his erstwhile ally's guts. Thus he allowed Molotov to flirt with a succession of Japanese envoys, conveying by the usual nods and smiles the USSR's willingness to serve as honest broker between Japan and America. So, up to the moment Soviet troops overwhelmed Japan's Manchurian forces, Japan was soft on Stalin, hard on Truman.

Stalin emerges from Hasegawa's research as the most impressive figure among the major players. From the start, he intended to punish Japan for its defeat of Russia in 1905, but as long as there was anything to be gained by doing so, he encouraged the Japanese delusion that the USSR had no territorial ambitions in the Far East and simply wanted all parties to find peace. The Japanese elite, hopelessly susceptible to such courtesies and locked in a war to the death with America, developed a hopeless infatuation with Stalin as disastrous as his with Hitler. The USSR ended up with all of Sakhalin Island, the Kuriles, and 600,000 Japanese POWs who came in very handy as slave labor in the GULAG.

Japan was slapped awake by the Soviet Union's declaration of war against it on August 9, 1945. In a poignant scene, Hasegawa describes the way Sato, Japan's ambassador to Moscow, reacted to the news: "With sarcasm shrouded in old-fashioned diplomatic formality, Sato expressed his profound appreciation to Molotov for working with him to keep both countries neutral during three difficult years, insinuating that in reality Molotov had been deceiving the ambassador and the Japanese government for four months: Molotov embraced Sato, and the two bid farewell."

The utter futility of Japan's reliance on formal courtesies shows almost pitiably in the exchange, as Sato attempts to retaliate against betrayal by Stalin's mouthpiece with "sarcasm"-even more pitifully, "sarcasm shrouded in diplomatic formality."

Yet so powerful was the high command's dream of Soviet help that, even as Soviet tanks were overwhelming Japan's Kwantung Army in Manchuria, "the Kwantung Army was instructed by the Imperial General Headquarters to limit action to self-defense," as if this might somehow placate the Soviets. In another twist to this weird tale, Hasegawa notes that it was the most extreme hawks in the Imperial Army who clung most fiercely to their Stalin-is-our-friend delusion, while the doves hoped that the Soviet attack could be "God's gift to control the army."

Hasegawa has assembled many quotes from memos, diaries and meeting notes to demonstrate that the Soviet attack shocked the Imperial circles far more than did the atomic bombs. Hirohito himself said, "The Soviet Union declared war on us, and entered into a state of war as of today: Because of this it is necessary to study and decide on the termination of the war."

Hasegawa's story is a weird, compelling one, and his case for revising our view of the leadup to VJ Day is overwhelming. Unfortunately, I doubt it will get the attention it deserves. It's just not a very pleasant or inspirational story, so the consensus will give it a polite nod and return to peddling the standard Paul Fussell fairytale: We dropped the bomb to save GIs' lives and slap the Japs awake, and thank God we did.

In my last book review, I discussed John L. Gaddis's consensus version of 20th-c. history, Cold War, and noted that Gaddis merely cites Hasegawa's book, then proceeds to tell the Fussell version of the end of WW II in the Pacific, not even bothering to argue with the dissenting account.

There's a stark contrast between Gaddis' book and Hasegawa's. Bluntly stated, Hasegawa is a true scholar and Gaddis is a whore. I think it might be a good idea to start treating the scholars with respect and treating the whores like whores. I suggest that Professor Hasegawa be given Professor Gaddis' chair at Yale, and that Professor Gaddis be given the employment for which Nature has fitted him: kneeling at an endowed glory hole in the toilet of the Republican Caucus.

Cheers, Neilster

[Shannon V. OKeets]

This confims something I learned a while back: a reviewer usually tells you more about himself (his biases) than what he is reviewing.

To say that Stalin caused Japan to surrender seems similar to saying that a woman who breaks a champagne bottle on the bow of an aircraft carrier both built the ship and sent it out to sea.

And describing megalomaniacs as delusional is redundant.

I would be interested in the internal political forces that caused Japan's controlling power structure to crumble. At some point the hawks lost control and the doves took over. This would have undoubtedly have to have been a cumulative effect involving many events and numerous people.

My own bias is that I have trouble seeing Stalin as "the most impressive figure among the major players".

Indeed, if it is true that Stalin's declaration of war caused Japan to surrender, then if he had declared war on Japan 1 year earlier would Japan have surrendered then? The corollary logic seems to be that Stalin prolonged the war in the Pacific by keeping Japan's hopes up.

[dwwindsor]

The last paragraph sums up the validity of this review. I would also like to point out that the reviewer is a writer, not a historian. Whether or not the book reviewed has any merit as a work of responsible history cannot be determined from this review.

[wesy]

The war for Japan was all about China - it started in '37 and precipitated the spiral into war.  Japan would have had to withdraw from China to lift sanctions that were imposed on Japan (post occupation of French-Indochina) - a politcally untenable position.  With the Soviet entry into the war and the loss of Manchuria etc. - that negated the sole purpose of why Japan went to war in the first place.  The Atomic Bombs were just another form of death and destruction to the leadership.  More people died in the firebombings of Tokyo, so in many ways it was dreadful, but no more so than what had already been experienced by the delusional leadership.  Japan was beaten by the US submarine war against it's merchant fleet/lines of communication and it's VAST material/qualitative superiority of its equipment and people.  The Soviet invasion created the political dynamic for Japan to finally capitulate.

[Arnir]

ORIGINAL: dwwindsor

The last paragraph sums up the validity of this review. I would also like to point out that the reviewer is a writer, not a historian. Whether or not the book reviewed has any merit as a work of responsible history cannot be determined from this review.

Well said.

[dwwindsor]

Thank you, even if it was not well spelled.

[Neilster]

I have no strong views on the topic but I do think the Soviet Manchurian offensive has been underplayed by Western historians. It was a phenomenal feat of arms (and logistics) to conquer an area the size of Western Europe in a couple of weeks (even against fairly poor opposition) from jump-off points that were often hundreds of kilometres from the nearest railheads, over high mountains and desert, in poor weather (either stinking hot or stormy) and through some tough defensive fortifications.

I also think that Stalin emerges as "impressive" if you define impressive as cunning as a sh!t-house rat and as having got what he wanted.

Cheers, Neilster

[rhondabrwn]

ORIGINAL: Neilster

I have no strong views on the topic but I do think the Soviet Manchurian offensive has been underplayed by Western historians. It was a phenomenal feat of arms (and logistics) to conquer an area the size of Western Europe in a couple of weeks (even against fairly poor opposition) from jump-off points that were often hundreds of kilometres from the nearest railheads, over high mountains and desert, in poor weather (either stinking hot or stormy) and through some tough defensive fortifications.

I also think that Stalin emerges as "impressive" if you define impressive as cunning as a sh!t-house rat and as having got what he wanted.

Cheers, Neilster

I agree completely. Thanks for sharing! This certainly opened my eyes to the possibilities of this interpretation of the end of the war and fleshed out my knowledge of what the Russians did contribute. Most text books barely mention any of this, other than a simple statement that the Russians finally declared on Japan and seized some territory.

Has any WiTP AAR duplicated this end of war event? Just curious.

[Brigz]

I'm surprised no one has mentioned the Yalta conference in which it was decided that the Soviet Union would concentrate on the elimination of Germany and then when conditioins were appropriate, turn it's attention toward Japan. Remember, the Russians had thier hands full with the hellish struggle against Hitler. The Germany First policy was always the predominant course of action agreed upon by the Allies throughout the war. It was proper and strategically correct for the Soviets to enter the Pacific war when they did and should come as no surprise to anyone. Although, having said that, I believe it had little impact on the ending of the war other than solidifying Soviet political gains, again, totally appropriate from the Soviet viewpoint. As for Stalin -- he was an extemely lucky homicidal maniac who was very fortunate to survive the war. I do give him credit for solidifying the Soviet people as he was an effective icon of strength and perseverance. But, as the saying goes -- desperate times give rise to desperate measures.
 
Three main events were mostly responsible for the defeat of Japan. First, the Japanese were incapable of formulating and executing effective strategic plans. This has nothing to do with thier intellegence, but everything to do with thier philosophy and mindset. Second, as someone else has mentioned and probably the most telling, was the submarine campaign against Japanese shipping. Third, and equally telling, was the ability of the Allies to crack the Japanese codes, thus allowing them to pretty much know everything the Japanese were planning.
 
As for the atomic bombs? Without their use, the Allies would have won the war anyway, but I do believe they hastened the end and saved the lives of thousands of Allied soldiers and Japanese civilians. We have to be careful second quessing decisions made sixty years ago and during the last moments of years of horrible and devastating war. If I would have been an adult then and thought those bombs would have brought an end to the war, then I'd have been all for using them too.

[Shannon V. OKeets]

ORIGINAL: Neilster

I have no strong views on the topic but I do think the Soviet Manchurian offensive has been underplayed by Western historians. It was a phenomenal feat of arms (and logistics) to conquer an area the size of Western Europe in a couple of weeks (even against fairly poor opposition) from jump-off points that were often hundreds of kilometres from the nearest railheads, over high mountains and desert, in poor weather (either stinking hot or stormy) and through some tough defensive fortifications.

I also think that Stalin emerges as "impressive" if you define impressive as cunning as a sh!t-house rat and as having got what he wanted.

Cheers, Neilster

From "The Making of Modern Japan" by Marius B. Jansen:
--------------
As the war situation worsened and a Soviet invasion became probable the government callously drafted able-bodied male settlers [Japanese immigrants to Manchukuo/Manchuria that served as village militia] while leaving their families defenseless along the border. ... Agricultural settlers made up only 14 percent of the Japanese in Manchuria, but they accounted for almost half of the civilian casualties there when the war came in August 1945.
--------------

I can't find the direct quote at the present, but the Japanese in Manchuria were under orders to only 'defend' when the Soviets attacked in 1945. Ironically this is similar to the orders the Chinese owners were under when the Japanese attacked in the 1930's. In both cases, the attackers met less resistence than it would have been possible to put up, because of orders from higher authorities.

===============
To summarize, the defensive line of militia villages had been depleted of manpower to fight elsewhere, the remaining forces were told not to annoy the Soviets if they attacked, and then the Soviets, under Stalin, slaughtered the civilians. Gee, this should receive more attention as an analysis of Soviet fighting prowess.

[SemperAugustus]

The Japanese leadership were not that willing to die, most of the wartime leadership didn't kill themselves on the surrender. There was a book on the theme of Kamikaze. The Economist review starts in this way

"“HOW unbearable to die in the sky,” wrote Tadao Hayashi, a student pilot, in his diary on July 27th 1945, the night before his plane was shot down. Hayashi's writings, like those of the other Japanese student soldiers compiled in this book, contradict the caricature of the fanatical kamikaze pilot imagined by Americans and Britons during the war, and challenge the myth of the nationalist hero spun by conservative institutions in Japan.

The student soldiers, argues the author, were wantonly sacrificed in the military government's final gambit of the war. She reveals that the tokkotai (“special attack force”, which is how the kamikaze are referred to in Japan) had no volunteers when it was formed in October 1944. Instead, new recruits were either assigned by their superiors or forced to sign up using pressure tactics. No senior officer offered his life for this mission; instead the “volunteer” corps comprised newly enlisted boy-soldiers barely of age and student conscripts from the nation's top universities."

[Zap]

Similar in respect to the terrorist of today, their leaders are cowards so they send out their youth to commit suicide and kill.

[rhondabrwn]

ORIGINAL: Zap

Similar in respect to the terrorist of today, their leaders are cowards so they send out their youth to commit suicide and kill.

There is some truth in that.

I would extend the analogy but that would probably set off a political firestorm and get the thread locked. [:D]

[wesy]

I would agree that the term "volunteer" was loosely used. Both my father and my mother were in Japan during the war. As a kid I asked the typical question - "what did you do during the war"(obviously from the Japanese perspective) and as the conversation continued I asked him about the Kamikaze and the people that volunteered for that duty. He sarcastically laughed and said the reality was more like - as he pointed at me and said "you volunteer". I've actually met a Kamikaze "survivor" - was in the corp, but the war ended before his unit was ordered on a mission - I didn't know what it was, but I felt deep melancholy even though I couldn't really understand. It was just something that you feel that transcends language.

[Neilster]

ORIGINAL: Shannon V. OKeets

To summarize, the defensive line of militia villages had been depleted of manpower to fight elsewhere, the remaining forces were told not to annoy the Soviets if they attacked, and then the Soviets, under Stalin, slaughtered the civilians. Gee, this should receive more attention as an analysis of Soviet fighting prowess.

Not everywhere. This is from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... 86/RMF.htm

On the Front's left flank the Japanese put up a fierce
and determined effort in the vicinity of Hailar. Bypassed
and isolated by the Soviet's first echelon, it fought a
valiant but losing battle. Although only rated 15% combat
effective [18-161], the Japanese 80th Independent Mixed
Brigade required the might of two Soviet divisions and an
imposing arsenal of artillery to pound it into submission.
[11-176] On 18 August the surviving 3,827 defenders
surrendered at Hailar and signified the end of organized
resistance by the Japanese in Manchuria.
The second pincer of the double envelopment was formed
by the 1st Far Eastern Front. Its mission was to penetrate
the border area, bypass fortified areas, rout the enemy and
link-up with the Trans-Baikal Front deep in central
Manchuria. [10-73] As this force faced the most heavily
fortified region of the Manchurian border, the "concrete
belt" [12-33], as well as extremely marshy terrain, this
front was heavy in artillery and engineers while lighter in
vehicular support. Its composition consisted of 586,589 men
divided into four combined-arms armies, a mechanized corps,
an operational group, and one air army. [10-39] Covering a
frontage of only 700 kilometers, it advanced in one echelon
to affect maximum confusion among the Japanese field
commanders while applying pressure along the entire zone of
action. [10-171]

And this...

The lessons to be learned from this closing chapter to
World War II are many indeed. Foremost in one's mind must
be the adaptability and boldness demonstrated by the Soviets
as well as the high degree of initiative shown by commanders
at all levels during the campaign. The Soviet war machine
had matured. It developed a combined-arms army concept
which relied on armored units at every unit level as the
spearhead of the offensive thrust and heavy concentrations
of artillery. Tactical surprise, a key element to their
rapid success, was achieved despite the enormous volume of
supplies, equipment and men moved forward to the border
regions. The Soviet planners were audacious and imaginative
in their utilization of multiple axes of advance through the
worst terrain to maneuver hundreds of thousands of men and
machines. They task-organized their forces to accomplish
their assigned missions in different terrain against varying
degrees of enemy opposition. The Manchurian campaign was
characterized by its gigantic scale, use of large formations
and extensive employment of amphibious and airborne troops.
[7-7] As Raymond Garthoff stated, "to mount such a campaign
after being bled for four years in Europe represented a
major achievement." [7-61]

Admittedly much of the Kwantung Army stopped fighting on about August 17th and the Russians pretended not to notice and kept going until they achieved their objectives.

Cheers, Neilster

[Shannon V. OKeets]

Foremost in one's mind must
be the adaptability and boldness demonstrated by the Soviets
as well as the high degree of initiative shown by commanders
at all levels during the campaign. ...

The Soviet planners were audacious and imaginative
in their utilization of multiple axes of advance ...

gives off a distinct aroma.

[Neilster]

ORIGINAL: Shannon V. OKeets

Foremost in one's mind must
be the adaptability and boldness demonstrated by the Soviets
as well as the high degree of initiative shown by commanders
at all levels during the campaign. ...

The Soviet planners were audacious and imaginative
in their utilization of multiple axes of advance ...

gives off a distinct aroma.

It's from Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1986]. I know that they used aerial fuel resupply to maintain the pace of the armoured advance.

Cheers, Neilster

[Shannon V. OKeets]

ORIGINAL: Neilster

ORIGINAL: Shannon V. OKeets

Foremost in one's mind must
be the adaptability and boldness demonstrated by the Soviets
as well as the high degree of initiative shown by commanders
at all levels during the campaign. ...

The Soviet planners were audacious and imaginative
in their utilization of multiple axes of advance ...

gives off a distinct aroma.

It's from Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1986]. I know that they used aerial fuel resupply to maintain the pace of the armoured advance.

Cheers, Neilster

Perhaps it context it doesn't come across so much as the author being in love with the USSR war machine. After getting my MBA I am very sensitive to choice of words in descriptions: 'adaptability', 'boldness', "high degree", 'initiative', "all levels", 'audacious', and 'imaginative' are laudatory terms. Other choices could have be made that are more neutral/factual. "Risk taking" instead of 'boldness'. My father drilled into me that the word 'utilization' can be replaced by 'use' for every occurrence and that the former sounds pompous.

The net result of those paragraphs is that they are totally one-sided in their assessment. Everything the Soviets did appears to have been brilliant in planning and execution. Where is the balance? From what I have read officiers who showed initiative in the Soviet army and then failed (or even succeeded) could be shot. The NKVD officiers were positioned in the rear of their units with authorization to shoot anyone who did not go forward.

And to use the author's own reference that the Japanese were at 15% effectiveness might have been given more importance as to why the Soviets did so well.

[Neilster]

Perhaps it context it doesn't come across so much as the author being in love with the USSR war machine. After getting my MBA I am very sensitive to choice of words in descriptions: 'adaptability', 'boldness', "high degree", 'initiative', "all levels", 'audacious', and 'imaginative' are laudatory terms. Other choices could have be made that are more neutral/factual. "Risk taking" instead of 'boldness'. My father drilled into me that the word 'utilization' can be replaced by 'use' for every occurrence and that the former sounds pompous.

The net result of those paragraphs is that they are totally one-sided in their assessment. Everything the Soviets did appears to have been brilliant in planning and execution. Where is the balance?

Maybe, but if you can find an account of this operation that doesn't highly praise the Soviets, I'd be interested to read it. 'Boldness' is much less clunky than 'risk taking' anyway. [:D]

From what I have read officiers who showed initiative in the Soviet army and then failed (or even succeeded) could be shot. The NKVD officiers were positioned in the rear of their units with authorization to shoot anyone who did not go forward.

The short answer is no; even in the disastrous period Jun-Nov 41 if offensive action was attempted, although failure was still risky. After Nov 42, commanders at all levels that were perceived to be displaying a lack of initiative were severely punished.

And to use the author's own reference that the Japanese were at 15% effectiveness might have been given more importance as to why the Soviets did so well.

That was an isolated figure and to associate it with the overall Japanese readiness is not valid. A significant factor in the low number for that unit is an inability to sustain offensive/counterattacking operations due to a lack of transport and/or fuel. In a defensive fight from prepared positions that is less important. The Japanese divisions on Okinawa had poor effectiveness ratings too but as we know they put up a nightmarish fight.

I wrote a long winded reply, going into far more detail but something happened when I went to post it and it disappeared. [:@]

Cheers, Neilster

[Shannon V. OKeets]

One last shot at this.

The original:

"Foremost in one's mind must be the adaptability and boldness demonstrated by the Soviets as well as the high degree of initiative shown by commanders
at all levels during the campaign."

Could be reworded:
adaptability ==> failure to follow the original plan
boldness ==> taking excessive risks
demonstrated ==> displayed
high degree of initiative ==> uncoordinated, independent action

This could be rewritten to as:
"Foremost in one's mind must be the failure to follow the original plan and willingness to take excessive risks displayed by the Soviets as well as the frequent, uncoordinated, independent action of commanders at all levels during this combat operation."

Choice of words is an author's way of introducing bias, without overtly showing that he is doing so. Of course my rewording would only be appropriate if things hadn't turned out well.[:D][:D]