The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread

[andysomers]

I think what ezz is saying is on the money.  The fact that he is so scathing of Lincoln and so big on himself is one of the reasons Mac brings on so much criticism.
 
The fact is though, where Lee succeeded is knowing how his foes would react, thus he was able to get away with big risks as he did (also at Chancellorsville, where he actually attacked).  For the South to win, they had to take these big risks. 
 
Truth be known, I think Mac would have made a great staff officer, lead quartermaster, recruiter, trainer, any type of support role that is as necessary to waging war as rifles.  We'd be talking about him then in the same light as someone like Herman Haupt.  He gets no press, but he was an absolute genius, and in my mind very vital to US supply and operations.  Mac was simply paranoid, egotistical, and flat out scared to commit.  He didn't have the balls for command that guys like Grant, Sherman, and even Hooker and Burnside has to commit his troops when opportunities arose.
 
AS

[regularbird]

ORIGINAL: andysomers

I think what ezz is saying is on the money.  The fact that he is so scathing of Lincoln and so big on himself is one of the reasons Mac brings on so much criticism.

The fact is though, where Lee succeeded is knowing how his foes would react, thus he was able to get away with big risks as he did (also at Chancellorsville, where he actually attacked).  For the South to win, they had to take these big risks. 

Truth be known, I think Mac would have made a great staff officer, lead quartermaster, recruiter, trainer, any type of support role that is as necessary to waging war as rifles.  We'd be talking about him then in the same light as someone like Herman Haupt.  He gets no press, but he was an absolute genius, and in my mind very vital to US supply and operations.  Mac was simply paranoid, egotistical, and flat out scared to commit.  He didn't have the balls for command that guys like Grant, Sherman, and even Hooker and Burnside has to commit his troops when opportunities arose.

AS

Right on Andy, now we are getting somewhere, I to believe Mac would have served much better in a role of lesser responsibility. His ego might not have gotten in his way. But you must admit he was not the only general with a large ego, he just failed to prevent his from impacting his judgement.

[andysomers]

Oh yeah - run the list on egotistical/political US generals, and you'll find all the US early war commanders:
 
Sickles, Pope, Hooker, McClellan, McClernand (US Corps commander in the West), Banks, Halleck, etc.
 
AS

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: andysomers

Right - let's be exact.  McClellan was not an idiot.  He was a vain, egotistical moron.
He built the AOP from the ruins of 1st Manassas, and his men liked him - that's all I can give him.

Above that, he hung around for months on the Peninsula with at that time the largest Army every assembled on the North American continent outnnumbering J Johnston (perhaps the only CS general as cautious as McClellan) two to one, and begged for reinforcements, refusing to move.  Afterwards, he won every battle in the Seven Days that Lee launched against him, but still retreated after every one all the way back to his base.

McClellan, take two: a starving, poorly-supplied enemy in your territory divides its force in your front (which, oh-by-the-way you conveniently outnumber again 2 to 1).  Voila!  September 13, you find this - SPECIAL ORDER NO. 191!  Exact disposition of your foe.  Move your army between the divided forces, crush each one piecemeal in detail right? NO!  Wait four days and attack his concentrated army entrenched along Antiteam Creek!!!  After the battle, which, after launching three uncorrdinated assaults, you somehow still manage to take the field, do you follow up quickly on their heels?  No!!!!  Wait in place for a month!  Let them slip away, rally, reinforce, and resupply!  Even after this, call your President an ape, etc., and still go on with the bravado assumption that you are still the savior of the Union.

McClellan, as long as an army did not need to fight, was a brilliant general.  To me however, that's like saying a guy is a master mechanic just because he does a great detail/wax job on a car.  Looks wonderful, as long as the car doesn't actually have to go anywhere.

AS

ALRIGHT! Someone out there actually "gets it". As a field commnader, the man was worthless. A good leader gets up to the front and sees for himself what is happening, and which subordinate needs a "kick in the pants" to get going, and to look for developing opportunities. Mac seemed to think that once he'd drawn up a plan, BOTH sides would conform to his wishes and his job was to brief the press on his own brilliance. And Lee's ONE mistake in Maryland was letting the order get captured. The rest (dividing his forces all over the countryside) he did because he KNEW McClellan would take forever to actually move forward and he's have plenty of time. Even with the captured order, McClellan STILL gave him the time (barely) to gather his scattered forces. Lee had to be audacious as Hell to have a chance; All McClellan ever had to do was announce "OK..., EVERYBODY pick up a stick..". Lincoln was reduced to pleading with the Army of the Potomac's Commanders, "This time put in ALL your men."

[spruce]

great succes is always build on the ruins of failures.

nothing goes all by itself, perhaps the only issue the Union high command had was that they lacked vision and common understanding how to win the war. When the war started, everybody in the Union high command was convinced this would be an easy walkover.

In this framework, you have to see the situation. I think the Union generals where eager to put the feather on their hat and were underestimating their opponent - a single big victory would be enough to win the war and be in Richmond, was their adagio. They didn't seem to understand that the confederacy was a hard nut that you could not really "open", you could only "smash" it nothing was left from it.

Also Lincoln was guilty on this problem ... only after some time he reckognized that the war would take the best of men to win ... and that it wouldn't be won all by itself.

[AU Tiger_MatrixForum]

ORIGINAL: regularbird

[font="times new roman"]AU, having a little E5 to O6 conversation is great, but until that E5 is in the shoes of that O6 it is E6 is unfair calling him an IDIOT.[/font]

From that little blurb it sounds like I called you the "idiot". Perhaps you misspoke, but I have NEVER called any fellow posters an "idiot", at least not in these forums. I may have used such language in some of the more political forums I occasionally visit though. ;-}

Yes, I did call Mac an idiot. The truth be known, he was a successful engineer antebellum, and I know of no SUCCESSFUL idiotic engineers. Rather than being an idiot, I should say some of his actions (or inactions) were idiotic. The sheer audacity of his rather public contempt for his superior, the Commander in Chief, is appalling, especially in the light of his notable lack of success on the battlefield.
Like you, I try not to judge commanders too harshly as I am not in their shoes. I do not see what they see, and as we know, the Fog of War thins remarkably in hindsight. But even so, Mac's actions are simply beyond the Pale.

Pan-fried cornbread and bacon, btw.
[:D]

[regularbird]

ORIGINAL: AU Tiger

ORIGINAL: regularbird

[font="times new roman"]AU, having a little E5 to O6 conversation is great, but until that E5 is in the shoes of that O6 it is E6 is unfair calling him an IDIOT.[/font]

From that little blurb it sounds like I called you the "idiot". Perhaps you misspoke, but I have NEVER called any fellow posters an "idiot", at least not in these forums. I may have used such language in some of the more political forums I occasionally visit though. ;-}

Yes, I did call Mac an idiot. The truth be known, he was a successful engineer antebellum, and I know of no SUCCESSFUL idiotic engineers. Rather than being an idiot, I should say some of his actions (or inactions) were idiotic. The sheer audacity of his rather public contempt for his superior, the Commander in Chief, is appalling, especially in the light of his notable lack of success on the battlefield.
Like you, I try not to judge commanders too harshly as I am not in their shoes. I do not see what they see, and as we know, the Fog of War thins remarkably in hindsight. But even so, Mac's actions are simply beyond the Pale.

Pan-fried cornbread and bacon, btw.
[:D]

LOL, the panfried cornbread is pretty good. No, I took no offense from the E5 to O5 thing I have heard it before both ways. I just thought it was a kinda the E5 could be doing better thing. Maybe I overshot on that.

I can agree to reach settlement on your post above because he did blunder greatly, but trying to put myself there I or any other general may have made the same mistakes.

You are right about his contempt for his superiors, I think Rosecrans had that same contempt for little Mac when he was under his command. General MacCarthur showed the same kind of contempt for Truman during the Korean war but that, I presume, is a whole other thread.

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: andysomers

Truth be known, I think Mac would have made a great staff officer, lead quartermaster, recruiter, trainer, any type of support role that is as necessary to waging war as rifles.  We'd be talking about him then in the same light as someone like Herman Haupt.  He gets no press, but he was an absolute genius, and in my mind very vital to US supply and operations.  Mac was simply paranoid, egotistical, and flat out scared to commit.  He didn't have the balls for command that guys like Grant, Sherman, and even Hooker and Burnside has to commit his troops when opportunities arose.

AS

Agreed, but the problem is, no one has ever joined the military saying "I'm going to be the best d**m admistrator this army has ever seen!" McClellan had the ability to hone the AoP to a razor sharp edge, but he just couldn't employ it properly. He didn't even have the opportunity to be a division or corps commander prior to the Army of the Potomac, unless you want to count that little bit of active in West Virginia. McClellan might have learned something about battlefield tactics and manuever if he had those chances. In the end, he was in over his head commanding an army. Not really much different than many other Union generals in that respect. Many lead armies unsuccessfully in the East and West.

Look at the first five Union commanders in the East and compare them to McClellan:

1. McDowell - Routed in 1st Bull Run (or 1st Manassas, if you prefer).
2. McClellan - Defeated in Peninsula Campaign, including Seven Days, but retreat was orderly. Fought to a draw at Antietam (or Sharpsburg).
3. Pope - Routed in 2nd Bull Run (or 2nd Manassas).
4. Burnside - Defeated at Fredricksburg.
5. Hooker - Defeated at Chancellorsville.

Of these five, McClellan could arguably be said to have been the best. The all tended to have plus sides (well maybe not Pope), but those pluses didn't include high command. The Union generals at the end of the war had begun as wee little brigade and division commanders. They have the chance to grow into the positions they would later occupy. Think about O. O. Howard. His XI Corps got clobbered at Chancellorsville and again at Gettysburg, but at the end of the war, Sherman considered him to be one of his most reliable commanders.

In the end, I wouldn't classify McClellan as an idiot. He was over his head as an army commander. If he had been able to recognize his own limitations and accepted that his gifts were in administration, he might well have been able to assist and ending the war earlier.

[Twotribes]

While the Union was clearly beaten at 2nd Bull Run, I would not call it a rout. In fact one of the generals I am writing about ( Brig Gen Z.B. Tower ) was instrumental in preventing that rout. The Union withdrew but did not rout off the field, it was a close thing though

[spruce]

Pope's army didn't rout at second Manassas - they retreated in an orderly way and saved the huge pile of artillery guns - so preventing them being captured by the rebels. During the attack some of Lee's divisions also took a heavy beating.

[RERomine]

Okay, not routed, but there have been armies that have lost battles before and been in better shape at the end. It was a clear defeat, none the less.

The point was during the first few years of the war in the east, McClellan was most successful. I know he should have done more with the opportunities he had, but he did quite well considering he was "outnumbered two to one" [:)] As stated, he was in over his head, but he didn't make any errors that were fatal. It could be said he created the nucleus of the army that would ultimately would win the war.

[andysomers]

And not all generals rose through the war as brigade/division/Corps commanders.
 
Two prime examples - Grant and Lee - both essentially had independent field commands from the start (Grant was colonel of the 21st Illinois for like one month).
 
AS

[AU Tiger_MatrixForum]

ORIGINAL: regularbird

You are right about his contempt for his superiors, I think Rosecrans had that same contempt for little Mac when he was under his command. General MacCarthur showed the same kind of contempt for Truman during the Korean war but that, I presume, is a whole other thread.

May I suggest the new thread be entitled "Little Mac and Big Mac".

Common Avian,
The E-5 to O-6 comment was typed with my tongue firmly planted in my cheek, as I think you now see. In other threads mithin the Matrix unbrella I have seen often innocuous, and sometimes humorous, comments totally misread by another party as an attack on them. That is a weakness in communicating strictly by the written word I suppose. Anyway, I have waited several years to use that line, having been on the recieving end of its reciprocal more often thatn not. Thinking back I am amazed I recieved the Never Got Caught Award at my four year point. Anyway, I was paroled from the Navy several years ago after having served five years, ten months, four days, and three hours.....

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: andysomers

And not all generals rose through the war as brigade/division/Corps commanders.

Two prime examples - Grant and Lee - both essentially had independent field commands from the start (Grant was colonel of the 21st Illinois for like one month).

AS

True, but Grant's first field action was at Belmont, where his force, although independent, was roughly the size of a division (3,114 engaged). By the time he moved out against Ft. Henry, his force was roughly the size of a corps (15,000). The fact his commands were independent doesn't take away from the fact he learn his trade starting with smaller sized units.

Lee also learned with smaller units. Don't forget he commanded the 2nd US Cavalry regiment before the war. It's not likely, however that they all took the field at the same time, but were more than likely scattered all over Texas. At Cheat Mountain, the force he commanded was about 4,500, about the size of a Confederate division. Lee also had the advantage of two superb corps commanders and wisdom to listen to them.

[Oldguard]

ORIGINAL: Twotribes

The failure is shared between Lincoln and MacClellan. Lincoln failed to use his available assets appropriately, when it became clear certain Generals were no good at leading Armies he did not talk to them and get them in the proper positions. The General failed in that his ego would not have allowed him to assume a Command that he felt was inferior.

I'm starting to wonder about you, Twotribes. Shall we do a detailed review of the correspondence between Lincoln and McClellan to see just how often Lincoln DID communication to Mac what he wanted? Shall we go down the list of Generals he tried in Mac's stead, all of whom were found severely wanting?

Your assertion that the President didn't talk to them or "get them in the proper position" flies in the face of just about every credible historian I've ever read.

McClellan was considered one of the best generals of his day. He won 2 brevets in Mexico (1st Lt. and Capt) for his engineering work, but the truth of warfare is that good peacetime officers often turn out to be seriously lacking in the aggressiveness and instinct that a good battlefield commander needs. Nobody can be certain who the good commanders are until the bullets actually start flying. While there's no question that Mac wasn't the man to win the war for the Union, it would also be unfair to call him an idiot. How many of you have a saddle named after you?

[Twotribes]

Ignoring again what was said. MacClellan was no field commander of an Army, as was borne out by his abysmal failures acting as such. He was however a superb Administrator, trainer, recruiter and moral Builder, and a very fine logisitician.

Be so kind as to provide a letter or letters where Lincoln offered or ask macClellan to take command of training and Administration of the Army while allowing a better Field Commander to operate in the field.

I must assume it never crossed Lincolns mind to ask MacClellan to fill such a position, unless you can provide some evidence otherwise. I must also assume, from reading of the Ego and Vanity and self grandure that MacClellan viewed his abilities in, that even if offered such a job, he would have refused.

In future do me the favor of actually reading what I wrote, not what you think I meant.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: Twotribes

Ignoring again what was said. MacClellan was no field commander of an Army, as was borne out by his abysmal failures acting as such. He was however a superb Administrator, trainer, recruiter and moral Builder, and a very fine logisitician.

Be so kind as to provide a letter or letters where Lincoln offered or ask macClellan to take command of training and Administration of the Army while allowing a better Field Commander to operate in the field.

I must assume it never crossed Lincolns mind to ask MacClellan to fill such a position, unless you can provide some evidence otherwise. I must also assume, from reading of the Ego and Vanity and self grandure that MacClellan viewed his abilities in, that even if offered such a job, he would have refused.

In future do me the favor of actually reading what I wrote, not what you think I meant.

Just what I've meen saying all along. As a General, McClellan was an IDIOT. Decent "Drill Sergant" and "Supply Clerk" and "Saddler"--- but his JOB was Commander of the Army, and at that he SUCKED!

[jjjanos]

ORIGINAL: RERomine
Look at the first five Union commanders in the East and compare them to McClellan:

1. McDowell - Routed in 1st Bull Run (or 1st Manassas, if you prefer).
2. McClellan - Defeated in Peninsula Campaign, including Seven Days, but retreat was orderly. Fought to a draw at Antietam (or Sharpsburg).
3. Pope - Routed in 2nd Bull Run (or 2nd Manassas).
4. Burnside - Defeated at Fredricksburg.
5. Hooker - Defeated at Chancellorsville.

Of these five, McClellan could arguably be said to have been the best.

This is somewhat like trying to decide which of your sisters you are going to take to the prom.

I'm not certain there is an objective way to decide which is worst... I acn give mitigating factors for some and small things that would have resnatched victory from the jaws of defeat....

1. 1st Bull Run - a command guilty of an overly complex plan. Didn't want to fight the battle and tried to do something his troops weren't capable of. Bobby Lee did the same thing in his W.Va campaign.
2. McClellan - OK, I can find nothing to mitigate his incompetence. Sorry, but only one thing was beaten in the 7 days campaign and that was Mac.
3. Pope - poorly handled his command and was a victim of political in-fighting between Mac supporters and mac detractors. Had Jackson's command broke, 2nd Bull Run would be viewed like Sheridan's almost lost battle in the Valley.
4. Burnside - stupid, stupid, stupid... then again Grant drove the Rebs off the mountain in-front of Chattanoga. I really cannot defend this, but if it had worked....
5. Hooker - one could claim that Hooker's plan was similar to how Longstreet wanted to wage the war... offensive movements with defensive battles. Hooker was out of it after he got his bell rung and his subsequent command errors should be evaluated in light of that.

Also, in evaluating Grant, remember that he was granted latitude that the early war commanders never had. Under Grant, they had to send troops up from the AoP after Monocacy... under everyone else, the troops would never have left.

[Twotribes]

Mac Dowell was just out of his league through the accident of time. No American Commander had ever commanded what he was expected to command and everyone thought it would be a cake walk.

He failed to ensure proper training and failed to exersize proper command and control. Those could have been due to his inexperience in such a position.

The South had the same problems but they had a few lucky breaks and it would seem more competent commanders at Bull Run.


Pope didnt listen to his intelligence. he was informed Longstreet had arrived and chose to ignore him. That might have been ok IF he had informed his left wing commanders to stand fast in case Longstreet moved. His army was rolled up because the center seemed to faulter ( it didnt really) and the Commander on the left reinforced with the bulk of his force leaving just 2 Brigades to face Longstreet.

I am not sure I would have fired him for that, I suspect your right about politics on him.

Burnside had a great plan. When it fell apart due to poor logistics he didnt have the common sense to change or abandon the plan. He was a good lower level commander, he was just out of his league.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: Twotribes

Mac Dowell was just out of his league through the accident of time. No American Commander had ever commanded what he was expected to command and everyone thought it would be a cake walk.
He failed to ensure proper training and failed to exersize proper command and control. Those could have been due to his inexperience in such a position. MacDowell was no genius, but his plan at Bull Run was sound and imaginative. To his credit, he fought with the "On to Richmond" crowd as long as he could because he knew his army wasn't ready. Lincoln had to chide him forward saying "I know your forces are green..., but they are green also.", Lincoln not realizing that it takes more training to attack than to defend.
The South had the same problems but they had a few lucky breaks and it would seem more competent commanders at Bull Run. True. The had the benefit of being on the defensive, and at a few critical junctures had the good fortune to have the "right man" turn up on the spot at the right time


Pope didnt listen to his intelligence. he was informed Longstreet had arrived and chose to ignore him. That might have been ok IF he had informed his left wing commanders to stand fast in case Longstreet moved. His army was rolled up because the center seemed to faulter ( it didnt really) and the Commander on the left reinforced with the bulk of his force leaving just 2 Brigades to face Longstreet.
I am not sure I would have fired him for that, I suspect your right about politics on him. Pope HAD to be fired. His pompous, bombastic, pronouncements and endless talk of how they did it in the West had his troops as well as his officers regarding him as a buffoon. Had he delivered a competant performance they would have accepted the B.S.---but when Lee and Jackson ran rings around him and Longstreet suprised him in spite of the warnings he recieved, he had to go. No one in his Army of Virginia or the Army of the Potomac would follow him to a "free lunch" after Second Manassas

Burnside had a great plan. When it fell apart due to poor logistics he didnt have the common sense to change or abandon the plan. He was a good lower level commander, he was just out of his league.
To his credit, he told Lincoln he didn't feel up to commanding the Army. To the Union's sorrow, he took it anyway just to keep it from his hated rival Hooker.