The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: jjjanos
This is somewhat like trying to decide which of your sisters you are going to take to the prom.

I'm not certain there is an objective way to decide which is worst... I acn give mitigating factors for some and small things that would have resnatched victory from the jaws of defeat....

1. 1st Bull Run - a command guilty of an overly complex plan. Didn't want to fight the battle and tried to do something his troops weren't capable of. Bobby Lee did the same thing in his W.Va campaign.
2. McClellan - OK, I can find nothing to mitigate his incompetence. Sorry, but only one thing was beaten in the 7 days campaign and that was Mac.
3. Pope - poorly handled his command and was a victim of political in-fighting between Mac supporters and mac detractors. Had Jackson's command broke, 2nd Bull Run would be viewed like Sheridan's almost lost battle in the Valley.
4. Burnside - stupid, stupid, stupid... then again Grant drove the Rebs off the mountain in-front of Chattanoga. I really cannot defend this, but if it had worked....
5. Hooker - one could claim that Hooker's plan was similar to how Longstreet wanted to wage the war... offensive movements with defensive battles. Hooker was out of it after he got his bell rung and his subsequent command errors should be evaluated in light of that.

Also, in evaluating Grant, remember that he was granted latitude that the early war commanders never had. Under Grant, they had to send troops up from the AoP after Monocacy... under everyone else, the troops would never have left.

Just trying to point out the idiot stamp on McClellan was harsh. Facts are, Grant wasn't any better tactically than any of of the others when you look at his results against Lee, but he had a much better grasp of the strategic. Grant knew what it took to win the war. It helped that he had stockpiled credibility before he came East.

[Riva Ridge]

As I think it was already said before, McClellan was an outstanding administrator, logistician, and trainer.  In other words, he was the consumnate staff officer.  Part of the skill-sets of a successful battle commander are decisiveness coupled with a strong imagination, an ability to rapidly see all the possibilities in both space and time then choose which one you want to execute and firmly move towards it.  That was Mac's problem in that he did not have that ability.  Additionally, he WAS vain and egotistical and given towards intrigue and that was a shame because Mac was actually the sort of officer you would have wanted to have as your Chief of Staff ability-wise.  If he could have been coupled with a better combat Commander, his reputation would have been great but obviously his character would not allow him to play second fiddle to anyone.  A good example of how this might had worked would have been what existed between Grant and Meade.  Meade retained Command of the AoP throughout the war but in essense he really played the part of Grant's Deputy..a role which by all acccounts he performed very well in.  His meticulousness and abilities complemented Grant's more earthy approach to Combat Command and thus were a net gain.

[RERomine]

I believe McClellan could have been an excellent staff officer if he could have been satistfied with that roll. Some of his other qualities might have made it unlikely he would have accepted himself in that roll.

It's interesting you mentioned that Meade was still in command of the AoP. A lot of people with casual knowledge of the Civil War probably don't know that, but for that matter, most people probably don't know the names of any generals other than Grant and Lee.

Before anyone has a cow, I figure people who are here reading this has much more than just a casual knowledge of the Civil War to begin with. [:)]

[jjjanos]

ORIGINAL: RERomine
Just trying to point out the idiot stamp on McClellan was harsh. Facts are, Grant wasn't any better tactically than any of of the others when you look at his results against Lee, but he had a much better grasp of the strategic. Grant knew what it took to win the war. It helped that he had stockpiled credibility before he came East.

Not sure I would agree it is harsh. Will say that, given what McClellan thought was true about the size of the commands he faced, his subsequent withdrawals and cautiousness is justifiable. Was his belief that he was consistently outnumbered two+-to-one based on his incompetence, his ego (wanting to win a batlle over a superior foe) or a combination of both?

Agree, Grant pretty much didn't win any battles in the east until the last days of the siege, but he won campaigns. McClellan came to command with creditability from his "great" victory in WVa, but he then proceeded to squander it by being....well...McClellan. McClellan would have been a great staff officer - he was terrible in command.

Then again, it's doubtful that Grant would have been able to do what he did with the AoP if it had not been for McClellan turning the mob into an army- something a great staff officer does.

[regularbird]

Not to get Mike and AU stirred up again but I still do not buy he was "horrible in command," or an "idiot" as many of you are saying.  There are many more elements to command than just the "x's and o's.  I would say he failed tactically on more than one ocassion, but I would also say that in every other facet of command he was competent.  He organized well, stood up to his superiors to get the things he needed (ok, thought he needed), maintained a high level of espirit de corp, and was able to get his army to do what he wanted, even if what he wanted was flawed.  I think Mac was a hands off commander and let his subordinates lead on the field, as Mr. Scholl will argue, at Antietam Mac needed to be there on the field, and he is right.  But this style of leadership has worked for others in the past.  I prefer a leader who will create a flexible plan and then allow me (the subordinate) to execute and I believe that is what Mac tried to do.  When he needed to make a big decision he usually made the wrong one. All the info he had aside, at Antietam he was the only thing between Lee and DC and I think he was scared to be the man that let Lee get by him or through him and take the capitol.
 
I know Mac had a copy of Lee's orders but I think I know what he may have been thinking....hmm why would Lee split his army and place himself, outnumbered with his back to the Potomac?"  Maybe he is baiting me, maybe these order are a trick, maybe he has more men, where did that division that smashed into Burnside come from?  Why would Lee take such an unnessecary gamble?  He would not put the whole ANV in such a bad spot.  What do I not know?......Hesitate....hesitate..doh!!! were the hell did Bobby go?  Oh well I won a big victory, break out the beer and call the Prez I'm the man.
 
Some have said Mac did not pursue and If I remember correctly he did, rather hotly i think.  But he got smashed at Shepardstown and once again got cold feet.
 
ONCE AGAIN I AM NOT SAYING THIS GUY WAS A BRILLIANT GENERAL, HE HAD ISSUES, BUT HE WAS NO IDIOT AND HE WAS NOT WORTHLESS.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: regularbird

Not to get Mike and AU stirred up again but I still do not buy he was "horrible in command," or an "idiot" as many of you are saying.  There are many more elements to command than just the "x's and o's.  I would say he failed tactically on more than one ocassion, but I would also say that in every other facet of command he was competent.  He organized well, stood up to his superiors to get the things he needed (ok, thought he needed), maintained a high level of espirit de corp, and was able to get his army to do what he wanted, even if what he wanted was flawed.  I think Mac was a hands off commander and let his subordinates lead on the field, as Mr. Scholl will argue, at Antietam Mac needed to be there on the field, and he is right.  But this style of leadership has worked for others in the past.  I prefer a leader who will create a flexible plan and then allow me (the subordinate) to execute and I believe that is what Mac tried to do.  When he needed to make a big decision he usually made the wrong one. All the info he had aside, at Antietam he was the only thing between Lee and DC and I think he was scared to be the man that let Lee get by him or through him and take the capitol. ]"Little Mac" loved all the "trappings" of command. and everyone telling him he was "the savior of the Nation" when he came to Washington. But he was a "moral coward"---scared sh-tless that he might get beat and and be exposed as a "fraud" and lose all the "pomp and circumstance" he loved. Look at his Campaign on the Penninsula---he wanted to substitute engineering and siege craft (at which he didn't feel the South could compete) for fighting (at which he might lose). And no matter how many men he had, he wanted "more"..., regardless of what might be left open to the Rebs by doing so. When Lee attacked, he responded by "changing his base" (which turned out to be a clever euphamism for running away to the James and the protection of the Navy while claiming to have performed a "masterfull stratagem"). And having arrived there, with numbers still exceeding those of the Rebels, he sat down in the mud and blaimed everyone but himself for his problems.

I know Mac had a copy of Lee's orders but I think I know what he may have been thinking....hmm why would Lee split his army and place himself, outnumbered with his back to the Potomac?"  Maybe he is baiting me, maybe these order are a trick, maybe he has more men, where did that division that smashed into Burnside come from?  Why would Lee take such an unnessecary gamble?  He would not put the whole ANV in such a bad spot.  What do I not know?......Hesitate....hesitate..doh!!! were the hell did Bobby go?  Oh well I won a big victory, break out the beer and call the Prez I'm the man. Another wonderful example of his "mora cowardess". Once he had Lee's "Special Order 191", he announced to all and sundry that he was going to "whip Bobbie Lee". Then he remembered that this would involve actually "fighting" Robert E. Lee, and proceeded to procrastinate his way into Western Maryland. Then when he finally found him anyway, he sat down for an entire day to screw up his courage to fight (and hope frantically that Lee would "run away" so "Mac" could tell everyone what a great "bloodless victory" he had "won". Then, on the 18th, after managing to pull a "bloody shambles" from "the Jaws of Victory", he again sat down in the mud and prayed for Lee to "go away". Having achieved the greatest one day slaughter in the history of North America..., and having nothing to show for it, all he could do was hope Lee would go home and "Mac" could declare a "win" and sit down in the mud to tell everyone how great he was and why they should elect him "God". The fact that the Rebs were still "out there" and the war no closer to being over meant nothing to McClellan as long as he could play the role of "Saviour of the Nation" in his own eyes.

Some have said Mac did not pursue and If I remember correctly he did, rather hotly i think.  But he got smashed at Shepardstown and once again got cold feet. Actually, his pursuit was all in his mind

ONCE AGAIN I AM NOT SAYING THIS GUY WAS A BRILLIANT GENERAL, HE HAD ISSUES, BUT HE WAS NO IDIOT AND HE WAS NOT WORTHLESS. And I will continue to say that as the General in Command of the Army of the Potomac (HIS JOB DESCRIPTION), he was a total buffoon, a charlatan, a whining, complaining, exasperating, "do-nothing", a total disaster, and a worthless IDIOT.

[regularbird]

Ok, Mike I accept your position and you have good reasons for your position, I still think it is easy to degrade a man after 150+ years of information.  Just asking because I cant remember, With the exception of Rosecrans, who was not at Antietam were any of his generals pissed at him after the battle?  Did any of them say he should have acted differently?  Remeber they all knew what he knew, maybe more because they were in the thick of it.
 
Just curious, what are your thoughts on MacCarthur, I think he was as bad as MecClellan in some of the areas you address.  In hindsight he made many blunders in his defense of Phillipines, and I am not sure that retaking the Phillipines was necessary other that fulfilling his ego.

[AU Tiger_MatrixForum]

ORIGINAL: regularbird

Not to get Mike and AU stirred up again

Don't worry about me! Watching this, and the "Constitutional Law 101 Thread" is more fun than wearing sunglasses at a nude beach.

[AU Tiger_MatrixForum]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: regularbird

Not to get Mike and AU stirred up again but I still do not buy he was "horrible in command," or an "idiot" as many of you are saying. There are many more elements to command than just the "x's and o's. I would say he failed tactically on more than one ocassion, but I would also say that in every other facet of command he was competent. He organized well, stood up to his superiors to get the things he needed (ok, thought he needed), maintained a high level of espirit de corp, and was able to get his army to do what he wanted, even if what he wanted was flawed. I think Mac was a hands off commander and let his subordinates lead on the field, as Mr. Scholl will argue, at Antietam Mac needed to be there on the field, and he is right. But this style of leadership has worked for others in the past. I prefer a leader who will create a flexible plan and then allow me (the subordinate) to execute and I believe that is what Mac tried to do. When he needed to make a big decision he usually made the wrong one. All the info he had aside, at Antietam he was the only thing between Lee and DC and I think he was scared to be the man that let Lee get by him or through him and take the capitol. ]"Little Mac" loved all the "trappings" of command. and everyone telling him he was "the savior of the Nation" when he came to Washington. But he was a "moral coward"---scared sh-tless that he might get beat and and be exposed as a "fraud" and lose all the "pomp and circumstance" he loved. Look at his Campaign on the Penninsula---he wanted to substitute engineering and siege craft (at which he didn't feel the South could compete) for fighting (at which he might lose). And no matter how many men he had, he wanted "more"..., regardless of what might be left open to the Rebs by doing so. When Lee attacked, he responded by "changing his base" (which turned out to be a clever euphamism for running away to the James and the protection of the Navy while claiming to have performed a "masterfull stratagem"). And having arrived there, with numbers still exceeding those of the Rebels, he sat down in the mud and blaimed everyone but himself for his problems.

I know Mac had a copy of Lee's orders but I think I know what he may have been thinking....hmm why would Lee split his army and place himself, outnumbered with his back to the Potomac?" Maybe he is baiting me, maybe these order are a trick, maybe he has more men, where did that division that smashed into Burnside come from? Why would Lee take such an unnessecary gamble? He would not put the whole ANV in such a bad spot. What do I not know?......Hesitate....hesitate..doh!!! were the hell did Bobby go? Oh well I won a big victory, break out the beer and call the Prez I'm the man. Another wonderful example of his "mora cowardess". Once he had Lee's "Special Order 191", he announced to all and sundry that he was going to "whip Bobbie Lee". Then he remembered that this would involve actually "fighting" Robert E. Lee, and proceeded to procrastinate his way into Western Maryland. Then when he finally found him anyway, he sat down for an entire day to screw up his courage to fight (and hope frantically that Lee would "run away" so "Mac" could tell everyone what a great "bloodless victory" he had "won". Then, on the 18th, after managing to pull a "bloody shambles" from "the Jaws of Victory", he again sat down in the mud and prayed for Lee to "go away". Having achieved the greatest one day slaughter in the history of North America..., and having nothing to show for it, all he could do was hope Lee would go home and "Mac" could declare a "win" and sit down in the mud to tell everyone how great he was and why they should elect him "God". The fact that the Rebs were still "out there" and the war no closer to being over meant nothing to McClellan as long as he could play the role of "Saviour of the Nation" in his own eyes.

Some have said Mac did not pursue and If I remember correctly he did, rather hotly i think. But he got smashed at Shepardstown and once again got cold feet. Actually, his pursuit was all in his mind

ONCE AGAIN I AM NOT SAYING THIS GUY WAS A BRILLIANT GENERAL, HE HAD ISSUES, BUT HE WAS NO IDIOT AND HE WAS NOT WORTHLESS. And I will continue to say that as the General in Command of the Army of the Potomac (HIS JOB DESCRIPTION), he was a total buffoon, a charlatan, a whining, complaining, exasperating, "do-nothing", a total disaster, and a worthless IDIOT.

A small point. Mac's charge into Western Maryland was uncharacterically aggressive, catching Lee & Co. off-guard. Only after he battled across South Mountain did his "slows" return.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: regularbird

Ok, Mike I accept your position and you have good reasons for your position, I still think it is easy to degrade a man after 150+ years of information.  Just asking because I cant remember, With the exception of Rosecrans, who was not at Antietam were any of his generals pissed at him after the battle?  Did any of them say he should have acted differently?  Remeber they all knew what he knew, maybe more because they were in the thick of it.

Just curious, what are your thoughts on MacCarthur, I think he was as bad as MecClellan in some of the areas you address.  In hindsight he made many blunders in his defense of Phillipines, and I am not sure that retaking the Phillipines was necessary other that fulfilling his ego.

MacArthur is another subject you don't want to get me started on... The man did some good things..., eventually. But so might Short and Kimmel had they been given a year of total screw-ups to learn their trade. He got the Congressional Medal of Honor for creating an unholy mess in the Philippines with a totally unrealistic strategic deployment, then managing to salvage some credit by following the plan he had dismissed as "defeatist" earlier. His Papua New Guinea opparation was a classic misuse of assets coupled with totally ignoring the advice from the men on the ground. Even when he finally started getting his head out of his ass in 1943, he was still politicing for the seizure of Rabaul when everyone else had already come to believe that "hopping" the large Japanese garrisons was the way to go. He was a great success as "Emperor of Japan", Inchon was a masterpiece, and his "leapfrogging up the back of New Guinea" in 1944 was well done---but in my book his "star" is dull and tarnished by the number of bone-headed stunts he pulled in 1941-43. He is better than McClellan only in that he eventually seemed to be able to learn from his mistakes.

[AU Tiger_MatrixForum]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: regularbird

Ok, Mike I accept your position and you have good reasons for your position, I still think it is easy to degrade a man after 150+ years of information. Just asking because I cant remember, With the exception of Rosecrans, who was not at Antietam were any of his generals pissed at him after the battle? Did any of them say he should have acted differently? Remeber they all knew what he knew, maybe more because they were in the thick of it.

Just curious, what are your thoughts on MacCarthur, I think he was as bad as MecClellan in some of the areas you address. In hindsight he made many blunders in his defense of Phillipines, and I am not sure that retaking the Phillipines was necessary other that fulfilling his ego.

MacArthur is another subject you don't want to get me started on... The man did some good things..., eventually. But so might Short and Kimmel had they been given a year of total screw-ups to learn their trade. He got the Congressional Medal of Honor for creating an unholy mess in the Philippines with a totally unrealistic strategic deployment, then managing to salvage some credit by following the plan he had dismissed as "defeatist" earlier. His Papua New Guinea opparation was a classic misuse of assets coupled with totally ignoring the advice from the men on the ground. Even when he finally started getting his head out of his ass in 1943, he was still politicing for the seizure of Rabaul when everyone else had already come to believe that "hopping" the large Japanese garrisons was the way to go. He was a great success as "Emperor of Japan", Inchon was a masterpiece, and his "leapfrogging up the back of New Guinea" in 1944 was well done---but in my book his "star" is dull and tarnished by the number of bone-headed stunts he pulled in 1941-43. He is better than McClellan only in that he eventually seemed to be able to learn from his mistakes.

I knew it was only a matter of time.

The Little Mac vs. Big Mac debate has begun!

For the record, you are right on target Mike.

[regularbird]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: regularbird

Ok, Mike I accept your position and you have good reasons for your position, I still think it is easy to degrade a man after 150+ years of information.  Just asking because I cant remember, With the exception of Rosecrans, who was not at Antietam were any of his generals pissed at him after the battle?  Did any of them say he should have acted differently?  Remeber they all knew what he knew, maybe more because they were in the thick of it.

Just curious, what are your thoughts on MacCarthur, I think he was as bad as MecClellan in some of the areas you address.  In hindsight he made many blunders in his defense of Phillipines, and I am not sure that retaking the Phillipines was necessary other that fulfilling his ego.

MacArthur is another subject you don't want to get me started on... The man did some good things..., eventually. But so might Short and Kimmel had they been given a year of total screw-ups to learn their trade. He got the Congressional Medal of Honor for creating an unholy mess in the Philippines with a totally unrealistic strategic deployment, then managing to salvage some credit by following the plan he had dismissed as "defeatist" earlier. His Papua New Guinea opparation was a classic misuse of assets coupled with totally ignoring the advice from the men on the ground. Even when he finally started getting his head out of his ass in 1943, he was still politicing for the seizure of Rabaul when everyone else had already come to believe that "hopping" the large Japanese garrisons was the way to go. He was a great success as "Emperor of Japan", Inchon was a masterpiece, and his "leapfrogging up the back of New Guinea" in 1944 was well done---but in my book his "star" is dull and tarnished by the number of bone-headed stunts he pulled in 1941-43. He is better than McClellan only in that he eventually seemed to be able to learn from his mistakes.

I agree, just wanted to make sure you were consistent with your comparison.

[regularbird]

Mike, how about the pissed generals question.  Did any of them criticize or disagree with MacClellan before or directly after the battle?

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: regularbird

Mike, how about the pissed generals question.  Did any of them criticize or disagree with MacClellan before or directly after the battle?

In "Mac's" case, most of them were his cronies so there wasn't a great deal of debate. But you have things like Porter screaming for support at Mechanicsville and Gaines Mill and recieving none, or Burnside having a case of the "sulks" at Sharpsburg because he had been a brevet Wing Commander over his Corps and Hooker's, and Mac moved Hooker to the other end of the line. One of the reasons for Burnside's very slow performance there was that he insisted on still regarding himself as a Wing Commander even though he only had his own Corps to command, which left an "extra" and less competant layer of "command" between him and the troops.

But overall, when Mac organized the Army of the Potomac, he made sure that it's leaders were "Little Mac" fans and supporters. It took a while to "clean house" after he was dismissed, but by Chancellorsville they were almost all gone.

[regularbird]

Did any sub subordinates criticise him at antietam in their memoirs, following the war?  Guys like meade or Hancock?  I am just trying to establish if another general around that time thought Mac's battle plan and actions during the battle were idiotic.  Just asking.

[AU Tiger_MatrixForum]

As I recall, there was a lot of heated criticism. I am not at home, so I can't document it.

[Mike Scholl]

None I can quote off the top of my head..., but it's been a while since I was deeply immersed in ACW reading. I'll let you know if something comes to mind or I have a chance to look at some old sources.

[Oldguard]

ORIGINAL: Twotribes

Ignoring again what was said. MacClellan was no field commander of an Army, as was borne out by his abysmal failures acting as such. He was however a superb Administrator, trainer, recruiter and moral Builder, and a very fine logisitician.

As others have pointed out, the issue isn't whether Mac was a great field commander - the issue was that the Union didn't have anyone better at the time - it's why Mac was given his army back after Lincoln's other attempts at command change (something you claim he didn't do) failed.

Be so kind as to provide a letter or letters where Lincoln offered or ask macClellan to take command of training and Administration of the Army while allowing a better Field Commander to operate in the field.

You're the world champion strawman debater aren't you?

In future do me the favor of actually reading what I wrote, not what you think I meant.

Oh, believe me, I read what you wrote. Right after I had a good laugh I responded to you. Specifically when you said earlier:

Lincoln failed to use his available assets appropriately, when it became clear certain Generals were no good at leading Armies he did not talk to them and get them in the proper positions.

Complete nonsense (as I pointed out) but go ahead and paint it however you wish - you've done a good job of exposing your own dearth of historical insight in several threads, now. Good job.

[Twotribes]

I dont know what your problem is BUT be so kind as to explain how me pointing out Lincoln failed to assign generals to commands more suited to their abilities is funny?

You IGNORED what I said and tried to make it sound like I said Lincoln never told macClellen what he expected. Never did such. I SAID Lincoln never ask MacClellen to assume the role of Staff Officer and allow a better field Commander to take over once it was obvious he couldnt command the Army effectively.

Lincoln could have had mac as Head of the Army and instructed him to allow others to lead it in Battle, as Meade did with Grant later in the war. Mac would have still had the head job but would be doing what he was good at while others fought the actual battles.

Your the one assuming, OBVIOUSLY Lincoln assigned Mac to command because he believed he could do the job, just as he fired him when he couldnt. Firing him though wasnt neccassary IF Mac would have agreed to allow others to run the Field Commands while he trained, equiped and drilled the Army. Lincoln never ask him if he would do that ( though I suspect Mac would have refused)

OBVIOUSLY Lincoln assigned people to command because at the time he believed they were the best avaialble. The point is with Mac he didnt go the extra mile and try to keep him in a position he was good at. Not just Lincoln's fault though, Mac was to big headed I suspect to have agreed.

[Mike Scholl]

OBVIOUSLY Lincoln assigned people to command because at the time he believed they were the best avaialble. The point is with Mac he didnt go the extra mile and try to keep him in a position he was good at. Not just Lincoln's fault though, Mac was to big headed I suspect to have agreed.


Actually, after Second Manassas, he tried to offer the command to some of Mac's Corps Commanders..., but they each refused. Lincoln didn't go with what he thought was the "best choice"..., he went with what he found was his ONLY choice.