The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread

[Riva Ridge]

"Did any sub subordinates criticise him at antietam in their memoirs, following the war?  Guys like meade or Hancock?  I am just trying to establish if another general around that time thought Mac's battle plan and actions during the battle were idiotic.  Just asking. " - I am still at work myself but I recall that several of his sub-Commanders complained in the wake of the Seven Days Campaign (Porter, Sumner, et al.).  That entire campaign was interesting in the sense that the AoP actually had decent Division/Corps Commanders in that battle and tactically, they made sound decisions (operationally, McClellan got totally out-generaled) enough so that their leadership actually saved the Army. 
 
"Agree, Grant pretty much didn't win any battles in the east until the last days of the siege, but he won campaigns. McClellan came to command with creditability from his "great" victory in WVa, but he then proceeded to squander it by being....well...McClellan. McClellan would have been a great staff officer - he was terrible in command." - Key Point.  Grant recognized that he was better equipped, manned, and had the operational advantage.  He could afford the trade battles in order to attrit/wear down the Rebels.  It was the whole 'vision' thing that allowed him to be the an outstanding Combat Commander even when he made mistakes. 

 
 

[RERomine]

The easiest thing in the world is to point out what went wrong, after it went wrong, thus the phrase "Arm Chair Quarterback". McClellan, believing he was really out number, going up against one of the most audacious commanders to fight on this continent, didn't do that badly.

One has to ask how short of a leash did Lincoln have McClellan on? Grant wasn't on the same leash. Under what circumstances would Lincoln have allowed McClellan, Pope, Hooker or Burnside try to maneuver around Lee and get to Richmond, while leaving Washington open? One of the standing orders was they could maneuver, as long as they could cover Washington. The Eastern theater in 1864-65 was different than in 1861-62. Switching places, McClellan might have looked brilliant at Fts. Henry/Donelson, Shiloh and Vicksburg and Grant might have gotten his walking papers after a Peninsula Campaign and Antietam. There is just no way to know how it would have played out differently.

Grant also had the knowledge that backing up was not a good career move. By the time the Vicksburg campaign was under way, he had seen McDowell, McClellan, Burnside and Pope had been removed in the East after failures. He subbornly refused to back off when stuck in the swamps in Louisiana, because there were many lessons depicting the price of failure.

As far as McClellan's actual campaigns go, that leash comes into play. Sure, he was pushed from the outskirts of Richmond to Harrison's Landing, but he wasn't prepared to give it up. He had a plan to move against Petersburg, but it was vetoed by Halleck and the army was withdrawn. McClellan wasn't permitted to exploit all the casualties that Lee had taken during Seven Days.

At Antietam, the plan was to hit both flanks at once. Obviously, that didn't work any better than Lee's similar attempt at Gettysburg. The Union Corps came across as attacking in piecemeal echelon, but that was not the plan. McClellan could have prodded Burnside to attack when he should have, but Lee could have done the same thing on the 2nd day with Ewell. Plans are only as good as their execution and when they fail to be executed, the army commander gets blamed. How many times have we read so and so had a great plan, but somewhere along the line, the execution failed?

While I wouldn't rate McClellan as a top notch army commander, he certained appeared to be adequate. No better or worse than Meade at Gettysburg. Meade let Lee get out of Pennsylvannia and had a better chance to stop him than McClellan did, yet Meade kept his job. McClellan might have too if he had been a little less arrogant. I can accept him being classified as an idiot based on that, but not by his actions in the field.

[Mike Scholl]

One has to ask how short of a leash did Lincoln have McClellan on? Grant wasn't on the same leash. Under what circumstances would Lincoln have allowed McClellan, Pope, Hooker or Burnside try to maneuver around Lee and get to Richmond, while leaving Washington open? One of the standing orders was they could maneuver, as long as they could cover Washington. The Eastern theater in 1864-65 was different than in 1861-62. Switching places, McClellan might have looked brilliant at Fts. Henry/Donelson, Shiloh and Vicksburg and Grant might have gotten his walking papers after a Peninsula Campaign and Antietam. There is just no way to know how it would have played out differently.


This is just plain wrong. Lincoln DID allow McClellan not just to "manuever", but to load up the Army of the Potomac and sail it around to the Penninsula..., effectively placing Richmond BETWEEN the Army and Washington! Of COURSE he was required to leave some troops to "cover" the nation's capitol! But he was promised that those 40,000 men would be moving to join him overland as soon as he had closed up to Richmond. And he still had more men with him than the Rebs had in the Virginia theatre. Lincoln not only didn't "have McClellan on a leash", he was often reduced to "begging" Mac to tell him what he and the Army were doing.

What happened? McClellan was so increadable slow that the Confederates were able to send more men to Jackson in the Valley and raise a huge stink while bluffing "Mac" with "smoke and mirrors". He had no-one to blame but himself that MacDowell's corps wound up being sent West to deal with Jackson instead of South to join him. All he had to do was get up off his ass and move and the Rebels would have had no choice but to unite to meet him---ending Jackson's campaign and allowing the rest of the Union Armies to join "Mac". Instead he spent weeks doing nothing, bawling for more of everything, and blaiming Lincoln and the Government for all his imagined problems. Show me a single instance of Grant pulling such a bunch of B.S. and I'll shut up. Grant took what he was given, and set out to do his job. No wonder Lincoln loved him..., he might get beat, but he usually won. And he never wasted a minute bitching and moaning about what he didn't have!

[AU Tiger_MatrixForum]

I have to impose a couple of points here. Everything you say is true, however you have to look at the commanders in their place and time.

1st. Grant cut his teeth out West where the micromanagement from Washington was minimized, and after his victory in the power struggle with Halleck was won, he had free-rein compared to Eastern Generals.

2nd. Grant learned a great deal about warfare in the West as an independent commmander. There is a quote about him being fearful of the enemy until he crested a hill and realized the enemy was just as fearful as he was. That changed him, and his command style.

3rd. By the time Grant came East, Lincoln had learned also, and gave Grant the latitude to do what he had to do. Had Grant been appointed commander of the AOP early in the war, I truly think he would have been fired also after his first Cold Harbor or Spottsylania Courthouse.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: AU Tiger

I have to impose a couple of points here. Everything you say is true, however you have to look at the commanders in their place and time.

1st. Grant cut his teeth out West where the micromanagement from Washington was minimized, and after his victory in the power struggle with Halleck was won, he had free-rein compared to Eastern Generals.

WHAT "MICROMANAGEMENT" from Washington? Are you confusing Lincoln with Lyndon Johnson? Lincoln was dying to turn the management of the war over to a "professional"..., if he could find one!
Had Helmuth von Moltke been available, he would have been extatic... He had tried Winfield Scott, who's thinking was clear, but couldn't mount a horse or move McClellan. Then he gave McClellan what he wanted and allowed him Scott's job as well as his own. Result? Lot's of bombast and bragging and press reports..., but Lincoln was cut "out of the loop" entirely and had to go begging for information. Then Mac disappears to the Penninsula and leaves a complete "command void". So Lincoln summons Halleck East so McClellan can concentrait on his Campaign and Army around Richmond..., and Mac immediately begins feuding with him as well. While Halleck refuses to accept any responsibility for doing anything except puting the Presidents wishes into military terms.

ALL of Lincoln's "Micromanagement" consisted of requesting that he be kept informed of what was happening (he was the Commander-in-Chief by law), and periodic exasperated requests that the Army of the Potomac "move forward and engage the enemy" (preferably using ALL it's resources). Why did he love Grant? Because when Grant came East, he did keep Lincoln "in the loop" as to what was going on..., and more importantly, he kept ALL the Armies moving forward. Lincoln was his "champion" in Washington when the casualty lists began coming in because he had finally found someone who would FIGHT instead of sitting on his butt.

[Feralkoala]

ORIGINAL: AU Tiger

3rd. By the time Grant came East, Lincoln had learned also, and gave Grant the latitude to do what he had to do. Had Grant been appointed commander of the AOP early in the war, I truly think he would have been fired also after his first Cold Harbor or Spottsylania Courthouse.

Actually, I doubt this quite a bit. The major problem with McClellan, et al, was that they would either fight reluctantly (McClellan) or go to pieces once in contact with the enemy (most of the rest). Grant simply refused to be beaten. One has difficulty imagining the lackadaisical Union command performance at Antietam happening under Grant, or the command paralysis that afflicted Hooker at Chancellorsville. Lincoln is reported to have wanted a "general who would fight"; Grant was that general. You go on about Wilderness and Spotsylvania Courthouse, and I imagine you even consider them Confederate victories...but certainly Robert E. Lee did not, as Grant's relentlessness forced him to remain on the defensive and attrition and losses sapped the AoNV's manpower and command pool. If you want to go on about a pointless slaughter, stick with Cold Harbor, which I don't think anyone (including Grant) will dispute should not have been fought.

The fact is, Grant did have the right idea--Stay in the AoNV's face and not give it a moment of respite. Combined with multiple offensives across the South, forces could not be transferred to alternate theaters. Elegant? No, but it was effective. And ended the war.

[Oldguard]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

WHAT "MICROMANAGEMENT" from Washington? Are you confusing Lincoln with Lyndon Johnson? Lincoln was dying to turn the management of the war over to a "professional"..., if he could find one!

Yes he was, but AU has a point. Lincoln actually opposed the movement of the AoP to Fort Monroe and was adamant in his opposition until he visited Mac in the field and listened to his reasoning. So both of you have some valid points here -- the fact that Lincoln felt compelled to micromanage was due both to the slowness of Mac's movements AND the lack of strategic direction Lincoln got from, first Scott and then Halleck. There's a reason Lincoln regarded Halleck as an "overpaid clerk".

So Lincoln summons Halleck East so McClellan can concentrait on his Campaign and Army around Richmond..., and Mac immediately begins feuding with him as well. While Halleck refuses to accept any responsibility for doing anything except puting the Presidents wishes into military terms.

As I've read it, Mac's "feuding" was really more of his own pride getting in his way -- after all, he had once been THE commander of the Army and then had that army split into pieces and handed to Pope. Could you blame him for having a bad attitude? Grant was operating in relative paradise, far to the west, while Mac's campfires were virtually under the White House windows. I live in a state capital, myself, I know what a chaotic, stultifying effect politics can have on things.

ALL of Lincoln's "Micromanagement" consisted of requesting that he be kept informed of what was happening (he was the Commander-in-Chief by law), and periodic exasperated requests that the Army of the Potomac "move forward and engage the enemy" (preferably using ALL it's resources).

True enough, but don't forget that at one point early in the war, Lincoln actually assumed command of a small contingent of troops on the Carolina coast and tried to organize the taking of a couple of forts. So he did have his own tendency to want to do something in lieu of action by the men he appointed to command. To his credit, that experience also convinced him that it was a job better left to professionals.

[jjjanos]

ORIGINAL: RERomine
McClellan, believing he was really out number

Which was his own fault and a major failing of his.

going up against one of the most audacious commanders to fight on this continent, didn't do that badly.

I disagree. McClellan fought 2 campaigns against Lee - 7 Days/Antietam and in both instances failed absolutely miserably. McClellan fought 2 campaigns against Joe Johnson - the sitzkrieg around Manassas and the Peninsular Campaign and failed. The sitzkrieg around Manassas could be mitigated by the raw nature of his army, but not the other.

Switching places, McClellan might have looked brilliant at Fts. Henry/Donelson, Shiloh and Vicksburg and Grant might have gotten his walking papers after a Peninsula Campaign and Antietam.

1. McClellan would still be advancing via parallels and decrying how Never before in the annals of military history has a beseiging force so outnumbered by the beseiged prevailed. I have pleaded for more men, citing the overwhelming numbers I face and that buffon Halleck does nothing but seek to undermine me. I have tried to save the Union and if I fail it will not be for lack of my effort.

At Shiloh, McClellan would have retreated to Cairo and would still be waiting for sufficient transports to move is army all the way down to New Orleans.

2. Grant would have been at the gates of Richmond in one week.

Antietam would have been known as the modern Cannae if Grant had been in charge.

[Oldguard]

ORIGINAL: Feralkoala
Grant simply refused to be beaten. One has difficulty imagining the lackadaisical Union command performance at Antietam happening under Grant, or the command paralysis that afflicted Hooker at Chancellorsville. Lincoln is reported to have wanted a "general who would fight"; Grant was that general. You go on about Wilderness and Spotsylvania Courthouse, and I imagine you even consider them Confederate victories...but certainly Robert E. Lee did not, as Grant's relentlessness forced him to remain on the defensive and attrition and losses sapped the AoNV's manpower and command pool.

Quoted for truth -- Grant was willing to accept operational setbacks because he knew full well that, strategically, he had the upper hand. By that time in the war, the Union war machine was in full blood, the South was feeling the ravages of 4 years of war, and Grant's strategy was exactly right considering the situation: exploit the superior Union resources and manpower and do not let the Confederates catch their breath.

The fact is, Grant did have the right idea--Stay in the AoNV's face and not give it a moment of respite. Combined with multiple offensives across the South, forces could not be transferred to alternate theaters. Elegant? No, but it was effective. And ended the war.

Very true. I wonder, though, whether such a strategy would have worked prior to Gettysburg. It may have, but I'm curious (one reason I'm anxiously awaiting FoF, so I can try it out). Union manpower was not nearly as inexhaustible before Grant came east because conscription laws had not yet been changed. In fact, the first Federal conscription act was put into force in July 1863, immediately after Gettysburg.

[Oldguard]

ORIGINAL: jjjanos

ORIGINAL: RERomine
McClellan, believing he was really out number

Which was his own fault and a major failing of his.

To be more accurate, his belief was a result of clever Confederate perfidy and the incompetence of the Pinkertons, more so than Mac's fault. Where Mac deserves blame is in giving credence to his own fear and thinking defensively (keeping the AoP as a force in being) rather than offensively.

Now that I think of it, for whatever qualities of command Mac did or did not have, it is also very true that you can not give a commander two conflicting missions and expect him to carry out either one of them well. Mac had to protect the capital AND destroy the Confederate army -- a task that, in retrospect, we know would have been best served by prosecuting the latter at the expense of the former, but Mac didn't know then what we know now. It was not too different from Yamamoto's similar plan for Midway in 1942 - by having to both facilitate the invasion of Midway AND sink the American fleet, he ended up exposing himself to destruction and accomplished neither.

[AU Tiger_MatrixForum]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: AU Tiger

I have to impose a couple of points here. Everything you say is true, however you have to look at the commanders in their place and time.

1st. Grant cut his teeth out West where the micromanagement from Washington was minimized, and after his victory in the power struggle with Halleck was won, he had free-rein compared to Eastern Generals.

WHAT "MICROMANAGEMENT" from Washington? Are you confusing Lincoln with Lyndon Johnson? Lincoln was dying to turn the management of the war over to a "professional"..., if he could find one!
Had Helmuth von Moltke been available, he would have been extatic... He had tried Winfield Scott, who's thinking was clear, but couldn't mount a horse or move McClellan. Then he gave McClellan what he wanted and allowed him Scott's job as well as his own. Result? Lot's of bombast and bragging and press reports..., but Lincoln was cut "out of the loop" entirely and had to go begging for information. Then Mac disappears to the Penninsula and leaves a complete "command void". So Lincoln summons Halleck East so McClellan can concentrait on his Campaign and Army around Richmond..., and Mac immediately begins feuding with him as well. While Halleck refuses to accept any responsibility for doing anything except puting the Presidents wishes into military terms.

ALL of Lincoln's "Micromanagement" consisted of requesting that he be kept informed of what was happening (he was the Commander-in-Chief by law), and periodic exasperated requests that the Army of the Potomac "move forward and engage the enemy" (preferably using ALL it's resources). Why did he love Grant? Because when Grant came East, he did keep Lincoln "in the loop" as to what was going on..., and more importantly, he kept ALL the Armies moving forward. Lincoln was his "champion" in Washington when the casualty lists began coming in because he had finally found someone who would FIGHT instead of sitting on his butt.

The micromanagement I was thinking of had more to do with Halleck and Stanton.

[AU Tiger_MatrixForum]

ORIGINAL: Feralkoala

ORIGINAL: AU Tiger

3rd. By the time Grant came East, Lincoln had learned also, and gave Grant the latitude to do what he had to do. Had Grant been appointed commander of the AOP early in the war, I truly think he would have been fired also after his first Cold Harbor or Spottsylania Courthouse.

Actually, I doubt this quite a bit. The major problem with McClellan, et al, was that they would either fight reluctantly (McClellan) or go to pieces once in contact with the enemy (most of the rest). Grant simply refused to be beaten. One has difficulty imagining the lackadaisical Union command performance at Antietam happening under Grant, or the command paralysis that afflicted Hooker at Chancellorsville. Lincoln is reported to have wanted a "general who would fight"; Grant was that general. You go on about Wilderness and Spotsylvania Courthouse, and I imagine you even consider them Confederate victories...but certainly Robert E. Lee did not, as Grant's relentlessness forced him to remain on the defensive and attrition and losses sapped the AoNV's manpower and command pool. If you want to go on about a pointless slaughter, stick with Cold Harbor, which I don't think anyone (including Grant) will dispute should not have been fought.

The fact is, Grant did have the right idea--Stay in the AoNV's face and not give it a moment of respite. Combined with multiple offensives across the South, forces could not be transferred to alternate theaters. Elegant? No, but it was effective. And ended the war.

Actually I don't think they were victories for the South. Tactically yes they were, and I am sure if Grant could have gone back and done things differently he would have loved to, but regardless of the losses incurred by the Union at those battles, they were a part of Grant's overall successful campaign to destroy the ANV.

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

This is just plain wrong. Lincoln DID allow McClellan not just to "manuever", but to load up the Army of the Potomac and sail it around to the Penninsula..., effectively placing Richmond BETWEEN the Army and Washington! Of COURSE he was required to leave some troops to "cover" the nation's capitol! But he was promised that those 40,000 men would be moving to join him overland as soon as he had closed up to Richmond. And he still had more men with him than the Rebs had in the Virginia theatre. Lincoln not only didn't "have McClellan on a leash", he was often reduced to "begging" Mac to tell him what he and the Army were doing.

McClellan's army moved to the Peninsula in pieces, so Washington had troops in and was thus covered. Plus, while farther from Washington than the Confederate army, it could get there quicker via transports. This was proven by the fact some of the McClellan's troops withdrawn from the Peninsula participated in 2nd Bull Run. Still, Lincoln didn't allow the move until the Confederate forces withdrew from Manassas Junction. And Lincoln intervened, preventing some troops from being moved to the Peninsula.

What happened? McClellan was so increadable slow that the Confederates were able to send more men to Jackson in the Valley and raise a huge stink while bluffing "Mac" with "smoke and mirrors". He had no-one to blame but himself that MacDowell's corps wound up being sent West to deal with Jackson instead of South to join him. All he had to do was get up off his ass and move and the Rebels would have had no choice but to unite to meet him---ending Jackson's campaign and allowing the rest of the Union Armies to join "Mac". Instead he spent weeks doing nothing, bawling for more of everything, and blaiming Lincoln and the Government for all his imagined problems. Show me a single instance of Grant pulling such a bunch of B.S. and I'll shut up. Grant took what he was given, and set out to do his job. No wonder Lincoln loved him..., he might get beat, but he usually won. And he never wasted a minute bitching and moaning about what he didn't have!

Yes, smoke and mirrors kept McClellan from moving when he should have, and a ship named the CSS Virginia, but he did end up moving. There was a series of major battles where the casualties were fairly equal on both sides, but Lee didn't have as many men and consequently the troop differential was greater. McClellan wanted to move against Petersburg but wasn't permitted to do so. Pope, with fewer troops than he had at 2nd Bull Run could have still proceded South. The could have accomplished in 1862 what Grant accomplished in '64-65, if he was allowed to execute the plan. Maybe Lincoln wasn't holding the leash all the time, but McClellan was on one.

Grant usually won? I will say he was certainly tenacious, but I would hardly say he usually won when you look at his battles against Lee. He managed to get the siege that he was after, but was only able to after getting pummelled at Wilderness, Cold Harbor and Spotsylvannia Court House. The AoP suffered casualties almost double that of the AoNV with estimates of Union loses being over 50,000. This is little more than a month! These were tolerable in 1864 considering the Mississippi was under Union control and Sherman was moving on Atlanta. In what world would those casualties have been acceptable in 1862? The war was ready for Grant in 1864, but not in 1862.

I can't argue the personality differences between Grant and McClellan. Grant was a no nonsense type of person, which is what you need as an army commander. McClellan might have been given more latitude if he had checked his savior of the Union act at the door.

[jjjanos]

ORIGINAL: RERomine
McClellan's army moved to the Peninsula in pieces, so Washington had troops in and was thus covered. Plus, while farther from Washington than the Confederate army, it could get there quicker via transports. This was proven by the fact some of the McClellan's troops withdrawn from the Peninsula participated in 2nd Bull Run. Still, Lincoln didn't allow the move until the Confederate forces withdrew from Manassas Junction. And Lincoln intervened, preventing some troops from being moved to the Peninsula.

1. I believe the lack of transport had something to do with the staggered arrival of the AoP at Fort Monroe.
2. McClellan took one month to advance. The Union had aroun 50K at Fort Monroe when George arrived and the CSA had about 13K facing this force.
3. I seriously doubt that Union forces involved in a forward movement of the Peninsula could have intervened in sufficient size or speed to influence the outcome of a major CSA force appearing on Arlington Ridge. It is one thing to make that move when the troops already are at their embarkation points and you have a major force in the field at the debarkation point.
4. Lincoln cancelled the movement due to perfidy on the part of McClellan who promised a covering force of a certain size and then double counted troops so as to increase his already swollen army.

Yes, smoke and mirrors kept McClellan from moving when he should have, and a ship named the CSS Virginia, but he did end up moving.

CSS Virginia only forced the cancellation of any attempt for an amphibious envelopment. It did not cause the subsequent one month delay before the siege began.

There was a series of major battles where the casualties were fairly equal on both sides, but Lee didn't have as many men and consequently the troop differential was greater. McClellan wanted to move against Petersburg but wasn't permitted to do so.

After how many months delay getting things to his satisfaction?

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: jjjanos

1. I believe the lack of transport had something to do with the staggered arrival of the AoP at Fort Monroe.

Be that as it may, Washington was covered due to the staggered arrival.

2. McClellan took one month to advance. The Union had aroun 50K at Fort Monroe when George arrived and the CSA had about 13K facing this force.

We know that now. Did McClellan? Obviously, the Confederates did an outstanding job of making it look like they were stronger than they were. How about a hurrah for an outstanding deception? While there were roughly 13K around Ft. Monroe, Johnston wasn't far away. McClellan probably didn't realize Johnston was as slow at moving as he was.

3. I seriously doubt that Union forces involved in a forward movement of the Peninsula could have intervened in sufficient size or speed to influence the outcome of a major CSA force appearing on Arlington Ridge. It is one thing to make that move when the troops already are at their embarkation points and you have a major force in the field at the debarkation point.

Speculation on both our parts. I believe they could have been moved fast enough to prevent disaster. No way to prove it either way, but that applies to most of this discussion.

4. Lincoln cancelled the movement due to perfidy on the part of McClellan who promised a covering force of a certain size and then double counted troops so as to increase his already swollen army.

This is still interference. Grant stripped all the defenses around Washington and almost got burned by Early's Campaign.

CSS Virginia only forced the cancellation of any attempt for an amphibious envelopment. It did not cause the subsequent one month delay before the siege began.

This still effected the planning. To me, the threat of the CSS Virginia was probably given more credence then than it should have been given. It was going to cruise up the Potomac and bombard Washington, when the reality was a strong tide probably would have carried it out to sea.

After how many months delay getting things to his satisfaction?

Likely much less than the 24+ months when Grant finally got to Petersburg.

[RERomine]

Who actually believes Grant would have stayed in command in 1862 if he incurred the same casualties he did at the Wilderness, Cold Harbor and Spotsylvannia Court House?

Who believes it the casualties might have been worse if Jackson had still been alive?

Point is, the state of the war was very different in 1862 and 1864.

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: AU Tiger
Actually I don't think they were victories for the South. Tactically yes they were, and I am sure if Grant could have gone back and done things differently he would have loved to, but regardless of the losses incurred by the Union at those battles, they were a part of Grant's overall successful campaign to destroy the ANV.

This is all true. In 1862, there was too much "On to Richmond" and not enough "Get Lee and the AoNV".

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: Oldguard
To be more accurate, his belief was a result of clever Confederate perfidy and the incompetence of the Pinkertons, more so than Mac's fault. Where Mac deserves blame is in giving credence to his own fear and thinking defensively (keeping the AoP as a force in being) rather than offensively.

Somewhere I read the Pinkertons actually provided accurate numbers, but McClellan didn't like them, so the numbers were modified to be more in line with what he expected. Not sure if I got that out of a book, web site or in this forum. With that, I remember someone in Washington was able to use references in Richmond newspapers to get a reasonably accurate count of the Army of Northern Virginia. As such, I don't know if it's true or not.

Does this ring any bells with anyone?

[regularbird]

ORIGINAL: RERomine

ORIGINAL: Oldguard
To be more accurate, his belief was a result of clever Confederate perfidy and the incompetence of the Pinkertons, more so than Mac's fault. Where Mac deserves blame is in giving credence to his own fear and thinking defensively (keeping the AoP as a force in being) rather than offensively.

Somewhere I read the Pinkertons actually provided accurate numbers, but McClellan didn't like them, so the numbers were modified to be more in line with what he expected. Not sure if I got that out of a book, web site or in this forum. With that, I remember someone in Washington was able to use references in Richmond newspapers to get a reasonably accurate count of the Army of Northern Virginia. As such, I don't know if it's true or not.

Does this ring any bells with anyone?

Mike Scholl made that statement. That was the first time I heard it but I am sure he read it somewhere. When I did staff ride at Antietam with a military historian guide, he mentioned the flaws in the Pinkerton's calculations but never that Mac demanded a recount.

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: regularbird
Mike Scholl made that statement. That was the first time I heard it but I am sure he read it somewhere. When I did staff ride at Antietam with a military historian guide, he mentioned the flaws in the Pinkerton's calculations but never that Mac demanded a recount.

In This Hallowed Ground by Bruce Catton, it pretty much says Pinkerton's numbers were inflated from the beginning. This just fit with what McClellan expected, so he didn't dispute it.