TOAW and napoleonic era ???

[Chuck2]

ORIGINAL: Fidel_Helms

No doubt. However, the reverse happened much more frequently, by virtue of the North being in possession of the vast majority of the capacity to make these weapons in the first place. That the South had these guns to capture in the first place is a consequence of the guns being taken from Federal arsenals upon secession or after battles. In particular, some 36,000 rifles were recovered during the Seven Days.

I'm really tiring of responding to this pop history view of the Civil War. Do you seriously think that the federal government had massive(30,000+) stocks of British rifles sitting around before the war? Again, totally laughable.

No, neither side had large stocks of rifles available. Each side ended up buying a similar number of rifles from oversea sources like Britain. The difference ended up being that Northern domestic production of rifles far outpaced what the Confederacy attained from their crash firearm production effort.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Fidel_Helms

Again with the non-sequiturs. What are you talking about?

I must also point out that part of this completely contradicts your earlier (ridiculous)assertion that the Confederacy didn't have enough modern rifles to equip whole regiments with. But you do think that a regiment or so of breechloaders per week is kosher? Laughable.

What I meant was that these guns might crop up as a hundred here or a hundred there. Less likely to be a thousand here or there.

I'm really tiring of responding to this pop history view of the Civil War. Do you seriously think that the federal government had massive(30,000+) stocks of British rifles sitting around before the war? Again, totally laughable.

And I'm tired of you evading the point: that the Confederates relied far more heavily on captured equipment than the Union did. This isn't even really a debatable point. Yes, the Union captured Confederate equipment, sometimes in large quantity. However this paled in comparison to the reverse.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Chuck2

No, neither side had large stocks of rifles available. Each side ended up buying a similar number of rifles from oversea sources like Britain. The difference ended up being that Northern domestic production of rifles far outpaced what the Confederacy attained from their crash firearm production effort.

I also suspect that the South wasn't buying many guns at all in the later years of the war, with the blockade in full effect. Nor indeed did they have the financial resources that the Federal government enjoyed, due to their decision to stockpile cotton at the start of the war.

[Chuck2]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Chuck2

No, neither side had large stocks of rifles available. Each side ended up buying a similar number of rifles from oversea sources like Britain. The difference ended up being that Northern domestic production of rifles far outpaced what the Confederacy attained from their crash firearm production effort.

I also suspect that the South wasn't buying many guns at all in the later years of the war, with the blockade in full effect. Nor indeed did they have the financial resources that the Federal government enjoyed, due to their decision to stockpile cotton at the start of the war.

True enough but the Confederacy usually had an adequate number of firearms in the later years of the war. As you alluded to earlier, they did capture many when they took the Harper's Ferry Arsenal in 1861 plus the machinery to fabricate more. The main problem was when they tried to rapidly expand the size of their army between late-1861 and early-1862. Imports between 1862-1864 including up to 400,000 British Enfield rifles met this problem and the Confederacy yielded large armies up to the last few months of the war.

[Fidel_Helms]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious
And I'm tired of you evading the point: that the Confederates relied far more heavily on captured equipment than the Union did. This isn't even really a debatable point. Yes, the Union captured Confederate equipment, sometimes in large quantity. However this paled in comparison to the reverse.

Captured equipment was not important for either side in the grand scheme of things. The assertion that I took issue with was yours that the Confederacy couldn't even equip a whole regiment with modern rifles, which is complete and utter BS; I just used the Vicksburg anecdote to illustrate that. Confederate armies were well armed for the most part; the real areas of weakness were uniforms and clothing, artillery ammunition, and food.

[Fidel_Helms]

ORIGINAL: Chuck2


In regards to the flinklocks, these represented some really old firearms that were being used. The Confederacy at one time was thinking about using pikes because of their shortage of firearms. IIRC Lee wrote a letter stating that this was a good idea. Or maybe it was Jackson. Eventually they purchased enough rifles from overseas to properly equip the troops and the pike proposal was dropped. But at the beginning of the war they had to use every firearm they could scrap up due to acute shortages.

The pike thing is way overblown, and I've never seen Lee's name attached to it. Joe Brown had some pikes made for the Georgia militia which weren't even issued. In general, the whole "flintlocks and squirrel rifles" school of thought is vastly overblown, and to the extent it was true, it was mostly the case early in the war in the West.

I think the breechloaders represent advanced weapons that didn't arrive until near the end of the scenario.

The Confederacy did like to arm its sharpshooters with Sharps buffalo guns whenever possible, but they were very hard to come by. It was mainly the rate I objected to. Might be something to it, though- there was a recent book which dealt with the differences in skirmishing and sharpshooting tactics between the Union and Confederacy. I forget its name. But the thesis was basically that the Confederates had a light infantry superiority early on that hurt the Union badly until they were able to adapt.

[Fidel_Helms]

ORIGINAL: Chuck2

True enough but the Confederacy usually had an adequate number of firearms in the later years of the war. As you alluded to earlier, they did capture many when they took the Harper's Ferry Arsenal in 1861 plus the machinery to fabricate more. The main problem was when they tried to rapidly expand the size of their army between late-1861 and early-1862. Imports between 1862-1864 including up to 400,000 British Enfield rifles met this problem and the Confederacy yielded large armies up to the last few months of the war.

It's interesting to read about Lee's retreat away from Richmond. He was vexed over and over again by the arrival of trains bumping full of guns and ammo, when what he needed was food.

[Chuck2]

ORIGINAL: Fidel_Helms

ORIGINAL: Chuck2


In regards to the flinklocks, these represented some really old firearms that were being used. The Confederacy at one time was thinking about using pikes because of their shortage of firearms. IIRC Lee wrote a letter stating that this was a good idea. Or maybe it was Jackson. Eventually they purchased enough rifles from overseas to properly equip the troops and the pike proposal was dropped. But at the beginning of the war they had to use every firearm they could scrap up due to acute shortages.

The pike thing is way overblown, and I've never seen Lee's name attached to it. Joe Brown had some pikes made for the Georgia militia which weren't even issued. In general, the whole "flintlocks and squirrel rifles" school of thought is vastly overblown, and to the extent it was true, it was mostly the case early in the war in the West.

There is a little bit about the pikes in the biography of Gorgas called Ploughshares into Swords. The peak of the pikes craze was in April 1862. Lee did order Gorgas to send 1,000 pikes to Jackson but that appears to be the extent of it.

http://www.vcdh.virginia.edu:8065/saxon ... 218845.xml

The Confederacy did like to arm its sharpshooters with Sharps buffalo guns whenever possible, but they were very hard to come by. It was mainly the rate I objected to. Might be something to it, though- there was a recent book which dealt with the differences in skirmishing and sharpshooting tactics between the Union and Confederacy. I forget its name. But the thesis was basically that the Confederates had a light infantry superiority early on that hurt the Union badly until they were able to adapt.

Well, the thing is that the Confederate replacement rates in that scenario would likely decline as the game went along. IIRC, this 6 companies per week would end up being 1 or 2 by the time it kicked in.

[Chuck2]

ORIGINAL: Fidel_Helms

ORIGINAL: Chuck2

True enough but the Confederacy usually had an adequate number of firearms in the later years of the war. As you alluded to earlier, they did capture many when they took the Harper's Ferry Arsenal in 1861 plus the machinery to fabricate more. The main problem was when they tried to rapidly expand the size of their army between late-1861 and early-1862. Imports between 1862-1864 including up to 400,000 British Enfield rifles met this problem and the Confederacy yielded large armies up to the last few months of the war.

It's interesting to read about Lee's retreat away from Richmond. He was vexed over and over again by the arrival of trains bumping full of guns and ammo, when what he needed was food.

Most of the food stocks were in places like Texas, Florida, Alabama, and Georgia. Especially the meat. The rail stock was run down at this point and lots of food ended up rotting in yards.

Also, there is a little known fact that Lincoln allowed certain merchants to trade with Confederacy merchants in Norfolk and the Eastern Carolinas up until 1864. They would give the Confederates staples like coffee and pork for cotton. Grant complained about this arrangement as it was feeding the army he was trying to defeat and Lincoln was pressured to end the trade for good.

[Fidel_Helms]

ORIGINAL: Chuck2


There is a little bit about the pikes in the biography of Gorgas called Ploughshares into Swords. The peak of the pikes craze was in April 1862. Lee did order Gorgas to send 1,000 pikes to Jackson but that appears to be the extent of it.

It's kind of a soft order, though- "if practicable" and in any case the request came from someone other than Lee, who merely seems to be trying to help cut through some red tape for a subordinate.

[Chuck2]

ORIGINAL: Fidel_Helms

ORIGINAL: Chuck2


There is a little bit about the pikes in the biography of Gorgas called Ploughshares into Swords. The peak of the pikes craze was in April 1862. Lee did order Gorgas to send 1,000 pikes to Jackson but that appears to be the extent of it.

It's kind of a soft order, though- "if practicable" and in any case the request came from someone other than Lee, who merely seems to be trying to help cut through some red tape for a subordinate.

Well, lots of Lee's orders were phrased in a similar manner. Though I agree it wasn't a big deal considering the small numbers. It may have even been a sly way of putting pressure on Gorgas and/or the Confederate Congress to come up with some badly needed rifles.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Fidel_Helms

It's interesting to read about Lee's retreat away from Richmond. He was vexed over and over again by the arrival of trains bumping full of guns and ammo, when what he needed was food.

Of course, a surplus in one sector didn't mean a surplus everywhere for the Confederacy. Hence Forrest sending regiments into action unarmed.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Chuck2

Well, the thing is that the Confederate replacement rates in that scenario would likely decline as the game went along. IIRC, this 6 companies per week would end up being 1 or 2 by the time it kicked in.

And here is my point in essence. This wouldn't work out at all if the rate was in regiments.

[Iñaki Harrizabalagatar]

To go back to the original question, I think TOAW is very unlikely to ever really suit a Napoleonic battle scenario, but it could, with some modifications, very well suit a Napoleonic campaign scenario. I did a couple with COW/Bioed that worked reasonably well.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Iñaki Harrizabalagatar

To go back to the original question, I think TOAW is very unlikely to ever really suit a Napoleonic battle scenario, but it could, with some modifications, very well suit a Napoleonic campaign scenario. I did a couple with COW/Bioed that worked reasonably well.

It would have to be a fairly small campaign as otherwise instant communication causes problems. Once one gets into the telegraph age, and particularly with the longer time scales, operational scenarios become more realistic.

[Chuck2]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Iñaki Harrizabalagatar

To go back to the original question, I think TOAW is very unlikely to ever really suit a Napoleonic battle scenario, but it could, with some modifications, very well suit a Napoleonic campaign scenario. I did a couple with COW/Bioed that worked reasonably well.

It would have to be a fairly small campaign as otherwise instant communication causes problems. Once one gets into the telegraph age, and particularly with the longer time scales, operational scenarios become more realistic.

The key would be setting up robust command and control features. Sub-units wouldn't be so reliable as point and click. You'd have to factor the slower communications in the game model some how.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Chuck2

The key would be setting up robust command and control features. Sub-units wouldn't be so reliable as point and click. You'd have to factor the slower communications in the game model some how.

Without writing reams of new code, it'll be very hard work to give each detachment the competency of a real general without giving him the omniscience of a TOAW player.

One possibility would be to assign a different player to each detachment. The game master would feed each player detailed information about their local situation but only allow horse-paced communications from further afield. This in itself would be quite an undertaking, and would take an awfully long time to play even if you could find enough interested parties.

[Iñaki Harrizabalagatar]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Iñaki Harrizabalagatar

To go back to the original question, I think TOAW is very unlikely to ever really suit a Napoleonic battle scenario, but it could, with some modifications, very well suit a Napoleonic campaign scenario. I did a couple with COW/Bioed that worked reasonably well.

It would have to be a fairly small campaign as otherwise instant communication causes problems. Once one gets into the telegraph age, and particularly with the longer time scales, operational scenarios become more realistic.

In fact, if you think about it, it is not instant comunication, but rather independent command what is simulated in the game. In full week turns your units move following orders for a fulkl week movement, wich IMO is realistic enough for a IGO/UGO system

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Iñaki Harrizabalagatar

In fact, if you think about it, it is not instant comunication, but rather independent command what is simulated in the game. In full week turns your units move following orders for a fulkl week movement, wich IMO is realistic enough for a IGO/UGO system

That's all very well. But how does some detachment at Hamburg know to start moving off to regroup the same day as Napoleon is defeated at Leipzig?

[Iñaki Harrizabalagatar]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Iñaki Harrizabalagatar

In fact, if you think about it, it is not instant comunication, but rather independent command what is simulated in the game. In full week turns your units move following orders for a fulkl week movement, wich IMO is realistic enough for a IGO/UGO system

That's all very well. But how does some detachment at Hamburg know to start moving off to regroup the same day as Napoleon is defeated at Leipzig?

It is not the same day, it is the same week