What is your favorite WWII tank?

[Rune Iversen]

ORIGINAL: hawker

According to Jentz (JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; op. cit.),

[Rune Iversen]

ORIGINAL: IronDuke



What makes German maneouver in the later years stand out though is surprise. Ardennes, the Gran, etc, they start a concealed offensive. Where did they manoeuver a la Mansteins backhand?

Where did they have the necessary room to maneuver in? Manstein could maneuver as he did because the forde to space ratio was low as a reult of soviet overextension.

If they can prepare, they can husband enough to get going, but there was no chance of a fluid battle given the fuel and air situation.

Or the size of the enemy opposition, which is either high form the get go (Operation Konrad, The Lorraine Battles) or becomes so within a week due to superior operational mobility (The Bulge for instance).

They also tend to attack when the weather prevents air power taking a hand which removes some of their advantages but is worth doing because of the perceived benefits. This isn't real manoeuver, its a shuffling around.

If wishes were horses.....

One time they quickly tried to operationally redeploy to meet a battlefield situation was at Mortain and that ended in tears, first because of air power, and secondly because they didn't have fuel enough left to retreat hard enough.

Also because the US units engaged shot the pants of their german opposites [:'(]. The stopping of Market garden and the attempted stopping of Pattons rampage in lorraine might also qualify as "operational redeployment" of significant assets in the west (at least if we don´t count armour as the sole measuring stick of "operational redeployment).

Fuel was the Germans single biggest issue. It helped destroy the Luftwaffe and forced them into operationally farcical ideas like the Ardennes.

Regards,
IronDuke

Well, at least it forced them into contemplating such "war winning" schemes in the first place.

[mdiehl]

But hold on, your claim they were actually in Lorraine counting wrecks is supposition.

That is incorrect.

Why would the Americans spend their time doing this?

Duh.

But it isn't for me to show you your supposition is wrong surely, but for you to show me your supposition is right?

No. Your supposition is that the guys counting tanks made inaccurate counts.. a supposition that you cannot support, or that they were unable to figure out how tanks were destroyed (a supposition you are unable to support). This all started with my citing 3rd AD's assessment teams' tallies of knocked out AFVs. Now you're telling me that the only standard of proof you will accept is that in 2007 I demonstrate that we must treat the source as credible, otherwise regard it as not credible. It's a stupid demand, considering that to treat it as not credible, we have to assume that the guys counting knocked out German AFVs either (a) couldn't count, (b) couldn't tell what killed a tank, or (c) couldn't tell what kind of wrecked AFV they were looking at. QED.

Most Tank killing assessments were off

So you claim.

so I'll stick with air kills and a mere factor of two.

And you'd have no business so doing if you were talking about Japanese pilots claims. The point isn't that you can pick some constant and "reduce accordingly." The point is that pilots' claims were based on pilots accounts and gun camera footafe because in the vast majority of cases the actual wrecked aircraft could not be recovered by the forces of the pilots making the claim. And it is a demonstrated fact that all manner of "we absolutely saw that plane blow up and the wings fall off" made by pilots and confirmed by other pilots, absent gun camera footage, turned out to be incorrect. The heat of battle stress of air to air combat led people to routinely think they saw things that did not in fact happen. Hell, even UNSTRESSED eyewitnesses have problems with things like that in courtrooms.

I thought Tiger armour may have been sloped 8 or 10 degrees, but the technical aspects of this are not my interest. So, you are saying a Sherman killed a Tiger by aiming low and hoping the riochet hit the track rather than the ground...? Why did they all start pouncing about getting themselves killed looking for flank shots then?

No. I am saying a Sherman (or for that matter an M10) armed with a 76mm gun aimed at the center of mass when confronted with a non-oblique front shot and routinely made a 76mm hole right through the thickest part of the PzVIEs armor. A Sherman with a 75mm gun had all manner of trouble holing a PzVIE (much less a PzV) from the front.

It is as though you have not grasped the idea that not all Shermans were just the same.

Well, I named five individuals earlier, one of who commanded armour at the tactical level through several campaigns, another who commanded them at the regimental level. Another was a mechanic, and two Senior Officers. The 76 was singled out by a couple as inadequate. I can only surmise the above statement was because you have never checked...

No, I surmise that you have been very selective in your collection of assessments. As Rune pointed out, your most compelling source is a wreck recovery guy whose only knowledge of German tanks was what they did to Shermans, not what Shermans did to Germans.

They would have had feer problems taking a Sherman. Use an Easy 8, you are vulnerable to everything.

No actually you aren't. You're not, for example, very vulnerable to a 75mm armed Sherman, Cromwell, any variant of the PzIII, any pre- PzIVF2, any StuG pre-StuGIIIG, at least not from the front at ranges in excess of about 400m. Whereas, in an M4A3E8, you can hole every one of these named vehicles (and also Tigers, and Panthers) at the longest of ranges, 1000m (approx, vs PzVIEs) and 800m (approx vs PzVs).

The "Tiger Is Great" claim oversimplifies the case as does the "Sherman is crap" claim. Neither claim is factually correct as a general statement if one considers who could put a hole in what, and at what range, and other operational qualities like reliability and mpg, and other tactical qualities like "how fast can one lay this gun on target when moving."

[Rune Iversen]

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

Well, therein lies the rub. I don't think it was adequate, and neither did the Yanks bearing in mind their attempts to get Fireflies and something bigger. The eye witness evidence is also pretty harsh.

Why did it soldier on untill the Korean war then, and why was it the preferred medium in that theatre? If it wasn´t adequate and the eye witnesses was so damning, how come there was no mutiny due to the excessive losses this supposedly entailed? (and come to think of it: Just where is these excessive losses of Shermans period? The Sherman was a fine vehicle, as evidenced by it´s pedigree and long history of use. As for the attempts to field a bigger gun, they ramped 76mm prduction and actually began to issue HVAP to others than the TD boys by late fall. The measures worked, and every time the german armour shoed itself in strenght, it got whacked. Badly.

I'd need to check, but the Soviets understood the operational Manoeuver was only as good as its ability to fight off the armoured counterattack, so these monstrosities seem well placed to do that.

That would be the job of the T34/85s of the Tank brigades themselves. Each tank Corps (of 3*Brigades) were also likely to have an SU regiment of some 20 guns or so, but this need not necessarily have been the heavy "Zookeepers" like the ISU 122-152.

Besides, I thought the Infantry divisions opened the hole and the armour went through when the breach was torn.

In theory yes. In practice the armour was often committed when the germans were on the ropes in order to ensure a "clean" breakthrough. . And in order to do this, the infantry was beefed up with Heavy tanks (Stalins) and (heavy) SU´s for Assult gun support.

But, he is surely aware of what everyone else is saying. Men who would routinely watch their shots bounce off. In other words, he might have mentioned it had he been assured that every Sherman he repaired had taken out two Germans before succumbing. Also, what about Hinds? Bradley? Eisenhower?

He might also have seen green men from Mars zapping the german tanks into oblivion.

I disagree. The issue was surely that the sherman couldn't penetrate, because the answer in every case was to upgun what they had. Why tack on a bigger gun if your main problem is vulnerability.

In that case, you are free to disagree. But you will have to pony up something substantial in order to convince me, since everything I have read on "the Sherman scandal" suggests that it was the vulnerability of the Sherman to every german shooter that came as a surprise to the reading US public.

It also depends on the timeframe. By 1945 you have so many Sherman 76mm that the criticism falls flat on it´s face (all the while ramping up production of upgunned shooters like the M36, even going so far as to simply smack the turrets on plain Shermans (The M36B1). Scandal or no scandal, at least the US Army was doing it´s best to rectify the problems. Which likely helped alleviate the impact of the Ardennes offensive, the last time you had Kats running rampant in numbers.

I think it was deeper that that. Allied doctrines didn't do it well and the Germans had the issues you mention. In addition, defences were getting deeper. The response to Blitzkrieg was to thicken the defensive belt. The Germans had 7-10 kilometres at Goodwood and I don't think the western Allies worked out how to get through.

As I said above, force to space ratio has to be low (either by driving where there is no enemy, or driving where all the enemy are dead) in order to anybody to "maneuver"

They still did it in Operation Totalize though (the breakthrough of a "hard" defensive crust) [:'(]

The Americans didn;t concentrate enough

Hard to concentrate when you can´t do so across a fromntage of more than a few 100 meters in the bocage. As for the fall fighting, it is partially correct, but the germans had gotten teir ducks in a row again after Market Garden. And you simply can´t maneuver across defended obstacles like the Rhine.

and the British didn't want to break through badly enough, which meant they rarely did.

Well, they wanted it badly enough. But either they themselves failed (lack of combined arms at Goodwood, Infantry-armour attrition fighting in the bocage against most of the german Panzer force in the West) or left the sticky wicket to the colonials (canadians being given the task in Totalize etc. ) [;)]

But what was their alternative?

Stay on the defence. Make any offensive moves by the allies prohibitively costly. Stall for time. Hope you can work out some kind of political solution after the general bump off Hitler [;)]

They were being beaten on each front. How did they turn that situation around (however slim the chance) without offensive action? No defensive victory in 1944 was ever going to be decisive. The Germans either found a way to set the tempo or admitted defeat and quietly blead to death. The Germans realised the same in 1918. Given surrender was not an option in 1944, some form of counter offensive was all they had wasn't it?

Well, tough break starting a Total war you can´t finish [:'(]

There you go again, except this time you have to rub it in by adding "wholeheartedly".

Well, the allies did outright kill a lot of the german armour deployed in the west. Being on the tactical defensive and being able to ambush the germans on favourable terms likely brought about the end of quite a few german panzers (yes, you guessed it; Lorraine again).

But where else did the Allies launch several hundred Tanks across a space the size of a few football pitches?

Totalize in August. [;)]

the British and Americans were not Russians, they did slow grinding attrition but not overwhelming breakthrough.

What do you call the "swan" across France that put the allies at the Rhine at D+90, when the original schedule would have them at the Seine then? Or the breakout across Germany in March-April?

You're asking me to write a report on Battleship V Battleship action in WWII but not mention the Bismarck. If it was the single large scale successgful defensive action, what large scale defensive actions would you suggest were failures?
Regards,
IronDuke

The germans had many tactical defensive victories. Apart from Goodwood just not many where their armour stood on the tactical defensive (but they might help out the defence through more or less timely counterattacks though). As for Large scale defensive actions that were failures, well they lost didn´t they [:'(]

[morvwilson]

Here is another tidbit that may keep this thread going for another five or six pages.
 
Training,
 
Toward the end of the war the Allies had it, the Germans did not. It was not necesarily better armor that beat Germany it was the crews themselves.
 
What about that angle?

[IronDuke_slith]

I'm not extrapoloating anything, its just that I seem to be the only one listening to the Americans on the ground (despite not speaking the language) whilst everyone else tries to tell me everything was fine (albeit only in a complex sense on paper

ORIGINAL: mdiehlNo, you're just selectively choosing from among those Americans on the ground the expressions that support your point of view. Patton had more direct experience with the M4 than any other American general and he thought it was well suited for the tasks that it faced.

Not exactly, Patton thought it well suited to the tasks he wanted to give it. He (like AGf in general) didn't think the Tank's best use was dueling with Kats, and part of the reason they resisted upgunning was a belief bigger weapons would encourage that. Therefore, Patton thought them fit for purpose, but that purpose didn't include going head to head with Panthers so his thoughts don't apply in this context.

And yes you are extrapolating. The ballistic tests showed what the 76mm gun could do (handily k-o) a tiger. The M10 TD sections armed with 76s had no complaints about their abilities to penetrate enemy armor. American generals who worked most with armor had no complaints about the 76-armed AFVs in most contexts. But against the actual ballistics data and against some well-informed American opinions you choose only to credit those American opinions that rate it "crap."

Yes, but to be fair, I'm naming names, whilst you are generalising. Rune mentioned the shatter issue earlier in the thread if memory serves, someone else has posted a fuller account of the problem. The battlefield experience was not good, and the ballistics data not that impressive. Patton is not on your side because he didn't want Shermans dueling, which meant he wasn't overly moved whether the 75 or 76 were good enough or not. Taking doctrine to a T, the Americans had TDs for that.

And it is very very clear that much of that complaint (as with the Cromwell) owes itself to the legitimate criticism of the utility of the 75mm gun vs PzVs, PzVIs and so forth.

Yes, but there were few if any 76s in June, and they replaced rather than upgraded units if memory serves. HVAP didn't arrive until September IIRC, and then in limited quantities. If American Armour Generals were happy with the 76, lets see some names and quotes. Hinds of 2nd Armoured was very telling in this respect, I thought. He was "happy" with the 76 as long as it came in plentiful numbers with ballsy crews.

Regards,
IronDuke

[IronDuke_slith]

But hold on, your claim they were actually in Lorraine counting wrecks is supposition.

ORIGINAL: mdiehl
That is incorrect.

It is until you cite me the figures. You seem to be suggesting a sober accounting of the battlefield after the fighting had moved on. I know of a couple of examples of this, but why was 3rd Army going to pause in order to count something it already knew from asking its individual units.

Why would the Americans spend their time doing this?

Duh.

Not duh, why? they already had the figures from the troops themselves. Why count? the only counts of this kind I know were carried out by research groups assessing the battlefield effectiveness of aircraft. If there were others, lets hear about them. I'd love to see the data.

But it isn't for me to show you your supposition is wrong surely, but for you to show me your supposition is right?

No. Your supposition is that the guys counting tanks made inaccurate counts.

But you haven't told us who these Guys were, or given us their methodology etc.

. a supposition that you cannot support, or that they were unable to figure out how tanks were destroyed (a supposition you are unable to support).

Yes, I can. We found in Normandy assessing Allied tanks destroyed that there was no way of differentiating between a Panther 75 hit and a towed 75 hit. It wasn't always possiblt to distinguish between 75 and 88 hits. Given this, we can extrapolate it wouldn't have been easy to differentiate between Sherman 76 and TD hits on German vehicles. Likewise when things have been hit several times, how do we figure out which was the killer etc.

This all started with my citing 3rd AD's assessment teams' tallies of knocked out AFVs.

who were these assessment teams? Until we know how they worked, they may have just gone around with pen and paper asking Battalions for their figures. As such, these figures were subject to inflation through the standard methods.

Now you're telling me that the only standard of proof you will accept is that in 2007 I demonstrate that we must treat the source as credible, otherwise regard it as not credible.

How can we treat it as credible when it hasn't being detailed, no methodology has been described and we're relying for info on its very existence on your 20year memory?

It's a stupid demand, considering that to treat it as not credible, we have to assume that the guys counting knocked out German AFVs either (a) couldn't count, (b) couldn't tell what killed a tank, or (c) couldn't tell what kind of wrecked AFV they were looking at. QED.

See above, if they assessed by asking rather than looking, they would be off. Telling the difference between TD and Sherman 76 hits would not have been possible. Without further info, this isn't evidence.

Most Tank killing assessments were off

So you claim.

No I can prove. Look at the figures claimed by air attack around Mortain and then look at how many vehicles the ORS Research Teams actually found, they were magnitudes apart in both number and cause.

so I'll stick with air kills and a mere factor of two.

And you'd have no business so doing if you were talking about Japanese pilots claims.

Strawman. I'll rephrase. I'll stick with BOB Fighter Command claims. How is that? What have the Japanese got to do with it?

The point isn't that you can pick some constant and "reduce accordingly." The point is that pilots' claims were based on pilots accounts and gun camera footafe because in the vast majority of cases the actual wrecked aircraft could not be recovered by the forces of the pilots making the claim. And it is a demonstrated fact that all manner of "we absolutely saw that plane blow up and the wings fall off" made by pilots and confirmed by other pilots, absent gun camera footage, turned out to be incorrect. The heat of battle stress of air to air combat led people to routinely think they saw things that did not in fact happen. Hell, even UNSTRESSED eyewitnesses have problems with things like that in courtrooms.

Which is exactly why most Tank counts were out.

I thought Tiger armour may have been sloped 8 or 10 degrees, but the technical aspects of this are not my interest. So, you are saying a Sherman killed a Tiger by aiming low and hoping the riochet hit the track rather than the ground...? Why did they all start pouncing about getting themselves killed looking for flank shots then?

No. I am saying a Sherman (or for that matter an M10) armed with a 76mm gun aimed at the center of mass when confronted with a non-oblique front shot and routinely made a 76mm hole right through the thickest part of the PzVIEs armor. A Sherman with a 75mm gun had all manner of trouble holing a PzVIE (much less a PzV) from the front.

And shatter? Was this a reality?

It is as though you have not grasped the idea that not all Shermans were just the same.

I have, I'm just saying the 76 was not that big a deal.

Well, I named five individuals earlier, one of who commanded armour at the tactical level through several campaigns, another who commanded them at the regimental level. Another was a mechanic, and two Senior Officers. The 76 was singled out by a couple as inadequate. I can only surmise the above statement was because you have never checked...

No, I surmise that you have been very selective in your collection of assessments.

Surmise means you are claiming I have for rhetorical effect, but don;t really know do you?

As Rune pointed out, your most compelling source is a wreck recovery guy whose only knowledge of German tanks was what they did to Shermans, not what Shermans did to Germans.

I disagree. I thought the other were more compelling. To believe you, I have to believe Ike and Bradley were lied to. Hinds and the Tanker were even more compelling. Why would Hinds men routinely go out looking for flank shots if straight on shots were fine? Either their weapons struggled when faced frontally, or their tactifs were unneccessarily suicidal. Which is it?

They would have had feer problems taking a Sherman. Use an Easy 8, you are vulnerable to everything.

No actually you aren't. You're not, for example, very vulnerable to a 75mm armed Sherman, Cromwell, any variant of the PzIII, any pre- PzIVF2, any StuG pre-StuGIIIG, at least not from the front at ranges in excess of about 400m.

But we were discussing Villers Bocage where the ranges were sometimes just a few feet. How has the discussion suddenly turned to ranges in excess of 400?

Whereas, in an M4A3E8, you can hole every one of these named vehicles (and also Tigers, and Panthers) at the longest of ranges, 1000m (approx, vs PzVIEs) and 800m (approx vs PzVs).

I disagree. The eye witness evidence simply does not support this. The incidental evidence doesn't. the shatter description doesn't and the alarm that the gun trials caused doesn't support it. On occasion I suppose you might, if you hit the Tiger at the right angle low on the hull with a shot that didn't shatter and riocheted into the track, but then if it didn't, you were toast.

Regards,
IronDuke

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: hawker

According to Jentz (JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; op. cit.), "The Tiger's armor was invulnerable to attack from most tank guns firing normal armor-piercing shells or shot at ranges over 800 meters, including the American 75 mm and the Russian 76 mm. It is obvious that the 17-pdr. firing normal APCBC rounds could defeat the frontal armor of the Tiger I at most combat ranges for tank vs. tank actions in Europe. However, by 23 June 1944, only 109 Shermans with 17-pdrs. had landed in France along with six replacements. By the end of the war, on 5 May 1945, the British 21st Army Group possessed 1,235 Sherman tanks with 17-pdrs., while the remaining 1,915 Sherman tanks were all equipped with the 75 mm M3 gun".

The armor of the Tiger I was not well sloped, but it was thick. Here is where many fail to understand that, in terms of World War II tank warfare, thickness is a quality in itself, since armor resistance is mainly determined by the ratio between armor thickness and projectile diameter (T/d). The T/d relationship regarding armor penetration demonstrates that the more the thickness of the armor plate overmatches the diameter of any incoming armor piercing round, the harder it is for the projectile to achieve a penetration. On the other side, the greater the diameter of the incoming projectile relatively to the thickness of the armor plate which it strikes, the greater the probability of penetration. This explains why the side armor of the Tiger I, being 80 mm thick, was so difficult to be penetrated at combat ranges by most Allied anti-tank and tank guns, whose calibers were overmatched by the thickness of the Tiger I armor. The quality of the armor was another major asset of the Tiger I, and it can't be emphasized enough that the Tiger I was a very special kind of Panzer, since it had the best quality of everything, compared to any other German tank. The rolled homogeneous nickel-steel plate, electro-welded interlocking-plate construction armor had a Brinell hardness index of 255-260 (the best homogeneous armor hardness level for WW II standards), and rigorous quality control procedures ensured that it stayed that way. The Tiger I's armor was much superior to that of, for example the Panther, which armor had a much higher Brinell index, and consequently, was very brittle. The Tiger, as a side effect from the usage of this special armor, also was a very expensive and resource consuming tank. The nominal cost of a Tiger was 250,000 Reichsmarks. In contrast, a PzKpfw III cost RM 96,200, a PzKpfw IV RM 103,500, and a PzKpfw V Panther RM 117,000; all these figures are exclusive of weapons and radios.

Another fact that helped the Tigers a lot was the "shatter gap" effect which affectted allied ammunition, a most unusual situation where rounds with too high an impact velocity would sometimes fail even though their penetration capability was (theoretically) more than adequate. This phenomenon plagued the British 2 pounder in the desert, and would have decreased the effectiveness of U.S. 76mm and 3" guns against Tigers, Panthers and other vehicles with armor thickness above 70 mm. It should be noted that the problems with the 76 mm and 3" guns did not necessarily involve the weapons themselves: the noses of US armor-piercing ammunition of the time turned out to be excessively soft. When these projectiles impacted armor which matched or exceeded the projectile diameter at a certain spread of velocities, the projectile would shatter and fail.

Penetrations would occur below this velocity range, since the shell would not shatter, and strikes above this range would propel the shell through the armor whether it shattered or not. When striking a Tiger I driver's plate, for example, this "shatter gap" for a 76mm APCBC M62 shell would cause failures between 50 meters and 900 meters. These ammunition deficiencies proved that Ordnance tests claiming the 76 mm gun could penetrate a Tiger I's upper front hull to 2,000 yards (1,800 meters) were sadly incorrect.

As a general rule, BHN (Brinell Hardness Index) effects, shot shatter, and obliquity effects are related to the ratio between shot diameter and plate thickness. The relationship is complex, but a larger projectile hitting relatively thinner plate will usually have the advantage. There is an optimum BHN level for every shot vs plate confrontation, usually in the 260-300 BHN range for World War Two situations. Below that, the armor is too soft and resists poorly, above that, the armor is too hard and therefore too brittle.

The 13.(Tiger) Kompanie, of Panzer Regiment Großdeutschland, reported on the armor protection of the Tiger: "During a scouting patrol two Tigers encountered about 20 Russian tanks on their front, while additional Russian tanks attacked from behind. A battle developed in which the armor and weapons of the Tiger were extraordinarily successful. Both Tigers were hit (mainly by 76.2 mm armor-piercing shells) 10 or more times at ranges from 500 to 1,000 meters. The armor held up all around. Not a single round penetrated through the armor. Also hits in the running gear, in which the suspension arms were torn away, did not immobilize the Tiger. While 76.2 mm anti-tank shells continuously struck outside the armor, on the inside, undisturbed, the commander, gunner, and loader selected targets, aimed, and fired. The end result was 10 enemy tanks knocked out by two Tigers within 15 minutes" (JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; op. cit.).

P.S. How anyone can put in same line Tiger and tiny sherman[:-]

What is the best book describing this ballistic issue? (In english).

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: Rune Iversen

ORIGINAL: hawker

The Tiger I, with its 88 KwK 36 L/56 gun, coupled with superior optics, could accurately hit targets at ranges the enemy could not even aim at.[;)]

A blatant falsehood. [:-]

I did read the Sherman optics simply weren't up to long range and that the 17pdr lost accuracy (if not penetrating power) after about 1000. Certainly most of the 2000+ shots you hear about are not Sherman kills.

I don;t know what the optics were like on the Pershing or the TD range, though.

[Paul Vebber]

Paul,
Whenever "is A better than B" gives a "complex" answer, the reality is that it was a bit narrower than everyone thought IMHO.

Complex enough to have a nearly 600 page book written about the "rest of the story" Usualy when "A is better than " is assumed cut and dried, its by someone examining the case in hindsight IMHO.

If the AORG had tested the Sherman 76 or 75 against the Panther 75, there would have been nothing complex about the answer, would there?

Hunnicuts book never references any of the datasheets to AORG reports. Given the 17lber was only slightly inferior tothe Panther 75 one would think it would have been a no brainer to just install it, no? Well in the wordsof Hunnicutt:

An ideal solution to the armament problem would have been the adoption of the British 17lber as the standard Allied tank gun. Such a decision, taken in 1942 would have insured quantity production of 17lber pounder Shermans well before D-Day. Instaled in properly redesigned turret such as that used with the 76, the 17lber would have provided the Sherman the firepower equivalent to the german Panther's 7.5cm KwK 42 and it would have been available in quantity fo the campaign in northwest Europe. Fitted in a larger turret, its operation would have been far more efficient than the improvised installation on the British Firefly.

Hindsight can easily show what should have ben done. Unfortunately, thing were not at all that clear at the time. The suggestion to adopt the British wepon was made by Col G.B. jarrett and others but their recommendation was rejected. As that time the 76 appeared to be more than adequate as far as power was concerned and it was a much lighter weapon. Its smaller cartridge case was easer to handle allowing a higher rate of fire and a larger ammunition supply. As a result, the 76 was selected as the new tank weapon and, as we have seen, even it had to overcome serious objections. (veb - referring to the Tank vs TD doctrinal debate, and the arguments over dual production of a medium and a heavy tank (detailed in Hunnicutt's other book Firepower a history of US heavy tanks - in which it describes the decision that it was better to have 2 30 ton class tanks than 1 60 ton tank - for a number of reasons including the anticipated dificulty developing the required bridging equipment to allow the operational manuever of such as the M6 in France).

I'm not extrapoloating anything, its just that I seem to be the only one listening to the Americans on the ground (despite not speaking the language) whilst everyone else tries to tell me everything was fine (albeit only in a complex sense on paper. )

The Sherman wasn't crap in 42/43, it was just relatively obselete by 1944.

So then you must consider the Panther to be a similar failure, as its early mechanical unreliability resulted in "Germans on the ground" bemoaning its inability to get to battle, and its late armor quality problems that resulted in "Germans on the ground" decrying its vulnerability to 122 and 152 HE. IF "users on the ground" complaining about a weapon are grounds to consider it crap (your words) than pretty much every weapon made has been 'crap' in someone's eyes. Those of us not "listening" are not trying to say 'everything was fine' just that RELATIVE to other SIMILAR vehicles (ie medium tanks) the Sherman was one of the better examples, all things considered, of the war.

The 75 M4 was a decent vehicle compared to the MKIII and MKIV Panzers, the Valentine series, and the early T-34s. The 76mm was comparable to the Cromwell, the late MKIV Panzers, and was comparable the T-34/85 (very good specimins of which were better, but production quality varied so much that a great deal of them were not due to flawed armor, defective power trains and bad lots of ammo.) Its continued modification and performance in the Arab Isreali wars demonstrated it was hardly obsolete.

What does Hunnicut have to say about the 76mm in the narrative?

OCM item 17202 of 11 Sep 1941 outlined the military characteristics of the M4 tank. It included the provision for interchangable turret face plates which could be used to mount a variety of armament. The proposals for the improved Shermans showed the 105 howitzer and 3in gun as alternatives to the 75mm gun M3. The 3 inch gun M7 had better armor piercing performance and as already standardized as the main armament of the heavy tank M6. (veb - you can't examine Sherman development in isolation of the M6 development and the whole doctrinal triangle of medium tank, heavy tank and tank destroyer, and its collision with operational reality. But I'm sure I'm making it overly complex )
However it was considered too heavy for installation in the medium tank turret. A weapon was needed which would have the armor penetration of the 3in gun, but could replace the 75 in the standard m34 ount. To achieve this objective, a developmental program began for a new gun designated a the 76mm gun T1.

Although referred to as a 76mm gun, the experimental cannon actually had a 76.2mm or 3in bore. o shorten the development cycle, the projectiles for teh standard 3in gun M7 were adopted for the new weapon. The powder charge in a smaller diameter cartridge case ws adjusted to obtain the same 2600ft/sec muzzle velocity as the 3in gun. The barrel ws lighter in weight than the 3in tube and, as originaly desinged, had a bore lenght of 57 calibers. Fitted with the same breach ring assemply as the 75mm gun M3, he new weapon could be installed in the standard combination gun mount m34.

Two 76mm guns T1 were manufactured and shipped to Aberdeen Proving Ground for tests starting on 1 Aug 1942. One gun was fired on a fixed test mount and the other was installed in the turret of an M4A1. In the M34 tan mount the long barreled canon was badly unbalanced. This was primarily corrected by cuting 15 in from the muzzle end of he tube and adding weight to the breech ring. After completion of the firing tests, Aberdeen concluded that the 76mm gun T1 was satisfactory for use in the M4 medium tank series with the modifications specified.

Based on the early test results, the Ordnance Committee on 17 Aug 42 recomended that the M4 armed ith the 76mm gun be classified as Substitute Standard. The T1 gun was also standardized as the 76mm gun M1 and his was added in parentheses to the tank's designation when it was armed with this weapon. (nomenclature examples omitted...and in the future) At this time it was planned to modify production orders to provide fo he manufacture of 1000 76mm tank gun tanks.

The testing program cntinued at Aberdeen with a production 76mm gun M1 now installed in medium tank M4A1 serial number 549. This tank carried the weapon in the newer cobination gun mount M34A1 equipped with a direct sight telescope. Elevation for the 76 in this mount ranged from +25 to -12.5 degrees. A number of minor changes were aso introduced. these included the use of a new turet front plate and spacer which moved the gun forwrd 2 inches. This provided more room behind the gun preventing interference between the recoil guard and the radio. The gun was balanced by adding weights to the recoil guard. This was necesary to permit proper operation of the gyro-stabilizer. Stowage space was provided for 83 rounds of 76mm ammo.

Like the earlier par of the program, these tess indicated that the 76 could be satisfactory installed in the M4. They also showed that much greater accuracy was possible using he M51(T60) 3-power direct sight telescope ver the earlier sight. However the turret itself was now terribly out of balance when fitted with the long barreled canon. On a 30 per cent slope it was extremely difficult to traverse, lthough both the Westinghouse and Oilgear systems succeeded in doing 20. An 800 pound counterweight at the rear of the turret was recommended as a cure for the unbalance and it was suggested that the weoght be aded to the stowge box. Once balanced, any standarddrive mechanism could easily traverse the turret.

12 medium tanks M4A1(76M1) were produced at Pressed Stel Car COmpany for evaluation by Aberdeen, the Armored Force Board, and the Tank Destroyer Board. On 2 Feb 43 one of these tanks arrived at Fort knox folllowed a month later by another. These tanks incorporated many modifications recommended by Aberden including the counterweight added as a turret bustle. Service tests begn immediately and continued on a 24 hour basis wih a final report being submitted on 5 Apr 43.

The Armored Force did not agree with the earlier test results. They concluded that the turret arrangement was inadequate mainly becasue of inadequate space. They pointed out that the tank represented a "quick fix" design that was improvised from available componenents to achieve rapid production. This was, of course, true and it reflected the original intention to produce lareg numbers of 76mm gun tanks prior to 31 Dec 42. fer rejection of the vehicle by the Armored Force, the Ordnance committee revoked the Substitute Standard classification and cancelled production of the 17 additional tanks which had been authorized to equip a complete company. they recommended that Aberdeen Proving Ground, the Armored Board, and the Tank Destroyer board each retain one of the 12 tanks already manufactured. The remaining nine were rebuilt as standard 75m gun vehicles.

The Ordnance Committee action of 3 may 43 which ended the medium tank M4A1(76M1) also recommended the manufacture of two pilots of an improved design mounting the 76mm gun. These vehicles, designated the medium tan M4E6, were to be fitted with the turret and gun mount developed for teh medum tank T20 series. For the first time, ammunition stowae below the sponson line was also recommended. This was a major step toward reducing the ulnerability of the Sherman to ammunition fires. The new welded hull with the cast front and larger drivers' hatches as incorporated into the design. Par of the turret basket was removed to allow access to the ammunition now stowed on the hul floor. the 76mm racks were lso surrounded by waer tanks to reduce the fire danger if he hull was penerated. The additional space required by this "wet storage" reduced the number of 76mm rounds to 71.

The new cast turret installed on the M4E6 was a preproduction version of the turret developed for the medium tank T23. he tank commander had the same rotating split circular hatch as on he 75mm gun Sherman and a double door rectangular hach was provided in the turret roof for the loader. The 76mm gun M1A1 and a coaxial .30 cal MG were carried in the combination gun mount T80. (some detail of the turret construction omitted)

The two M4E6s were buit by Chrysler at Detroit and one was retained at the Arsenal fot est purposes. The other pilotwas at Aberdeen Proving Ground in July 43 and shortly thereafter was shipped to Fort knox. Firing tests began at once nd a etter report from the Armored Board dated 17 Aug 43 recommended the immediate production of tanks based on the M4E6. Numerous modifications were required but none were of a serious nature. The T20 series of tanks, fr whichthe turret was origianlly designed, were equipped with a hul mounted roroclone blower. SInce the Sherman did not have such a bower, additional ventilation was needed to remove the powder fumes from the turret. This and other modifications were applied to production vehicles.

The Army Ground Forces requested 1000 M4Es and the Chief of Ordnance was instructed to discontinue production of the 75mm gun tanks. However, the armored force indicated that it did not want to completely drop the 75mm gu. They pointed out that the HE projectile for the 75mm gun was superior to that for teh 76. The M48 75mm shell weighed 14.7 pounds with an explosive charge of 1.47lbs. This compared to only 12.9 pounds with .86 lbs of explosive for the 76. Objections were also raised to the muzzle balst of the 76 nd he resultant target obscuration from smoke and dust. The larger rounds for teh 76 were more difficultto handle in the turret and fewer could be carried. Agaisnt these objections the ony advantageof the 76 was its suerior armor piercing performance. Its would penetrate approximately 1 in more than the 75mm gun M3 at the same range. In battel this would prove to be the all important factor, but that leson had to wait unitl the Summer of 44. After the Normandy fighting agianst the heavily armored German tanks, even the 76 was considered inadequate and more powerful hole punchers were sought.

The M4E6 remained at Fort Knox and was used as a test vehicle to help solve some of the problems with the 76. Target obscuration was greatly reduced by the installation of a muzzle brake. The long primer improved the burning of the powder, reducing the smoke and the muzzle brake deflected the gases to the side minimizing the dust kicked up by the blast. Based on the test program, it was recommended that all the 76s be equipped with muzzle brakes. hen the end of the barrel was threaded for a muzzle brakethe M1A1 was redesiganted as the 76mm M1A1C. A later model designated as teh 76mm gun M1A2, differed in having rifling with a tighter wist. Rifling the M1A2 made one turn in 32 calibers while that in the MA1 turned once in 40 calibers. The tighter twist improved projectile stability producing a slight increase in penetration performace at longer ranges. All of the M1A2 guns were equipped with muzzle brakes.

the standard 76mm armor iecing round was the APC M62. This was a capped projectile fitted wih a balllistic windscreen (APCBC) to reduce the drag and improve long range performance. Late production rounds were explosive loaded using a base detonating fuze. After the appearance of heavily armored German vehicles, a rush development program introduced the M93 hypervelocity armor piercing (HVAP) solid shot. This was a lightweight shot with an aluminum body and a tungsten carbide core. Frequenly referred to as armor peircing composite rigid (APCR), the low weight resulted in a muzzle velocity of 3400 ft/sec compared to 2600 ft/sec for teh APC M62. The high velocity combined with the high core density greatly increased the armor penetration. Although the velocity decreased more rapidly with the lightweight projectile, its armor piercing performance still exceeded that of the standard round at ranges greater than 2000 yards. Rushed into prodution for both the 76mm and 3in guns, the HVAP ammunition was used effectively during the final months of the war.

(In the section on 90mm gun experimentation) Although the upgunned (90mm) Sherman appeared to be a good solution o the problem of increased firepower, General holly wasinformed that it would be about 6 months (ie Dec 44) before produciton quantities could be available. By tha time the new Pershings woud be coming off the assembly lines so the decision was taken to drop the 90mm armed Sherman and to concentrate all efforts on speding up Pershing production. In retrospect, it appears the wise course would have been to procure some fo the 90mm armed Shermans as a hedge against further delays in the arrival of the Pershing. However, the real problem was the late hour when the decision was made in favor of a high powered tank gun. Production could not be turned on and off like a waer faucet, despite the seemingly miraculous performace that frequently was achieved. If need for a poweful tank gun had been specified a year earlier, they certainly could have been made available in time for the Normandy invasion. however, argument over the role of the tank still raged until evens on the battlefield proved conclusivey that tanks had to be able to fight tanks and that the best tank destroyer was a better tank.

As late as June 44, it was consiered that the 76mm gun tank would make up only one third of the armored strength with the balance retaining the 75. Within a month the hedgrow fighting had shown the 75 to be completely ineffective against the front armor of the german Panther and Tigers. The combat units now wanted every 76mm gun tank available. Earlier objections to excessive muzle blast and the long wkward rounds of ammunition were forgotten overnight, only hole punching ability was important. Even the 76 proved inadequate in this regard and the ush was on to obtain a weapon which could penetrate the front armor of the tough skinned enemy tanks.

In August a few rounds of the new 76mm HVAP (APCR) ammuntion were rushed to France and tests conducted near Isigny against six captured Panthers. The tests showed the new ammunition was extremely accurate and a great improvement over the old APC M62, but it could not penetrate the Panther's front plte at ranges over 300 yard. Production of the new ammunition was also limited to only 10,000 rounds per month, which meant that it could only be used on an emergency basis.

On 9 August 44, gen Omar Bradley directed his XII Army Group, Armor Section to request an allotment of tanks armed with the british 17lber. This attempt proved fuitless since the limied tnak reserves were insufficient o permit the release of vehicles for the installation of the British gun. The effort to obtain 17 lber tanks was revived laterin the middle of Feb 45 when reserve tank situation had impoved. At that time, the XII AG requested an initial conversion of 160 Shermans wih further conversiondependant on battel experience. Later this was cut to 80 becasue of limitations in British ammo supplies. Unfortunatley, the crowded condition of the shops delayed delivery and only the first few began to arrive in mid-March. These were allotted to the Ninth Army, but there is no recod of their use prior to the end of the war. In fact, the Ninth Army After Action Report indicates that the delievery of 40 17lber tanks was expected, but it does not record their arrival.

Interestingly, much of the delay getting the 76mm fielded was taken up problems identified by perhaps too much "listening to the gripes of troops on the ground". While in hindsight a singular focus on "hole-punching" while ignoring the other issues that may have prevented that capability from being effectively used was a Hobson's choice. Rushing the 76 out would likely have resulted in troops on the ground complaining about poor rate of fire, turret freezing in rough terrain, and inability to effectively taget after the first few rounds.

Is it better to have guns that can hit the target with marignal effectiveness or a gun that can penetrate, if you can get a hit, but for which that is a more difficult task? And given the problem was engaging enemy heavy tanks, where does the decision to abandon the M6 Heavy tank - a decision that implicitly accepted the risk of sending more medium tanks which could be assumed to find themselves up agaisnt enemy heavy tanks? Would it have been better, rather than using tank destroyers in independant battalions (later companies) or say attach a platoon of them to each tank company? By the time the answers were understood, the war would be over before they could be fielded. And one can't discount the fact that Sherman armored forces in North Africa and Italy wer nonetheless successful at driving the Germans back.

Was the Sherman perfect? Hardly, but neither were any of the other tanks its comparable to.

What is the best book describing this ballistic issue? (In english).

World War II Ballistics: Armor and Gunnery by Lorrin Bird and Robert D. Livingston (Overmatch Press) but I believe it is out of print...

[Ursa MAior]

Rune

According to Ian. V. Hogg's Encylpoedia of Infatry weapons of WWII. (Bison books, 1977) p. 130 As long as ACPR ammo was available the PAK 36 was ok. But from 1942 the tungsetn shortage...

Lik I said 50mm/L60 still had ist uses e.g. in the bocage, but from beginning 43 its strength was not enough. 

[Rune Iversen]

ORIGINAL: morvwilson

Here is another tidbit that may keep this thread going for another five or six pages.

Training,

Toward the end of the war the Allies had it, the Germans did not. It was not necesarily better armor that beat Germany it was the crews themselves.

What about that angle?

Yes, no, possibly. Depends upon the formations in question. The US had a few debacles in 1945, where well trained (but totally green) tankers of the 8th and 12th Armoured got badly mauled by german antitank ambushes. On the other side of the coin you have 3rd Army mauling 4 Panzer brigades in september 44, destroying most of a months production run of Panthers in the process.

[Rune Iversen]

ORIGINAL: IronDuke


I don;t know what the optics were like on the Pershing or the TD range, though.

Good enough [:'(]

Beside, according to the danish army service manual for 76mm armed M4a3e4 (75mm shermans upgunned to 76mm, but without the turret swap), a hit is counted as likely against a stationary target out to 2000 meters with just 3 rounds (by "forking" the target). (We used the Sherm as an intermediate vehicle before we got the Centurions in 1953).

As for the 17 Pdr, the issue was only really relevant when firing APDS ammo. Other than that, then gun itself was supposedly very precise (we used that as well, in it´s towed configuration and in the form of the M10 Achilles). Again, danish army shooting manuals for the relevant systems point out that first round hits out to about 1500 meters (supposing that the range, wind and all that other guff is known etc.) is quite likely out to 1500 when firing APCBC (possible a more modern shot type than used in WW 2 though).

[Rune Iversen]

ORIGINAL: Ursa MAior

Rune

According to Ian. V. Hogg's Encylpoedia of Infatry weapons of WWII. (Bison books, 1977) p. 130 As long as ACPR ammo was available the PAK 36 was ok. But from 1942 the tungsetn shortage...

Lik I said 50mm/L60 still had ist uses e.g. in the bocage, but from beginning 43 its strength was not enough. 

Well, I agree. In the end, it was mostly replaced with Panzerschrecks, since the PAK 40 was in short supply and usually went to the Divisional PanzerJ¨ger Battalion first.

[freeboy]

There are so many issues beyond which gun in which tank, to name only a handful; how these where used, repaired reliability range of weopen etc etc. If the germans had done MUCH better at the air war, had tons more fuel, from pushing further in USSR? had done a great rather than poor job in strategic asset managment in East, the war probably would have gone a little longer, seen more jets on each side.. b 29's in Europe, and probably Hitler dying under a big mushroom cloud. So in a hypothetical world of the above, does the Panther or Tiger 1 do better ?

If we look at them in terms of years in service.. the big gunned tiger one, for all its shortcomings, surely rates high. What is the weight ratio on the PAnther? I did not think it was out of the Shermans league but the specs excape me. Surely the issue of one to one tank comparision is not panther vs any of the Shermans? IMO simply not realistic to compare, differnt armies tactics and needs.
Could the allies have done better and ended the war in 44? Absolutley, but again 20/20 hindsight...
So back to the ? of best and favorite tank? Does anybody love the Big red army Stalins?

Also, anyone know if the statement that most tanks where killed by anti tank weapons is true? Great thread btw...

[mdiehl]

Patton is not on your side because he didn't want Shermans dueling, which meant he wasn't overly moved whether the 75 or 76 were good enough or not. Taking doctrine to a T, the Americans had TDs for that

That is correct. Now ask yourself, with what gun was the M10 tank destroyer, whose doctrinal job was to kill enemy tanks, armed? Answer, in the 3rd AD, it was armed with the same 76mm gun used on the M4A3E8. The 76 had enough power to kill Tigers (PzVIEs), a heavy tank, and did so regularly and right through the thickest part of the PzVIE's armor. The real problem is noted with PzVs (as I have observed all along) and of course Koenigstigers, jagtigers (which had heavier armor IIRC) and jagdpz.

That means that roughly 90% of the German OOB (PzVIEs, PZIVs, StuGIIIs, StuGIVs, lighter-skinned AFVs of the Crazy Adolph's Refurbished Czec and French MilSurplus and Used Car Lot variety) were all wholly vulnerable to American 76-gunned AFVs. The most common German medium in the west, the PzIVF/G types, were qualitatively inferior to the 76 armed Shermans in almost every way. They had better ground pressure though.

No one here is saying that the Sherman was a fantastic Panther killer. It was an adequate Panther killer (and the evidence shows Shermans holing panthers under all kinds of circumstances) and wholly inadequate for killing the heaviest of German AFVs from the front. The answer to that was the M36 TD (initially) and finally the M26.

Did the Sherman suck? No. Was it better than any German AFV of the PzIV or older variety? Yes. Was it better than a Tiger (PzVIE)? IMO yes. Better than a PzVG, no I don't think so. For a tank designed in 1940 and continually upgraded through the years it has a darned fine track record of killing the German equivalent (PzIV --- another tank designed in 1940 and upgraded through the years) and the Russian equivalent (the T34). And it did rather well in the 76 armed variants against the German PzVIE -- a heavy tank outside of the Sherman's weight range and 2 years junior to the Sherman in design and development).

[mdiehl]

Surmise means you are claiming I have for rhetorical effect, but don;t really know do you?

That must be what you meant by "surmise" when you used it in the preceding post.

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Did the Sherman suck? No. Was it better than any German AFV of the PzIV or older variety? Yes. Was it better than a Tiger (PzVIE)? IMO yes. Better than a PzVG, no I don't think so. For a tank designed in 1940 and continually upgraded through the years it has a darned fine track record of killing the German equivalent (PzIV --- another tank designed in 1940 and upgraded through the years) and the Russian equivalent (the T34). And it did rather well in the 76 armed variants against the German PzVIE -- a heavy tank outside of the Sherman's weight range and 2 years junior to the Sherman in design and development).

Sums it up rather well.

As for the German heavies (the kitties as someone called them) a good case was made that when the Germans were able to build new tanks, the leopard does not seem to be based on any of them... however the Germans did see fit to put their MG-42 right back into production - so it suggests that as designs go the Panthers and Tigers were dead ends - while the Pershing, Centurion, and T-44 were anything but dead ends.

[Speedysteve]

Not being a tank expert but aren't the M4A3 and Pz IVH/J seen as being fairly even in performance? As in penetration? Armour? etc.

[mdiehl]

@IronD since you place so much emphasis on anecdotes here's one.

From Brassing Off Kraut , Maj. E.A. Raymond

This account in Italy Feb 1944 features M10 TDs dueling PzVIs and a Jagdtiger from s.Pz.Abt. 508 and s.Pz.Abt. 653.

An individual destroyer action which took place on February 29th is worth recounting.

3d Plat Co B was interdicting the Cisterna Road. The destroyers of Sgts. H. J. Ritchie and J. C. Christian were behind buildings in Isola Bella. A Ferdinand (88-mm assault gun) and a PzKw VI tank attacked directly toward Sgt. Ritchie's building and reached a point on the road about 300 yards from him. They were being supported by the fire of three PzKw VI tanks 250 yards up the road behind them [ed. range 550 yards] and another Ferdinand and a "VI" in a farmyard about 250 yards east of the position. As Cpl. J. P. Goldsmith, the gunner, tells the tale:

"Sgt. Ritchie ordered me to pull into open view around the corner of the building, and from this exposed position directed three hits onto the most exposed tank, it being about 550 yards up the road at that time, and knocked it out [ed. a frontal penetration at 550 yards on a PzVI from an M10]. We drew heavy AP and HE fire from the other tanks, shells barely missing our destroyer by a few feet and fragments hitting us. We were exposed for about five minutes. Then Sgt. Ritchie ducked his head and shoulders below the turret and pulled back behind the house. When enemy fire had ceased, Sgt. Ritchie had me pull out again, and from the same exposed position directed two rounds of AP shell that hit and bounced off the front armor of the Ferdinand 250 yards east of us. We again received intensive fire from the enemy tanks and shells were landing so close that fragments were coming through the open turret, one slightly wounding our gunner in the head when it hit our tank and damaging the counter-balance and .50-cal. machine gun mounted on the edge of the turret. We were again exposed to enemy fire for about five minutes. He ducked into the tank and we pulled behind the house again. We continued to fight throughout the day with our damaged gun." Sgt. Ritchie continues the story: "The second time we fired, Sgt. Christian radioed me to cover him and pulled out behind the house that he was using for defilade and directed the fire or five rounds, scoring two hits on the PzKw VI and two hits on the Ferdinand that were pinning us down. He definitely knocked them out: only two men got out of those two armored vehicles. Direct fire from the supporting enemy tanks was so intense that I saw two rounds hit the house around which he had moved to fire and another hit the corner of the building directly above his tank. If any of these shells had scored a hit, it would probably have put destroyer and crew out of action.

"A few minutes later Sgt. Christian again pulled out and fired on another supporting “VI” on the main road, scoring a direct hit and neutralizing that tank. He was exposed to intense enemy direct fire for about 15 minutes. By his coordinating the fire of our two weapons, diverting the attention of the enemy, that attack on our position was stopped. Prior to this action the sight extension bar on Sgt. Christian's gun had been bent, and the only means he had to adjust fire was to stand completely exposed above the turret with field glasses. Two teeth were broken off the turret worm gear, and throughout the engagement the gun was traversed by jolting against the gun housing and jerking the traverse handle until the gears would mesh."

Notably absent from the account is any whining about the alleged inferiority of the 76mm gun.