British Intervention

[sol_invictus]

iamspamus, I agree completely.

Since you are here and from the UK, maybe you can answer a question I have. Why in hell did Portugal feel the need to enter the war? I realize that the UK and Portugal had a special relationship for many decades, but what interest could Portugal have felt for them to make the choice to go to war? Did Britain offer German SW Africa as a plum?

Decided to see what the mighty Google could tell me and it seems that Germany actually declared war on Portugal over some seized ships. Like Germany needed more adversaries.

[TriumphRider]

The reason I say Tannenburg was not the victory it seemed was because (and you are correct in saying a good chunk of the Russian army was shattered) firstly:
The main reason I say the Russians were not defeated at Tannenberg was because of Galicia and Brusilov. Granted these were not against the Germans, but look at the effects those offensives had against Germany's war effort. Russia forced Germany, perhaps not in a direct way army to army, but forced Germany to expend MUCH needed resources on her ally Austria. I think there is a lot of myths surrounding Tannenberg. I really think a great resource to check this out:

The First World War by Holger Herwig, he covers the entire war from the perspective of the Central Powers, interesting stuff.


PS:
I was simply pointing out that the Kaiser telegrammed Moltke and ordered him to stop the schlieffen plan and go east. Moltke refused outright saying "the paperwork would take a year" so it did not happen, however, the occupation of Luxembourg was delayed.

[sol_invictus]

TriumphRider, I assume you are replying to Iamspamus but I will continue to throw in random thoughts. I agree that Tannenburg didn't cripple the Russian Army, but it certainly set it back on its heels. The rushed Russian offensive did achieve its goal though, in that it forced the Germans to draw off forces from the West and relieved pressure on the hard pressed French; needlessly as it turned out. If Molke had just kept his nerve and not felt compelled to rush the three Corps east in a moment of panic, things just might have gone better at the Marne; maybe.

I think the Kaiser's reply to Molke when he stated that making the last minute change was not possible; something like ,"Your uncle would have given me a different answer". I do think that August first or second was just a tad to late for such a change, but if the decision had been made a couple of weeks earlier, when the crisis began, things could probably been hashed out.

It seems that the German General Staff simply assumed that Britain would enter the war regardless, but that the German Army could defeat France before Britain could bring her forces to bear. Ludendorf made the same mistake later when he opted for the unrestricted U-Boat campaign. Again, America was discounted and it was decided that Germany could bring Britain to its knees before American force could be deployed.

I guess now that we know that Britain starts the game already at war, the actual question becomes American intervention. I really don't know anything about the rules governing American actions. I assume that a German policy that honored Belgium neutrality would help forstall American intervention, but I imagine any rules governing the U-Boat campaign will be the deciding factor. I wonder if anyone could comment on that. Does Germany, at some point, have to choose whether to commence unrestricted U-Boat operations and what effect does this have on both British resources and American intervention? I imagine that at that late stage it will be a moot point. If Germany doesn't already have the war well in hand by 1917, I think the game will be up. Another question that would govern a German decision about which front to concentrate on at the begining; does Germany have to leave forces in Russia after conquest? I would think so, but I wonder how large this garrison would be? So many questions and concerns, no wonder Ludendorf lost his mind toward the end.

[spence]

A long time ago I read "1914" (I think) by Alexander Solsenitsyn. For anyone unfamiliar with it, it concerned itself with the Tannenburg Campaign from the Russian perspective. As I recall it was originally supposed to be the first of a trilogy which concerned itself with the coming of the Russian Revolution (not sure what the other books were or even if the trilogy was ever completed). From Solsenitsyn's perspective (at least) Tannenburg marks a decisive moment in the advent of the Revolution.

Following the Russian Revolution and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk the Germans maintained a fairly large number of troops in the Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic States. Certainly some eastern garrison should be required if Russia leaves the war.

[Syagrius]

Very interesting thread. Would be great to experience those difficult decisions in the game, if it eventually get out [;)]

[sol_invictus]

spence, i wonder how the game will handle this though. Will there be some minimual number of Corps that the CP will need to maintain in the conquered portions of a defeated Russia? I think there should be some requirement and expect that there is. Same could be said for a conquered France if Germany is still fighting in the east.

[iamspamus]

Hey Arinvlad, I live in the UK but am from the States. To be honest, the W Front is my weakest section. I like the Near East, then the Balkans, then Eastern Front, then Italy, then the West. Kinda the opposite of the norm.

So, in short, I don't know. Sorry.

ORIGINAL: Arinvald

iamspamus, I agree completely.

Since you are here and from the UK, maybe you can answer a question I have. Why in hell did Portugal feel the need to enter the war? I realize that the UK and Portugal had a special relationship for many decades, but what interest could Portugal have felt for them to make the choice to go to war? Did Britain offer German SW Africa as a plum?

Decided to see what the mighty Google could tell me and it seems that Germany actually declared war on Portugal over some seized ships. Like Germany needed more adversaries.

[TriumphRider]

Portugal was sympathetic to the allies from the start and in Feb. 1916, under british encouragement, the Portugese seized 36 German ships in Portugese ports. Germany declared war on portugal in March 1916. the PEF was a disaster though, it was mostly British equipped and did not fare well in combat. I think the British, or have at least read, that the British really resented countries like Portugal sending troops because they often became liabilities that had to be equipped, trained and uniformed all at British expense. And as has already been stated, did not fare well in combat. 

[sol_invictus]

Thanks, I was very hazy on Portugal's involvement in the war.

[jjjanos]

I think that if the decision had been made early enough, say mid July, the German military machine could have been flexible enough to send more forces east.

Mid July of what year? Changing the mobilization plans in July 1914 was impossible. The logistics would have taken weeks.

[sol_invictus]

The German General Staff had detailed train tables for an Eastern deployment that were updated on a yearly basis. The General that commanded the Military Transportation Section, Staab I think was his name, wrote an entire book after the war to refute the comment that General Molke made to the Kaiser when he suggested that changing the Front was impossible. According to General Staab, if he had been given the order to concentrate to the east by August 1st, it could have been done. I think Molke's mind was more inflexible than the Train Schedules that the General Staff had created. He was just afraid of causing confusion by making a last minute change to a plan that Schlieffen and Molke, as his underling, had been anticipating for several years. We will never know of course, but it is interesting to contemplate the possible outcome of such a change.