OT: Choices - Sea Of Thunder or Black Shoe Carrier Admiral?

[TOMLABEL]

Gee-wiz, my first off-topic post, but thought I would get some of your ideas. I'm finishing up Shattered Sword and now trying to decide what to read next. I was seriously thinking about Black Shoe Carrier Admiral by Lundstrom, but I noticed Sea Of Thunder by Evans concerning the Leyte Gulf action. Has anyone got any opinions/suggestions on which should be next?

OK - back to finishing my turn.
TOMLABEL

[Tiornu]

You can blow through the Thomas book rather quickly. You will find it has nothing to say regarding the naval hardware in the battle or even an adequate account of the battle itself. It is a study of personalities involved in the decision-making process, and good on that level.
I haven't read the Lundstrom, but I'm sure you can count on it to exist in context of the military/historical realities relevant to its subject matter, unlike Sea of Thunder.

[marky]

i cant tell u anything about BSA since i havent read it

but Sea Of Thunder is an EXCELLENT book[:)]

[YankeeAirRat]

I just finished Lundstroms new book. I would highly recommend it. It talks pretty well of how Black Jack Fletcher was shuffled off to the side following the success of the 'Canal campaign. He took it to a point as a personal insult from Nimitz, but instead of brooding about it he rose to successfully turn around the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and the Pacific Northwest Naval Region in general. Lundstrom also seems to take on the myth that Fletcher was a coward and didn't know what he was doing, rather the theme that Lundstrom puts across is that Fletcher understood what dire straits the US was in post-PH. So he did his best to preserve forces that would be needed for defense rather then try and go for the finishing kills in a couple of the battles. Lundstrom points out that Fletcher knew that with the US Fleet trying to do double duty and the majority of the fleet on the bottom of Pearl those units available for use wouldn't be useful if they were heavily damaged or sunk while awaiting the latest round of ship building to catch up.
Overall a good book and worth the cost of buying it.

[JJB647]

I just read "The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors". Good read about the Battle off Samar.

[TOMLABEL]

Thanks guys for the responses. Based on what has been said, I think I will try out Black Shoe Admiral first and then look into SOT. I'll be going out with my honey to celebrate my birthday and I think I'll drop a few hints starting with Black Shoe Admiral and ending with Black Shoe Admiral!

[;)]

TOMLABEL

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: YankeeAirRat

I just finished Lundstroms new book. I would highly recommend it. It talks pretty well of how Black Jack Fletcher was shuffled off to the side following the success of the 'Canal campaign. He took it to a point as a personal insult from Nimitz, but instead of brooding about it he rose to successfully turn around the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and the Pacific Northwest Naval Region in general. Lundstrom also seems to take on the myth that Fletcher was a coward and didn't know what he was doing, rather the theme that Lundstrom puts across is that Fletcher understood what dire straits the US was in post-PH. So he did his best to preserve forces that would be needed for defense rather then try and go for the finishing kills in a couple of the battles. Lundstrom points out that Fletcher knew that with the US Fleet trying to do double duty and the majority of the fleet on the bottom of Pearl those units available for use wouldn't be useful if they were heavily damaged or sunk while awaiting the latest round of ship building to catch up.
Overall a good book and worth the cost of buying it.

Lundstrom has carefully explored and analyzed Fletcher's actions in various battles and has exonerrated him (in my mind, at least) of the most damaging charges... his main offense seems to have been believing the reports on fuel and aircraft given to him by the commanders of the ships in his TFs. He acted on these reports, and then was castigated and raked over the coals when they later didn't prove to be true.

Also, much of the blame for the Guadalcanal pullout can be placed on the changing plans of Turner et al. Apparently (and i had never read this anywhere else before Lundstrom) the plan was to pull out on day 2 to establish a seaplane base to the South of Guadalcanal, but the pace of loading did not allow it. So, by pulling out when he did, Fletcher was sticking to the original plan (more or less)*... a detail omitted by most writers on the landing.

*At least according to "The First Team" vol. 2.

[John 3rd]

I plan to read Black Shoe Admiral first.  Looks like the more interesting read.

[Nikademus]

If i were to summarize Lundstrom's stance on Fletcher vis-a-vis the First Team books (and elaborated it seems in his newest) its that Fletcher tends to get sliced with the sword of hindsight, a much sharper sword than is generally wielded in Spruance's direction for his actions at the Phillipine Sea Battle. Easy enough to do because of the Savo disaster. Fletcher as related in the previous post didn't really do anything that could be labeled as inapropriate. He interpreted his situation and orders to the best of his knowledge while always keeping an eye on the fact that he was commanding the USN's last bastion of strategic and operational naval strength. It was a heavy burden.

[Admiral DadMan]

It seems to me that many early writers (most notable Morison) flog Fletcher for excessive fueling and a lack of aggressiveness. Yet more and authors of late paint a different picture of him as you said Nik.

I also feel he got the shaft for not possessing omnipresent knowledge of hindsight.

[BrucePowers]

Ok, now I have read Lundstrom's books. I have not as yet.

[TOMLABEL]

Thanks everyone, again, for your input. It will definitely be BSA next. I'm very interested to read Lundstrom's current views on Fletcher.

TOMLABEL

[tsimmonds]

ORIGINAL: Admiral DadMan

It seems to me that many early writers (most notable Morison) flog Fletcher for excessive fueling and a lack of aggressiveness. Yet more and authors of late paint a different picture of him as you said Nik.

I also feel he got the shaft for not possessing omnipresent knowledge of hindsight.

Fletcher was a nuts and bolts guy. If every last line was not secured it creeped him out.

On the one hand this led to him mounting the searches that allowed Spruance to maintain contact with Nagumo following the morning strikes and get Hiryu in the afternoon. It also led to TF 17 launching a well-coordinated strike on June 4, where that of TF 16 was a debacle that was rescued from utter failure only through some good decision-making on the part of Wade McClusky and Dick Best.

On the other hand it led to him bugging out from supporting the Lunga landing after 36 hours (cutting the planned time on station short by more than half) because the fighter strength available on his 3 CVs had fallen from 99 to 78, and because he wanted to refuel.

The night following the day he left was the Savo island disaster. The presence of US carrier air during the preceding afternoon could have made a difference here.

Of course, this was Ghormleys operation, and he could well have told Fletcher to stay put. Halsey certainly would have done that had he been in command.

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

ORIGINAL: Admiral DadMan

It seems to me that many early writers (most notable Morison) flog Fletcher for excessive fueling and a lack of aggressiveness. Yet more and authors of late paint a different picture of him as you said Nik.

I also feel he got the shaft for not possessing omnipresent knowledge of hindsight.

Fletcher was a nuts and bolts guy. If every last line was not secured it creeped him out. On the one hand this led to him mounting the searches that allowed Spruance to maintain contact with Nagumo following the morning strikes and get Hiryu in the afternoon. It also led to TF 17 launching a well-coordinated strike on June 4, where that of TF 16 was a debacle that was rescued from utter failure only by some clear-headed thinking from Wade McClusky and Dick Best.

On the other it also led to him bugging out from supporting the Lunga landing after 36 hours (cutting the planned time on station short by more than half) because the fighter strength available on his 3 CVs had fallen from 99 to 78, and because he wanted to refuel.

The night following the day he left was the Savo island disaster. The presence of US carrier air during the preceding afternoon could have made a difference here.

As mentioned earlier, the original plan (ignored by most authors) was for the carriers to relocate on day 2 - and somehow this gets left out of almost every treatment of Guadalcanal. So, the plan time on station was not actually cut by half - unless you define the planned time on station to be "as long as we decide it should take - afterwards."

The carriers left the EVENING of the 8 Aug - so they *were* present the afternoon before the Savo Battle. They might have made a difference the next morning in striking the retreating Japanese, but then again, they may have run into a world of hurt. A Japanese strike force (a large one, by most accounts) sank a DD retreating through the approximate area where the CVs had been operating (West of Guadalcanal). The DD saved the landing force from being attacked (according to some).

[tsimmonds]

I confess my only source is Morison; he does say that Fletcher told Turner he would only cover him for no longer than two days, even though Turner said he needed four days. Apparently Ghormley left it for them to work out such details. Clearly this is not Fletcher's "fault", although it might have been well if he had been more committed to his mission of supporting the landing.

Another question I have is in regard to the area Fletcher was operating in. On the 7th he steamed along the southern shore of Guadalcanal, maybe 50 miles south of the beaches. Throughout the 8th (the afternoon before Savo) he was operating further to the east and south, more off San Cristobal than off Guadalcanal. It is not surprising that he did not find Mikawa, as this deployment kept this carriers on the disengaged side of the operation. At best this can be called "distant cover", but I have never read what his orders were or what the plan had been for the op. Again, this is not Fletcher's "fault", in the same way that Halsey was not at fault for failing to cover San Bernardino Strait.

If Morison is accurate, Fletcher turned southeast to leave the area pertty much at the same time that he requested permission to do so. He steamed in that direction for 8 hours before turning back to the northwest (still not having received permission to retire); at this point he was already nearly halfway back to Espiritu Santo. Clearly his enthusiasm for covering the landing force was not high. If the landings were going to take place at all, they should have been properly supported. Again, more Ghormley's failure than Fletcher's. But Fletcher does not cover himself with glory here.

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

I confess my only source is Morison; he does say that Fletcher told Turner he would only cover him for no longer than two days, even though Turner said he needed four days. Apparently Ghormley left it for them to work out such details. Clearly this is not Fletcher's "fault", although it might have been well if he had been more committed to his mission of supporting the landing.

Another question I have is in regard to the area Fletcher was operating in. On the 7th he steamed along the southern shore of Guadalcanal, maybe 50 miles south of the beaches. Throughout the 8th (the afternoon before Savo) he was operating further to the east and south, more off San Cristobal than off Guadalcanal. It is not surprising that he did not find Mikawa, as this deployment kept this carriers on the disengaged side of the operation. At best this can be called "distant cover", but I have never read what his orders were or what the plan had been for the op. Again, this is not Fletcher's "fault", in the same way that Halsey was not at fault for failing to cover San Bernardino Strait.

If Morison is accurate, Fletcher turned southeast to leave the area pertty much at the same time that he requested permission to do so. He steamed in that direction for 8 hours before turning back to the northwest (still not having received permission to retire); at this point he was already nearly halfway back to Espiritu Santo. Clearly his enthusiasm for covering the landing force was not high. If the landings were going to take place at all, they should have been properly supported. Again, more Ghormley's failure than Fletcher's. But Fletcher does not cover himself with glory here.

Odd... i had read (or at least i remember reading) that Fletcher operated his carriers to the WEST of Guadalcanal... i can go back and review the charts in the First Team (volume 2).

No, Fletcher didn't cover himself with glory... but i don't think that was his mission. i don't believe his actions had much to do with Savo, though. Ghormley has responsibility for much of the poor communications between senior officers (imo) - which broke down badly at the scene, and not just between Fletcher and Turner, but also between Crutchley and Turner, Crutchley and his ship commanders, etc., etc.

Ideally, Fletcher might have refuelled and then returned to cover the landing force late on Aug 9, which would have given the landing force more time to unload supplies. i won't get into who was responsible for the unloading debacle except to say from what i have read, it wasn't whom popular novelists (i.e. W.E.B.Griffin) blame.

EDIT:
Morrison is pretty good, but concerning a lot of stuff about Savo (and time leading up to it), much more information has come to light over the years making his account rather out of date, i think. (In)famously, his remark about the Australian pilots going to tea (rather than immediately reporting the Japanese task force coming down the Slot) was incorrect and angered the Aussies for years.

[Nikademus]

agreed....and Mikawa was never aware of Fletcher's dispositions so Fletcher being on station the day before Savo would have made no difference on his decision making process. In fact, even on withdrawing, the whereabouts and disposition of the CV's was still enough on his mind that he broke off after defeating the defending surface forces rather than move on to search out the transports.

to vent the flip side however....Shattered Sword doesn't credit Fletcher with orchestrating Yorktown's coordinated strike but rather credits Buckmaster and cites the fobiles of Coral Sea as the genesis of the improvement.

[tsimmonds]

In Morisson's Guadalcanal volume on p. 59 he shows Wasp's track from 0230 on the 7th through 0840 on the 9th. After about 1200 on the 7th, Wasp was never further west than Cape Esperance or further north than the northernmost tip of San Cristobal.

It is certainly possible that Fletcher's 3 carriers were not operating together the whole time.

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

In Morisson's Guadalcanal volume on p. 59 he shows Wasp's track from 0230 on the 7th through 0840 on the 9th. After about 1200 on the 7th, Wasp was never further west than Cape Esperance or further north than the northernmost tip of San Cristobal.

It is certainly possible that Fletcher's 3 carriers were not operating together the whole time.

OK [&:]- i'll have to go dig out the Lundstrom books (when i get home). i don't doubt your accurate quoting of Morrison, but now i am wondering if Lundstrom and Morisson agree on the carrier locations.

EDIT: Of course, i might just be misremembering as well - looking at the map of the Solomons, i realize i probably should have said SW rather than W, as i have tilted Guadalcanal in my mind's map folder... [8|]

[Nikademus]

Would have to check Lundstrom myself, but IIRC, Fletcher became more and more worried about a strike from Rabaul, esp after his fighter force got it's ass handed to it while LR-CAP'ing over Lunga. He might have shifted more SE after that point. I do recall clearly that after the fiasco he felt he didn't have the fighter strength to cover both himself and the landings and he felt the carriers were more important to protect. (I don't think he can be blamed here given what just happened to the Japanese at Midway)