Another way to get Chinese slots

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: Big B

ORIGINAL: treespider
{snip}

Most Japanese offensives that "failed" in China, "failed" because they had met their objectives and the Japanese ordered withdrawls to their original start positions because the start positions were the areas that had the best lines of communication in China - ie the Yangtze.
...

Ok, I'm not an expert on the Sino-Japanese war, but I must say that the description above, even though found in books, sure has the ring of "Japanese point of view".
It just seems suspect that the ANY army would repeatedly launch large incursions bringing on bloody protracted battles only to return time after time to their start line and then say "we weren't beaten at all - the mission was a success".
That has all the ring of WWI Allied "victories" on the Western Front - that were in reality bloody stalemates, and downright defeats that were never recorded as such in the western press.

Just my thoughts...

April 1942- July 1942 - Chekiang-Kiangsi Operation
Objective - Destruction of Airfields in Chekiang and Kiangsi Provinces the initial orders specifically state that after the objective is met units would be withdrawn. In addition it was intended to recover railway materials from the Chekiang-Kiangsi Railway.
Outcome - Airfields destroyed, Although the occupation of the railway was anticpated to last one month it was extended to two because bad weather hampered the salvaging. Units were then withdrawn.
Japanese losses 1640 dead 3716 Wounded

November 1943- December 1943 - Changte Operation
I've discussed the synopsis elsewhere. The objective of attacking toward Changte was acheived and Changte was occupied- total Japanese losses 1274 dead and 2977 wounded.The Japanese actually considered staying in Changte in preparation for Ichigo - however because the orders were already written to withdraw they were withdrawn. That rigid Japanese protocol everyone likes to mention. There was much back and forth between 11th Army, CEA and IHQ.

More to follow...

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: Zeke

treespider,

According to materials released by the War History Research Institute of Japan Ministry of Defense in late 70's,
Japanese 11th army, the attacking army based on Wuhan had to issue order to withdraw from approaching area of Changsha because they suddenly found they fell into a trap set by General Xue Yue, and the entire attackking force were being encircled by ROC Army from all direction. Despite the objection from the 3rd division, General Anami Korechika, the commander of 11th army issued the order immediately. One more day staying in the vicinity of Changsha might mean the destruction of the entire attacking group. Japanese never captured most part of Changsha in the Battle despite its heavy loss. At Jan 4 most part of the city were still in the holding of ROC 10A. From Jan 1 to Jan 4, and through Jan 16 in retreating Japanese attacking group was beaten badly. Actually I can give you a list of lost Japanese high-ranking officer's name, position, plus date and place of loss in the Third Battle of Changsha, just to show how badly the attacking group was beaten.

Hongkong surrendered at Dec 25, 1941, when Third Battle of Changsha just started.

Generally books in english regarding China Theatre were not in abundance and lack in detail and accuracy. Much better resource exists in Japanese and Chinese.

I agree that the Third battle of Changsha was a defeat for the Japanese. However during the battle the Japanese had occupied most of Changsha by the evening of January 4, when the order to withdraw was issued. In addition the intent of the whole operation was to tie down any potential Chinese reinforcement of the Canton Sector by units from the 9th War Area. The orders were issued about two weeks prior to the commencement of the offensive.

My sources include the abbreviated version of the Official Chinese History as well as the Monographs prepared by Japanese officers describing the different operations. And yes there is much reading between the lines with each.

[el cid again]

But back to the question of the thread:

IF we have Chinese slots - WHAT units would be added during the war? Where? When?

[Zeke]

el cid,

I have a bunch of first-hand and very detailed material about China Theatre available to me, released by all side of the theatre, the Japanese side, the ROC side, and the China Red Army side, in Japanese Language and Chinese Language. It is true that all of them have quite some ingredients pf prpopaganda, (the same applies to everything in this world) but after you put all these stuff from all participant of the theatre together, you are closer to the fact.

Since badnews is on his work to have a complete and accurate China Theatre OOB and TOE, I would just wait for his work. In the meantime, I would be glad to help research into the situation of any specific unit at any specific time in the theatre.

Just one suggestion, maybe you wanna try to cut ROC army supply level even further to limit their ability to be on offense.

As a a rule of thumb, around the end of 1941, in term of battle strength, roughly one Japanese battalion (Daitai) was equal to one division of ROC Central Army, or one army of ROC provincial (warlord) Army.

[Zeke]

treespider,

I will try to translate something from Japanese and Chinese into English, about The Third Battle of Changsha, and Changte. Also will try to find a map of Changsha.

[Zeke]

el cid,

roughly how many slots can you spare for ROC army and China Red Army? we can see to which level we should simplify...

[Zeke]

Wang Ching-wei's puppet army had the unaltered ROC uniform, just for one reason. Wang Ching-wei simply claimed he, and his Nanking based KMT, goverment and army, was the legitimate one, while the Chongqing-based Chiang Kai-Shek's was not.

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Let us try to separate propaganda from reality. Read, for example, World War II Nation by Nation - for a sense of the numbers. The number of ROC (and ROC warranted) troops serving Japan was in seven figures: millions. The uniform of the "Reformed" military - the largest of all the so called "puppet armies" - was the unaltered ROC uniform itself - except Japan insisted an anti-communist slogan be added to the hat.

For a scholarly view of the politics of the era INSIDE ROC - see China and the Origins of the Pacific War by Yaouli Sun - published by Stanford Univesity Press - and based on declassified ROC archives. This material suggests that ROC intentionally - and successfully - engineered the US entry into the war - because it was "the last, best hope for China" to defeat Japan.

For lots of reasons, a lot of untruth was and is still spread around. We were not entirely honorable either: China was victim to the largest instance of biological warfare in modern history - we knew it - and we denied it - instead cutting a deal with the Japanese to get the technology for ourselves. A lot of Chinese were upset about it. Russians too. When the Russians held a war crimes trial at Khabarovsk for these criminals - we denounced it as a "show trial" - knowing full well EVERY allegation was true. Because we did not want to be forthcoming with evidence we feared would help Soviet bw programs.

Ironically, ROC was a charter member of the Anti-Comintern Pact - with Nazi Germany and IJA dominated Japan. In that period Germany trained and equipped 10 ROC divisions - and not one of these was fit for combat by the time we got into the war. I did write from memory however - but as I recall there were two different battles of significance - the one involving Shanghai was the first and only time Japan ever fielded a Marine (Naval infantry) division in history - and then later a movement that ended in the "rape of Nanking." The ROC army did attempt to stand and fight - but it did not turn out very well - both the Army and Air Force suffering terribly and the Navy being wiped out as an organization.

[Zeke]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

For a scholarly view of the politics of the era INSIDE ROC - see China and the Origins of the Pacific War by Yaouli Sun - published by Stanford Univesity Press - and based on declassified ROC archives. This material suggests that ROC intentionally - and successfully - engineered the US entry into the war - because it was "the last, best hope for China" to defeat Japan.

For lots of reasons, a lot of untruth was and is still spread around. We were not entirely honorable either: China was victim to the largest instance of biological warfare in modern history - we knew it - and we denied it - instead cutting a deal with the Japanese to get the technology for ourselves. A lot of Chinese were upset about it. Russians too. When the Russians held a war crimes trial at Khabarovsk for these criminals - we denounced it as a "show trial" - knowing full well EVERY allegation was true. Because we did not want to be forthcoming with evidence we feared would help Soviet bw programs.

Ironically, ROC was a charter member of the Anti-Comintern Pact - with Nazi Germany and IJA dominated Japan. In that period Germany trained and equipped 10 ROC divisions - and not one of these was fit for combat by the time we got into the war. I did write from memory however - but as I recall there were two different battles of significance - the one involving Shanghai was the first and only time Japan ever fielded a Marine (Naval infantry) division in history - and then later a movement that ended in the "rape of Nanking." The ROC army did attempt to stand and fight - but it did not turn out very well - both the Army and Air Force suffering terribly and the Navy being wiped out as an organization.

I agree with all these though...

[Zeke]

el cid,

What happened in 1948 was quite different. It was civil war.

We can have a detailed list of instance of ROC army unit, at division and above, going over to the Japanese side during the war. So we can have a better analysis.

The view doesn't matter, the data and fact matter. Just as you said, for lots of reasons, a lot of untruth was and is still spread around.

to be followed soon.

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: Zeke


There were just no instance of ROC Central Army switching side to Japan.
(to be continued)

First of all - I was writing generally of Chinese military attitudes and behaviors - not just saying defection to Japan.
What we saw in 1948 - when most of the ROC went over to the Reds ("the best divisions in the morning would go over by nightfall") - was just a dramatic case. It is typical of Chinese behavior. They had corrupted Sun Tzu's "the greatest generals are not renowned because they do not fight battles but achieve the (objectives) of their prince by other means" into a system that justified changing sides (based on such things as "who has the artillery piece?").

Second of all - if you check your Osprey books on the Japanese puppet armies - you will find the view that they went over en mass - it isn't just World War II Nation by Nation.

Third - if you get the ROC historians to talk to you outside a situation deemed patriotic - you may learn some things not often put in print.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Zeke

el cid,

I have a bunch of first-hand and very detailed material about China Theatre available to me, released by all side of the theatre, the Japanese side, the ROC side, and the China Red Army side, in Japanese Language and Chinese Language. It is true that all of them have quite some ingredients pf prpopaganda, (the same applies to everything in this world) but after you put all these stuff from all participant of the theatre together, you are closer to the fact.

REPLY: I agree with this in principle. Further - I read (assisted by software and Chinese academics) in the principle languages which matter (Japanese, Mandarin, Hakklo, Cantonese, Vietnamese, Russian) - so I would be interested in any material you have I don't already have. Can you be specific?

Since badnews is on his work to have a complete and accurate China Theatre OOB and TOE, I would just wait for his work. In the meantime, I would be glad to help research into the situation of any specific unit at any specific time in the theatre.

REPLY: I don't really have time to do original work. It takes far too long. I am seeking corrections to the existing work - which is CHS modified stock - about one level back in time (I branched at CHS level 155 - was updated to CHS 177 - both of which were not released versions - and I think there is yet one more revision since). This isn't completely right: I also corrected the basic CHS set in several respects - including changing unit locations, commanders, heavy weapons,
and so on, when specific information existed to indicate it should be done that way. I also altered the nature of guerillas and added many more of them - and increased their absolute unit size and gave them small numbers of machine guns and light mortars. On top of that, I expanded the ROC Air Forces, added several significant missing plane types and quite a number of air units. I also got rid of the IL-4 - which never served in ROCAF - and gave it to the Russians - which for some reason were not allowed ot have it at all in stock or CHS.

Just one suggestion, maybe you wanna try to cut ROC army supply level even further to limit their ability to be on offense.

REPLY: I have gone the other way. China was considered too easy to conquer. I greatly "roughed up the map" (although - in fairness - Andrew ALSO roughed up the map a bit about the same time) - and I went to some trouble to make the Chinese economy more viable and harder to crush. The way the game "kills" units is to prevent them getting supplies - and so too few supplies is a way to insure units are not strong - but weak and prone to elimination.

As a a rule of thumb, around the end of 1941, in term of battle strength, roughly one Japanese battalion (Daitai) was equal to one division of ROC Central Army, or one army of ROC provincial (warlord) Army.

I am not sure I agree with that. Often regarded as something close to a JFB, nevertheless I would say that the ratio was more like one regiment to one division. And in WITP there is no difference between Central Army and Warlordy troops - we do not even know which is which? I think it might be worth a bit of research - using the War of Resistence data set might be a shortcut - to make there be a difference. But there was not when I got the data - and I have not changed that.
What I DID change was the relative ability of the Reds vs ROCs. The red guerilla units will tend to be at full strength (compared to 67% for ROC troops) if cut off from supply. Red line units have some elite commanders - including notably Gen Ping - later Marshall Ping - and higher morale and skill ratings.

IRL I am a serious student of IJA, ROCA and what became PLA. I do not regard the Chinese as pushovers - and in a sense the inability of Japan to defeat them cost Japan the war. If they WERE pushovers, Japan should have won the war before ever we got into it. In fact - the situation of China vs Japan is very similar to Russia vs Germany - it is not at all clear that the Axis power could win in any case? I think it is possible in both cases - but it is not a view universally held - nor beyond criticism. IF it is possible for Japan to defeat China (both ROC and Red) it should be difficult, not easy, IMHO.

[Badnews]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
.... we do not even know which is which? I think it might be worth a bit of research - using the War of Resistence data set might be a shortcut - to make there be a difference. But there was not when I got the data - and I have not changed that.
....

I've done 50 corps OOB with their real commanders by multi-data.
The rest 60 corps will be finish in few days[8D]. But I must say the tasks are arduous.[:o]
Though with many friends' help, it still needs time to check and make the data prefect.
Keep moveing on.[:D]

[el cid again]

We need posting of any changes from the data we use to what you think it should be - or it won't change.

[Badnews]

ORIGINAL:  el cid again
We need posting of any changes from the data we use to what you think it should be - or it won't change.

Most data of chinese army need rewirte, including CHS.
I will list some for example (CHS208 155#):
1. 2232# N28D The commander was Liu, Bo-long, not 19377# Mai, O.
2. The number of squard of the divsion was calculate as 3x3x3(Bn)x2(Regt)=162Sqd, but these division has 3 Regts.
3. 2233# N29D The commander was Ma, Wei-ji, not 19484# Yan, F.
4. 2234# N38D The commander was Sun, Li-ren, not 19212# Bai, J.
5. 2235# 19C The commander was Liu, Shao-tang, not the random one.
6. 2235# 19C better place them near Yenen, not Sian.
7. 2235# 19C has 3 divisions (68D, Temp.37D, Temp.38D), so 334 sqd is in correct.
....
So fully rewirte may be a better idea.[8D]

[el cid again]

It would be more germane to post modifications to the RHS data set. I do not control the CHS data set - I diverged from them a long time past - and I have folded in a number of changes. Not least of these, I removed all the bogus dual commands: CHS had "corps" and then "armies" as HQ - I renamed all the "corps" AS armies - and removed the "army HQ" as separate units. In RHS there are no corps at all - except when the term is part of a proper name (there are about two such cases). I also added the entirely missing heavy weapons suites supporting the infantry. A number of formations are not in the CHS locations either. We could gain a number of slot - as outlined above - but won't UNLESS you provide identification of what units should fill them. We also won't change the location or composition of a force UNLESS you provide information of what that should be. I can verify a recommendation - but the data set is vast - and reading Chinese isn't easy - and time is limited. As in a day or two. Whatever you can say to help - say it now - before we freeze this data set. This thread was started by me - and I am the RHS coordinator. It is not germane to comment on CHS except en passing - I can't change it even if I wanted to. I called for data to make RHS better and only data that contributes to that end will be reviewed for inclusion.

[Andrew Brown]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

It would be more germane to post modifications to the RHS data set.

More germane to you, but not me. I am interested in any corrections to the CHS data. Any corrections to the Chinese OOB are very welcome, and will presumably be useful to anyone interested, not just me.

I am still gathering fixes/updates for CHS, even though the next update is still stalled (for now).

Thanks,

Andrew

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: Andrew Brown

ORIGINAL: el cid again

It would be more germane to post modifications to the RHS data set.

More germane to you, but not me. I am interested in any corrections to the CHS data. Any corrections to the Chinese OOB are very welcome, and will presumably be useful to anyone interested, not just me.

I am still gathering fixes/updates for CHS, even though the next update is still stalled (for now).

Thanks,

Andrew

So I take it you're not interested in the China I put together for Treespider's CHS?

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: Badnews

ORIGINAL:  el cid again
We need posting of any changes from the data we use to what you think it should be - or it won't change.

Most data of chinese army need rewirte, including CHS.
I will list some for example (CHS208 155#):
1. 2232# N28D The commander was Liu, Bo-long, not 19377# Mai, O.
2. The number of squard of the divsion was calculate as 3x3x3(Bn)x2(Regt)=162Sqd, but these division has 3 Regts.
3. 2233# N29D The commander was Ma, Wei-ji, not 19484# Yan, F.
4. 2234# N38D The commander was Sun, Li-ren, not 19212# Bai, J.
5. 2235# 19C The commander was Liu, Shao-tang, not the random one.
6. 2235# 19C better place them near Yenen, not Sian.
7. 2235# 19C has 3 divisions (68D, Temp.37D, Temp.38D), so 334 sqd is in correct.
....
So fully rewirte may be a better idea.[8D]

For Treespider's CHS I did not concern myself with the leader names and likely have assigned random leaders, but I will input your suggestions.

In Treespider's CHS I placed the 19C as a Guerilla Unit in a base named Kao-ping in the wooded/rough area between Yenan (South of on the map/ East of IRL) and Honan (East of on the Map/ North of IRL). It is colocated with the Shansi Area Guerilla Base Force. A fictitous creation of mine to create a "safe" haven for Chinese guerilla unist to retreat to. There are two other such units - Shantung Area and Chahar Area.

Edit: OOPS I forgot about the Yenan Area Base force as well...

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: Zeke

treespider,

I will try to translate something from Japanese and Chinese into English, about The Third Battle of Changsha, and Changte. Also will try to find a map of Changsha.

No need but if you would like to great.

Here are the reader's digest versions-

Third battle of Changsha -
Chinese Version - Brilliant victory by Chinese forces allowing the japanese to enter Changsha then enveloping the attacking force. Or to quote the Chinese -

"During this battle, the enemy was late in launching the attack (the enemy crossed the Hsin-chiang River on Decemebr 24) and failed to respond timely to the enemy operations in Hong kong-Kowloon (the operations in Hong Kong were terminated December 25). Inadequate strength, narrow front, lack of depth, mistaken estimate on our strength and dispositions, blind attacks on our fortified positions in Chang-sha led to enemy defeat. Had the enemy not had air superiority and exceleent equipment, he would have been destroyed. taking full advantage of the lessons learned during the Second battle for Changsha, our forces adequately chose the time and the battlefield for the decisive battle. Our massing of superior strength to seek local superiority and over-run the enemy, enabled our forces to win glorious victories which contributed immensely to the overall situation. Over 50,000 enemy troops including 4 regimental commanders were killed or wounded, 139 enemy troops were captured together with 1,138 rifles and carbines, 115 machine guns, 11 guns, 26 pistols, 20 grenade launchers, 9 radios and large quantities of supplies."

Source: History of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945, Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai

Japanese Version - Diversionary attack that was called off on Jan 4. resulting in a hard fought withdrawal to the original start line for the offensive. Or to quote the Japanese-

"The objective of the second (the Japanese refer to this as the second Changsha operation) Changsha operation was to support the 23rd Army's operation against Hong Kong by preventing the Chinese from reinforcing that area. However, the operation was not begun until the day before the fall of hong Kong. Under these circumstances, the Chinese were relieved from the necessity of reinforcing Hong Kong and could freely assemble their fighting strengthin the Changsha area. In addition, the operational strength of the japanese forces was one-third less than during the first Changsha Operation and the strength of the enemy had been underestimated. Therefore, during the latter phase of the operation, although they were successful in the outlying areas, the Japanese forces were outnumbered and, in some cases, were overcome by the greater strength of the chinese. Japanese casualties during this operation were 1,591 killed and 4212 wounded; also 1120 horses were killed and 646 wounded. (4)

(4) Information in regard to operations of the 11th Army in this area was obtained from the memoirs of General Anami, former commander of the 11th Army."

Source: Japanese Monograph No 71, Army Operations in China December 1941- December 1943 - basic manuscript written by Lt Col Heizo Ishiwari.

[Andrew Brown]

ORIGINAL: treespider
So I take it you're not interested in the China I put together for Treespider's CHS?

I am interested. But I have yet to have a close look at it. It is on "the list" though. I just made my comment above to indicate that there are still people interested in CHS corrections.

Actually I don't want to play around with China too much, but I do want to improve the accuracy of the OOB if units are in the wrong place, for example, and I am also thinking of reducing the number of Chinese engineers.

Andrew

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: Zeke

treespider,

I will try to translate something from Japanese and Chinese into English, about The Third Battle of Changsha, and Changte. Also will try to find a map of Changsha.

The Battle of Changte

Chinese Version -

" During the course of the battle, ground and air, the fighting was most intense. The gallantry of our officers and men led to the killing and wounding of 20,000 enemy troops. Three of our division commanders, Hsu Kuo-chang, Peng Shih-liang and Sun Ming-chin were killed in action, so were most of the officers and men of the 57th Division. Similarly our 10th and 73rd Corps also suffered heavy losses. Due to the re-dployment of several elite corps to Yunnan and India, our strength in this battle was inadequate. However, our forces, having succeeded in defeating a stubborn enemy and shattered the enemy objective to capture changteh and keep our forces from clearing the China Burma highway, contributed immensely to the overall situation"

Japanese Version -

Operational Plan:
The main force of the 11th Army (approximately 35 infantry battalions, including those forces from other areas) will advance rapidly from Tungshih and Shihshu areas and capture the Changte area, destroying the enemy everywhere en route.
Successively, the enemy assembling in and counterattacking from the Changte area will be sought out and destroyed.
After the operational objective has been attained, the Army will begin its withdrawal to its former station at an oppurtune time, taking into consideration the possibility of enemy counterattacks from Burma....

Lines of Communication

All the principal roads had been destroyed but, having regard to previous experience, it was felt that it would not be feasible to attempt to repair the roads. As the operational zone was a rice-producing area, supplies could be obtained locally and it was planned to supply ammunition only at the Li Shui line and at Changte.

... The 11th Army's objective during the second phase of this operation was to destroy the enemy in the proximity of Changte and to capture the town....

On 23 November, the 11th Army ordered the main force of the 116th Division with elements of the 68th and 3rd Divisions to capture Changte. On the 25th, this force opened its attack but one division of the 74th Army, whaich was occupying Changte, resisted stubbornly. During this time, the Chinese 10th Army adavanced north from Hengyang to reinforce changte, crossed the Tzu Chiang and attacked the japanese forces. As the enemy had advanced through the area between the 3rd and 68th Divisions, the divisions effected a pincer movement and on 1 December, destroyed this force.

In spite of continued resistance on the part of the enemy on 4 December, the 11th Army occupied Changte.

The Army then adjusted its positions on the Northern bank of the Yuan chiang and was on the verge of withdrawing when an inquiry was received from Imperial General Headquarters, through the commander in Chief of the China Expeditionary Army, concerning the possibility of maintaining Changte in preparation for the Ichigo Operation which was to be conducted the following year. The Army objected on the grounds that it was impossible to alter the present operational plan and on 9 December, ordered the various units to withdraw to the Li Shui starting on the night of the 11th...

...Japanese casualties during the operation were 1,274 dead and 2977 wounded."