Shattered Sword Website

[Prince of Eckmühl]

For anyone interested in the book's subject matter, check out the website:

http://www.shatteredswordbook.com/

PoE

[hempy]

thank you for your info! I like it very much!!

[Duck Doc]

I totally agree. I am just finishing Shattered Sword & it is the best WW2 Pacific Theater battle history I have ever read. It is a very thorough & detailed treatment of the Japanese dilemma at Midway & provides very good reasons why the Japanese experienced the lopsided defeat they had visited upon them. I learned more about carrier operations from this book than from all my other reading combined. The diagrams, maps & OOB's are painstakingly complete. I can't recommend the book highly enough. It is very innovative & most entertaining.

[BlitzDude]

Thanks for the link. I finished the book a couple of weeks ago and thought it was excellent. It is, however, essentially the Japanese side of the story - but that's why I bought it. Among the interesting facts...the USN lost about 40% of its carrier strike force in it's attack, much of this due to ditching the planes as they ran out of fuel while attempting to return to the US carriers. The Japanese CAP was HIGHLY effective but limited ultimately in its ability to handle a (simultaneous) *multi-vector* attack as the CAP tended to "bunch up" and ended up in a lop-sided formation around the IJN carriers. The Akagi was sunk by only ONE direct hit. Another near-miss jammed its rudder. Yet another near-miss produced no effect. That was it...ONE hit. The book dishes out plenty of criticism at Yamamoto and the other Japanese leadership and doctrines. It praises the Japanese naval air forces except for their tendency to clump together in CAP. In the end though, there was a great deal of luck involved (as there is in any battle) and it was all of the bad variety for the IJN. Overall highly recommended.

[decaro]

Does anyone know where the authors got their source material for this book?

[Prince of Eckmühl]

ORIGINAL: BlitzDude

Thanks for the link. I finished the book a couple of weeks ago and thought it was excellent. It is, however, essentially the Japanese side of the story - but that's why I bought it. Among the interesting facts...the USN lost about 40% of its carrier strike force in it's attack, much of this due to ditching the planes as they ran out of fuel while attempting to return to the US carriers. The Japanese CAP was HIGHLY effective but limited ultimately in its ability to handle a (simultaneous) *multi-vector* attack as the CAP tended to "bunch up" and ended up in a lop-sided formation around the IJN carriers. The Akagi was sunk by only ONE direct hit. Another near-miss jammed its rudder. Yet another near-miss produced no effect. That was it...ONE hit. The book dishes out plenty of criticism at Yamamoto and the other Japanese leadership and doctrines. It praises the Japanese naval air forces except for their tendency to clump together in CAP. In the end though, there was a great deal of luck involved (as there is in any battle) and it was all of the bad variety for the IJN. Overall highly recommended.

I came away from the reading with the impression that, from top to bottom, the IJN was saddled with operational and tactical doctrines that were overwhelmingly slanted in the direction of attack and that this pervaded every aspect of the battle. While certainly highly-skilled aviators, Japanese fighter pilots were undisciplined when committed to the defensive role. Examples in the battle can be found in the CAPs pirahna-like reaction to the presence of Jimmy-Thach, their tendency to clump together that you describe above. Another example of this lack of discipline occurred when the Hiryu's torpedo planes were abandoned by their escorts to attack U.S. bombers. In both cases, the behavior was associated with a feverish determination to attack and destroy, defensive duties being looked upon as inherently less effective (and less honorable). Certainly, when tasked with defensive duties, Japanese personnel would carry out their orders, but their training (and heart) really wasn't in it.

In concert with what was essentially an ethic of all-out attack was Kido Butai's doctrine of massive, deck-load strikes. This reliance on concentration to obliterate an enemy before the assailed could effectively respond was full of holes, the foremost of which was the formation's inability to defend against a large, multi-vector threat like that which it experienced at Midway. It's weaknesses were manifold, running the gambit from it's CAP, which were essentially "wild-boars" once they were launched, lacking even rudimentary radio contact with their ships, to their anti-aircraft doctrine, which could be best summarized as "every carrier for itself." One of the assertions that the authors make is that these weaknesses were so dramatic in their implications to the fate of the KB that the formation was essentially doomed as soon as the U.S. carrier strike(s) had cleared their decks. The vaunted collection of ships was just that vulnerable to that which was headed its way.

Finally, I found their depiction of Nagumo and his decision-making to be profound in the extent to which his actions were dictated by circumstance, of how he became aware of the presence of enemy carriers AFTER the U.S. strikes had already launched, of how his own strike aircraft were held below-decks because of the need to recover the Midway strike and the incessant cycling of a CAP that was inexorably trending toward disintegration. And again, it's culture expressed via doctrine that is the culprit. The authors posit that Nagumo withheld orders to immediately launch a strike against the U.S. carrier sighting because it would have meant attacking dispersed, willy-nilly, "American-style," if you will, and that he would not do. It would have been a violation of doctrine and, were it to fail, he would shoulder the blame rather than the system that had generated it. And that was too great a burden for any Japanese commander to bare.

I'd encourage anyone who's interested in the 1942 carrier battles to read Shattered Sword. Parts of it, particularly those which are open to interpretation, such as a figures motivation for doing this or that, can be argued up a storm. But it's certainly a breath of fresh air to read a book that was written by authors who bothered to seek the counsel of Japanese historians before generating their volume. It's great that someone has actually done their homework in documenting what occurred on the decks of the KB and why it was destroyed.

PoE

[Prince of Eckmühl]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

Does anyone know where the authors got their source material for this book?

Much of it is from eye-witness accounts produced by Japanese historians. Also, a lot of work has been devoted to flight-logs of the KB airgroups. The ships logs conveniently went down with the carriers, btw. The material has been available for twenty-thirty years but went unnoticed for want of translation and interpretation. The authors offer copious source referencing.

PoE (aka ivanmoe)

[GoodGuy]

ORIGINAL: Prince of Eckmühl
The ships logs conveniently went down with the carriers, btw. The material has been available for twenty-thirty years but went unnoticed for want of translation and interpretation. The authors offer copious source referencing.

PoE (aka ivanmoe)

Hi POE, you suggested that I should read Shatt.Sword a while ago, and I've read a lot of reviews and reader comments, and now I think ppl should read this interesting book, especially since the US Navy put it on their list of "must-read" works for their academy and their research facilities.
I have not read the book yet (delivery to Germany takes several weeks [8|]) but I've ordered it.
I do think, despite all the numbers and facts the authors collected, that this work has a few weak spots, though. Correct me if I'm wrong (since I've not read the book yet), but I got the following impressions after I did quite some research about the book:

Since the authors communicated with so many ppl around the globe (via email, hey this is the electronic age :p) many quotes/footnotes refer to emails only. Japanese experts/historians forwarded numbers/figures, blueprints etc., but original sources/works (given, most likely in japanese anyways) remain unknown/unmentioned, with some of these "evidences" coming across as hearsay, although these experts might be spot-on. In quite some cases, the authors never got their hands on original sources/material. Don't get me wrong, with their thorough research/communication, they collected a massive amount of facts, no doubt.

Still, all the details about hangar setups, loading processes, operating mode and construction design of AA's, fire control, doctrines, do not tell what the USN did right (besides having a good amount of luck), so I still tend to think that dedication and a few quick bold moves on the US side, and - in turn - some bad coordination and delayed decisions on the jap side were important factors at Midway, maybe a tick more important than the authors would accept.

They paint a picture where the IJN's assets and doctrines were ill-fated right from the start, with doctrines, procedures and even vessels/aircrafts having quite some weaknesses.
I for one do think that, in addition to these weaknesses, some officers within the KB were "just" incapable and/or they proposed/conducted half-assed operations.

Misconceptions during the planning phase (for Midway), poor planning (or bad luck, depending on your POV) regarding the collection of intel (i.e. operations of the seaplane base, which was supposed to track the movement of US carriers, were delayed), bad a/c coordination and double minded officers ... all of these factors have to be added to the facts stated in the book.

The US in turn did have one or another incapable high-ranking officer, even with subordinates demanding the removal, but dedication and finesse presented by some of the TG commanders partially made up for some dumb moves.

Also, I don't know if the authors factor in the sheer US advantage when it comes to industry/weaponry production. Even if IJN doctrines / procedures / weaponry would have been superior all along the way, the amount of weaponry the US could field after Midway was impressive and a tough nut to crack. Until Midway, US air assets for example, were not as successful/capable as one might think after reading Shattered Sword.
I think I'll stick to my theory (for now) that the IJN would have had a chance at Midway, if the operation would have been planned differently. Spreading the forces (by ordering the simultaneous attack on the Aleutians, which wasn't even conducted simultaneously [8|]) was one of the worst moves around.

Last but not least, it seems to be like KB here KB there in the book, although the term for the "combined fleet" (superior unit, I can't recall the japanese term atm) was the more important part within the japanese doctrine.
Gigantic surface ships played a vital role in that fleet and in their doctrine in general, since the IJN believed that these monstrous BBs were needed, although we know today that they bet on the wrong horse, so I would like to know how the authors treat that part of history.
(High numbers of) Carriers turned out to be one of the decisive factors during the war in the Pacific, with the USN's submarines accounting for 55% of all Japanese tonnage sunk in the war, maybe the most important branch if you look at what quickened Japans fall.

Unlike the fight for resources in Europe, namely the Allied doctrine to cut supply lines/resources of the Axis, which was only partially successful (because the Axis powers managed to rebuild/repair plants often), the raids on Japanese supply lines, conducted by a/c's, TGs and submarines, with the latter being the most succesful branch, were impressively successful.

I think reading a good book covering the US POV, along with reading Shattered Sword, would be the way to go, since Sh.-Sword delivers valuable insights, but it does not draw the whole picture.

My 2 cents.

[decaro]

... Gigantic surface ships played a vital role in that fleet and in their doctrine in general, since the IJN believed that these monstrous BBs were needed, although we know today that they bet on the wrong horse, so I would like to know how the authors treat that part of history ...

Re the History Channel: IJN BBs were to be used in a stand-off role, engaging enemy surface ships w/o having to close the range between them and the rest of their fleet. BBs are also handy for pre-invasion shore bombardments. We even used the Missourri in Korea and outfitted it w/cruise missles for DS.

I wouldn't say the IJN underestimated carrier power since they used it fairly effectively at Pearl Harbor; Japan just didn't have the resources to mass produce CVs.

Anyway, just got the word from the bookstore that my "Sword' is in; After I read it, maybe then I will become more knowledgable on this subject.

[GoodGuy]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

Re the History Channel: IJN BBs were to be used in a stand-off role, engaging enemy surface ships w/o having to close the range between them and the rest of their fleet. BBs are also handy for pre-invasion shore bombardments. We even used the Missourri in Korea and outfitted it w/cruise missles for DS.

Some of the reasons for reactivating the US BBs after WW2: The US had to do something about the fact that they were facing a massive amount of Warsaw pact ships, so they tried to make up for the lack of tonnage/firepower after the war. Also, the US BBs were meant to act as deterrence mainly, especially for smaller states (sending a BB to the coast of {what we call} a "banana republic" used to impress foreign leaders, hehe), as their combat effectiveness was somewhat low during the cold war era, if compared to modern frigates or nuclear CVs.
Given, as u pointed out, they were somewhat useful for shore bombardments, but they did not gain any combat effectiveness before they had been equipped with missiles, keeping in mind that it takes like 2 anti-ship missiles only to strike a BB.

Btw, were u referring to "history channel" documentaries? If so, let me tell you that you should watch these with suspicion, hehe. They often shuffle around statements/numbers and mix up facts, research is often sloppy. I tend to refer to most of their docs as "junk food", especially if looking at some of their docs about the German "blitz" (full of errors and misinterpretations). There's nothing like a thoroughly researched BBC doc.

I wouldn't say the IJN underestimated carrier power since they used it fairly effectively at Pearl Harbor;

I didn't say they underestimated CVs. They just overrated the usefulness of their BBs, which is funny, since Japanese air assets sunk 2 British BBs right after the Pacific war started. They saw how vulnerable the British ships were, but still proceeded to speed up production of their own BBs.

[decaro]

Some History Channel shows are certainly better than others; I don't think they have a very big budget. We sometimes get BBC International, but it's usually a series of shows re their monarchy.

I think those Brit BBs were the Repulse and Prince of Whales; they were operating w/o any air cover, and suffered accordingly. Even the Japanese were surprised they were sunk so easilly.

[GoodGuy]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

Some History Channel shows are certainly better than others; I don't think they have a very big budget. We sometimes get BBC International, but it's usually a series of shows re their monarchy.

We have a few channels which are either co-producing series with the BBC (ZDF/ARD) or obtaining the BBC productions about military history. Other formats (like Spiegel TV, a spin-off of the Spiegel magazine) dig for unknown material ("WW2 in color", KG Peiper - Ardennes) on their own and they produce their own doc's.

I think those Brit BBs were the Repulse and Prince of Whales; they were operating w/o any air cover, and suffered accordingly. Even the Japanese were surprised they were sunk so easilly.

Correct. They proved to be useless if without fighter cover. But, for the Japanese, even if using fighter cover, a higher number of IJN light/heavy cruisers and CVLs may have been the better choice, imho.

[decaro]

... Correct. They proved to be useless if without fighter cover. But, for the Japanese, even if using fighter cover, a higher number of IJN light/heavy cruisers and CVLs may have been the better choice, imho ...

A very fast task force; first the enemy has to find it, and if they do, the CVLs can put up CAP.

But my book is in, so I'm off.

[decaro]

Thank you for recommending this book and posting its Website: although I haven't even finished the first chapter, I have already learned about the Kido Butai (Mobile Group), its ships and commanders.

Unfortunately, I guess that after I finish Shattered Sword, I will never be able to watch the movie Midway the same way again; it was one of my favorite WW II naval flics.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: Prince of Eckmühl

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

Does anyone know where the authors got their source material for this book?

Much of it is from eye-witness accounts produced by Japanese historians. Also, a lot of work has been devoted to flight-logs of the KB airgroups. The ships logs conveniently went down with the carriers, btw. The material has been available for twenty-thirty years but went unnoticed for want of translation and interpretation. The authors offer copious source referencing.

PoE (aka ivanmoe)

Almost finished Shattered Sword and just read that sailors did manage to save the ship's log from Nagumo's flagship, Akagi. They had plently of time to do this; allthough all the IJN CVs eventually became burning hulks after they were hit, they didn't take on water and had to all be scuttled w/torpedoes.

And if the Japanese had (more than) enough time to retrieve the Emperor's photo from each crippled carrier, why not all the ship logs as well?

[wworld7]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

And if the Japanese had (more than) enough time to retrieve the Emperor's photo from each crippled carrier, why not all the ship logs as well?

Joe,

You are thinking like a Westerner, you have to try to undestand the "way" and "why" the people of Japan lived their lives and made their priorities the way they did. Some were choices we disagree with and some are just hard to understand from our point of view.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: flipperwasirish

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

And if the Japanese had (more than) enough time to retrieve the Emperor's photo from each crippled carrier, why not all the ship logs as well?

Joe,

You are thinking like a Westerner, you have to try to undestand the "way" and "why" the people of Japan lived their lives and made their priorities the way they did. Some were choices we disagree with and some are just hard to understand from our point of view.

Have we had this discussion before? It sounds very familiar.

Anyway, they did save all the flights logs and the log of Nagumo's flagship. Nagumo and his staff were as steeped in IJN doctrine and Japanese culture as any of the other CV officers, and it's not like there was a choice between the Emperor's portrait or the logs.

And if any KB carrier officer had anything to conceal by letting his logs go to the bottom, it was Nagumo who, as commander, had the most (face) to lose.

Oriental or occidental, I still find this inexplicable.

[wworld7]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.


Have we had this discussion before? It sounds very familiar.

Oriental or occidental, I still find this inexplicable.

Joe, we have not had this conversation before.

I believe you find it inexplicable. I am at a loss as how to assist with this.

[NawlinzVoodoo]

Read the 'Sword' book, then...go get the book called 'Midway Inquest'. Blows this book and all others out of the water. [;)] hehe. Seriously, this book is awesome, I promise you will love it!!! Was release in July of 2007!!!!
 
http://www.amazon.com/Midway-Inquest-Japanese-Twentieth-Century-Battles/dp/0253349044

[decaro]

Did you read sword, cause Midway Inquest seems similar in that it goes back to IJ records?

The price of MI is certainly cheaper than Sword.