Tactical Reserve & Local Reserve

[rhinobones]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
Really? What's your 'first hand experience' -- and what range of conditions and scales does it cover?

Yes, really. Nam, 70-71, Co/Bn. There were three of us called Rhino . . . I was the Bones. And no, I was not a medic. The Navy provided the medics.

Point being that OPART covers a wide range of scales, unit capabilities, etc. Obviously, a mechanized battalion deployed over a 2 km front might be able to pull up stakes pretty quick when it gets the word -- but whether the same applies to a 1916 Russian infantry corps dug in across 20 kilometers is another question.

You’re making a problem where there isn’t any. A variable can be defined that calculates how any MPs a unit needs to both move and entrench based on the designer’s input.

In general, though, it seems a tad odd to me that a unit could be simultaneously entrenched to hold a given sector and ready to move out at a moments' notice.

Besides you, who said it was at a moments notice? Moving takes time and that is all part of the usage of MPs by a unit in reserve. The number of movement points required is function of the unit’s readiness and experience. I don’t see a big difference between an entrenched unit moving out as opposed to a unit milling about in “reserve” status and moving out.
Your position implies that units are either tasked 100% to move out or 100% to entrench and that switching from one mode to another take some kind of extraordinary effort. This is just not the case no matter how absurd you try to frame your argument.

Certainly, it's not a change I think would necessarily improve the game.

As is, a unit will move from the back line to reinforce the front line and has absolutely no ability to defend itself by digging in (the current TOAW model). You evidently find this more realistic than a unit that moves up to the front line and, provided time is available, entrenches before the next assault.

Regards, RhinoBones

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: rhinobones

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
Really? What's your 'first hand experience' -- and what range of conditions and scales does it cover?

Yes, really. Nam, 70-71, Co/Bn. There were three of us called Rhino . . . I was the Bones. And no, I was not a medic. The Navy provided the medics.

Point being that OPART covers a wide range of scales, unit capabilities, etc. Obviously, a mechanized battalion deployed over a 2 km front might be able to pull up stakes pretty quick when it gets the word -- but whether the same applies to a 1916 Russian infantry corps dug in across 20 kilometers is another question.

You’re making a problem where there isn’t any. A variable can be defined that calculates how any MPs a unit needs to both move and entrench based on the designer’s input.

In general, though, it seems a tad odd to me that a unit could be simultaneously entrenched to hold a given sector and ready to move out at a moments' notice.

Besides you, who said it was at a moments notice? Moving takes time and that is all part of the usage of MPs by a unit in reserve. The number of movement points required is function of the unit’s readiness and experience. I don’t see a big difference between an entrenched unit moving out as opposed to a unit milling about in “reserve” status and moving out.
Your position implies that units are either tasked 100% to move out or 100% to entrench and that switching from one mode to another take some kind of extraordinary effort. This is just not the case no matter how absurd you try to frame your argument.

Certainly, it's not a change I think would necessarily improve the game.

As is, a unit will move from the back line to reinforce the front line and has absolutely no ability to defend itself by digging in (the current TOAW model). You evidently find this more realistic than a unit that moves up to the front line and, provided time is available, entrenches before the next assault.

Regards, RhinoBones

A unit does take time to deploy, and if it is already deployed, it takes time to assemble in march order and move off. Unlike you, for example, Patton did not regard it as routine when his army was able to disengage, promptly move north, and go into the attack to relieve Bastogne. He actually thought it was quite a feat.

You try to cavalierly dismiss my point that depending upon the scale and so on, it can indeed be impractical for a unit to be simultaneously deployed in a defensive posture and ready to serve as a rapid-reaction force -- but you should be able to see my point.

If you choose not to, that's your affair.

[Karri]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
A unit does take time to deploy, and if it is already deployed, it takes time to assemble in march order and move off. Unlike you, for example, Patton did not regard it as routine when his army was able to disengage, promptly move north, and go into the attack to relieve Bastogne. He actually thought it was quite a feat.

Patton moved a whole army in 48 hours...It was quite a feat, but it is not what we are discussing. The point is that for example if I have a division with 3 regiments, I can hold 2 regiment in the frontline and 1 behind them in tactical reserve. What stops this third regiment from being in entrenched positions? Unless the time is something like 6 hours a turn then the unit moving to counter-attack is completely possible.

And do remember that this is not in any way comparable to what Patton did, this is easy and there are plans for it.

I do not have experience of battalions, regiments, brigades and divisions, but from company level down I do have.

A company can get on the move pretty fast. If an immediate counter-attack is needed, then no more than an hour is needed. If everything needs to be moved then a few hours...but this doesn't mean the combat forces wouldn't still get on the move within an hour. Just leave the cooks etc. to strip down the tents etc.

Platoons can get on the move within minutes. I know this because I have done this. From entrenched positions to counter-attack.

Btw. deploying doesn't really take much time. Our liutenat made us run back and forth for a whole day back when I was conscript, we had 10 minutes to set up a tent(plus everything inside) and look up defensive positions. 5 minutes to strip down the tent, pack up everything, and be ready to move. That's with a 7 men squad.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: rhinobones

We are talking Tactical Reserve, not Local Reserve.

Regimental scale, time wise probably half week or one week turns . . . and you’re telling me that is not adequate time to move to a new position (a position that is already occupied and at least partially prepared by friendly forces).

I'm sorry -- but I don't see it.

Think this really displays the pundit’s lack of first hand experience. The ability of a combat unit to move, and to find cover while under fire, is being vastly understated.

Regards, RhinoBones

Now how'd we decide it was 'regimental scale, time wise probably half week or one week turns'?

Could be one day turns and regiments. Or it could be half-week turns but corps.

Finally, it could be some military period your twelve-month tour in Viet Nam gives you no knowledge of whatsoever. Like, did you get a lot of experience with the need to feed and water stock before hitching them up to that field gun?

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Karri

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
A unit does take time to deploy, and if it is already deployed, it takes time to assemble in march order and move off. Unlike you, for example, Patton did not regard it as routine when his army was able to disengage, promptly move north, and go into the attack to relieve Bastogne. He actually thought it was quite a feat.

Patton moved a whole army in 48 hours...It was quite a feat, but it is not what we are discussing. The point is that for example if I have a division with 3 regiments, I can hold 2 regiment in the frontline and 1 behind them in tactical reserve. What stops this third regiment from being in entrenched positions? Unless the time is something like 6 hours a turn then the unit moving to counter-attack is completely possible.

And do remember that this is not in any way comparable to what Patton did, this is easy and there are plans for it.

I do not have experience of battalions, regiments, brigades and divisions, but from company level down I do have.

A company can get on the move pretty fast. If an immediate counter-attack is needed, then no more than an hour is needed. If everything needs to be moved then a few hours...but this doesn't mean the combat forces wouldn't still get on the move within an hour. Just leave the cooks etc. to strip down the tents etc.

Platoons can get on the move within minutes. I know this because I have done this. From entrenched positions to counter-attack.

Btw. deploying doesn't really take much time. Our liutenat made us run back and forth for a whole day back when I was conscript, we had 10 minutes to set up a tent(plus everything inside) and look up defensive positions. 5 minutes to strip down the tent, pack up everything, and be ready to move. That's with a 7 men squad.

Sure -- but as you say, this is for certain time scales, and with a particular army using particular equipment. What a modern US rifle company with extensive training and lavish communications can do is one thing -- what some Russian Civil War corps with not even one field telephone to its name can do is another.

My point -- Rhinobones' attempts to sneer notwithstanding -- is that allowing units to be both entrenched and standing by on reserve may not be especially realistic across the whole range of situations. As far as TOAW goes, I actually could care less about what a modern US unit can or can't do. My interest in warfare ends at about 1960 -- and look at the scenario list on the disc. How many of the units involved have anything like the capabilities of the military unit you served in?

[Karri]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright


Sure -- but as you say, this is for certain time scales, and with a particular army using particular equipment. What a modern US rifle company with extensive training and lavish communications can do is one thing -- what some Russian Civil War corps with not even one field telephone to its name can do is another.

My point -- Rhinobones' attempts to sneer notwithstanding -- is that allowing units to be both entrenched and standing by on reserve may not be especially realistic across the whole range of situations. As far as TOAW goes, I actually could care less about what a modern US unit can or can't do. My interest in warfare ends at about 1960 -- and look at the scenario list on the disc. How many of the units involved have anything like the capabilities of the military unit you served in?

I would argue that in most situations the units would be able to do this. WWI onwards.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Karri

ORIGINAL: ColinWright


Sure -- but as you say, this is for certain time scales, and with a particular army using particular equipment. What a modern US rifle company with extensive training and lavish communications can do is one thing -- what some Russian Civil War corps with not even one field telephone to its name can do is another.

My point -- Rhinobones' attempts to sneer notwithstanding -- is that allowing units to be both entrenched and standing by on reserve may not be especially realistic across the whole range of situations. As far as TOAW goes, I actually could care less about what a modern US unit can or can't do. My interest in warfare ends at about 1960 -- and look at the scenario list on the disc. How many of the units involved have anything like the capabilities of the military unit you served in?

I would argue that in most situations the units would be able to do this. WWI onwards.

You could argue that...but I would argue otherwise.

Of course, it all depends what situation you take as typical -- so I'll cheerfully take the one I'm familiar with. Day long turns, 5 km hexes, leg infantry, varying levels of training, varying levels of communications.

Okay, they're either dispersed along a 10 km (the hex they're in and one of the two hexes they can exert a zone of control over) front, or they're concentrated at some road junction pending an order to move. In the latter case, they probably can be on the road in an hour. That leaves them fifteen hours of a sixteen hour day to get to where they are wanted.

In the former case, add an hour to get the word out and three hours to physically assemble -- plus the hour to do whatever they did to get ready when they were already assembled.

So it's eleven hours of actual movement and fighting or whatever in the new position versus fifteen hours.

...

I'll grant that in this particular case the difference wouldn't suffice to justify ruling out entrenching and being in reserve status. However, if 'Rhinobones' wants to claim it, I'll cheerfully reverse my position again. There are cases where his position doesn't hold up -- and he does little to make me inclined to agree with him.

...I'll put it down as #357 on the list of things I would like to see changed in TOAW. Not especially relevant to my play style, not terribly important, and not invariably constituting an improvement. If it pops up on the next list of proposed changes, it'd elicit mild unenthusiasm from me. So what -- and when are we going to get meaningful improvements in naval warfare?

[sPzAbt653]

Isn't this why units in 'mobile' deployment get a defensive benefit over those that are 'moving'?

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: sPzAbt653

Isn't this why units in 'mobile' deployment get a defensive benefit over those that are 'moving'?

First I've heard of that. Anyway, couldn't you just select any unit that was 'moving' and change it to 'mobile' just by clicking on 'mobile'?

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
Okay, they're either dispersed along a 10 km (the hex they're in and one of the two hexes they can exert a zone of control over) front, or they're concentrated at some road junction pending an order to move. In the latter case, they probably can be on the road in an hour. That leaves them fifteen hours of a sixteen hour day to get to where they are wanted.

In the former case, add an hour to get the word out and three hours to physically assemble -- plus the hour to do whatever they did to get ready when they were already assembled.

So it's eleven hours of actual movement and fighting or whatever in the new position versus fifteen hours.

This isn't right- this movement takes place in just one round. So 2.4 hours. In other words, your former case can do it, your latter case can't.

[STIENER]

RHINOBONES

a little off topic but what were the call signs of the other 2 rhino's?? you were bones......
and out of curiosity what raank did you hold? im just interested is all.. nothing to do really with the post ...altho i am reading it with interest.

thanks
stiener

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
Okay, they're either dispersed along a 10 km (the hex they're in and one of the two hexes they can exert a zone of control over) front, or they're concentrated at some road junction pending an order to move. In the latter case, they probably can be on the road in an hour. That leaves them fifteen hours of a sixteen hour day to get to where they are wanted.

In the former case, add an hour to get the word out and three hours to physically assemble -- plus the hour to do whatever they did to get ready when they were already assembled.

So it's eleven hours of actual movement and fighting or whatever in the new position versus fifteen hours.

This isn't right- this movement takes place in just one round. So 2.4 hours. In other words, your former case can do it, your latter case can't.

...that's an interesting point. The reaction time of an unentrenched unit is going to be substantially less than that of one that is dispersed and dug in -- even if the delay doesn't eat up most of the turn.

Sort of like letting the firemen take all the firetrucks home for the weekend. Sure, they can still get to all the fires that break out on Saturday and Sunday -- difficulty is how soon they get to them.

It gets back to scale and time-period. While I'm perfectly prepared to grant that modern American infantry companies can hop on the choppers within half an hour regardless of their deployment when the call comes in, the same doesn't apply to larger organizations operating with more ponderous command and communication networks.

After all, the French in 1940 famously had no reserve available when the Germans broke through. Rhinobones et al notwithstanding, the troops already on the line were not able to promptly pull out, rush south, and block the German penetration.

[Karri]

I'd also like to know what kind of unit is in a 24/7 readiness to hop into trucks and go to the counter-attack. Especially if close to frontlines, within artillery range...as Rommel said, the best friend of infantry is spade.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Karri

I'd also like to know what kind of unit is in a 24/7 readiness to hop into trucks and go to the counter-attack. Especially if close to frontlines, within artillery range...as Rommel said, the best friend of infantry is spade.

Well, I was just looking at British deployments for I and II Corps in Flanders on 15 May 1940 (Ellis, p.47). Five divisions, three up and two back. In each division that was on the line, two brigades up and one back. A net of four brigades dug-in and on the line out of fifteen theoretically available.

While this doesn't prove all the others were standing by as reserves as opposed to being dug in somewhere, it does suggest a strong aversion to having all units committed to the line...and a lack of faith in a doctrine that would hold that units can simultaneously be in a defensive deployment and able to act as reserves.

As a rule, I don't think troops are simultaneously available to function as reserves and deployed so as to defend a section of a defensive line. They may well be deployed with an eye to defending their particular locality, but that's an entirely different matter from being spread out and holding a full length of defensive frontage, as an 'entrenched' status in OPART implies they are.

Of course, there are all sorts of half-way points that OPART can't reflect -- but I'm not convinced allowing units to be simultaneously entrenched and also on 'reserve' status would improve TOAW's fidelity to reality.

[Karri]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Well, I was just looking at British deployments for I and II Corps in Flanders on 15 May 1940 (Ellis, p.47). Five divisions, three up and two back. In each division that was on the line, two brigades up and one back. A net of four brigades dug-in and on the line out of fifteen theoretically available.

While this doesn't prove all the others were standing by as reserves as opposed to being dug in somewhere, it does suggest a strong aversion to having all units committed to the line...and a lack of faith in a doctrine that would hold that units can simultaneously be in a defensive deployment and able to act as reserves.

It's defence in depth...I would assume the other brigades were at least in some sort of defensive posture as opposed to standing ready to move.

As a rule, I don't think troops are simultaneously available to function as reserves and deployed so as to defend a section of a defensive line. They may well be deployed with an eye to defending their particular locality, but that's an entirely different matter from being spread out and holding a full length of defensive frontage, as an 'entrenched' status in OPART implies they are.

Of course, there are all sorts of half-way points that OPART can't reflect -- but I'm not convinced allowing units to be simultaneously entrenched and also on 'reserve' status would improve TOAW's fidelity to reality.

As said at least in comapny level this is the case, the units are ready to move and in well chosen spot to defend in. The only problem would probaply be with artillery, but that would depend on the scale again.

If we would then assume that the hex is overcrowded, and that all 9 untis have to just defend their 'locallity'? As a rule of thumb I'd say it's a question fo tiem and scale. For example with weekly turns it would be possible, with half week turns, well Patton did it with an entire army. Why not an unit that alrady knows where to move.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Karri

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Well, I was just looking at British deployments for I and II Corps in Flanders on 15 May 1940 (Ellis, p.47). Five divisions, three up and two back. In each division that was on the line, two brigades up and one back. A net of four brigades dug-in and on the line out of fifteen theoretically available.

While this doesn't prove all the others were standing by as reserves as opposed to being dug in somewhere, it does suggest a strong aversion to having all units committed to the line...and a lack of faith in a doctrine that would hold that units can simultaneously be in a defensive deployment and able to act as reserves.

It's defence in depth...I would assume the other brigades were at least in some sort of defensive posture as opposed to standing ready to move.

As a rule, I don't think troops are simultaneously available to function as reserves and deployed so as to defend a section of a defensive line. They may well be deployed with an eye to defending their particular locality, but that's an entirely different matter from being spread out and holding a full length of defensive frontage, as an 'entrenched' status in OPART implies they are.

Of course, there are all sorts of half-way points that OPART can't reflect -- but I'm not convinced allowing units to be simultaneously entrenched and also on 'reserve' status would improve TOAW's fidelity to reality.

As said at least in comapny level this is the case, the units are ready to move and in well chosen spot to defend in. The only problem would probaply be with artillery, but that would depend on the scale again.

If we would then assume that the hex is overcrowded, and that all 9 untis have to just defend their 'locallity'? As a rule of thumb I'd say it's a question fo tiem and scale. For example with weekly turns it would be possible, with half week turns, well Patton did it with an entire army. Why not an unit that alrady knows where to move.

I don't think so. There's no mention of these units forming a second line that the advance battalions withdrew to at any point -- nor is there any reason to think that they did. Rather, they were held ready to counter-attack German penetrations -- and that is what they did.

The discussion could go on interminably. One can always speculate as to what battalions that weren't up front were doing instead, or shift what example one considers-- as you just did -- or -- as 'Golden Delicious' did -- shift the time frame under consideration from the whole turn to the time needed to react.

For some large part of the possible combinations of time and scale, the change would not necessarily be an improvement, and in any case, it wouldn't affect the tactics I use one whit. To my mind, that's sufficient to prefer that programming energy go elsewhere. There are plenty of potential changes that unequivocally would be improvements, and that would be relevant to my style of play.

[rhinobones]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
. . . and in any case, it wouldn't affect the tactics I use one whit. To my mind, that's sufficient to prefer that programming energy go elsewhere. There are plenty of potential changes that unequivocally would be improvements, and that would be relevant to my style of play.

In summary, this is the basis of your argument.

Regards, RhinoBones

[brucekg]

OK, OK. Take it outside before I call the SP.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: rhinobones

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
. . . and in any case, it wouldn't affect the tactics I use one whit. To my mind, that's sufficient to prefer that programming energy go elsewhere. There are plenty of potential changes that unequivocally would be improvements, and that would be relevant to my style of play.

In summary, this is the basis of your argument.

Regards, RhinoBones

Lol. Even going by the bit you quote, that's a transparently inaccurate statement. It's amazing you can't see that.

The irony of it is that the bits you are seizing on are in fact there because I am attempting to acknowledge that my attitude is to some extent dependent upon my own style of play. That is to say, others may indeed feel differently, and that's okay -- they just don't have my vote.

So I'm trying to be reasonably polite -- and all you can find in that is more grist to your mill. I see in that a comment on you -- not on me.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: brucekg

OK, OK. Take it outside before I call the SP.

Kind of funny, really. I mean, it's like there's this guy who's getting all worked up about how I like flashy ties.