When we made our first estimates of the total force required for the air offensive against Axis Europe, current information indicated that the air base requirements in England exceeded the capacity of those in existence or planned. As a result, we considered providing double crews for the B-17s, B-24s, and B-29s to be based in the European Theater. In this way, we hoped to increase aircraft utilization pending construction of additional bases and the availability of a large number of B-36 type aircraft with a 4,000 mile radius of action. We anticipated that ultimately twelve groups of B-29s would be deployed in the Mediterranean basin, probably in the vicinity of Cairo. Twelve more were scheduled for Northern Ireland. The B-36s would operate from the Western Hemisphere.
In contemplating the optimum force structure for the Air Force, we naturally gave attention to the two other prime tasks levied upon us, i.e., support of ground operations, strategic defense in the Pacific, and defense of the Western Hemisphere.
Support of ground operations gave us some concern, primarily because of our fear that strategic forces would be diverted to ground support. This opened up a whole new area of problems, not the least of which was weakening the strategic offensive itself and the inevitable problem of trying to recover forces once they had been "loaned" out.
Basically, however, the problem was one of numbers and in this regard we came up with what we felt were adequate tactical air forces, so that demands upon the strategic air forces would be minimal. The Plan called for tactical air forces in both England and the Mediterranean. In the aggregate, these amounted to thirteen groups of light bombers, such as the A-20, and thirteen groups of dive bombers, along with two photo-recon squadrons, 108 observation squadrons, and nineteen transport groups. In addition, ten Pursuit groups were scheduled for England and six for Cairo. Five pursuit groups would be set up as a reserve.
In defense of the Western Hemisphere, the Plan called for bombers to cover the coastal areas of the Atlantic and to support defensive operations in the Pacific to protect our possessions in Hawaii and the Philippines against attack. We expected that those aircraft deployed in the Western Hemisphere for example would be useful in anti-submarine operations, in much the same manner as the RAF operated bomber types under Coastal Command. To meet the air requirements for the Western Hemisphere, the Plan called for 25 Bomber Groups and 32 Pursuit Groups. This included Hawaii. The Plan presumed that the major burden of defense of the Far East would be borne by the U.S. Navy relying primarily on its carriers and battleships. In the latter area, air forces could act in support of or in lieu of the fleet.
Overall Force Requirements
Overall, the number of organized combat air units recommended by AWPD-1 came to 207 groups without the B-36 type bombers, and 251 groups with them. This came to 11,853 unit equip. combat aircraft. This massive combat force was to be backed by 37,051 trainers, fora total of 61,799 operational aircraft, including 3,740 B-36s. (Twenty-one percent of the aircraft in this total force, 109 percent of the combat aircraft, would be in reserve depots. The forces were to be manned by 179,398 officers and 1,939,237 enlisted men.)
To understand the scope of AWPD-1, it must be remembered that the stated objectives required not only the production of vast quantities of aircraft but also the training of enormous numbers of personnel. The Plan called for 135,526 pilots, navigators, bombardiers, observers, and machine gunners, 862,439 technicians, 60,153 non-flying officers, and 1,106,798 non-technical, but trained, personnel. This amounted to some 2,164,916 men.
The total number of aircraft of all categories required to accomplish the objectives stipulated in AWPD-1 came to 68,416. In addition, vast numbers of replacements would be required. As mentioned earlier, 37,051 of this number were earmarked for training. Anticipated attrition called for a monthly replacement rate of some 2,133 aircraft.
In short:
10 Groups of 1,060 Medium Bombers (B-25/B-26) in ETO
20 Groups of 1,700 Heavy Bombers (B-17/B-24) in ETO
24 groups of 2,040 Very Heavy Bombers (B-29/B-32) in ETO
44 Groups of 3,740 Very LONG Range Bombers (B-36) in very edge of US; probably Maine, or Bermuda.
