A thought on bombardments

[bradfordkay]

Naval bombardments are one of the more, shall we say, controversial aspects of this game. I have heard many times the argument proposed that, aside from the "Tokyo Express" bombings of Guadalcanal, one can't find any instances of "drive by" naval bombardments.

In perusing the Churchill Centre website, I came across this paragraph from a speech the Prime Minister gave in February of '41:

"How far-reaching these resources are we can see from what happened at dawn this morning, when our Western Mediterranean Fleet, under Admiral Somerville, entered the Gulf of Genoa and bombarded in a shattering manner the naval base from which perhaps a Nazi German expedition might soon have sailed to attack General Weygand in Algeria or Tunis. It is right that the Italian people should be made to feel the sorry plight into which they have been dragged by Dictator Mussolini, and if the cannonade of Genoa, rolling along the coast, reverberating in the mountains, reached the ears of our French comrades in their grief and misery, it might cheer them with the feeling that friends-active friends-are near and that Britannia rules the waves."

I am trying to find out more about this attack, but here is at least one instance outside of the Tokyo Express where we had such an occurance. Perhaps there are several more we haven't uncovered as well.

[Gen.Hoepner]

That attack is well known among the italians.
Our waters were violated. Geona is very close to La Spezia, which during the war was our primary naval base in the Tirrenian Sea.
Damages at the city were pretty severe, considering that Genoa is built on a small strip of land of less than 2/3 km between the sea and the mountains.
Military speaking the major facilities weren't touched...but the city buildings suffered severe damages.
In witp-game terms it would have been a naval "city attack-manpower"...so to say Airfields and Port aren't almost touched

[John Lansford]

The Germans bombarded British ports with battlecruisers routinely in WWI, at least until the Dogger Bank engagement.  Besides the "Night of the Battleships" at Guadalcanal, two IJN CA's also hit Henderson Field, and IIRC destroyers running supplies down from Rabaul would shell the island before returning as well.

But, I can't think offhand of that many other instances during WWII where this was done the way bombardments are handled in the game.

[Alfred]

I stand to be corrected here by Gen.Hoepner but I thought I recalled the attack on Genoa occurred in 1940, fairly soon after Italy entered the war.  Another instance where WWII imitated WITP [:D] would be the RN attack on on the Vichy fleet in its North African ports.
 
Alfred

[ChezDaJez]

I have heard many times the argument proposed that, aside from the "Tokyo Express" bombings of Guadalcanal, one can't find any instances of "drive by" naval bombardments.

The US conducted at least two drive-by bombardments of Attu Island in the Aleutians well before eventually landing troops.

Brit and NZ naval forces bombarded Truk under Operation Inmate in 1945.

The US Navy bombarded Wotje and Taroa during the Marshall Islands raid in Feb 42.

I think those would all classify as drive-by bombardments as no troops were landed and the ships did not remain in the area.

Chez

[jumper]

Also the USN bombarded routinely Munda once they discovered, that under the palm trees is hidden airstrip..

[rtrapasso]

The US rather routinely had "drive by" bombardment missions throughout the Solomons Campaigns, and also bombarded the Home Islands (aimed at industrial targets). Also, from what i can tell, they weren't nearly as effective as the BB bombardment of Henderson Field by the IJN - probably because the USN didn't have a naval spotter with a radio sitting on a hill overlooking the target and calling in corrections as the IJN did that night.

The Japanese (from what i can tell from readings) could not afford to bombard in such a fashion due to:
1. fuel constraints
2. ammo constraints
3. gun tube constraints (just firing a couple of rounds per month for the BB gunfire practice might have been enough to stress IJ industrial output for guns/liners).

However, the IJN did a couple of bombardments of more limited success, iirc: one in Malaya, and one at Christmas Island (the Indian Ocean one).

BTW - my Uncle's DD during the Solomon's campaign (USS Charles Ausburne - Burke's flagship at the time) had pretty much burned up her guns on these kinds of bombardment/interdiction missions (as well as a couple of stiff naval encounters).

[Terminus]

ORIGINAL: Alfred

I stand to be corrected here by Gen.Hoepner but I thought I recalled the attack on Genoa occurred in 1940, fairly soon after Italy entered the war. Another instance where WWII imitated WITP [:D] would be the RN attack on on the Vichy fleet in its North African ports.

Alfred

The bombardment of Genoa (Operation "Grog") took place on the morning of February 9th, 1941, and was fired by the Renown, the Malaya and the Sheffield.

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

The US rather routinely had "drive by" bombardment missions throughout the Solomons Campaigns, and also bombarded the Home Islands (aimed at industrial targets). Also, from what i can tell, they weren't nearly as effective as the BB bombardment of Henderson Field by the IJN - probably because the USN didn't have a naval spotter with a radio sitting on a hill overlooking the target and calling in corrections as the IJN did that night.

The Japanese (from what i can tell from readings) could not afford to bombard in such a fashion due to:
1. fuel constraints
2. ammo constraints
3. gun tube constraints (just firing a couple of rounds per month for the BB gunfire practice might have been enough to stress IJ industrial output for guns/liners).

However, the IJN did a couple of bombardments of more limited success, iirc: one in Malaya, and one at Christmas Island (the Indian Ocean one).

BTW - my Uncle's DD during the Solomon's campaign (USS Charles Ausburne - Burke's flagship at the time) had pretty much burned up her guns on these kinds of bombardment/interdiction missions (as well as a couple of stiff naval encounters).

I'll have to find my sources but IIRc the Japanese also bombarded Midway returning from PH as well as Canton Island on another occasion.

Edit:

Fortress Against the Sun - p91 - (On Jan 16, 1941), a small detachment of Japanese warships shelled Samoa...

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

The US rather routinely had "drive by" bombardment missions throughout the Solomons Campaigns, and also bombarded the Home Islands (aimed at industrial targets). Also, from what i can tell, they weren't nearly as effective as the BB bombardment of Henderson Field by the IJN - probably because the USN didn't have a naval spotter with a radio sitting on a hill overlooking the target and calling in corrections as the IJN did that night.

The Japanese (from what i can tell from readings) could not afford to bombard in such a fashion due to:
1. fuel constraints
2. ammo constraints
3. gun tube constraints (just firing a couple of rounds per month for the BB gunfire practice might have been enough to stress IJ industrial output for guns/liners).

However, the IJN did a couple of bombardments of more limited success, iirc: one in Malaya, and one at Christmas Island (the Indian Ocean one).

BTW - my Uncle's DD during the Solomon's campaign (USS Charles Ausburne - Burke's flagship at the time) had pretty much burned up her guns on these kinds of bombardment/interdiction missions (as well as a couple of stiff naval encounters).

I'll have to find my sources but IIRc the Japanese also bombarded Midway returning from PH as well as Canton Island on another occasion.

Mostly with subs, iirc... i think at the time the USN thought it was DDs, but at any rate, not with BBs.

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

The US rather routinely had "drive by" bombardment missions throughout the Solomons Campaigns, and also bombarded the Home Islands (aimed at industrial targets). Also, from what i can tell, they weren't nearly as effective as the BB bombardment of Henderson Field by the IJN - probably because the USN didn't have a naval spotter with a radio sitting on a hill overlooking the target and calling in corrections as the IJN did that night.

The Japanese (from what i can tell from readings) could not afford to bombard in such a fashion due to:
1. fuel constraints
2. ammo constraints
3. gun tube constraints (just firing a couple of rounds per month for the BB gunfire practice might have been enough to stress IJ industrial output for guns/liners).

However, the IJN did a couple of bombardments of more limited success, iirc: one in Malaya, and one at Christmas Island (the Indian Ocean one).

BTW - my Uncle's DD during the Solomon's campaign (USS Charles Ausburne - Burke's flagship at the time) had pretty much burned up her guns on these kinds of bombardment/interdiction missions (as well as a couple of stiff naval encounters).

I'll have to find my sources but IIRc the Japanese also bombarded Midway returning from PH as well as Canton Island on another occasion.

Mostly with subs, iirc... i think at the time the USN thought it was DDs, but at any rate, not with BBs.

Edit posted above..

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

ORIGINAL: treespider




I'll have to find my sources but IIRc the Japanese also bombarded Midway returning from PH as well as Canton Island on another occasion.

Mostly with subs, iirc... i think at the time the USN thought it was DDs, but at any rate, not with BBs.

Edit posted above..

There were 2 DDs that shelled Midway (briefly): Ushio and Akebono - they were reportedly hit in return (although the question of damage to the DD is unclear... the Philippine Clipper apparently spotted the DDs retreating and "saw below it an intense fire on the surface of the sea, by the light of which could also be discerned the wakes of two ships".

Both DDs made Japan under their own power.

US casualties: 4 killed, 10 wounded.

EDIT: These were the 2 DDs identified in the article, however, accoridng to Combined Fleets TROM - Akebono did not participate (being repaired) - Ushio did.

So, either the TROM is incorrect and Akebono did participate (possibly being damaged), or only Ushio did (unlikely), or maybe a different DD... multiple sources quote the two DDs, however... [&:]

[rtrapasso]

The shelling of Pago Pago harbor was on 11 Jan 1942 - by a submarine.

EDIT: This according to the Official USN Chronology.

[HansBolter]

nm

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso




Mostly with subs, iirc... i think at the time the USN thought it was DDs, but at any rate, not with BBs.

Edit posted above..

There were 2 DDs that shelled Midway (briefly): Ushio and Akebono - they were reportedly hit in return (although the question of damage to the DD is unclear... the Philippine Clipper apparently spotted the DDs retreating and "saw below it an intense fire on the surface of the sea, by the light of which could also be discerned the wakes of two ships".

Both DDs made Japan under their own power.

US casualties: 4 killed, 10 wounded.

EDIT: These were the 2 DDs identified in the article, however, accoridng to Combined Fleets TROM - Akebono did not participate (being repaired) - Ushio did.

So, either the TROM is incorrect and Akebono did participate (possibly being damaged), or only Ushio did (unlikely), or maybe a different DD... multiple sources quote the two DDs, however... [&:]

Turns out it was Sazanami not Akebono according to several other sources... and no mention of damage in the Combined Fleets TROM. She was in port 3 weeks before sailing again after the mission.

EDIT: Reading further, i must take all this with a grain of salt... the same sources list Akebono in the PH Task Force... while (as above) others have her in the home islands (or bombarding Midway)... maybe she had a WITP-style teleport device?? [&:] [:'(]

[crsutton]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

The US rather routinely had "drive by" bombardment missions throughout the Solomons Campaigns, and also bombarded the Home Islands (aimed at industrial targets). Also, from what i can tell, they weren't nearly as effective as the BB bombardment of Henderson Field by the IJN - probably because the USN didn't have a naval spotter with a radio sitting on a hill overlooking the target and calling in corrections as the IJN did that night.


3. gun tube constraints (just firing a couple of rounds per month for the BB gunfire practice might have been enough to stress IJ industrial output for guns/liners).


BTW - my Uncle's DD during the Solomon's campaign (USS Charles Ausburne - Burke's flagship at the time) had pretty much burned up her guns on these kinds of bombardment/interdiction missions (as well as a couple of stiff naval encounters).

This is a good point and the best argument against the "merry go round" bombardment routine found in the game. The gun tubes just can not handle that sort of contant operation. I recall reading a memior of the USS Houston and that author stated that after a few months active service and the all major actions the Houston fought before going down, reported that the tube linings had slid a couple of inches out of the barrels and the guns could no longer shoot with any accuracy due to the wearing of the linings.

We like to use the Japanese BB runs against Henderson as an example but the IJN top brass hated the idea of using the big ships in confined waters. They knew the risks the big ships were running and it all was contrary to the grand climatic battle doctrine that they held so dear.

Other factor is simply the stress put on a large capital ship every time the guns were fired. It is a factor of design but those big guns could just rattle a ship to the bones. After the surface action with the Bismark, the HMS Rodney (not a very good ship) has to go to the states for a complete refit. The Bismark did not hurt her much but the impact of her own guns just about wrecked her-springing plates and such

Perhaps the best and easiest solution is to just heavily up the sys damage taken by all ships involved in any bombardment runs. So that a couple of bombardment runs by a BB might pile on 11 or 12 sys damage. This would not elimate bombardments which should be in the game but would bring the frequency into a more realistic range.

[Gen.Hoepner]

ORIGINAL: crsutton



Perhaps the best and easiest solution is to just heavily up the sys damage taken by all ships involved in any bombardment runs. So that a couple of bombardment runs by a BB might pile on 11 or 12 sys damage. This would not elimate bombardments which should be in the game but would bring the frequency into a more realistic range.

Yes, that sounds really a good solutions, which is good for both parts.
In my game vs. Trollelite he has being running CAs and BBs from Bombay to Karachi every other day for 6 months now...their tubes must be very hot by now[:D]

However, i agree with the crsutton's solution[8D]

[Charbroiled]

ORIGINAL: Gen.Hoepner

ORIGINAL: crsutton



Perhaps the best and easiest solution is to just heavily up the sys damage taken by all ships involved in any bombardment runs. So that a couple of bombardment runs by a BB might pile on 11 or 12 sys damage. This would not elimate bombardments which should be in the game but would bring the frequency into a more realistic range.

Yes, that sounds really a good solutions, which is good for both parts.
In my game vs. Trollelite he has being running CAs and BBs from Bombay to Karachi every other day for 6 months now...their tubes must be very hot by now[:D]

However, i agree with the crsutton's solution[8D]

I like the idea of higher sys damage. Maybe not as much as crsutton proposes, but close.

From Wikipedia: Naval Gunfire Support

Second World War
The practice reached its zenith during World War II, when the availability of man-portable radio systems and sophisticated relay networks allowed forward observers to transmit targeting information and provide almost instant accuracy reports — once troops had landed. Battleships, cruisers and destroyers would pound shore installations, sometimes for days, in the hope of reducing fortifications and attriting defending forces. Obsolete battleships unfit for combat against other ships were often used as floating gun platforms expressly for this purpose. However, given the relatively primitive nature of the fire control computers and radar of the era combined with the high velocity of naval gunfire, accuracy was poor until troops actually hit the beach and were able to radio back reports to the ship — usually after sustaining heavy casualties.

The solution was to engage in longer and longer bombardment periods — up to two weeks, in some cases— saturating target areas with fire until a lucky few shells had destroyed the intended targets. This had the unfortunate effect of "telegraphing the punch", alerting an enemy that he was about to be attacked. In the Pacific War, this mattered little, as the antagonists were usually expecting their island strongholds to be invaded at some point and had already committed whatever combat resources were available. Bombardment periods were usually shorter in the European theater, where surprise was more often valued and ships' guns were responding to the movements of mobile defenders, not whittling away at static fortifications.

[John Lansford]

The Wikipedia article referenced is, as usual for Wikipedia articles, rather biased and inaccurate.  WWII naval bombardments got longer and longer as the war dragged on not because the ships were inaccurate, but because the Japanese got better at digging and concealing their positions.  There are many instances where battleships destroyed critical positions with just a few rounds fired throughout the Pacific War.  Similarly, the Iowas found that those "primitive" analog firecontrol computers used to aim the big guns were as accurate as anything more "modern" could be developed for them.
 
The Japanese certainly appreciated the destructive ability that the USN's battleships delivered in these bombardments; it is one of the main reasons why they abandoned the "fight at the beach" type of defense in favor of a defense in depth and attrition.  They realized that no matter how well prepared their beach defenses would be, they could be destroyed by the naval gunfire the USN would bring against them.  I'm currently reading "Storm Landings" by Joseph Alexander, and he discusses how the Japanese revised their defensive plans after Tarawa and Guadalcanal to the more elaborate defenses at Pelieliu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: John Lansford

The Wikipedia article referenced is, as usual for Wikipedia articles, rather biased and inaccurate. WWII naval bombardments got longer and longer as the war dragged on not because the ships were inaccurate, but because the Japanese got better at digging and concealing their positions. There are many instances where battleships destroyed critical positions with just a few rounds fired throughout the Pacific War. Similarly, the Iowas found that those "primitive" analog firecontrol computers used to aim the big guns were as accurate as anything more "modern" could be developed for them.

The Japanese certainly appreciated the destructive ability that the USN's battleships delivered in these bombardments; it is one of the main reasons why they abandoned the "fight at the beach" type of defense in favor of a defense in depth and attrition. They realized that no matter how well prepared their beach defenses would be, they could be destroyed by the naval gunfire the USN would bring against them. I'm currently reading "Storm Landings" by Joseph Alexander, and he discusses how the Japanese revised their defensive plans after Tarawa and Guadalcanal to the more elaborate defenses at Pelieliu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

From my readings, i don't think bombardments were terribly accurate until troops got ashore and could call in naval gunfire corrections on spotted positions... certainly guns (even large guns) that were concealed well could go on for weeks and avoid naval gunfire and air attacks (witness Anzio Annie and friend...)

Gunfire could disrupt the enemy in random bombardments, causing them to withdraw temporarily to shelter, but generally left the gun positions relatively intact.