A thought on bombardments

[rockmedic109]

Shortly after the Pearl Harbor raid, an IJN sub bombarded Kahalui on Maui.  I think the target was a whale oil processing plant. 
 
I believe the DDs that bombarded Midway were originally attached to KB and detached for the bombarment.

[Charbroiled]

ORIGINAL: John Lansford

The Wikipedia article referenced is, as usual for Wikipedia articles, rather biased and inaccurate. 

LOL...true. I always take Wikipedia with a big grain of salt, but is is pretty good for quick semi-accurate info.

Here is another article from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... 93/HRE.htm

During World War II, one of the lessons learned was the need for long term, sustained, preassault bombardments, prior to conducting amphibious assaults. At the battle for Tarawa, the Navy shelled the island for 4 hours, using carrier aircraft and seventeen fire support ships.(6) When the Marines began the assault, they found that the four hours of bombardment had little effect upon the enemy defences. In preparation for the attack on Iwo Jima. Naval gunfire shelled the island for 3 days. These fires were able to destroy numerous gun positions, but three days of fire was insufficient to adequately soften enemy resistance.
By the time the war in the pacific had reached Okinawa, the need for long-term, preassault bombardment had been realized. The united States Navy began sending aircraft carriers to attack Okinawa, almost six months prior to beginning the amphibious assault. By the time the battle for Okinawa was complete, the navy had fired in excess of 700,000 rounds of 5-inch or larger munitions. On d-day alone, in the heaviest concentration of naval
gunfire ever delivered in support of landing troops, 3,800 tons of naval gunfire shells from battleships, cruisers, and
destroyers, exploded ashore. During the battle "at least one call fire ship...was assigned to each front line regiment during most of the campaign, and on occasion...each assault battalion had a destroyer on call." Naval gunfire was critical to successfully conducting amphibious assaults in the Pacific.

[John Lansford]

IIRC Anzio Annie was firing indirectly, and withdrawing into a cave while being loaded.  Hardly the type of target you'd expect naval gunfire or even airstrikes to hit accurately without someone observing where the gun was.
 
However, when the targets were visible (or revealed themselves by firing), naval gunfire was extremely effective in destroying them.  Look at Iwo Jima, when the defenders fired upon the frogmen and their supporting LCI(G)'s.  Once those hidden guns started firing, they were quickly destroyed by naval gunfire.  Same with the big 8" guns on Tarawa; the ships knew where they were and all of them were destroyed even by that short bombardment.
 

[Panther Bait]

Like rtrapasso said, the problem with bombardments was more about identifying the targets, not necessarily hitting them.  Once a CD/artillery gun fired, it could be hit or at least suppressed quickly, but pre-invasions bombardments were more like level bombing, lots of shells aimed over an area with the hope of hitting something useful.  That and the general morale effects of repeated bombardments, I suppose.  The Japanese learned to dig deep, secure positions quickly.
 
Also, the USN used reduced powder charges for the later-war invasion bombardments to limit barrel wear since the ranges were well below maximum and the HE shells did not rely on muzzle velocity as much for damage.
 
 

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: John Lansford

IIRC Anzio Annie was firing indirectly, and withdrawing into a cave while being loaded. Hardly the type of target you'd expect naval gunfire or even airstrikes to hit accurately without someone observing where the gun was.

However, when the targets were visible (or revealed themselves by firing), naval gunfire was extremely effective in destroying them. Look at Iwo Jima, when the defenders fired upon the frogmen and their supporting LCI(G)'s. Once those hidden guns started firing, they were quickly destroyed by naval gunfire. Same with the big 8" guns on Tarawa; the ships knew where they were and all of them were destroyed even by that short bombardment.

Exactly the point - concealed positions prevented their destruction... and at least at Iwo (and in Okinawa, iirc) the Japanese started firing from concealed positions that could not be spotted by naval forces easily. It wasn't until ground troops could get into position to spot them that they could be shelled and destroyed. Even after the prolonged bombardment of Iwo noted above, the Japanese forces were largely intact.

This spotting of positions eventually happened to all the IJ guns on the islands as US troops advanced and overran the various islands involved. Eventually ALL positions were seen - and destroyed.

In Italy, the guns could withdraw up the peninsula and remain a problem. It was only when someone could see the target that naval gunfire became the huge factor that is seen in the game.

[crsutton]

ORIGINAL: Panther Bait



Also, the USN used reduced powder charges for the later-war invasion bombardments to limit barrel wear since the ranges were well below maximum and the HE shells did not rely on muzzle velocity as much for damage.

I did not know this. Makes sense though. It pays to read this forum

[crsutton]

ORIGINAL: Charbroiled

ORIGINAL: Gen.Hoepner

ORIGINAL: crsutton



Perhaps the best and easiest solution is to just heavily up the sys damage taken by all ships involved in any bombardment runs. So that a couple of bombardment runs by a BB might pile on 11 or 12 sys damage. This would not elimate bombardments which should be in the game but would bring the frequency into a more realistic range.

Yes, that sounds really a good solutions, which is good for both parts.
In my game vs. Trollelite he has being running CAs and BBs from Bombay to Karachi every other day for 6 months now...their tubes must be very hot by now[:D]

However, i agree with the crsutton's solution[8D]

I like the idea of higher sys damage. Maybe not as much as crsutton proposes, but close.

From Wikipedia: Naval Gunfire Support

Second World War
The practice reached its zenith during World War II, when the availability of man-portable radio systems and sophisticated relay networks allowed forward observers to transmit targeting information and provide almost instant accuracy reports — once troops had landed. Battleships, cruisers and destroyers would pound shore installations, sometimes for days, in the hope of reducing fortifications and attriting defending forces. Obsolete battleships unfit for combat against other ships were often used as floating gun platforms expressly for this purpose. However, given the relatively primitive nature of the fire control computers and radar of the era combined with the high velocity of naval gunfire, accuracy was poor until troops actually hit the beach and were able to radio back reports to the ship — usually after sustaining heavy casualties.

The solution was to engage in longer and longer bombardment periods — up to two weeks, in some cases— saturating target areas with fire until a lucky few shells had destroyed the intended targets. This had the unfortunate effect of "telegraphing the punch", alerting an enemy that he was about to be attacked. In the Pacific War, this mattered little, as the antagonists were usually expecting their island strongholds to be invaded at some point and had already committed whatever combat resources were available. Bombardment periods were usually shorter in the European theater, where surprise was more often valued and ships' guns were responding to the movements of mobile defenders, not whittling away at static fortifications.

Unless of course you are using a Nelson class BB. They the sys damage should be somewhere near 30.[;)]

[John Lansford]

Well, to be honest about Rodney, she was already headed to the US for refit and repair when she was called up to go hunt Bismarck.  Having all 9 guns firing from the same general location on the ship couldn't have helped either.  She was also ferrying several hundred retirees to the US at the time; I bet they had an exciting story to tell people when they got to NYC.
 
Rodney was in such bad shape from firing her guns and previous condition that the Germans claimed that Bismarck had hit her several times in the final fight, that had to have been the only way she could have gotten in that condition.
 
As far as naval shore bombardment goes, the USN was hardly "firing blind" in most of their missions.  At Iwo Jima there were hundreds of targets identified from aerial and swimmer recon; even at Tarawa there were some large targets (the 8" CD guns for example) that were known targets from the start.  What the ships could see, they could hit, and what they could hit, they could destroy.  Kind of hard to see a single man spider hole, though, or a dugout for a light machine gun.

[mikemike]

After the surface action with the Bismark, the HMS Rodney (not a very good ship) has to go to the states for a complete refit. The Bismark did not hurt her much but the impact of her own guns just about wrecked her-springing plates and such

IIRC the Rodney was on its way to a refit in the States anyway when it was diverted to hunt down Bismarck. The class was subject to a massive weight-saving effort to stay below the 35,000 ton limit; as they came out 1500 ts too light, I'd assume the designers and builders went a bit too far.

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

From my readings, i don't think bombardments were terribly accurate until troops got ashore and could call in naval gunfire corrections on spotted positions... certainly guns (even large guns) that were concealed well could go on for weeks and avoid naval gunfire and air attacks (witness Anzio Annie and friend...)

AFAIK "Anzio Annie" was a 280mm K5 railway gun; as these guns had a maximum range of about 68,000 yds I'm not surprised naval gunfire didn't bother them; if you'd driven HMS Warspite on the beach her shells would still have fallen short by sixteen nautical miles. The guns hid in railway tunnels when they were not firing.

As to accuracy of naval gunfire with shoreside spotting: Lützow at least once broke up a Soviet tank attack by indirect long-range fire directed by land-based observers; this was in late 1944 when the Soviets started to overrun German positions along the Baltic shores. Generally, right up to the end of the war, Soviet attacks in gun range of the sea ground to a halt if the German defenders had naval gunfire support. The Kriegsmarine controlled the Baltic right to the capitulation; NGFS missions were only limited by lack of fuel or ammunition or by air attacks. Admiral Scheer was sunk in Kiel by a British bomb attack (I think it was the Dambusters with Tallboys); the ship was forced to go into the yard because its guns were shot out and replacement of the 280 mm barrel liners was a dockyard job. The liners of the 203 mm guns on the CA's could be replaced using shipboard resources.

[blam0]

Quite overlooked is the late 1941 bombardment of a Southern California amusment park, which destroyed the ferris wheel there.[8D]

[Mark VII]

That was by Sub if I remember correctly.

ORIGINAL: blam0

Quite overlooked is the late 1941 bombardment of a Southern California amusment park, which destroyed the ferris wheel there.[8D]

[USSAmerica]

ORIGINAL: crsutton

ORIGINAL: Panther Bait



Also, the USN used reduced powder charges for the later-war invasion bombardments to limit barrel wear since the ranges were well below maximum and the HE shells did not rely on muzzle velocity as much for damage.

I did not know this. Makes sense though. It pays to read this forum

Every day, crsutton, every day! [8D][&o]

[blam0]

ORIGINAL: Mark VII

That was by Sub if I remember correctly.

ORIGINAL: blam0

Quite overlooked is the late 1941 bombardment of a Southern California amusment park, which destroyed the ferris wheel there.[8D]

You are correct!

[bradfordkay]

I found at least one bombardment that occurred on the WITP map in WW2 and involved Renown - Sabang on the western tip of Sumatra in late '44. I found that one within a few minutes of starting this thread last night, so it seems reasonable to me that a thorough search of RN records would find  us several more. It does seem that the Royal  Navy was not averse to capital ship bombardments throughout the war.

[Terminus]

I believe the action involving the Renown you're referring to was the bombardment of Sabang on July 25th 1944. Other than that, the only bombardments I could find that the RN carried out in WitP-land was the BPF's battleships shelling targets in the Home Islands in the summer of 1945.

[bradfordkay]

July certainly doesn't sound like "late '44", does it? I'm working from memory, as the site I was using is bookmarked on my home computer, not the one I'm using at lunch...

[Terminus]

Well, that was when Renown bombarded Sabang as part of Operation Crimson.

[witpqs]

If sys damage is applied to BB's for bombardments then the same should apply to any occasion their main batteries fire.

[Terminus]

And even 1 point would be too much.

[bradfordkay]

T, I'm not arguing that your date was wrong, but pointing out how wrong I was...

Sometimes it isn't you who is the idiot! [;)]