OT: question: US military size, prewar

[Big B]

By the way Bob, I'm sure you know I wasn't stating you were being dis-ingenuous...just that the Army sources were being a might short of accurate.[:D]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

- they had rifles and machine guns and mortars and the like...

93 mortars, to be exact! [:'(]

They did have 2.5 mill bolt action rifles, 113,000 MGs and 9,000 field artillery pieces, though.

They also had a total of 329 tanks (almost all of them light tanks) and 4,000 Garand rifles.

[Chris21wen]

ORIGINAL: mlees

Thanks, all. The reason I'm asking is because, on a completely different forum-board, there is a thread where the OP postulates that the money the US currently spends on the military is better spent on domestic stuff.

In his/her mind, a large military leads to unnecessary wars. So, a small military leads to a peaceful (presumedly because your neighbors do not feel threatened) world, and no imperial ambitions.

I wished to counter with the data that, when the US was attacked in WW2, it's military was not large and threatening. (The USN and RN were in relative parity for the number one slot in size. But the US Army was relatively small.)

Pacifists and isolationalist pop up all the time but the problems occur when they come to power as the first thing they do is reduce the countries armed forces. No problem with this but you can't trust your neghbour to think the same, or in this day and age anybody, hence the need to have protection. You might not (hopefully never) need to use it but there again! I always tell them to read some history books.

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: Big B

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

- they had rifles and machine guns and mortars and the like...

93 mortars, to be exact! [:'(]

They did have 2.5 mill bolt action rifles, 113,000 MGs and 9,000 field artillery pieces, though.

They also had a total of 329 tanks (almost all of them light tanks) and 4,000 Garand rifles.

By the way Bob, I'm sure you know I wasn't stating you were being dis-ingenuous...just that the Army sources were being a might short of accurate.[:D]

Possibly, but this is in the "Official History" series written after the war.

It seems that with 113,000 machine guns (requiring at least 2 men to run them in most circumstances) that the Army wouldn't have had enough men to run just the MGs with <200,000 troops. So, yes, i am guessing those pics they would show of men drilling with broom sticks MIGHT have been propaganda.

On the other hand, having the guns in inventory doesn't mean that they were immediately available... it could be they were stuck in cosmoline, or stored in Illinois and hadn't been moved to a training camp, or some other "dumb" reason...

People sometimes forget that there was no computerized system for tracking stuff, and even recently with modern inventory and tracking methods - large amounts of supplies (many thousands of tons) have been lost/misplaced for considerable periods of time (Major Mike Solli had some comments a few months ago about this in his deployment to Kosovo in the 90's.)

[AW1Steve]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

ORIGINAL: Big B

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso



93 mortars, to be exact! [:'(]

They did have 2.5 mill bolt action rifles, 113,000 MGs and 9,000 field artillery pieces, though.

They also had a total of 329 tanks (almost all of them light tanks) and 4,000 Garand rifles.

By the way Bob, I'm sure you know I wasn't stating you were being dis-ingenuous...just that the Army sources were being a might short of accurate.[:D]

Possibly, but this is in the "Official History" series written after the war.

It seems that with 113,000 machine guns (requiring at least 2 men to run them in most circumstances) that the Army wouldn't have had enough men to run just the MGs with <200,000 troops. So, yes, i am guessing those pics they would show of men drilling with broom sticks MIGHT have been propaganda.

On the other hand, having the guns in inventory doesn't mean that they were immediately available... it could be they were stuck in cosmoline, or stored in Illinois and hadn't been moved to a training camp, or some other "dumb" reason...

People sometimes forget that there was no computerized system for tracking stuff, and even recently with modern inventory and tracking methods - large amounts of supplies (many thousands of tons) have been lost/misplaced for considerable periods of time (Major Mike Solli had some comments a few months ago about this in his deployment to Kosovo in the 90's.)

Not to nitpick , but I wonder how some of the numbers were calculated. For instance , a lot of coastal defense sites had 8" and bigger mortars, but that is a huge difference from a infantry type (81mm or 60mm portable mortar). I wonder how many of those machine guns belonged to the Air Corps ( or AAF depending ondate) , which did still belong to the Army. Do they count the 2,4, or six guns in a fighter plane , or the 10-12 guns in a B-17? Or the two to four guns on a tank?

I would be very curious about the methodolgy used. Also I wonder what percentage of those guns were truly service ready (barrels NOT worn out , or parts missing,worn or damaged).

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

ORIGINAL: Big B



By the way Bob, I'm sure you know I wasn't stating you were being dis-ingenuous...just that the Army sources were being a might short of accurate.[:D]

Possibly, but this is in the "Official History" series written after the war.

It seems that with 113,000 machine guns (requiring at least 2 men to run them in most circumstances) that the Army wouldn't have had enough men to run just the MGs with <200,000 troops. So, yes, i am guessing those pics they would show of men drilling with broom sticks MIGHT have been propaganda.

On the other hand, having the guns in inventory doesn't mean that they were immediately available... it could be they were stuck in cosmoline, or stored in Illinois and hadn't been moved to a training camp, or some other "dumb" reason...

People sometimes forget that there was no computerized system for tracking stuff, and even recently with modern inventory and tracking methods - large amounts of supplies (many thousands of tons) have been lost/misplaced for considerable periods of time (Major Mike Solli had some comments a few months ago about this in his deployment to Kosovo in the 90's.)

Not to nitpick , but I wonder how some of the numbers were calculated. For instance , a lot of coastal defense sites had 8" and bigger mortars, but that is a huge difference from a infantry type (81mm or 60mm portable mortar). I wonder how many of those machine guns belonged to the Air Corps ( or AAF depending ondate) , which did still belong to the Army. Do they count the 2,4, or six guns in a fighter plane , or the 10-12 guns in a B-17? Or the two to four guns on a tank?

I would be very curious about the methodolgy used. Also I wonder what percentage of those guns were truly service ready (barrels NOT worn out , or parts missing,worn or damaged).

Dunno - it looked like they were just pulling up inventory numbers... on the inventory doesn't necessarily mean service ready. These were "Summer 1939" numbers - chosen to be those in inventory when the war in Europe broke out.

They did mention there were ZERO aircraft cannon - so maybe MG on fighter planes, etc. were counted. But, there were only around 3000 aircraft available (most of them obsolete/obsolescent with only a "handfull of modern aircraft available") - even if each of the aircraft had 6 MGs (extremely doubtful), that only subtract around 18,000 from the number, leaving around 100,000 mgs for troops.

BTW: as for B-17s, i think there were something less than 39 available in that time frame (total of 39 delivered by March 1940).

[rtrapasso]

i will admit - the "93 mortars" number struck me as bizarre... i am wondering if this could be a typo... even 930 seems very low as there were more field artillery pieces than this.

[1275psi]

I seem to recall seeing a LIFE Magazine article from 1937? that as its centre spread had a photo of the USA's entire armoured(or mobile) forces all lined up on the one field.

Cannot have been much of an army if you can get the bulk of it on the one photo[:'(][:'(][8|]

[John Lansford]

"They did mention there were ZERO aircraft cannon - so maybe MG on fighter planes, etc. were counted."
&nbsp;
Well, until the P-39 the USAAF had no cannon on aircraft, and the 37mm wasn't exactly an air-to-air weapon anyway.&nbsp; Not until the P-38 did the USAAF mount a 20mm on a fighter, and only the P-61 after that.&nbsp; Apparently they really liked the .50 caliber weapon...

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: John Lansford

"They did mention there were ZERO aircraft cannon - so maybe MG on fighter planes, etc. were counted."

Well, until the P-39 the USAAF had no cannon on aircraft, and the 37mm wasn't exactly an air-to-air weapon anyway. Not until the P-38 did the USAAF mount a 20mm on a fighter, and only the P-61 after that. Apparently they really liked the .50 caliber weapon...

There were X and Y models of the P-38 and P-39 in the inventory in Summer 1939, at least some of which (i think) did carry aircraft cannon (according to some online articles) ... so either they excluded these aircraft for some reason, or didn't count their weapons separately in the inventory (i am guessing this later was the case)... and apparently they didn't have spares in the inventory...

[Panther Bait]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso


[There were X and Y models of the P-38 and P-39 in the inventory in Summer 1939, at least some of which (i think) did carry aircraft cannon (according to some online articles) ... so either they excluded these aircraft for some reason, or didn't count their weapons separately in the inventory (i am guessing this later was the case)... and apparently they didn't have spares in the inventory...

If they were X and Y models, i.e. experimental or developmental models, they might not have been tracked in the inventory directly, not being officially in service yet.

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: Panther Bait

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso


[There were X and Y models of the P-38 and P-39 in the inventory in Summer 1939, at least some of which (i think) did carry aircraft cannon (according to some online articles) ... so either they excluded these aircraft for some reason, or didn't count their weapons separately in the inventory (i am guessing this later was the case)... and apparently they didn't have spares in the inventory...

If they were X and Y models, i.e. experimental or developmental models, they might not have been tracked in the inventory directly, not being officially in service yet.

Maybe - it all depends on the (unknown) way the Army did its inventory in 1939...[&:]

[Mike Scholl]

The one factor this discussion fails to take into account is that the US Army KNEW that in peacetime they would be "sucking hint tit" for funds and support---but if war threatened the would be innundated with money and told to "get on with it!".&nbsp; They'd been through it before, which was why the US Army alone among the world's military maintained an "Industrial Mobilization School"&nbsp; with the sole job of preparing and updating piles of data on what industries could be rapidly co-opted for military production of what items.
&nbsp;
When the tap was "turned on"&nbsp;, the military knew what it wanted, and who could produce it, and who would sub-contract the parts.&nbsp; And unlike&nbsp;most of the rest of the world, they knew that&nbsp;the quantities would be huge.&nbsp;&nbsp; One of the reasons&nbsp;for Japan's complacency in going to war was that the US had barely produced a single merchant ship during the decade of the '30's (the Depression).&nbsp; Based on that observation, the idea that it would produce over 50,000,000 tons of them in the next 4 years seemed remote.&nbsp; Only a few Japanese officers had listened to Sun Tsu's maxim to "Know your Enemy!"..., the majority clung to myths.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;

[USSAmerica]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

The one factor this discussion fails to take into account is that the US Army KNEW that in peacetime they would be "sucking hint tit" for funds and support---but if war threatened the would be innundated with money and told to "get on with it!".  They'd been through it before, which was why the US Army alone among the world's military maintained an "Industrial Mobilization School"  with the sole job of preparing and updating piles of data on what industries could be rapidly co-opted for military production of what items.

When the tap was "turned on" , the military knew what it wanted, and who could produce it, and who would sub-contract the parts.  And unlike most of the rest of the world, they knew that the quantities would be huge.   One of the reasons for Japan's complacency in going to war was that the US had barely produced a single merchant ship during the decade of the '30's (the Depression). Based on that observation, the idea that it would produce over 50,000,000 tons of them in the next 4 years seemed remote.  Only a few Japanese officers had listened to Sun Tsu's maxim to "Know your Enemy!"..., the majority clung to myths.   

That's a fantastic bit of insight, Mike! [8D]

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

The one factor this discussion fails to take into account is that the US Army KNEW that in peacetime they would be "sucking hint tit" for funds and support---but if war threatened the would be innundated with money and told to "get on with it!". They'd been through it before, which was why the US Army alone among the world's military maintained an "Industrial Mobilization School" with the sole job of preparing and updating piles of data on what industries could be rapidly co-opted for military production of what items.

When the tap was "turned on" , the military knew what it wanted, and who could produce it, and who would sub-contract the parts. And unlike most of the rest of the world, they knew that the quantities would be huge. One of the reasons for Japan's complacency in going to war was that the US had barely produced a single merchant ship during the decade of the '30's (the Depression). Based on that observation, the idea that it would produce over 50,000,000 tons of them in the next 4 years seemed remote. Only a few Japanese officers had listened to Sun Tsu's maxim to "Know your Enemy!"..., the majority clung to myths.

i think that proves the point of the original poster - this thread was all started to disprove the claim that the US having a huge army provoked the attack on the US... your post supports the claim that it was the weakness of the US that encouraged the attack (not the strength).

[morganbj]

When I came back to the States in 1975, the tank battalion to which I was assigned only have five tanks.&nbsp; The rest of us used jeeps and trucks as tanks in field excercises.&nbsp; That's 1975.&nbsp; Big bucks in the budget.&nbsp; Lot's of troops.&nbsp; Much equipment.&nbsp; Just not were I was.
&nbsp;
I was in a unit that&nbsp;had been de-activated in Vietnam and was being reactivated in the US.&nbsp; (That in itself is an interesting way of doing things, BTW.)
&nbsp;
In the jolly green jungle&nbsp;the division&nbsp;was mostly infantry; in the US it was to have one tank-heavy brigade (2 tk 1 inf btns) and a second split brigade (2/2).&nbsp; The third brigade was to be a roundout bde of national guard.
&nbsp;
We didn't get all our tanks for over a year, so seeing troops train with broomsticks, and trucks labeled "tank" in 1940 is very possible.&nbsp; Remember, we went from a small 200,000 to something approahing a 1,500,000 in a single year.&nbsp; That's reactivated units out the wazoo!
&nbsp;
Those films are hardly propaganda.&nbsp; My father and two uncles were in the service pre-war, and all three have told me that the films weren't accurate.&nbsp; Why?&nbsp; "Broomsticks were too expensive for most units,"&nbsp;according to my uncle.&nbsp; It was said tongue in cheek, but it was backed up by first-hand knowledge.
&nbsp;
Also training wasn't all that great, either.&nbsp; Sure we were "trained," but we were using woefully outdated doctrine.&nbsp; We only got VALUABLE training once we started taking horrendous casualties early in the war.&nbsp; We adjusted our docrine some, especially to account for faster and more lethal combat,&nbsp;and were much more prepared later in the war.&nbsp; Units already deployed had little time to conduct this new training and were forced to learn as they went.&nbsp; (This was actually a pretty effective way to do it, as it turned out.)&nbsp; An example:&nbsp; We didn't have a clue about mobile, combined arms&nbsp;warfare until sometime after Kasserine.&nbsp; Another? We ddn't figure out how to use airborne troops until sometime around Normandy.&nbsp; (My uncle was a D-Day Screaming Eagle and said we never did figure it out.&nbsp; But he was a little biased since his stick&nbsp;missed the drop zone by 13 miles.)&nbsp; ANother?&nbsp; Our knowledge of the use of airpower.&nbsp; Another?&nbsp; The use of carriers in naval operations.
&nbsp;
While there were some who knew how to train troops, sailors, marines, etc.&nbsp; The service doctrines were just not modern enough to do a good job at the operational levels.&nbsp; Sure, the rifleman could shoot, the radio operator could communicate, the pilot could fly.&nbsp; Individually we were pretty well trained, but at battalion or higher, we were just cluless.&nbsp; Being a great shot is a wonderful thing, but if you're in the wrong place, you're worthless.
&nbsp;
The marines were probably the most ready of all the services.&nbsp; The others, I'm afraid, were all tied for last place.
&nbsp;
The point is that we were not ready for war in 39 or 40.&nbsp; We were not ready for war in 1941, either.&nbsp; It did take us until the second half of 42 to even come close.&nbsp; Why?&nbsp; Congress fought Rooselvelt tooth and nail to leave Europe to solve its own problems.&nbsp; Pretty shortsighted, if you ask me, but that's the truth about it.&nbsp; I'm no Roosevelt fan, but he was right.
&nbsp;

[Grell]

ORIGINAL: Terminus

When America entered the war, the US Army had 37 divisions, but exactly ONE was considered fit for operational deployment overseas.

Geez, that is unreal!


Regards,

Greg

[ilovestrategy]

What amazes me is the turn around in a couple of years. Sometimes I'll run across a chart that has the comparison from 1941 and say, like 43 or 44 and the difference is astoundng.
Can you imagine being a German private on the beach at Normandy and seeing a carpet of ships and boats or A Japanese pilot seeing a vast Armada of ships stretching to the horizon...

[Big B]

Well said.

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

The one factor this discussion fails to take into account is that the US Army KNEW that in peacetime they would be "sucking hint tit" for funds and support---but if war threatened the would be innundated with money and told to "get on with it!". They'd been through it before, which was why the US Army alone among the world's military maintained an "Industrial Mobilization School" with the sole job of preparing and updating piles of data on what industries could be rapidly co-opted for military production of what items.

When the tap was "turned on" , the military knew what it wanted, and who could produce it, and who would sub-contract the parts. And unlike most of the rest of the world, they knew that the quantities would be huge. One of the reasons for Japan's complacency in going to war was that the US had barely produced a single merchant ship during the decade of the '30's (the Depression). Based on that observation, the idea that it would produce over 50,000,000 tons of them in the next 4 years seemed remote. Only a few Japanese officers had listened to Sun Tsu's maxim to "Know your Enemy!"..., the majority clung to myths.

i think that proves the point of the original poster - this thread was all started to disprove the claim that the US having a huge army provoked the attack on the US... your post supports the claim that it was the weakness of the US that encouraged the attack (not the strength).

[Big B]

Those films are hardly propaganda.

If Why We Fight wasn't propaganda - I don't know what is,

Main Entry:
pro•pa•gan•da
Pronunciation:
\&#716;prä-p&#601;-&#712;gan-d&#601;, &#716;pr&#333;-\
Function:
noun
Etymology:
New Latin, from Congregatio de propaganda fide Congregation for propagating the faith, organization established by Pope Gregory XV died 1623
Date:
1718
1: a concerted set of messages aimed at influencing the opinions or behavior of large numbers of people. Instead of impartially providing information, propaganda in its most basic sense presents information in order to influence its audience. The most effective propaganda is often completely truthful, but some propaganda presents facts selectively (thus lying by omission) to encourage a particular synthesis, or gives loaded messages in order to produce an emotional rather than rational response to the information presented. The desired result is a change of the cognitive narrative of the subject in the target audience.
2: the spreading of ideas, information, or rumor for the purpose of helping or injuring an institution, a cause, or a person
3: ideas, facts, or allegations spread deliberately to further one's cause or to damage an opposing cause; also : a public action having such an effect

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

The one factor this discussion fails to take into account is that the US Army KNEW that in peacetime they would be "sucking hint tit" for funds and support---but if war threatened the would be innundated with money and told to "get on with it!". They'd been through it before, which was why the US Army alone among the world's military maintained an "Industrial Mobilization School" with the sole job of preparing and updating piles of data on what industries could be rapidly co-opted for military production of what items.

When the tap was "turned on" , the military knew what it wanted, and who could produce it, and who would sub-contract the parts. And unlike most of the rest of the world, they knew that the quantities would be huge. One of the reasons for Japan's complacency in going to war was that the US had barely produced a single merchant ship during the decade of the '30's (the Depression). Based on that observation, the idea that it would produce over 50,000,000 tons of them in the next 4 years seemed remote. Only a few Japanese officers had listened to Sun Tsu's maxim to "Know your Enemy!"..., the majority clung to myths.

i think that proves the point of the original poster - this thread was all started to disprove the claim that the US having a huge army provoked the attack on the US... your post supports the claim that it was the weakness of the US that encouraged the attack (not the strength).

Not quite. It was the APPARENT weakness that they mis-read. Had they bothered to look at what was "in the pipeline" for 1919 when the First War ended, they would have been wiser. Or even at the figures for Aircraft production from 1939 to 1941, which had tripled and was exceeding that of all three Axis powers. Or the fact that of 3.5 million motor vehicles produced in the whole world in 1939, 2.5 million were produced in the US. Not realizing what such production could grow to in the event of being re-directed to military hardware was very short-sighted by the Axis.

The only "provoking" America provided (if you can call it that) was the "Two-Ocean Navy Bill" and it's supplements---which the Japanese realized meant that their 20-year Naval buildup was going to be swamped in 3 years by the US Fleet...., and their "Window of Opportunity" was closing fast.