Originally posted by Nikademus
Its hard to say for sure what the true reasons were behind Kurita's withdrawl, given that from what i've read, the man himself refused to comment about his view of things after the war.
My information about Kurita's mindset comes from the analysis of John Costello, as well as from the book "Eagle Against The Sun", and from some other battle summaries I've read. These are secondary sources, but in the case of Costello and the Eagle against the Sun author, one can safely assume that they had access to interview transcripts of Kurita, and more importantly Kurita's immediate staff (those that survived).
I've heard, in addition to the fear of heavy surface units being nearby, that he also feared an impending attack by the returning Fleet carriers as well. Odd, i've always thought.....given that a key part of the plan was to lure away the American carriers by using their own as bait. Why would not Kurita have faith that this part of the plan might not work? And if so, what does it matter if they return as long as the mission goal is achieved? One might point to the heavy and sustained air attacks he suffered on the way in. However the attacks did cease allowing him to get into the Strait come the morning
The fear of air attack is absolutely correct, and which I forgot to mention. All of my sources mention this also.
The entire battle is replete with irony in the first degree. In essence, Kurita's battlegroup's mission had been a complete success on all counts up until the time he decided to withdraw. The plan called for a Japanese heavy surface group to achieve contact with the transport group by stealth and the committment of an entire fleet of Japanese carriers as a DIVERSION precisely so Kurita could get to where he actually got. A commander looking at that plan prior to execution would assume risk of heavy surface units protecting the transport, risk of air attack from enemy carriers, or both. This was precisely what happened, and precisely these risks obtained. Kurita simply refused to believe that he had succeeded.
As for heavy surface units.....again a puzzling conclusion (if it's true) A pitched battle through heavy surface elements, even in defeat would be preferable to a slow death sitting in harbor. More importantly would be the realization that his force would never get a better shot at the transports even if heavy surface elements are in the way. I can better understand Kurita's puzzlement here though. Any commander in his position would not make the assumption that the enemy would leave their front door unguarded, but in fact, thats what Halsey did and whatever the reason (flubbed communications are often cited), he must bear the responsibility for that. It might have proven costly
But thats the benefit of not only hindsight, but being able to calmly think about things over time with no pressure or heavy weight of responsibility on one's shoulder. Kurita had none of that during the fight, was not a well man, had his flagship shot out from under him, and had previously suffered some of the most intensive air attacks yet seen in the conflict over an entire day.
So in other words, he, and his men were anything but "fresh" for the upcoming fight. Surgio Strait is often taken as an extreme indication of IJN proficiancy vis-a-vis a straight gunfight, which in my personal view is silly. It was anything but a conventional fight, the main element of the "enemy" was doing everything in it's power to avoid the fight, while at the same time brave and heroic light forces, aided by up to 300 aircraft (all told) making sporadic but nearly constant air attacks, harrassed the pursuing Japanese and forced them to manuever against them disrupting their formations and causing the Yamato in particular to take herself out of the fight to avoid torpedoes. Such conditions make it hard to conduct a gunnery practice.
The really sad part is that, even had Kurita been more agressive and stayed around, he would never have succeeded in the IJN's ultimate goal, which were the transports.
Because they had already for the most part unloaded. SHO-1 was doomed even before the Japanese arrived.
All he would have succeeded in doing is allowing Halsey enough time to close the front door with either his carriers, his heavy surface elements or both.
So was Kurita right even if for the wrong assumptions? Guess thats a matter of hindsight again. After Leyte, there would be no more opportunities, even to inflict serious damage.
Gotterdamerung in the 1st degree.
Again you are correct in that most of the Leyte landing forces had gotton ashore. Critical staff and support units were still on board, but even if Kurita had gotton into the transports and begun firing his guns against the American land forces, he probably would not have succeded in altering the course of the campaign. The victory would have been more moral than physical. It would have embarassed the US Navy, and also caused serious losses in tranports, albiet which could have been made up within a few short months.
There was really no way for the Japanese Navy to stop the US by the time of the Leyte landings. But, they could not "do nothing". It would be their last chance to even attempt to inflict losses on the USN with surface craft or carrier air (Kamikazes were just started up in the PI campaign, and became intense by Okinawa -- but the IJN was just a memory by then), and they could not stand by while the Empire crumbled. They had to make the sacrifice against impossible odds. Their conception of honor demanded it. Even knowing they would lose, they gave themselves a decent plan that had a remote chance of success against these odds. The fact that it worked is credit to them, the fact that Kurita's force was lashed by heavy attacks from a force of US Destroyers with 1/10th the firepower of Kurita's force is a credit to the elan and spirit of the US Navy.
